The security concept in Southern Africa: Prospects for the post-apartheid era. by Zacarias, Agostinho M
The Security Concept in Southern Africa: 
Prospects for the Post-Apartheid Era
A Thesis Submitted by : 
Agostinho M. Zacarias
For the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
in Economics/ International Relations
London School of Economics and Political Science
June 1996
UMI Number: U087011
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
Dissertation Publishing
UMI U087011
Published by ProQuest LLC 2014. Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author.
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
All rights reserved. This work is protected against 
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.
ProQuest LLC 
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346
F
7 S
QNV  »**ivounow
To the Memory of my father: 
Marcelino Bonifacio Zacarias 
who did not live longer 
to share this experience with me
and
to my mother Hortencia, and to 
Luisa and Jose, all of whom made immense 
sacrifices for my education.
Abstract
The thesis examines the concept of security that states and other actors in Southern 
Africa have acted upon. It argues that Southern Africa, due to its peculiar colonial 
history and apartheid, and the regions’ links with great powers, embraced the traditional 
concept of security, a concept that was unsustainable and inappropriate for its specific 
conditions. The traditional concept seeks to protect states and domestic societies from 
outside threats. This concept was inherently militaristic, nationally focused, state-centric 
and narrow in scope. The emphasis is on immediate problem-solving rather than on a 
sustained attempt to identify the underlying causes of insecurity. Its application to 
Southern Africa led to regional confrontation and produced more insecurity than 
security. Southern Africa needs a new concept which is broader and long term in its 
outlook in order to restore stability and prosperity. The new concept should essentially 
be people centred, because people are the only object of security. The new concept 
should take into account the diverse factors, military and non-military impinging on the 
security of people.
Placing people at the centre, when conceptualising security, requires focusing 
on making the environment secure rather than on the threats to and the vulnerabilities 
of the state. The environment of security is defined by the coexistence of three pillars: 
order, justice and peace. Thus the task of building security in Southern Africa should be 
orientated towards the strengthening of these pillars. In the final analysis the pillars need 
to be supported and reinforced by a political process which seeks to promote the good of 
all members of society as the final goal of all policy. This cannot be achieved without 
building legitimate states, i.e. states regarded as protectors of their citizens interests and 
strengthen social agents other than those merely around the state. The task of building a 
legitimate state and strengthening civil society then become primary steps in the process 
of building the desired security community in Southern Africa. National integration of 
different political communities within the states and regional co-operation are essential.
This implies strengthening domestic and regional institutions. While domestic 
institutions are necessary to reduce internal conflicts, regional institutions are essential 
to allow the predictability of peace in relations among states. The economic and social 
inequalities between the states and the military asymmetries, will hamper states quick 
integration, hence the building of the security community. Regional institutions will tend 
to drain the resources of the relatively richer states, even though there is a strong will to 
avoid the confrontations of the past. This thesis suggests that a security system, defined 
as a pattern of relations aimed at assuring the sharing of common values and interests, 
should be followed in the process of building security in Southern Africa.
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Introduction
In the present study, the term Southern Africa refers to the territory occupied by 
Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, 
Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. This region is largely inhabited by 
Bantu people, but it has undergone a process of occupation by Europeans since 
1495 which culminated in the formation of the present states and it has attracted the 
migration of arabes and Asians. Over the last century, this region was the scene of 
intense political, military, diplomatic and economic activity that developed it into a 
coherent system of relations.1 In addition to economic imperatives, two other 
phenomena have helped to shape the formation of the system: the struggle of the 
African peoples for emancipation and the resistance shown by the settler 
communities; and the attempt by South Africa to maintain a regional order based on 
principles of domination, exploitation and inequality. These phenomena have 
resulted in a climate of confrontation which lasted until the beginning of the 1990’s 
and its main consequence was a climate of confrontation throughout the region.
Indeed, over the last 30 years, security has eluded Southern Africa. Millions 
of people have died, been dispossessed, or forced to seek refuge in neighbouring 
countries, because of constant war, conflict, destabilisation, poverty and natural 
disasters. Social and political unrest, high levels of criminal activity and economic
]Hedley Bull believes that a system of states is formed “when two or more states have sufficient 
contact between them, and have sufficient impact on one another’s decisions”. Hedley Bull 
Anarchical Society .The Study o f Order in World Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1976), pp. 9-10; For an account of the Southern African system see Larry Bowman, “The 
Subordinate State System of Southern Africa”, International Studies Quarterly Vol. 12: 3, 1969; 
See R. T.Libby, The Politics o f the Economic Power in Southern Africa (New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 1987).
decline characterised the region over most of this period. At present, 3 out of the 10
poorest countries in the world are in Southern Africa while the remaining are
• •  2 classified as low income countries. Economic decline in the region has
accentuated the levels of poverty, social and political instability and weakened
states and their institutions. States have found it difficult to maintain law and order
and attract foreign investment to alleviate the problem of unemployment, poverty
and social disorder. They find it difficult to act as a source of security. Southern
Africa is also beset by other social problems such as environmental concerns, the
AIDS epidemic and other diseases, frequent national disasters, such as floods,
droughts and cyclones, all of which place an additional strain on the security of
people. None the less, in the last 3 decades, governments and nationalist movements
in the region, spent large sums of money acquiring and developing weapons,
training large armies and police forces in an attempt to make their states secure.
Large military expenditures, for strong defence and police forces supports the
‘realist’ conception of security in international relations, which became dominant. A
strong defence force is a symbol of national power, it allows the state to acquire
international respectability prestige and keeps the enemies at bay, argues the
‘realist’ conceeption.4 However, the evidence in Southern Africa, suggests that this
observation is not accurate and that there is a contradiction between what the
concept of security recommends and the reality it produces. Large military
2 See The World Development Report, The World Bank, 1995, pp. 162-228.
3 Statistics suggest that states in Southern Africa were spending between 6-45 % of their GNP in 
military activities, see for example, United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World 
Military Expenditure and Arms Transfer, 1989, Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 
1989.
4 See for example, Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (New York: Mac Graw Hill, 1993), 
pp. 31-149.
expenditures, in Southern Africa, far from deterring enemies, have encouraged 
confrontation and led to destruction, accentuated poverty, the rise of crime, the 
proliferation of illegal light weapons, the mining of territory - in short insecurity in 
the region. The situation of Southern Africa, in the last 30 years, thus forces a re­
examination of the concept of security, its objects and its ends, if social and political 
stability, economic prosperity and development are to be turned into a reality . 
However, in order to re-examine the concept of security, it is necessary to consider 
the question of what is security.
What is Security?
Security studies is a western post-World War II concept, that emerged in 
response to the needs and conditions of western states and the ideological division 
of the world. Its main concern was to avoid the damages that western states had 
inflicted upon each other and to protect liberal democratic values and the way of life 
they represented from competing ideologies. The historic epoch and circumstances 
in which security studies emerged has contributed to the underdevelopment, and the 
narrowness of the concept of security. In International Relations, the concept of 
security has always assumed the division of the world into competing sovereign 
states, a state of affairs in which anarchy, as opposed to law, guided their relations. 
Thus, the notion of raison d ’etat has always underpinned the concept of security. 
State goals and state interests have occupied the agenda of security. In most post- 
World War II literature, the term security has often been interchanged with the term 
of defence, reinforcing its military character. Those who argued for the broadening
3
of the agenda and talked about the security of ‘human collectivities’,5 or ‘societal 
security’6 implying a paradigm shift or a multiplicity of objects of security, were 
still constrained by the assumptions of the state-system approach, thus failing to 
explore the environment for security.
Security is, a concept resulting from a complex web of interactions among 
individuals, in different spheres of social life, such as the political, economic, social, 
military and environmental. This interaction is mediated by a number of structures, 
institutions and interests. It is a concept that cannot be defined in the absence of 
human beings. The essence of security whether it concerns single individuals, 
communities or states is the assurance of human beings of their ability to predict 
and to fulfil their aspirations without incurring the danger of physical damage or 
sacrificing their core values. Thus, the predictability of peace in their relations with 
other individuals is fundamental. In fact, in predictability, lies the basis of the 
distinction of the concept of security from peace, whether peace is conceived of, in
g
classical terms, as the absence of war; the absence of structural violence ; or even, a 
process of conflict management,9, or even as justice, order and harmony10. Security
5 See for example, Barry Buzan, People States and Fear: An Agenda For International Security 
Studies in the Post Cold War Era (London: Harvester, Wheatsheaf, 1991), Hereafter referred to 
as: An Agenda for International SecuritvStudies.
6 See Ole Waever, ‘Societal Security: the Concept’ in Ole Weaver, Barry Buzan, Morten Kelstrup 
and Pierre Lemaitre, Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe (London: 
MacMillan, 1993) pp. 15-40.
7 See K. Deutsch, Sydney Burrell, Robert Kann, Maurice Lee Jr. Martin Lichterman, Raymond 
E.Lindgreen, Francis L. Loewenhein and Richard W. Van Wagnen Political Community and the 
North Atllantic Area ( Princenton: Princeton University Press, 1957), p. 5.
8 This definition characterises situations such as that of apartheid South Africa in the 1960’s and 
1970s in which signs of war or physical violence in the street of South Africa were invisible yet the 
system of apartheid was founded on racial basis and cultural violence. See details in Johan Galtung 
“Violence, Peace and Peace Research”, Journal o f Peace Research, Vol.6:3 , pp. 167-191.
9 See Michael Banks, “Four Conceptions of Peace” in Dennis Sandole and Ingrid Sandole-Staroste 
(eds.) Conflict Management and Problem Solving: Interpersonal to International Applications 
(London : Pinter, 1987), pp. 258-274.
reflects the assurance that peace and the fulfilment of aspirations will not be 
disturbed either by a natural or human phenomenon. People need this assurance in 
order to predict and plan their progress and continuity of their ‘way of life’; 
communities and states11 need security also to guarantee their continuity and 
progress in their relations with others. The lack of predictability of peace in 
relations among individuals, societies and states impinge upon diverse factors 
affecting their stability. It disrupts the basis of sociability and co-operation in the 
attainment of society goals; it impedes states from maximising the potential benefits 
in their interactions and it is one of the major detractors of foreign investments. The 
lack of predictability of peace also encourages high military expenditures, which in 
addition to being a drain of resources may enhance tensions in relations. The 
search for security is thus, a fundamental component of relations between 
individuals, societies and states because it provides a measure of continuity, 
progress and the improvement of people’s and state goals.
However, security is not readily obtained, nor does it solely depend on the 
capacity of individuals, their aggregates, being states or not. As mentioned above, 
security is the outcome of multifaceted and complex relations. Since these relations 
are not static and are subject to many variations, security cannot be defined in the 
absence of its object, human beings. Contrary to Buzan who believes that the 
concept is easy to apply to things other than to human beings, security is a concept 
only applicable to human beings. As Shaw observes, “the things in question, money 
and other material goods, have only a meaning in relation to people who own
10 In this definition I deliberately exclude peace as state of mind because this may lead to war and 
confrontation which is what this study is seeking to overcome.
11 Understood as a number of individuals bound together by the national idea, See James Mayall, 
Nationalism and the International Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p.3
them.” Therefore it does not make sense “to talk of security of things as opposed
12to the security of individuals.” In fact it is a concept which depends on the 
perception of the referent, whether this is an individual, community or 
representatives of a state. In the study of international relations, the main actors 
have, for a long time, been assumed to be states, and traditionally security is 
understood as an outward looking concept, seeking to protect states, or domestic 
societies from outside threats. Because of its close attachment to the dominant 
international theory this view of security has been a subject of contestation and has 
generated a debate within the international relations discipline.
The Security Debate in International Relations
For a long time, the security debate has polarised the discipline of 
international relations. It is founded on the development of the European system of 
states. Two main strands of thought came to dominate the debate: the strand 
deriving its ideas from classical thinkers such as Machiavelli and Hobbes, termed 
realism and the strand that derived most of its ideas from thinkers such as Grotius 
and Kant, that came to be known as idealism.
13Realists centred their analysis on the state and defined security relations, 
between the members of the international system, rooted on states’ self-help and the 
pursuance of states’ particular interests, according to their capacity. Thus, security,
12 See Martin Shaw, Global Society and International Relations: Sociological Concepts and 
Political Perspectives (Cambridge: Polity Pres, 1994), p. 91
13 These theorists derive their conception of International Relations from scholars such as E.H. Carr, 
and Hans Morgenthau. Classical texts are E.H. Carr, The Twenty Years Crisis 1919-1939 (London: 
Macmillan, 1946); and Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, op. cit., quote n-4.
for the realist strand has become synonymous with power, and in many instances, 
military power to enable them to deal with external threats they face. It assumes the 
internal cohesion of states to act as a single locus of power. States existed to 
maximise their power and security was derived from this power.14 The implication 
was that absolute power would lead to absolute security. However, this view of 
security, failed to provide security to all. Instead, it has promoted a zero-sum 
conception of security. Pushed to its extreme, the implication of this conception is 
that the absolute security of one member of the system implies absolute insecurity 
for all the other members. For realists, security for all in the international system 
can only be assured through the balance-of-power, that is to say a condition of 
equal power for all members of the system that would avoid mutual overthrowing.15 
The balance of power would assure the protection of weak states and the 
independence of all members of the system, by assuring that power is equally 
distributed in the system. However, as we shall see later, the idea of the balance-of- 
power failed to work in a system which rests on unequal power relations between 
members. The idea of balance-of-power did not provide for satisfactory 
mechanisms for power redistribution within the system. None the less because of 
the fears spawned by the two World Wars and the simplicity of the realist argument, 
its conception of security became dominant and known as the traditional 
conception of security.
At the other end of the spectrum is the alternative view expressed by 
idealists. Although they agreed with realist on the centrality of the state for the 
provision of security, they rejected the idea that power was synonymous with
14 See for example, E. H. Carr, The Twenty Years Crisis, op. cit., pp. 102-140.
15 See Hans Morgentahu, Politics Among Nations, op. cit., pp. 187-240.
security. They argued that the accumulation of power was a self-fulfilling exercise 
and instead of leading to international security, led to war. Realist strategies, such 
as the balance of power or nuclear deterrence, rather than assuring security led 
states to the ‘balance-of-terror’ assuring mutual destruction and insecurity. Idealists 
believed that security in the international system was possible to attain if states 
reduced their differences by adopting common constitutional principles; adhering to 
international law and conventions regulating the behaviour of states and disarming 
the world. This would restrain the indiscriminate use of power and the possibility of 
war. Idealists placed an emphasis on institutions, such as the League of Nations 
and the United Nations, to promote collective security and the objectives of peace. 
Thus, in the post World War II period, they saw peace research as an alternative 
capable of providing an answer in the search for a more secure world.16 However, 
both the realist and idealist focused on one issue, war, which tended to produce a 
fragmented view of security dominated by military power.
The realist conception of security was found to be problematic by many
authors. One problematic element, was the “security dilemma” identified by John
Herz in 1959.17 He argued that the mere fact states pursue their own security,
regardless of their intentions, increases the insecurity of other states. The security
dilemma appears to be a permanent feature of a system of states which was
18replicated as the system expanded to other geographical regions. This fact raises a 
fundamental question on the nature of relations among various actors participating
16 See B. Buzan, An Agenda for International Security Studies,op. cit. p.3.
17 See John Herz, International Politics in the Atomic Age (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1959).
18 See Adam Watson and Hedley Bull (eds.) The Expansion o f International Society ( Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1990).
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in the domestic and international spheres of social life especially the position of the 
weak members. In other words, are individuals, communities and states capable of 
relating to each other in a way which leads to security of all? or will they always be 
interlocked into the ‘security dilemma’ ?
The fundamental challenge raised by the question of security is how to 
assure the security of all without jeopardising the security of any. This challenge 
assumes particular importance, due to the inequality of power and the lack of an 
overall authority in the international system to act as a source of order, justice and 
common good for all.
Security and the Third World
The question of assuring the security of all raises special challenges in the 
Third World where states, in addition to problems derived from the security 
dilemma, are plagued with political, social, economic and military problems that 
weaken their domestic cohesion. The lack of internal social cohesion makes the 
‘realist’ conception of security difficult to apply. In fact the concept of security that 
most states in the Third World acted upon is a product of their colonial history 
rather than their own specific conditions. Most of these states, as I will argue 
further, are a result of the evolution of the international system. They are junior 
members of this system having only been established over three decades ago. 
Despite their weak position in the spectrum of power and their accentuated 
domestic problems, Third World states have tended to act, behave like and look at 
security in the same way it is looked ait in by those in the West, i.e. the First World.
9
However, this has not resulted in their security. Thus, the situation of the Third 
World deserves special consideration within the security debate particularly with 
regard to the question whether the traditional conception of security is or is not 
applicable for their conditions.
The incidence of violent conflict in the Third World in the 1970’s and 
1980’s generated an interest among international relations scholars searching for 
answers to the problems of instability, conflict, war and insecurity. However, most 
of the writings about the security of the Third World were very much influenced by 
the Cold War context and tended to see security within the context of superpower 
competition for power in strategic regions.19 Thus security problems in the Third 
World were primarily seen from the point of view of American and Soviet interests.
A number of scholars concentrated on domestic instability attributed to inter-ethnic
20rivalry or religious factions, while others focused more on empirical work, but
made little effort to understand security in the Third World from the conceptual
21point of view. There were, however a few exceptions. Barry Buzan’s work, 
People States and Fear, set the stage for future discussion.
Buzan argued that, to be useful, the concept of security needed to be 
considered on three levels, the individual, the state (national) and international 
system. In the international system security is primarily about the “collectivities” of 
human beings organised in sovereign territorial states and the anarchical structure of 
the international system can lead to a stable security regime provided that states are
19 See for example, Robert Litwak and Samuel Wells Jr. (eds) Super Powers Competition and the
Third World (Cambridge, Massachussets: Ballinger, 1988)
20 Ibid.; see also Bruce Arlinghaus (ed) African Security Issues: Sovereignty, Stability and Solidarity 
(Colorado, Boulder: Westview Press, 1984)
21 Ibid
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strong. Strong states are those with strong socio-political cohesion - the ideal type 
are nation states such as Japan and Denmark.22 The security of human collectivities 
is affected by factors in five major sectors: military, political, economic, social and 
environmental. Buzan asserted that in international relations, the security of the 
state, or the concept of national security, was the most important because it tended 
to organise the other two levels.
Building on Buzan’s work, in the 1980s an increasing number of studies 
began to focus on the inadequacies of the traditional concept of security. In fact a 
number of scholars interested in security of Third World states tended to ask the 
same question : Can security in the Third World be understood as having the same 
meaning as in the Developed World24? Caroline Thomas argued that “security in 
the context of the Third World does not simply refer to the military dimension as is 
often assumed in Western discussions of the concept, but to the whole dimension of
25states existence which are already taken care of in the more developed states”.' 
This argument was echoed by Azar and Moon who noted that “defining the concept 
of national security in terms of physical protection of nation-states from external 
military threats is not only narrow but also misleading”. The threats facing the Third 
World are diverse and complex, so are the dimensions and content of national
B. Buzan, An Agenda for Intenational Security Studies, op. cit., p. 19
23 Ibid., p. 1
24 See for example, Caroline Thomas, In Search o f Security, The Third World and International 
Relations (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1987); Edward Azar and Chung-In Moon (eds.) National 
Security in the Third World: The Management o f Internal and External Threats ( Centre for 
International Development and Conflict Management University of Maryland, 1988); Nicole Ball, 
Security and Economy in the Third World (Princeton: Princeton Univerity Press 1988); Robert 
Litwak and Samuel Wells Jr. (eds) Super Power Competition and Security in the Third World, op. 
cit.
25 See Caroline Thomas, In Search of Security, op. cit. p.l
26 rsecurity. They observed that issues relating to legitimacy, integration and policy 
capacity are more important in the security of the Third World than physical
27power.
In a later work, Buzan argued that the concept of national security was easy
to apply to strong states, those with strong socio-political cohesion and difficult to
apply in weaker states, those with weak or no socio-political cohesion what he
termed “anarchical”. These types of states are plagued with domestic problems with
no machinery for political succession. He writes:
but as we go down the spectrum towards weaker states,
the referent object for national security becomes harder to
define and the primarily external orientation o f the 
• 28 concept gives way to an increasingly domestic agenda.
He concluded that for the Third World, the concept of national security does not 
make sense unless strong states can be created.
A strong attack on the traditional concept of security also came from socio­
economists and environmentalists. The former argued for the need to expand the 
traditional concept of security to include economics, sustainable development and 
resource politics. The latter insisted that the state system was inadequate to deal 
with the environmental challenges facing the world. Sovereignty and the national 
interest hampered common approaches to environmental security. For the Third 
World, socio-economists argued that military power was an inadequate response to
26 See Edward E. Azar and Chung-in Moon, “Rethinking Third World National Security”, in Edward 
E. Azar and Chung-In Moon (eds.) National Security in the Third World: The Management o f  
Internal and External Threats op. cit., p.l 1.
21 Ibid., p. 8.
28 See B. Buzan, “People States and Fear: The National Security Problem in the Third World” in 
Edward E. Azar and Chung-in Moon, National Security in the Third World op. cit. p. 23. Hereafter 
referred to as: “The National Security Problem in the Third World”.
domestic crises of legitimacy, failed economic development and poverty.29 The 
traditional understandings of security cannot be applied to the Third World and 
therefore the concept requires re-examination.
Security and Southern Africa
The traditional conception of security needs re-examining in Southern 
Africa, because as mentioned above, the security policies of the regional states and 
non-state actors have stimulated conflict, which was exacerbated by the East-West 
confrontation.
The end of the Cold War in the late 1980’s, encouraged new developments 
in the region. Dialogue replaced confrontation and allowed former contenders to 
reach agreements on ending many of the conflicts in the region. The conflict over 
Namibia that led South Africa and Angola to confrontation came to an end when
- i n
the New York agreements were signed. Peace settlements were reached in 
Mozambique and Angola, while dialogue in South Africa culminated in the first 
multiracial elections in May 1994. These elections marked the end of the long 
standing source of insecurity in the region, the apartheid regime. States increasingly 
spoke of co-operation even in the area of security. The drive for co-operation was 
facilitated by the ascension to power of the ANC government seen by its neighbours
29 See for example, Fantu Cheru, The Silent Revolutionin Africa: Debt, Development and Democracy 
(London: Zed, Press, 1989); A. M. Al-Mashat, National Security in the Third World (Boulder, 
Colorado: Westview Press, 1985); Mohammed Ayoob, “Security in the Third World: The Worm 
About to Turn?” International Affairs Vol 60:1, pp. 41-51; I. Rowlands, “The Security Challenges 
of the Global Environmental Change”, The Washington Quarterly Vol. 14:1, 1992, pp. 99 -114; 
Caroline Thomas, The Environment in International Relations (London: RIIA) 1992, pp. 115-120.
30 See Robert Jaster, “South Africa and Its Neighbours the Dynamics of Regional Conflict”, 
Adelphi Papers 209 (London : International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1986).
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as friendly and supporting principles of justice and equality. Since then, there have 
been developments in the region signalling the desire to increase co-operation in the
  i _
area of security whose foundations have been laid out by the SADC Treaty. The 
Declaration by the SADC Heads of States and Governments on the Treaty notes 
“that war and insecurity are the enemies of economic progress and peace and 
mutual security are critical components of the total environment for regional co­
operation and integration.”32 SADC has also taken important steps to increase co­
operation in the area of security. Its 1993 program of action recommends the 
adoption of a new approach to security which emphasises the security of people and 
other non-military dimensions of security including the creation of a forum for 
mediation and arbitration; reduction in force levels and military expenditure, the 
introduction of confidence and security- building measures and non-offensive 
defence strategies.33 In 1994, the SADC Summit of Heads of State and 
Governments approved the Creation of a Sector on Politics, Diplomacy, 
International Relations and Security, and in January 1996 an Organ for Politics, 
Defence and Security was established within SADC.
Southern African states face the challenge of curbing the insecurity 
problems which are numerous and diverse in scope. Some of these, such as the 
character of the states, are historical and inherent in the international system; and 
others such as the nature of armies, crime, economic decline are partly a result of 3 
decades of confrontation yet others are specifically related to the end of the bipolar
31 The SADC Treaty was signed in Windhoek in August 1991 by Heads of States or Governments of 
the Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe. South Africa joined formally SADC in 1995 Annex I in this study.
32 See Towards Southern Africa Development Community Declaration o f Heads o f State and 
Governments o f Southern Africa states, Windohoek, Auguist 1992, Annex I to this study.
33 See SADC Programme of Action, SADC Secretariat 1993.
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structure of the international system. The end of Cold War had a special impact on 
single party states. It encouraged the emergence of multiple actors and interests and 
changed the nature of politics in these states. Notable among these was the 
replacement of monopartyism by multipartyism which tended to exacerbate the 
politics of distribution and redistribution and polarised national politics by 
highlighting sub-national divisions.34 In South Africa the question of the devolution 
of power from central to regional authorities occupies the centre of politics. 
Equally important is the question of redistributing resources among those who 
have for a long time, been deprived by apartheid. In fact, the differences on the 
level of development between regions of the same state make redistribution and 
power devolution the centrepieces of politics in Southern Africa in the post Cold 
War era. In most instances the claims for redistribution have led to violent conflicts 
such as rioting and looting. The problem of democratisation merits special attention 
since elsewhere in Africa where monopartyism came to an end, explosive violence
35led to the collapse of state structures and disintegration of the social fabric. The 
rest of Southern Africa is characterised by weak economies overdependent on the 
West especially in terms of markets, technology, and pricing policies which affects 
their stability and often causes conflicts over the distribution of resources. Some 
survive because of external aid provided under certain conditionality which makes 
their security dependent upon extra-regional actors.
The militarisation of society from regional confrontation has had adverse 
consequences. One such consequence was to divert resources that could be used in
34 Ibid. At the time of writing there has been a call to liberalise politics in Lesotho and Swaziland.
35 This is the case of Liberia, Somalia and Zaire, see details in Marina Ottaway, “Democratization 
in Collapsed States” in I. W. Zartman (ed) Collapsed States ( London: Lynne Reiner, 1995). 
pp.221-235.
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the development. Now that most of the wars have ended the region has to deal 
with many of the legacies of militarisation to restore stability. Among these legacies 
is the disarmament of societies. A significant number of light weapons have fallen 
out of control of authorities during the period of confrontation. This heightens the 
propensity for crime in a region where the possibilities for employment are low. 
The abundance of former soldiers who are not fully integrated in social life is 
another source of instability, especially in countries such as Mozambique, Angola, 
South Africa and Namibia.
The facts described above makes the need to understand security in 
Southern Africa imperative and it is against this background that the present study 
is conducted.
This study seeks to address two questions: (i) can the traditional concept of 
security work in Southern Africa, given present conditions, and (ii) if it cannot, is 
there an alternative concept which may lead to stability and prosperity for the 
Southern African societies?
This study will argue that the traditional concept of security is inadequate 
for Southern Africa and that the broadening of the agenda to include non-military 
phenomena in the understanding of security is not sufficient. The region needs a 
different approach to security, one that is better informed about the environment for 
security. Since this environment is created through a political process, this implies, 
making it more responsive to the common good, needs and aspirations of people. 
Building security in the region requires an approach founded on philosophical 
idealism and theories pertaining to the ‘good life’. This study also argues that 
because most states in the region are faced with problems such as political
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fragmentation, poor national integration, absence of compatible values, shortage of 
economic resources, attempts at building regional security should aim at 
establishing a ‘security society’. This approach seeks to ensure that common 
principles, values and interests are shared by states and most people in the region.
The argument is structured in three parts: Part I deals with the history of the 
idea of security, the strengths and weaknesses of the various concepts. It is 
intended to show how the concept of security has historically evolved and the 
impact of these ideas on Southern Africa. Chapter 1 shows how the traditional 
conception of security has been shown to be inadequate for the European system of 
states. It notes that the Machiavellian and Hobbesian conceptions of security, 
founded on a strong sense of order, led states to the ‘security dilemma’. Although 
statesmen believed they could maintain their security and independence through the 
balance of power, they were soon proved wrong. The balance-of-power provided 
states with all sorts of excuses to wage wars against others, thus undermining 
security, while their internal affairs were constantly being disturbed by those 
seeking to understand to which side the balance was tilting and force weak states to 
form alliances with strong states. The inadequacies of the traditional conception of 
security led Kantians and the like to advocate similar constitutional principles and 
introduce the notion of collective security. The notion of collective security did not 
also work because, essentially states could not subordinate their national interest to 
the collective interest. In addition, the concept of collective security, was not always 
translated into strong alliances against a weaker aggressor. This undermined the
36very basic assumption of the concept .
36 See For example, Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, op. cit., pp. 451-461.
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The traditional concept of security was often found to protect a status quo 
rooted in domination of some sections of society by others. This fact led Marxist 
theorists to attack it. The Marxist saw in the state system a perpetuation of 
domination of a capitalist class over a proletarian majority. They proposed as an 
alternative, the creation of a world communist society founded on non-exploitation 
and on ethics of solidarity of the proletariat. They argued that only a classless 
society would eliminate wars and bring security to people. However, the methods 
envisaged to achieve this goal entailed most of what the realist understood as 
building security. Chapter 1 argues that Southern Africa through its colonial 
heritage, and the conflictual environment in which its colonisation proceded led 
actors guided by different principles, interests and ideoology to see the use of force 
as synonymous with security.
The argument that security interaction resting on the traditional concept of 
security in the region brought more instability and insecurity than security is 
followed through and developed in Chapter 2, where the dynamic of the formation 
of the Southern African security complex is discussed. It shows that the process 
which triggered the formation of the Southern African security complex pre-dates 
state-making. State boundaries had their roots in the need to protect the welfare and 
expand the wealth of the settler communities. This gave rise to the need to 
dominate the natives which in turn yielded militaristic conceptions of security. The 
security interaction that followed was rooted in clashes founded on the will of the 
settler communities and the will of natives. Confrontation became inevitable and 
militarisation was the consequence of this disagreement. The starting of the anti­
colonial armed struggle marked the beginning of a duopoly in the Southern African
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security complex, as the colonial regimes and South Africa increased economic and 
military co-operation in an attempt to offset their opposition. The situation in the 
sub-continent compelled the liberation movements to co-ordinate strategies and co­
operation in their struggle inviting more confrontation in the region.
Chapter 3 discusses the role of extra-regional powers in the formation of the 
Southern African security system. It attempts to show that the traditional concept of 
security was underpinned by extra-regional actors, who fuelled confrontation on the 
basis of their perceptions. Portugal believed that it could avoid decolonisation by 
defeating the nationalist movements thorugh force. It therefore embarked on policy 
of militarisation and hoped that NATO would support this move. The most that 
NATO could show was ambiguity, turning a blind eye on the use of its weapons in 
the Portuguese colonial wars, while Britain, due to its historical links with South 
Africa, maintained close economic, defence and security ties with South Africa. 
Britain played an important role in modernising the South African Armed Forces 
and developing its manufacturing sector. Other Western countries such as Italy, 
France and Germany helped to create the South African military complex by 
guaranteeing licences for manufacturing military hardware. The links with the West 
made South Africa claim the status of a bastion of Western interests in the region. 
These facts helped to shape the perception of nationalists and their supporters that 
the West favoured the continuation of colonial regimes and apartheid in Southern 
Africa. This perception led to more militarisation as the Soviet Union, its Warsaw 
Pact allies and China supported the liberation movements and later the so called 
‘progressive’ states. The liberation movements’ perception also helped to strengthen 
an outward looking concept of security founded on confrontation. The action of the
extra-regional powers helped to consolidate the bipolar system in the region and 
fuelled the spirit of confrontation which lasted until the end of Cold War.
Part II of this study discusses the legacies of the Southern African security 
complex, namely the weak character of states, weak character of the armies, the 
abundance of light weapons outside the control of the authorities, the large 
numbers of demobilised people, econmic deprivation, political fragmentation and 
other social factors. Chapter 4 examines how these legacies are likely to affect the 
process of building security in Southern Africa. It notes that fragile armies and 
police force will make the task of maintaining order difficult, since the armies 
themselves may be a source of conflict. Most of the armies in the region came into 
existence through the merger of former contending forces. Their stability is 
contingent upon the extent to which they will remain depoliticised and loyal to 
governments of the day. The existence of large numbers of demobilised people 
who may have an easy access to abundant light weaponry and weak economic 
performance are likely to perpetuate instability in the region while military 
asymmetries and economic inequalities encourage an adversarial approach to 
security. Chapter 5 shows how these factors make the traditional concept of security 
inadequate for Southern Africa.
Chapter 5 argues that the traditional concept cannot work because it relies 
very much on states, while states in Southern Africa are weak and are plagued with 
domestic problems that prevent them from adopting an outward looking concept of 
security. In fact understanding security as threats and vulnerability of the sates does 
not tell us much about the conditions of human beings that live in those states.
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Thus the concept of vulnerability loses its heuristic value, while what is conceived 
to be threats to the state may not be threats to people.
Chapter 6 argues for a new approach to security, one concentrating on the 
environment for security. It underlines that the environment of security has three 
pillars order, justice and peace. These virtues need to coexist in equilibrium for 
security to be ensured. To achieve this in Southern Africa will require 
concentration on the political processes, since it is the political process that ensures 
the pillars of security environment. It will also require building, consolidating and 
improving institutions that can protect principles and values underpinning the 
political process, state and non state. The openness and transparency of the political 
process is the key to the process of building security in the region.
Chapter 7 deals with the implications of adopting a new concept of security 
in Southern Africa. It recognises that security is best assured by a community of 
security in which the main variables affecting the Southern African system: power, 
fear, political fragmentation and interdependence are managed in a way to assure 
stability. The chapter argues that the process of building a security community 
requires the stabilisation of power and its use in the promotion of positive change; 
elimination or reduction of fear and political fragmentation and strengthening 
interdependence. This will require regional and domestic institutions that can 
promote common principles and values and foster the integration of national 
communities. It argues that national integration in Southern Africa cannot be 
assumed, state institutions are not functional as were European institutions in the 
aftermath of World War II; the level of interdependence among states is not 
significantly high and common values are not yet shared by most people. This
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reality and the lack of financial resources will constrain the security community 
building in the region. The task of building security compels Southern Africa to 
achieve, as a first step, a ‘security society’ which will aim at ensuring that common 
values are shared by most, that institutions are in place and the existence of more
37assets to integrate.
Finally, Chapter 8 summarises the argument and explains the main claims 
of the study as being: the inappropriateness of the traditional concept of security for 
Southern Africa; the need for a new approach founded on philosophical idealism 
and theories pertaining to the ‘good life’; the need to focus on political process as 
and to adopt the security society approach.
The study assumes that the present insecurity of Southern African states and 
the instability of their societies is partly due to the way in which security was 
conceptualised, that is to say, adopting uncritically the traditional concept, without 
examining the specific conditions of the region. By proposing a new concept of 
security founded on common principles and interests and suggesting ways in which 
the development of crises can be avoided this study hopes to contribute to the 
understanding and subsequently provide ideas that can ameliorate the conditions of 
the Southern African peoples.
37 The concept of society of states was coined by Hedley Bull, See Hedley Bull the Anarchical 
Society, op. cit., p. 13 .
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PARTI
THE IDEA OF SECURITY AND SOUTHERN AFRICA
Chapter 1 
Historical Overview of the Concept of Security
This chapter examines the historical evolution of the concept of security and 
the impact of the different conceptions on the Southern African region. It seeks to 
demonstrate that the traditional concept of security has been found inadequate since 
the seventeenth century. A reaction to these inadequacies gave rise to two other 
schools of thought: The Liberal and the Marxist. This chapter seeks also to 
demonstrate that conceptions of security related to realist thinking dominated 
Southern Africa for historical reasons. The need to respond to crises and security 
concerns of the colonial powers led to practices that increasingly equated security 
with power. The chapter is divided into 4 sections. The first section discusses the 
Realist school; the second and third deal with the Liberal and the Marxist 
respectively, while the fourth examines the impact of these ideas on Southern 
Africa.
The writings on security can be grouped into three main schools: the Realist, 
the Liberal and the Marxist. The Realist school dominates the literature on security 
and is best represented by classic writers such as Thucydides, Machiavelli and 
Hobbes. These have influenced recent writers such as Carr, Morgenthau and Buzan 
and the whole generation of scholars of strategic studies. The realist school believes 
in the centrality of power in the maintenance of security and the state as its main 
source. The Liberal School is less homogeneous that the Realist since it includes
writer who acknowledge the role of power and those who do not. The classic 
writers of the Liberal School include Grotius, Rousseau and Kant who subsequently 
influenced a number of writers such as Woodrow Wilson and other contemporary 
actors. They share one common assumption, that security is best assured by 
regulating relations among states and creating institutions that can police the 
international behaviour of states and promote common goals. Finally, the Marxist 
School, represented by the writing of Marx Engels and Lenin proposes a classless 
society and an international solidarity of the proletariat as a way of achieving global 
security.
The Realist School
There are differences between earlier writings and most recent writings of 
this school. Early writers such as Machiavelli and Hobbes focus on the domestic 
security, while most recent writings are on inter-state security. This is because at the 
time of their writing the state system had not yet been crystallised, and domestic 
order was a major problem. The exception is ancient Greece, where the two rival 
city states, Athens and Sparta seemed to constitute the first international system we 
know of.
Thucydides, in his accounts of the Peloponessian Wars, points out that what 
made war between Athens and Sparta inevitable was the rise of Athenian power 
and the fear that this caused in Sparta1. Athens’ power superiority guaranteed its
1 Thucydides, The Peloponessian Wars (Harmondsworth: Penguin Classics, 1979), pp. 402; see 
further details in Michael Doyle, “Thucydidean Realism”, Review of International Studies, July 
1990, pp. 224 -227.
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security, but it caused fears and insecurity in Sparta, so the accumulation of power 
by Sparta to match its rival was a necessary condition for Sparta’s security. 
Thucydides also shows the primacy of power in conducting international affairs in 
his account of the Athenian response to the Melians. The latter pledged for fair play 
between Athens and Sparta to avoid the state of war between these two city states 
The Athenians replied : “The Strong do what they have power to do and the weak 
accept what they have to accept”.2 It is clear, from this, that to woo away any kind 
of threats power was central and that Athenian security meant Spartan insecurity. 
Any attempt at reversing or balancing this situation led to war. For Sparta, war was 
a way to reduce its insecurity by humbling the power of Athens , while for Athens 
war was the means of maintaining its security.
Machiavelli writing in 1514 and Hobbes writing in 1651 were primarily 
concerned with questions of domestic order, that is to say, how to ensure domestic 
security. One reason for this is because they were reacting to domestic situations 
and the other is that the state system had not yet been consolidated at the time of the 
writing.
When advising the Prince of Medici on how to achieve order and stability,
Machiavelli wrote:
The main foundation o f every state,...are good laws and 
good arms; and because you cannot have good laws 
without good arms, and where there are good arms, good 
laws inevitably follow, I shall not discuss laws but give 
my attention to arms.3
2 Thucydides, The Peloponessian Wars, op. cit., p. 402
3 Nicolo Machiavelli, The Prince (Harmondsworth: Penguin Classics, 1961), p. 77.
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The above statement suggests that Machiavelli believed that power, more 
crucially, military power was vital to the survival and the security of the state. It is 
the force of arms that creates order internally. A state with strong military power 
will be more stable and more secure than a state with weak power. By implication 
power will deter external enemies from any attacks.
The centrality of power for security is also recognised by Hobbes, whose 
main writings were a reaction to the English Civil War. Hobbes argued that it was a 
part of human nature for man to struggle for power which ceases only with his 
death: “Man seeks power because it represents the means of acquiring those other 
things which make life worthwhile. It is through power alone that we can achieve a 
contented life (felicity)”.4
He believed that human nature is influenced by three main factors: 
competition which makes people disregard the rights of others for gains; diffidence 
which makes people strike against others for defence and glory which makes the 
people violate others’ liberty for the sake of reputation. The combination of these 
three factors generates a situation of complete insecurity since every man is in a 
state of war against every man. Hobbes argued that “what is missing is a common 
power to keep people in awe”. From this it follows that security within the state can 
be reached if every man can surrender his individual freedom to a Leviathan (the 
mighty power) who would define the rules for intra-societal relations and oversees 
who breach them. Hobbes drew an analogy between the state of war among 
individuals and state of war among nations, states and he observes:
4 T. Hobbes, The Leviathan ( Handsworth:Penguim Classics, 1981), p. 161.
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...Kings and persons of sovereign authority, because of 
their independency are in continual jealousies, are in the 
state and posture of gladiators; having their weapons 
pointing, and their eyes fixed on one another; that is, their 
forts garrisons and guns upon the frontiers of their 
kingdoms; and continual spies upon their neighbours.5
However, Hobbes does not believe in the need of a Leviathan at the international 
level since Kings and Sovereigns could grant international security by upholding 
the industry of their subjects and control the evil of men in a state of nature6.
Although both authors see power playing an important role in the security of 
communities, fundamental differences between Machiavelli’s and Hobbes’ 
perspective of security can be found. Machiavelli sees power as an instrument of 
policy. The state has to increase its power in order to become more secure winning 
friends to its side and subjugating enemies, through the power of swords, a line of 
argument that leads inevitably to power competition and an arms race. This is 
because each state will try to maximise its power to achieve security. From 
Machiavelli’s perspective, it follows that international security is zero-sum. Security 
of one state will mean insecurity of another state. Hobbes’ perspective however, 
sees a way out from this zero-sum perspective. It calls instead, for individuals to 
renounce freedom and power within the state or community, in order to create an 
organised form of society in which men are bound by rules defined by the 
Leviathan. It also calls for Kings and Sovereigns to establish a more secure 
international system by eliminating the state of nature in their individual states or 
communities.
5Ibid., pp. 186-188.
6Ibid.
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The idea that power was central to security also became popular among 
twentieth century writers. Carr writing in 1939, reacting to those calling for 
cosmopolitanism and harmony of interests in conducting international affairs, 
argued that these claims were utopian. They were a mere attempt to dominate by 
promoting one’s own views as though they were in the interest of all. To attain 
security, states should not concern themselves with individuals’ morality. They 
should only be driven by the morality of states which is the pursuit of national 
interest. For this the maximisation of power was fundamental for survival in the 
anarchical international system.7 Morgenthau, described international politics as a 
struggle to keep or to increase power and glory among sovereign states. He argued 
that under these circumstances the duty of each state is to take whatever action to 
protect its physical, economic and cultural identity.8 This line of argument gave rise 
to a generation of scholars known as strategists who were fundamentally concerned 
with managing power to ensure security in the system. Thus traditionally security 
has always been understood as power derived. However, if each state was 
recommended to maximise power, for its security a question that remained to be 
solved is how could this lead to the security of all.
1.1.2 The Balance of Power
The traditional response to this question was the concept of balance-of - 
power which implied a system with a self-correcting mechanism for the excess of
7 See E.H. Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919-1939, op.cit., pp. 232-234.
8 See Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, op. cit., pp. 4-18.
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power concentrated in one or more members of the system. In other words, if a state
accumulated power to the extent that it became a threat to the remaining members 
of the system, a countervailing mechanism ought to be found by the latter in the 
form of an alliance to thwart the hegemonic ambitions of this particular member. 
Defoe explains:
...No power whether friend or foe should be accorded the 
opportunity to dominate the affairs o f  the continent as 
France has recently done. Eveiy power that over-balances 
itself, makes itself a nuisance to its neighbours. Europe 
being divided into a great variety o f  different governments 
and constitutions, the safety o f  the whole consists in the 
due distribution o f  the power, so shared to every branch o f  
government that no one may be able to oppose and to 
destroy the rest. A  threat to this balance should thus be 
met by potent confederacies among the weaker powers to 
preserve and secure the tranquillity o f  the rest....9
From Thucydides accounts on the Peloponessian Wars, it becomes clear that 
the concept was used even in 1000 years B.C. Diplomatic manoeuvring, 
consolidation or splitting of alliances in inter-war and war periods, was part of the 
game to establish a more secure system and avoid a hegemonic rule in the 
prevailing bipolar system However, it was not until the post- Westphalia system of 
states that the concept was formally used as a ground to theorise the maintenance of 
international security. States such as Britain in the Treaty of Utrecht of 1712-1713, 
had also already advanced the concept as a ways of creating general order in 
Europe, but it failed to crystallise and to become widely accepted as a security 
doctrine in the European state system.10 Before Westphalia the mechanism was very
9 Daniel Defoe, Review of the State of Nation, Vol III, June 1706, pp. 261-63 ; see also Evan Luard, 
The Balance o f Power System ( London : MacMillan, 1992), p. 10.
10 Kalevi J. Holsti, Peace and War: Armed Conflicts and International Order 1645-1989 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp.73-76.
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much disturbed by religious allegiance. Protestant states of Europe would show 
allegiance to other Protestant states and would tend to constitute their alliances 
along these lines. Similarly, Catholic states would also tend to ally themselves with 
other Catholic states, thus preventing an effective balance bom out of necessity. The 
Christian States of Europe would not seek alliance of non-Christian states11, since 
the church was still regarded as the supreme authority of states. Another reason that 
prevented the functioning of the balance prior to Westphalia was the hegemony of 
Spain in 1559 over the European continent, which was not matched by any power.12
However, in the Post-Westphalia system states tended towards 
secularisation and the Spanish Power was humbled.13 The concept began to be 
popular. States no longer felt constrained by religion and other loyalties and began 
to seek short-term alliances that would best promote their interests. Britain who 
found herself, in 17th century, in wars with the Southern provinces, was allied with 
them against Louis XIV. Austria was at War with Spain between 1718 -1720 was 
her ally in 1725.
After the Napoleonic Wars of the eighteenth century, Frederick Von Gentz14 
formulated the principles that the mechanism was to rest upon, advocating order in 
conducting international affairs as opposed to the disorder that characterised most of 
the eighteenth century. He was reacting to the horrors of war caused by the 
hegemonic ambitions of France and the disorder caused by the French Revolution. 
He argued that Europe was advancing towards more perfect system in which the
11 See Evan Luard, The Balance of Power System, op. cit., p. 6.
12 Ibd.
13 Ibid., pp. 6-7
14 Frederick Von Gentz : The State of Europe Before and After French Revolution, Being an Answer, 
to L'Etat de la France a la Fin d'L'An VIII, London, 1809, pp. 258-262.
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law of nations prevailed. It was only necessary to resume the progress towards the 
perfection of the system and this would come with the restoration of equilibrium,15 
that is to say, with the balance-of power.
In the historic Congress of Vienna of June 1815, he presented the ideas that 
were to become the principles under which the security of states was to be achieved 
through the balance of power.16 Gentz idealised a system in which there would not 
be a place for abuse of power by a preponderating state thus guaranteeing that the 
equality of power would be the principal basis of conduct of the system.17
He argued that no single power should predominate in the system, that is to 
say, become so powerful as to coerce all the rest put together. Gentz believed that 
any member disrupting the system should be coerced, not only by the collective 
threat of the remaining members but by any majority of them. A state that sought to 
increase its power to defy the union, should be treated as a common enemy. He 
further recommended a constant alertness and readiness to intervene at an early 
stage to defend a state under attack.18
Gentz saw the states of Europe as forming one single system whose stability 
could be preserved by the doctrine of the balance-of-power. For the balance to 
become effective it would need a dedication of all members of the system and the 
will to curb injustice. Force was still the preponderant element that would legitimate 
pre-emptive attacks that would make sure that the system worked, though
15 Ibid., pp.65-91
16 See F. H. Hinsley, Power and the Pursuit o f Peace (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 
1963) pp. 153-186
17 Ibid., p. 196.
18 Ibid., p. 225
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consultation and concentration was the new rule that would help to preserve it as 
implied by Gentz:
...We must hear o f  no insularity systems, no absolute 
neutrality, no unconditional seclusion from any important 
transaction . The more industry and vigour is employed in 
checking the first acts o f injustice and violence the less 
frequent will be the cases in which it will be necessary to 
march forth to fight against them in the field, the more 
steadfastly they hold themselves in a state o f  preparation, 
the greater reluctance will be felt to challenge them to 
combat...19
The balance-of powers primary concern was to prevent the establishment of 
a universal empire. The concept did not disregard the role of international law. 
Instead, states thought that the mechanism should be the last preserve of 
international law. If law was respected by all members of the system there would be 
no need, for any member of the community to intervene in other states affairs. 
However, if law was breached the instrument that would preserve it was the balance 
-of-power. The balance of power took different forms. There were instances that the 
it took a form of alliance, bilateral and multilateral, voluntary and compulsory, 
defence arrangements that normally lasted for a short time. The balance was 
maintained through the intervention of individual states through diplomatic 
arrangements, economic action, let alone military action.
Compensation was the other form in which the balance was carried out. 
Compensation meant matching the increase of power in one side by the increase of 
power of the opposing side. This included the swap or seizure of territories, 
provision of trade concessions and rights to extract spoils, and the establishment of
19 Frederick Von Gentz, Fragments of the The Balance of Power System (London ,1806) pp. 105- 
106.
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spheres of influence or buffer zones. The further manner in which the balance was 
maintained was using the divide and rule method and the balance of terror aimed at 
preventing potential enemies from forming an alliance. This form can be 
encountered in the Greek state system as well as in the European state system up to 
the present era.20 With the introduction of the concept of balance-of-power, the idea 
of permanent allies yielded to the idea of permanent interests. There was only one 
thing that mattered, that was the preservation of the system. This had implications. 
The need not to destroy totally the enemy state since it would be needed for 
tomorrow's alliance. Seizure of territory, in general, began to be abandoned as a 
practise following the military victory. Assets, colonies and trading rights became 
the compensatory mechanism for the overall balance. Another implication of the 
balance of power is that bilateral wars involving two disputants became uncommon. 
Instead, wars that would normally include alliances against others became the main 
feature instead. The continent was thus in wars that involved almost all members, 
since neutrality was not wished. Therefore, the system could not protect 
independence. Never the less, war was understood as the last resort. The concept led 
to the belief that somehow war would not be necessary, since it would be deterred 
by threatening a collective action against breachers of the prevailing order.
The concept of balance-of-power helped to consolidate the state system, 
although its effectiveness in maintaining security is still questionable. The 
ambiguity of the term led to various interpretations inconsistent with the objective 
of maintaining security in Europe. It was in the name of the balance of power that
20 Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations op.cit., pp. 198-9.
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one time wars were fought and in other times peace was claimed. It was also in the 
name of the balance of power that some weak states were protected and others were 
invaded and partitioned. Thus, the principle of balance-of-power to some states 
meant not equilibrium but weighing the balance in their favour.21 The concept also 
implied that all states would know to which side the balance was tending so as to 
compensate. It also implied that the concept of power could be clearly defined. 
However, the definitions of power that one finds in the literature of international 
relations have multiple meanings and are vague. The term balance is found to have 
a multiple meaning22 and it is also unclear whether by power, the proponents of the 
concept meant military power, economic power or other forms of power.23 From 
this, it follows that states were left to interpret the concept the way they wished, 
which made it difficult to provide it with an accurate meaning.
The mechanism presupposed constant vigilance and surveillance of 
members and their activities, so as to know whether the balance was being shifted 
from one member of the system to another.24 However, constant vigilance of the 
neighbours, allies and non-allies did not prevent them from organising secretly their 
armies and wage war against other states. In this process weaker states were an easy 
target.
The system took it as a given that power could be easily measurable and 
this would be done by different members of the system. However, this was not so.
21 Inis Claude, Power in International Relations (New York: Random House, 1962), pp. 40-51.
22Ibid., pp.40-86. In this section the author discusses different concepts and meanings of the concept: 
balance-of power. Sometimes the concept is applied to mean some kind of equilibrium, some other 
times to mean a process, or to mean superiority.
23 See the different characterisation of power in Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, op.cit., 
pp. 117-133.
24 See Evan Luard, The Balance o f Power System op. cit., p. 21.
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As suggested by the Johan Von Justi writings in 1758, this measurement of power 
turned out to be subjective and instead of serving the purpose of creating security 
amongst the members of the system it ended up creating a status of insecurity since 
it could provide an inexhaustible source of justification for any state wishing to 
wage a war against another.25 Justi saw in the concept of balance of power a 
rationalisation that could be put forward by any state which wished to justify the use 
of force against another power, as he sums up in the following passage:
When a state which has grown more powerful... is 
attacked... in order to weaken it, such action is motivated 
least o f  all by the balance o f  power. This would be a war 
which is waged by the several states against a strong 
states for specific interests, and the rules o f  the balance o f  
power will only be a camouflage under which these 
interests are hidden... States like private persons are 
guided by nothing but their private interests, real or 
imaginary, and they are far from being guided by 
chimerical balance o f  power. Name one state which has 
participated in a war contrary to its interests or without a 
specific interest, only to maintain the balance o f  power.26
Although the mechanism was meant to preserve peace security and stability, 
these aims remained unachievable. Being one of the reasons the fact that war was 
always seen as a possibility, a legitimate mechanism for a state to achieve security 
in case it felt threatened by an opponent. This meant it could be started at any time 
whenever states thought it appropriate and when they had the means and the will to 
do so. The fact that the concept of balance-of-power produced a multipolar system, 
war occurred with a certain degree of frequency. The system, thus lacked an
25 J.H. Justi, Die Chiamara des Gleichgewitchs von Europa, Atloma 1758, quoted in Evan Luard: 
The Balance of Power System, op. cit., p. 15.
26 Ibid.
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instrument and a procedure for the formulation of consensus for collective action. 
The balance-of-power system rested upon the belief that security was achievable if 
all members of the system knew what the other members of the system were up to. 
In other words, the system should be in a state of equilibrium similar to the 
Newtonian equilibrium of the solar system, whereby each member of the system 
while preserving its independence would know its right place in the system. It 
implied a static equilibrium of powers, as if power was evenly distributed amongst 
the members of the system. Thus, the system denied room for progress, the driving 
force for social life. The balance of power mechanism, throughout this time, 
became synonymous with a world in which outcomes were determined by threat, 
display or use of force serving primarily the interests of stronger states. In the end 
the mechanism of balance of power did not serve the purpose of maintaining 
security.
The concept of balance-of-power influenced a generation of writings that 
came to constitute the subfield of strategic studies, which was preoccupied with the 
question of how to ensure national security. Modem strategists stressed the 
understanding of security as an outward looking concept and saw security in very 
narrow, militaristic and state centric terms which led to the underdevelopment of 
concept.27 This underdevelopment was first recognised by Buzan.28 Buzan sought to
27 See for example, Joseph Nye Jr., “The Contribution of Strategic Studies: Future Challenges” 
Adelphi Paper Series n-235 (London: IISS, 1989); Robert Jervis, “Security Regimes”, International 
Organisation, Vol. 36: 2, 1982; by die same author “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma”, 
World Politics, Vol. 30: 2, 1978, pp.167-264; Alfred Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration 
(Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1991); Michael H.H. Louw, National Security, 
(Pretoria, ISS-University of Pretoria, 1978); Richard H. Ullman, “Redefining Security”', 
International Security, Vol.8:3, 1983, pp. 129-153; Jessica Tuchman Mathews, “Redefining 
Security”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 68:2, 1989, pp.162-179.
28 Barry Buzan, An Agenda for International Security Studies, op. cit., pp.3-12.
36
understand the concept of security by analysing the logical and objective 
dimensions of security at the level of individuals, states and the system. He 
concluded that the state can be both, source and threat to the security of 
individuals.29 He also dwelt on the question of national security versus individual 
security, noting that there is no necessary harmony between the two.30 Buzan argued 
that security should not be understood narrowly; the concept of security implied 
webs of interconnection at different levels of social life, such as political, societal, 
military, economic and environmental.31 He argued for the need to treat the concept 
of security from an integrative perspective,32 a question I will return to in 
subsequent chapters.
1.2 The Liberal School of Security
Grotius, among other thinkers in the seventeenth century, believed that the 
maximisation of state power was not the key to security. Instead, he believed that 
this could be achieved by making war unlawful and creating norms that would 
regulate relations among states. He argued that there was a basis to create these 
norms because the international arena was not fully anarchical. It operated 
according to a set of norms customary to states.33 Each state had the sense of what 
was right and what was wrong. The lack of an overall sovereign did not justify
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid., p.50.
31 Ibid., p. 19.
32 Ibid., p. 363.
33 Hugo Grotius, The Laws o f War and Peace (translated by F.W. Kelsey), (London: Wildy & 
Sons, 1969), pp. 16-20.
maximisation of power for states security.34 In their relationships they were 
constrained by a set of community interests and a corpus of international law. 
Moreover, all states calculated their self-interest in terms of their own long-term 
interests such as the preservation of sovereignty and independence.35 Within the 
international community there was an understanding that the independence of 
states should be preserved and this constituted the basis upon which relations 
between states should rest.
Grotius rejected the preponderance of force as a means of achieving security 
though not totally. He believed in international law establishing norms and rules 
that would regulate the relationships of states. Like Locke, he saw the recourse to 
force as justifiable only under special circumstances. For him these are those 
conditions capable of jeopardising the interests of the entire system or society, in 
which case self-defence is legitimate. Sovereignty and the principle of non­
intervention should be the basis of conduct in interstate relations.
Another contribution to new thinking on security came from Kant. Writing 
in the eighteenth century, Kant dismissed the pessimistic realist view that there was 
no progress in history. He asserted that there was room for change in international 
relations, depending upon how much governments were prepared to put up with 
morality, or to create a space for it, since morality and war were incompatible 
inasmuch as war was responsible for the lack of progress in the international 
society. Unlike Grotius, he refused to accept Aquinas’ proposition of just war, and
34 Ibid., pp. 33-4.
35 Ibid., pp. 51-57.
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the idea that security can be achieved through legislation, as the following passage 
shows:
As far as the law that is directly applicable to states is 
concerned, no state can sit in judgement over another and 
can be no such thing as just and unjust war inasmuch as 
justice in international life is subjectively defined. In a 
state o f  nature the right to make war is the permitted 
means by which states prosecutes its rights against 
another. Thus, if  a state believes that it has been injured 
by another state, is entitled to use violence for it cannot in
36state o f  nature gain satisfaction.
He also dismissed the effectiveness of the balance-of-power mechanism. 
His proposition to end war between states and hence, achieve security was moralist, 
cosmopolitan and universalist. It lay in the creation of an international federation of 
states volkerstaat, that share the same constitutional principles, through a universal 
union of states ein alegemeiner staatenverein.37 Thus, states should renounce their 
savagery and form a civitas gentium (international federated state ) which would 
necessarily continue to grow until it embraces all the peoples of the world38
War was not an incurable evil, he argued. It derived from a selfish tendency 
and the moral wickedness of men in a state of nature, the despotic and bellicose 
character of domestic governments as well as the anarchical nature of the 
international system. While this situation prevailed, no peace could be achieved. 
There was a need for an agreement of all nations to establish an international 
federation of Republics.39 As long as humankind was separated in small units
36 I. Kant “Perpetual Peace” in Hans Reiss (ed) Kant’s Political Writings (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1970) p. 167 Hereafter referred to as : Perpetual Peace in Hans Reiss
37 Ibid., p. 107.
38 Ibid.
39 Ian Clark, The Hierarchy o f States (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 74
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named states, in a state of nature, security was unachievable, because the root cause
of insecurity was not the frequency of war but the state of nature:
... peoples who have grouped themselves into states may 
be judged in the same way as individual men living in 
state o f  nature, independent o f  external law; for they are a 
standing offence the very fact that they are neighbours.40
For Kant the answer lay in believing in morality and education of human beings and 
society so that they could be “enlightened”. Then they would automatically 
abandon savagery and enter the federation of peoples in which every state, even the 
smallest could expect to derive security and rights, not from its own power, or its 
own legal judgements but solely from this great federation.41 This federation would 
be the authority in charge of defining the rules for the coexistence of the members 
of the community through a united power and from law governed decisions. This 
was the only way that security and tranquillity of the universal society could be 
maintained.
He also rejected the idea that there was no connection between domestic and
international politics.
So long as international anarchy continued attempts at 
establishing political liberty domestically would be 
frustrated. The problem o f  solving a perfect civil 
constitution is subordinated to the problem o f  law- 
grounded external relationship with other states and 
cannot be solved unless the latter is solved42
Kant’s proposition of international security is novel in the sense that it adds 
to the Westphalian international system the need to adopt, in each state, common
40 Perpetual Peace in Hans Reiss, op. cit., p. 102.
41 Ibid., p. 96.
42 Quoted in Andrew Hurrel, “Kant and Kantian Paradigm in International Relations”, Review of 
International Studies, July 1990, p. 180.
constitutional principles, that would form a basis for international federation in 
which the rights of the citizens would be acknowledged. The international 
federation was the basis for international harmony, since any problem arising in 
individual state would be dealt with from the same basis, reducing therefore the 
risks of antagonising the nature of constitutional organisation. Kant's contribution to 
security studies is also novel in the sense that it propounds a paradigm shift from a 
state centred-approach to a people centred approach.
In the eighteenth century, Rousseau continued Locke’s theme of social 
contract. Unlike Hobbes and Kant, Rousseau thought that human beings are bom 
innocent. Greed, selfishness competition pride and the desire for glory were evils 
that human beings learnt from living in a society with others. By analogy, he also 
thought that the evils of international society were not dependent upon individual's 
human nature. They were as much a result of the anarchical nature of international 
environment which was dominated by the self-interest of the states.
At the domestic level where states had governments to regulate relations 
among nationals, the system was functional because there was a social contract 
between the rulers and the ruled. Leaders were leaders because there was a consent 
of the people to govern and governed. There was a legitimate authority providing 
protection and granting security to all citizens.43
His idea of social contract between the mlers and the mled transcends the 
state level and it is brought to bear on the international society. He denies that
43 Howard Williams, Rousseau in International Relations in Political Theory (London: Open 
University Press, 1992), p.70.
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authority, and by implication security, can be derived from force. He concludes that
conventions are the key factor to international harmony, as he explains:
Domestic and international society can function 
harmoniously if  they are founded on the t consent o f  their 
participants.44
Rousseau sees as a solution to the problem of war the establishment of an
international social contract, although he thinks that this is not achievable due to
the primacy of self-interest of states:
No state is prepared to give up the possibility o f  gaining 
individual advantage over the rest, even if  this leads to a 
more stable international environment. States are 
unfortunately inclined to put their particular wills first 
rather than pay heed to the general will.45
His idea of the international social contract was that states could accord to
general will while preserving their independence. He envisaged that all sovereign
powers of Europe could create an alliance to fight a common enemy: the war.
Decisions regarding this struggle to eliminate war, would need to be taken in an
international parliament whereby states could send representatives to discuss those
issues. Clearly, with this proposal, Rousseau aimed at a confederation of states
which would govern European affairs. These states should be subjected to law
which should treat them as equal:
if  there is any way o f  reconciling the dangerous 
contradictions between states, it is only to be found in 
such a form o f  federal government as shall unite nations 
by bonds similar to those which already unite their 
individual members and ^ place the one no less than the 
other under the authority
44 See J.J. Rousseau, “A Discourse on the Origin of Inequality”, in the Social Contract Discourses, 
translation by G.D. H. Cole, London, 1968, p. 161.
45 Howard Williams, Rousseau in International Relations in Political Theory op. cit., p.74
46Ian Clark, The Hierarchy of States, op. cit., p.74.
If this confederation would have been attainable the preservation of peace
and security would be attainable. Rousseau envisaged a confederation that would
have a power of enforcement and a right to secession in case a state disagreed with
the established order. He ends up defeated by his proposition of World government
since he thinks that the princes will not concede to it:
... all that is needed to establish the federation is the 
consent o f  the princes who, unfortunately with their 
might any proposal for its creation.47
The recurrent theme in the Liberal school is the idea of collective action, 
institutions to protect common interests and common principles underpinning these 
institutions which gave rise to the notion of collective security.
1.2.2 Collective Security
The Kantian ideas inspired younger writers in subsequent centuries, 
particularly those writing at the beginning of the twentieth century, who developed 
the concept of collective security. Collective security idea is understood as being 
“one for all and all for one”. It meant a creation of a treaty system binding its 
signatories to protect any member of the system who is a victim of aggression. 
Unlike the balance-of-power, it did not rely upon a military alliance haphazardly 
arranged, but on a permanent commitment of all members of the system bound by 
treaty obligations.
41 Ibid., p. 75.
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The idea of collective security can be traced as far back as the seventeenth 
century in the Treaty of Osnabruck.48 Article 17 provided for the defence of all and 
each by all of the contracting parties against whomsoever it may be. However, it 
was not up until the failure of the mechanism of balance of power that scholars and 
statesman, turned their attention to the concept. At the earlier part of the present 
century, inspired by the horrors of the Word War I, the doctrine of collective 
security gained its importance and popularity and culminated in the establishment 
of the League of Nations.
It was the American President Woodrow Wilson who played the most 
important role in the creation of the League. Wilson advocated the idea that 
international security could not be based on haphazard precarious and selective 
arrangement of certain states. It had to be an inclusionary system of all states. 
However, he did not dismiss the preponderance of force within the system. The 
preponderance of force was to be available to every state for defensive purposes but 
to none for aggressive purposes. Thus, small and weak states could be protected. 
The concept of collective security could be achieved if the international community 
would create an international institution capable of supervising and co-ordinating 
the policies of states in the interest of maintaining general order. Wilson understood 
that military power could not be ruled out of the system but believed that the 
international institution would decrease the frequency of use of force and eventually 
reduce it to its minimum level since the system would be composed of enlightened 
governments who understood the inconveniences of war:
48 G. Finch, The Sources of Modern International Law (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, 1937), p.64.
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...You cannot establish freedom my fellow citizens 
without force, and the only force you can substitute for an 
armed mankind is the concerted force of the combined 
action of the mankind through the instrumentality of all 
the enlightened governments of the world. This is the only 
conceivable system that you can substitute for the old 
order of things which brought the calamity of this war 
upon us...49
With the League, Wilson was proposing a system of deterrence that would 
obviate the need of fighting by the promise to fight.50 The system would be 
consolidated by highlighting morality which would then undermine the use of 
force:
My conception of the League of Nations is just this, that 
the it shall operate as the organised moral force of men 
throughout the world and that whenever or wherever 
wrong and aggression are planned or contemplated, this 
searching light of conscience will be turned upon them.
We shall now be drawn together in a combination of 
moral force that will be irresistible... It is moral force as 
much as physical that has defeated the effort to subdue the 
world.51
The Doctrine of Collective Security was called into question mainly after 
Britain and France, the strongest powers in the League, having failed to take action 
against Mussolini’s invasion of Abyssinia in 1935. Three years before the Japanese 
invasion of Manchuria largely succeeded because the rest of the world did little 
other than condemn these actions within the League and to apply insignificant 
sanctions. The rearming of Nazi Germany and the re-occupation of the Saar region
49 Quoted in Ray Baker, and E. Dodd, The Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson, War and Peace 
(New York: Harper, 1927), p.234.
5(W . ,  p. 114
51 See A. Hecksher, (ed) The Politics o f Woodrow Wilson (New York: Harper Collins, 1956), pp. 
255; see also J.B. Scott, President Wilson’s Foreign Policy (Oxford :Oxford University Press ,1918), 
p. 114
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in a clear violation of Versailles Treaty were also met with little more than verbal 
condemnations by the League.
E.H.Carr criticised the League as a Utopian dream whose founders based it 
upon the conception “that public opinion was the voice of reason and only 
reluctantly admitted the need for real sanctions”.52 However, Rosseau had already 
identified and illustrated the dilemmas of collective security with his famous fable 
of the stag hunt.53 Rousseau found the analogy between the stag hunt and the 
behaviour of states in the international system. He argued that national interest in 
inter-state relations will prevail over over collective interests and this was a liability 
for co-opration in collective security. Indeed, states will always tend to maximise 
their individual security in their relations with others. When they find themselves in 
a position of having to choose between the security of the whole community and 
their individual security. They would without any doubts, defect the rest of the 
community to protect their security interests.
Critiques to Collective Security have indicated that the League system was 
predicated on wrong assumptions: i)that the principle assumes that the military 
power of the rest of the community can overwhelm that of the potential aggressor 
or coalition of aggressors; ii) that the states that would form a coalition against the 
aggressor would have the same conception of security that are supposed to defend;
iii) that defending states under aggression is in the interest of the rest of the system
52E.H. Carr, The Twenty Years Crisis 1919-1939, op. cit, p. 34.
53 In this fable, four hunters were supposed to co-operate to catch a stag which would guarantee 
food for all four and their families. Rousseau concluded that the probability that the stag would 
be hunted through the cooperation of all was low. There was a high probability that one of the 
hunters would abandon co-operation after he had seen a rabit which he thought was sufficient for 
himiself and his family. This leads to the conclusion that satates’ self interest will predominate in 
relation to collective interests.
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iv) that all the states will be willing to subordinate their national interest to the 
common good. As Morgenthau points out the odds are against such an eventuality. 
It is highly unlikely that all these elements can converge to protect a state suffering 
from aggression.54
Morgenthau’s suspicion is confirmed by few examples within the UN 
system.There have been some cases such as, the occupation of South Lebanon by 
Israel, the South African invasion of Angola in which members of the UN system 
suffer aggression from other members despite the UN provisions according 
collective security to all its members. At the time of writing Israel occupied South 
Lebanon Only a few exceptions have attracted common military action from the 
rest of the community to repel the aggression. These exceptions are often motivated 
by the pursuit of national interests although questions pertaining to global order are 
not to be neglected, as was the case of the Gulf War.55
However strong is the criticism against collective security, it does not 
invalidate the reason why it sprang forth. Among these are the issues that cannot be 
dealt with only within the nation-state model such as the economic security in the 
face of a growing interdependent world which impose international co-operative 
efforts in the realm of trade and finance and environmental security which is a 
global concern. Approaching these issues from the national security perspective is 
conflict prone. Indeed, the nation-state model appears to be inadequate to deal with 
problems such as desertification, global warming, air pollution and the loss of
54 Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations op. cit., p.452.
55See James Mayall, “Non-intervention, Self-Determination and the New World Order”, in Ian 
Forbes and Mark Hoffinan (eds) Political Theory, International Relations and the Ethics of 
Intervention (London: Macmillan, 1993), pp. 167-176.
4 7
biodiversity, and the like, since the respect for sovereignty, and divergent interests 
within the community of states makes it difficult to have an international legislation 
for the environment.56 On the other hand, societal issues concerning human-kind 
such as economic development and refugees, that have a direct bearing on security, 
cannot be curbed within the boundaries of the nation-state, they need a transnational 
effort and collective responsibility.
Herz was among the contemporary liberal writers to recognise this need for 
collective responsibility. He recognised that in the nuclear age, the survival of 
human species may depend upon nations defining their interests in terms wider 
than those of self-interest. Herz argued that engaging in new thinking in an effort to 
define the nature of international politics is crucial for international security.57
David Mitrany advocated functionalism as a way to international security. 
Mitrany observed that philosophers such as Hume, Burke and Mill, believed that 
there was an ideal system of relations between state and society and among 
individuals, and that they had spent time searching for this ideal system. Yet, the 
society changed so fast that any attempt to fix it was prone to failure. This is 
because there was a growing complexity of highly technical and non political tasks 
facing governments, which rendered traditional political institutions obsolete and 
inadequate. This was the heart of crises, war and insecurity. He proposed the 
development of institutions, national and international in areas of activity which 
directly affected the lives of human beings, such as health, energy and transport to 
be led by technicians with no political interest, but the function of serving the
56 See for example, Caroline Thomas, The Environment and International Relations, op.cit., p. 121.
57 See John Herz, “The Rise and Demise of the Territorial State” World Politics, Vol.9:4, 1957, 
pp.473-493.
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people. Organisations such International Labour Organisation (ILO) were the ideal 
and could lead to more stability and security58 among states existed because 
development and technological advancements have created new functions that lay 
beyond the reach of national politicians.
Kenneth Booth suggests an approach to the concept of security from an 
emancipatory angle. He argues that emancipation should be given precedence over 
power and order, since power and order are at someone’s else expense. The idea of 
maximising power to achieve absolute security implies the absolute impotence of 
all others. He emphasises the Kantian idea people should be treated as ends not 
means and states should be treated as means not ends. His proposition is that the 
security theory should encapsulate the idea of community, since in community 
building we are concerned in breaking down the distinctions between in-groups and 
out-groups. This process of community development should be realised hand in 
hand with power diffusion and the transformation of states into a global mesh of 
norms and rules, decision making structures, complex economic interdependence, 
non-territorial and territorial communities and overlapping identity patterns. He 
suggests that we should move beyond Bull's anarchical society to an anarchical 
global community of communities.59
The Liberal School, has argued for the need to liberate security from the 
state monopoly and has attempted to redefine the very notion of “political
58 See for instance, David Mitrany A Working Peace System, London,The Royal Institute of 
International Affairs, 1943; see also David Mitrany, “Political Theory of New Society” in A J  
Groom and Paul Taylor, Functionalism: Theory and Practice in International Relations (London: 
Univerity Press, 1975), pp. 25-37.
59 Kenneth Booth, Security In Anarchy.Utopian Realism in Theory and Practise, An Inaugural 
Lecture, The University College of Wales Paper, May 1993, p. 14.
4 9
community” in view of the problems that escaped the scrutiny of the narrowly state 
centric and power-political focus. It sought to formulate the concept based on 
moral transformation of society. For Rousseau moral values should change the 
depravity of man gained in society, and for Grotius and Kant, moral values would 
help to create a more stable society free of war. Kant went far in associating the 
reasons of war with the nature of the international system. It was the system of state 
that was the main source of insecurity, because it allowed higher degree of 
independent action, yet it lacked mechanisms to curb moral wickedness. 
Universalism and education were key for the creation of a more secure system in 
which there will not be a need to resort to war.
The criticism faced by this school is that it based its assumptions on 
metaphysical aspirations far from the real world. In this world states had to 
articulate their actions and to envisage their relations with others. In the writings of 
both authors in the pre-state era and the post Westphalia era, the security debate 
seemed to revolve around two different ideas. One was the realist proposition that 
argued that the state-system and power are the main sources of international 
security; the other, the Kantian proposition which defended the idea that insecurity 
was inherent and pervasive in the state system. However, both Grotius and 
Rousseau, agreed with Kant on one point namely that that there is room for change 
and that education, international law and co-operation are the sources for change. 
Whereas Utopians see as a common enemy war which is immoral, most realists 
especially those of seventeenth and eighteenth centuries see as their main enemy the
rise of hegemonic power. Thus, for strong states, military power became 
synonymous with security.
The Marxist School
Marx did not write specifically about security, but his ideas have serious 
implications for it. Marx concentrated on economic relations and his writings are a 
reaction to the prevailing order in the nineteenth century which he found to be 
unjust, oppressive and founded on exploitation. Exploitation was by one section of 
the society, the capitalist who owned the means of production, of the rest, i.e. the 
proletariat which owned nothing but its labour force. He argued that social and 
political relations -national and international- are conditioned by changes in 
material productive relations. Marx understood production as a process of a 
appropriation of nature.60 Different appropriation of the nature would tend to create 
different conflicts. The prevailing order was a result of the capitalist mode of 
production. As in the past history, the prevailing political and social relations 
epitomised a class struggle between the oppressors and oppressed. Indeed history 
has been nothing more but the struggle between oppressors and oppressed: the 
slave-masters and slaves, the patricians and plebeians, the barons and serfs, the 
guildmasters and journeymen. Marx recognised the superiority of the capitalist 
mode of production in relations to previous modus of production such as feudalism. 
Capitalism created wealth , it brought together a world society through the
60 See K. Marx, The Critique of Political Economy -The 1857 Introduction, Grundrisse Foundation 
(London: Penguim Books in Association with New Left Review, 1973), p.87.
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expansion of trade and markets and shaped a global culture. However, capitalism
was fUll of contradictions. It tended to overproduce, it created high levels of
unemployment, and it alienated the working class, the creator of wealth, and the
wealth was unevenly distributed. Capitalism was global force creating a global
market, strengthening the division of societies into classes. The exploitation of
people was facilitated by the state which was an expression of the dominant
capitalist class. These were the reasons behind insecurity, conflict and war. Marx
believed that conflict and war will prevail as long as the capitalist mode of
production continues to exist. Peace and security could only be achieved through
an international solidarity of the proletariat to overthrow the capitalist mode of
production and create a new society.61 As he explains:
... For us the issue cannot be the alteration of private 
property but only its annihilation, not the smoothing over 
of a class antagonisms but the abolition of classes, not the 
improvement of existing society but the foundation of a 
new one...62
Building on Marx, Lenin noted that there was a growing imperialism, an 
economic imperialism which expressed itself through the concentration of 
production and creation of monopolies; fusion of banking and industrial capital 
which created financial oligarchy; export of capital; the formation of capitalist 
monopolies which share the world and the division of the world among the great 
powers. Lenin argued that the overproduction and the inequality of wealth 
distribution dampened consumption and reduced the potential for profitable
61 See for example, K. Marx and F. Engels, “The Communist Manifesto” in Selected Works in 
One Volume (London: Lawrence and Wishart,1988), pp.35-40, see also in the same volume, “A 
Preaface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy”, pp. 182-83.
62 Marx, K. and Engels, F. “Address of the Central Committte to the Communist League (March 
1850) in Selected Works ( Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1955), Vol. 1, p. 110.
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investments in the industrialised capitalist countries. These were then obliged to 
look for markets abroad. The capitalist class did not only enter into conflict with 
the proletariat within the national border of the state, but also with the capitalist 
classes of other states, since some are more stronger than others and hardly satisfy 
their greed for capital. When they perceive their interests threatened they wage wars 
to protect their capital, or its expansion. This is why they were interested in 
establishing colonial empires, especially in Asia and in Africa. The capitalist mode 
of production was thus a source of global conflict. The state system was the way in 
which the capitalist classes organised themselves to maintain dominance in the 
world. Lenin also believed that a classless society, without oppressors and 
oppressed would be conducive to peace and security since it would eliminate the 
global conflict.63
This tradition of theorising continued to influence contemporary 
writers. Wallerstein’s contribution was in identifying how capitalist states remained 
secure and free from an all out challenge from an underdeveloped world. For this he 
examined the structure of the international system and concluded that the world 
capitalist system includes the division of states into three categories: the core, semi­
periphery and periphery. He challenged the view that, modernisation, progress and 
industrialisation would bring benefits to all including the underdeveloped states, 
because the semi-peripheral states was of particular political importance. They 
were exploiters and exploited at the same time and this prevented a unified
63 See V. I. Lenin, Imperialism The Highest Form o f Capitalism (Moscow: Progress, Publishers, 
1969) pp. 81-92.
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opposition to the dominance of core states. The semi-periphery acts as a buffer 
states of the underdeveloped world.
The challenge to Marxist thinkers, has always been how this new classless 
secure society can be achieved. They argued that this was to be achieved through a 
revolution when the two classes have reached the highest stage of antagonism. This 
would also require the annihilation of bureaucratic power:
... Preliminary condition for every real people’s revolution 
is no longer to transfer the bureaucratic power from one to 
another but to smash it...64
However, Marxists understood that the state could not be eliminated 
immediately. Its elimination would be gradual, it would last until the day that 
capitalist class would be totally defeated. This was a necessary pre-condition since 
the proletariat would continue to need the state to fight its enemies:
..So long as the Proletariat continues to use the state it 
does not use it in the interest of freedom but in order to 
hold down its adversaries, and as soon as it becomes 
possible to speak of freedom, the state as such, ceases to 
exist...65
For Marx the revolution would bring the peaceful world inasmuch as it 
would change the ethics of domination and exploitation and replace them with the 
ethics of solidarity, since the new society founded on the communist mode of 
production would eliminate stratification of society vertically and horizontally
64K. Marx, “Letter to Kugelmann” in Marx & Engels Selected Works (Foreign Languages Publishing 
House, Moscow, 1955) Vol. 2, p. 463.
65 Engels, F., “Letter to Bebel” (1875) quoted in Lenine State and Revolution (1917) - Marx & 
Engels Selected Works ( New York: International Publishers, 1943), Vol.7 p. 60
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across the frontiers of states. This line of argument follows from Marx’s reasoning 
that the material world created conflict in societies and this needed to be addressed. 
Marxist theory appeals to a high degree of morality in its theoretical construct. But 
its methods were not peaceful. Like the realist they regarded war as their 
instrument of policy. War was the instrument that they would utilise to achieve their 
objectives, that is to say the peaceful society in which each and everyone would feel 
secure, as Marx explains; “... Force is the midwife of historical change...”66
This idea is refined in Lenin who is discussed in more detail in the Chapter 2. Here,
it will suffice to quote him as follows:
...War cannot help but arouse in the masses the most 
stormy feelings which disturb the usual condition of 
sleeping psyche. And without being in conformity with 
these new, stormy feelings a revolutionary tactic is 
impossible..67
Thus the Marxist theory of security, although it was articulated from a different 
stand point it led to the same conclusion arrived at by realists that in today’s world 
power is a preponderant instrument of policy to achieve security. This view, 
however, was changed in the 1990’s with the emergence of so called the “new 
thinking” in security which understands the limitations of the military power in 
ensuring security and its role in creating the security dilemma and arms races. The 
new thinking holds that security is indivisible, international and interdependent. \
66Marx, K. Nauchnii, Kommunizm Slovar ( Scietific Communism, A Dictionary), Vol.l ( Politzdat, 
Moscow, 1980), pp. 176-177
67 V. I. Lenin, Complete Works Vol. 26, pp. 290-291, quoted in the Albert Weeks (ed) Brasseys Book 
on Soviet Communist Quotaions (London: MacMillan for Brasseys), p. 315
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More security for one state produced more security for all members of the system 
and unless there is international security there can not be any national security, 
because insecurity in a certain region compels the intervention of other members of 
the system. Since these are guided by self-interest, they are likely to be rivals in 
their intervention which increases the insecurity of the system. The implication of 
this idea is that security is best ensured through the cooperation of all states in the 
system which does not seem to be feasible and practical due to the diversity of the 
world in terms of interests, resources and capabilities. Indeed, some may not have 
the capacity. The idea seems only to translate the reality of those states which are a 
global force and have global ambitions.
Southern Africa and the Concept of Security
The participation of Southern Africa in the international system begins with its 
colonisation by European powers. Colonisation introduced new modes of political 
and military organisation; it brought, capital and new technology which expanded 
intra-regional and extra-regional trade. Colonisation, particularly the developments 
of the last two centuries set the framework within which security thinking and 
praxis was shaped. From the outset, of colonial occupation, security was never 
conceptualised to meet the needs and aspirations of the people in the region, but the 
interests of the colonial powers. These interests included the expansion of trade 
opportunities, control of trade routes and resources that could be sold in European
68 See for instance Vladmir Petrovsky, Sovetskaya kontsepsiy vseobshchei beopasnosti ( Soviet 
Concept of Global Security), Memo 1986, n-6, pp.3-13
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markets, which were rarely achieved without the use of force. To this one should 
add the fact that security has always been associated with crisis management arising 
mainly from competing political, economic and social orders between the settlers 
and native Africans which legitimised the application of realist conceptions of 
security. Most of Southern African territories attained independence in the last 
thirty years. Consequently they were unable to develop a security thinking 
independent from their colonial powers. In fact, the realist understanding of security 
was a consequence of relations with Europeans influenced by this school of 
thought. At independence the new states had inherited ideas, institutions, 
structures designed not to deal with their security problems, but those of the 
colonial powers. These factors and the environment created by the bipolar system of 
international relations, that began to operate after 1945, helped to entrench the 
traditional conception of security in the region.
The implications of the Marxist and liberal ideas of security will be 
examined in the subsequent chapters. The liberal ideas have been seen by a number 
of analysts as an alternative to realist conceptions of security in the post Cold War 
period. In this section I will only examine the roots of how the realist conception of 
security came to dominate Southern.
The Portuguese presence on the west coast of Southern Africa has been 
recorded since the late 1400’s and expanded to the east coast in the early sixteenth 
century.69 The Dutch and English presence in the region followed during the 
seventeenth century Dutch wars, although Dutch settlements in the region did not
69 See Malyn Newitt, Portugal in Africa: The Last Hundred Years, (London:Hurst& Co, 1981), 
pp. 1-13.
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start until 1652, the year the first group of settlers landed at the Cape.70 Britain’s 
permanent presence began with their taking over the Cape Colony in 1795.71 The 
peoples of Southern Africa had traded with Indians, and Arabs prior to the 
Portuguese arrival, but, neither the Indians nor Arabs had any ambition to conquer, 
occupy or establish vast empires in Southern African territories and peoples. To 
some degree, neither the Portuguese nor the Dutch or British showed this ambition 
until later in the nineteenth century. The European powers were interested in 
establishing stations from which they could trade and control trade routes with 
their African and Asian partners. The Cape was used as a calling station for the 
Dutch East India Company’s freight which had its eastern headquarters in Java. 
Economic considerations made the Company to encourage settlements in 1657, 
from which it relied upon for food supplies for its ships.72 The Portuguese 
established positions in the west and east coasts of Southern Africa in what today 
is Angola and Mozambique, to trade with Africans in slaves, paper, ivory, iron and 
gold. The British were also interested in expanding their trade with Africa but the 
Cape had other priorities. Its rulers used it as a frontier fortress for their eastern
73empires. After the Napoleonic wars, the British occupied most of the French and 
Dutch territories except those of their allies, Portugal and Spain. They were 
prepared to return the majority of these territories to their former possessors, except 
the Cape of Good Hope, St. Helena and Mauritius. The decision was based on their 
strategic value and not on their economic importance. The British government
70 See T.R. Davenport, South Africa: A Modern History, op. cit., p. 3.
71 Ibid., p.29.
72 Ibid., p. 18.
73 See I. E. Edwards, The 1820 Settlers in South Africa: A study o f the British Colonial Policy 
(London: Longman, Green and Co., 1934), p. 18.
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believed that a blockade capable of disrupting its trade interests with India could be 
organised from the Cape and this was a compelling reason to station its troops and 
installations to service its fleets. The Cape was also a location from which they 
could send reinforcements to India in the event of an outbreak of war, as Lord 
Bathurst, the Secretary of War and Colonies explains :
Cape was a military ‘depot’, to which troops might be 
sent from Great Britain in the event of an outbreak of war 
in India.74
However, trade with Africans was not always pacific, especially the slave 
trade which proved to be lucrative for most. It caused competition and rivalry 
between backwoods traders, crown expeditions and powerful African chiefs. At the 
heart of competition lay the attempt to establish monopolies. The competition often 
led to violent conflict which required a constant presence of the military. The 
Portuguese brought troops to attack African communities, to penetrate the interior, 
and gain more access to slaves, resources and control trade routes. For the same
75reasons they fought wars against the settlers and Arabs. Likewise, the British 
competed with the Boers and Khoisan people to control the slave trade, land, 
mineral resources and other goods that could be sold in the European markets. The 
search for more trade opportunities required a constant European presence and for 
this, several European expeditions were dispatched to the interior in the 18th 
century, while other communities, such as the Boers trekked expanding the white 
frontier through conquest. The increased access to trade opportunities and resources 
brought to bear the need for protection of either the routes or the goods from rivals,
74 Hansard xxxiii, 235, London, 15 March 1816
75Malyn Newitt, Portugal in Africa op.cit., pp. 1-13.
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bandits and pirates.76 European military presence was thus increased to fulfil these 
objectives. The other reason that justified an increased European military presence 
was the perception that developments in the occupied territories could jeopardise 
the strategic goals of using the territories as calling stations. One such development 
was the conflict between the Boers and Khoisan people. The heart of the problem 
was the use of grazing and farming lands. The Boers increasingly occupied grazing 
and farming lands that were originally used by the Khoisans. They introduced the 
notion of private land ownership, a concept that was strange to the Khoisan people. 
In turn it forced most of the Khoisan people out of these lands. This gave rise to 
violent conflict resulting in casualties on both sides. This forced the British to 
intervene, to maintain order to safeguard the use of the Cape of Good Hope as a 
strategic calling station. However, the British attempt to maintain order, was not 
always welcomed by the Boers who regarded the British, as partial towards the 
Khoisans. They often protested using acts of violence. Episodes of this nature
• • 77required a reinforcement of troops to maintain order. The Portuguese were also in 
constant dispute with settlers who controlled large extensions of grazing and 
farming land (prazos). These disputes were founded either on refusal by the owners 
of the prazos (prazeiros) to pay levies on goods they traded, and the 
implementation of the legislation abolishing slave trade and the prazos. Slave 
trade was abolished in Portugal but it continued in Mozambique and Angola until 
1912. Portugal wanted to abolish the prazos because they brought very little 
revenue to the Portuguese government. The abolition was resisted by the force of
76 See Eric Axelson, Portugal and the Scramble for Africa (Johannesburg, Witawatersrand 
University Press, 1968), pp. 1-20.
77 Ibid., pp.20-21.
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arms by the prazeiros. In order to quell armed opposition an increased Portuguese 
military presence was required. It was in this context of dealing with crises that the 
use of force was legitimised and became the only method of maintaining security.
European powers also encouraged massive immigration to the territories, 
both for economic and security reasons. A massive European presence could help 
increase the production of cash crops and exert better control over resources, thus 
benefiting European markets. European immigration would also help to match the 
number of Africans who often attacked and waged wars against settlers. European 
immigration would help to expand white frontiers, help the protection of trade 
routes thus safeguarding the original strategic objectives. However, an increased 
European immigration intensified the conflict between the settlers and Africans, 
since it implied that land, resources, and employment opportunities had to be 
divided among a greater number. This often led to violence which encouraged 
further use of force to maintain order. In fact, the use of force became the only 
vehicle that could ensure the security of the settlers. They used force to quell 
revolts, uprisings, grievances or disputes with power holders over civil rights or 
resources. Thus, security from the outset, seen in terms of antagonic interests 
between the settlers and the natives and access to power, particularly military 
power, was the way in which it could be achieved. Invasions of African kingdoms 
by Europeans, of African Kingdoms by others, and of Europeans by Europeans 
continued in the region well after the conclusion of the Westphalia Treaty in 1648 
and the Concert of Europe in 1815. Sovereignty and the balance-of-power were 
European concepts that were not extended to African kingdoms and territories. The
Anglo-Boer wars, the pacification wars undertaken by the Portuguese in Angola 
and Mozambique, the Mphecane wars fought between Africans, testify how the 
quest for power became important for security. Europeans conspired to topple
• 70African kingdoms, and Africans allied with Europeans to topple other Africans; 
Backwoods traders and prazeiros formed alliances to topple others. However, this 
situation allowed power fragmentation and the development of independent power 
was indiscriminately used. Slave masters, prazeiros, Boer farmers and backwoods 
traders used their private forces, to maintain order, mainly among the Africans; to 
resist orders from the government which they disagreed and fight the rivals. This 
generated a sense of chaos and questioned the authority of governments. 
Governments were compelled to take strong measures to reduce and cut the
79privileges of this independent power which was often met with dissatisfaction. 
Some settlers, particularly the Boers, were prepared to accept the principle of 
equality among them but were not prepared to extend it to Africans. When arrested 
by abusing Africans they protested, and used quotes from Grotius and Locke to
on
claim principles of justice and equality. But they inferred only, equality and 
justice among settlers. Special privileges should be accorded to them with respect 
to Africans. This created a conflict between these settlers and those who really 
believed in the liberal principles of equality of human beings who called for the 
abolition of slavery, recognition of cosmopolitan principles and observation of 
Christian principles. Conflicts of this nature polarised the society and they were not
78 See, T.R.H. Davenport, South Africa: A Modern History, op. cit., p. 11.
79 See Eric Axelson, Portugal and the Scramble for Africa, op. cit., pp. 10-1; see also,T.R.H 
Davenport, South Africa: A Modern History, op. cit. pi 1-13; I. E. Edwards, The 1820 Settlers, op. 
cit., pp.20-22.
80 Ibid., p.27-28.
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resolved with the emergence of the state. In fact states in Southern Africa were
founded and operated behind the rationale of the need to protect the security
interests of the settlers and the European metropoles. Colonial states continued to
observe this pattern of discriminating between the interests of the settlers and
natives. This was also the case of South Africa, the first state in the region to
participate as an independent member in the international system. South Africa
continued to understand security in terms of Europeans versus Africans. It
undertook policies deepening the faultlines of its domestic society promoting 
81racism and ethnicity, and encouraging domination and exploitation of Africans. 
South Africa also saw itself as an extension of an European state which was in the 
region to represent European interests. The clash with the majority of South 
Africans who were victims of this type of state became inevitable. South Africa and 
the other colonial states clashed also with other Africans who saw in them a 
symbol of injustice. The nature of the colonial and South African states 
contradicted the principles of order which Europe sought to establish in 1648, since 
these states were not founded on the spirit of the nation. This contradiction was 
superimposed by the conflict resulting from different conceptions of international 
order between liberals and realists. Colonial states and racism in South Africa were 
resisted by those who believed in the principles of freedom, equality and justice. 
The environment of conflict allowed the emergence of movements, forces informed 
by liberals and Marxists who tried to influence the resolution of the conflict. The 
nature of interaction among actors guided by different interests, values and
81 See Leroy Vail, The Creation o f Tribalism in Southern Africa (Berkley: University of 
California Press, 1986), p.30.
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principles, gave rise to the Southern African security system which I discuss in the 
next chapter.
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Chapter 2
The Making of the Southern African Security Complex: Regional Factors
The concept of a ‘security complex’ is owed to Buzan, but it is derived from Hedley 
Bulls concept of a system of states.1 It refers to a distinctive pattern of security 
relations in a certain region conditioned by geographic proximity, interdependence 
and a degree of interaction. The security perceptions and concerns of states 
involved in a complex are so intense and interlinked to the extent that their national 
security problems cannot be analysed independent of each other.2
This chapter argues that the SADC states, with the exception of Mauritius, 
constitute such a complex. Although its features and contours became more evident 
in the 1970’s, its making started long before the present states were formed, with 
the Portuguese, Dutch and British occupation of the subcontinent in the fifteenth, 
seventeenth and eighteenth ceturies respectively. The complex came about as a 
result of economic, social, political and military interaction. The use of force 
played a key role in imposing colonial and apartheid orders and securing the 
monopoly of instruments of violence by the European settlers.The fact that the 
order imposed by the European settlers were offensive to millions inspired 
confrontation betwen the native Africans and the settlers and later between the 
black majority-ruled states and the white regimes conditioning their security 
interaction.
1 Hedley Bull argues that “a system of states is formed when two or more states have sufficient 
impact on one another’s decisions to cause them to behave at least in some measure as parts of 
whole” See Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society op. cit., pp. 9-10.
2 See B. Buzan, Morten Kelstrup, Pierre Lemaitre, Elzbieta Tromer, Ole Waever., The European 
Security Order Recast: Scenario for the Post Cold War Era (London: Pinter, 1990), pp.13-14.
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The events in what is now South Africa dominated the making of the 
complex from the nineteenth century and gradually brought to a closer interaction 
the Portuguese settlements in Mozambique and the Dutch and British settlements. 
Towards the end of the nineteenth century Southern and Northern Rhodesia and 
Nyasaland were drawn into the complex following the British occupation of these 
territories. After World War I, the complex was expanded to Namibia and Angola, 
following the South African occupation of Namibia in 1915 and the discovery of 
diamonds in Angola in 1920. Tanzania’s integration into the complex started with 
the beginning of the nationalist armed struggle in the 1960’s. Its support of the 
ANC, PAC, FRELIMO, MPLA, and SWAPO drew it into a closer association with 
the south. The need to access resources that could be sold in European markets, and 
protect the welfare and privileges of the settlers, led to a conception of security in 
the region in a zero-sum fashion, achievable only if they could establish a monopoly 
over the instruments of violence.
Four main factors can be seen as having influenced the making of the 
complex. First, the discovery of diamonds and gold. This discovery facilitated the 
occupation and domination of the Africans as it provided reasons and resources for 
quick militarisation and tilted the balance towards the European settlers. It also led 
to a search for mineral riches which culminated in the partition of the subcontinent 
by the European powers in the 1884/5 Berlin Conference. The second factor was the 
need to protect the settlers’ welfare status. This led sucessive South African leaders 
to seek an expansion of the colony frontiers, to seek legitimation abroad by 
developing closer relations with African states and establishing closer co-operation 
with the West in defence and security and acquiring weaponry that would allow 
South Africa to enjoy military superiority. The third factor was the emergence of
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the national liberation movements in Southern Africa which challenged the white 
regimes by force. This forced the strengthening of the alliance among the white 
minority regimes, increased military and economic co-operation and shared 
intelligence. The fourth factor was the emergence of new states that formed an 
alliance to oppose South Africa’s domestic order and its proposals for regional 
order. The emergence of new states tilted the regional balance and increased more 
confrontation between these states and South Africa.
The Discovery of Diamonds and Gold
The discovery of diamonds at Kimberly in 1867 and gold in the 
Witwatersrand area in 1886 brought changes to the peoples of Southern Africa. It 
gave an opportunity to the settlers to improve their quality of life and increase their 
wealth. It changed the nature of the economy of the white communities from 
agricultural and pastoral to mining and industry based; expanded intra-regional and 
extra-regional trade; it invited massive immigration of Europeans and it increased 
South Africa’s labour markets. The discovery of mineral riches attracted
investments in the transport and industrial sector and allowed new technology to be
.  2 
imported.
Investments in the transport sector soon linked Port Elizabeth, East London 
and Cape Town with the diamond fields. New railways were built across the region 
linking the South African colonies and the then called Native Reserves of 
Basotholand (Lesotho), Bechuanaland (Botswana) and Swaziland. New railways 
were built linking Transvaal with the Delagoa Bay port (Louren9 0  Marques) in the
3 See, O. Doughty, Early Diamond Days: The Opening of Diamond Fields in South Africa (London: 
Longman, 1963).
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Portuguese controlled territory of Mozambique and the Mozambican central city of 
Beira with Rhodesia.4 By 1910 about 10 million miles of railways had been built in 
the region which facilitated regional trade and enhanced the interaction among 
people.5 The development of rail and road infrastructure facilitated the contacts 
amongst white colonies, and between the white colonies and the African chiefdoms 
drawing them into closer interaction. It made possible the expansion of markets for 
agricultural and pastoral produce of farmers.6
The discovery of mineral riches also had a significant impact on the 
military. Prior to the arrival of the British, the Dutch military comprised commando 
formations which were supported by civilian militias that involved all the farmers, 
coloured and Khoi people, who were compelled or voluntarily joined the force, to 
undertake both military and police functions. They were equipped with rifles, small 
artillery and had a modest cavalry unit consisting of horses privately owned by 
farmers. This was an advantage in relation to their main enemies the Khoisan 
people who were equipped with cutting weapons and had no other means of 
mobility than their feet. Frontier wars of the eighteenieth century forced the 
tranformation of the commando into a regiment, but the mixed colour composition 
of the force survived. Even with the British arrival (1895-1803) and consequent 
substitution of the Boer commando by the Cape Regiment, the recruitment of 
coloured and Africans was maintained. There were a number of reasons that 
accounted for this. First there was a reluctance of the colonial metropoles to send 
European soldiers to the subcontinent. There was also the resistance of settlers to 
participate in the military activities. In fact a significant number of desertions has
4 See J. D. Omer Cooper, History of Southern Africa (London: James Currey, 1994) pp. 101-103; see 
also R.T. Libby, The Politics o f Economic Power, op. cit., pp. 19-36.
5 See A.J. Christopher, Southern Africa ( Hamden, Conn: Archon, 1976), p.248.
6 See, J. D.Omer-Cooper, History of Southern Africa, op. cit., p. 101.
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been recorded perhaps because farmers found it difficult to combine military and 
farming activities.
Africans and coloureds were, however, confined to auxiliary functions such 
as moving equipment, loading the second rifles and attending to horses. The 
trekking Boers relied upon the commando formations wherever they settled, but 
wars with locals forced their transformation into regiments. The regiment was 
preferred by most farmers because it alleviated them from military activities and 
allowed them to dedicate more time to farming. However, the regiments remained 
inneficient because of their amateur nature. Their commander was elected and they 
lacked a professional support system for the soldier which often resulted in low 
combat performance because of living in harsh conditions. Thus, thefts, corruption 
and non-sanctioned violence was a common practice among soldiers. The 
commando structure also had the disadvantage of arming almost all the citzens 
which made the task of maintaing order difficult, since protests over apllication of 
certain laws were often transformed into armed protest. The commandos did not 
show levels of distinctive discipline in combat which affected their performance 
and their battle plans were subjected to vote in the council which made it difficult to 
ensure discipline in the army.
Such reasons made the British reluctant to keep the commando formations 
when they took over the Cape in 1806. Their dilemmas were resolved in favour of 
maintaining the commandos as a subsidiary force. The British military organisation 
was far more advanced and its structure resembled the present professional army. 
They distinguished operational functions, those aimed at preparing the soldier for 
combat, from support functions, aimed at ensuring good organisation and high
7 See P. Frankel, “Race and Counter-Revolution: South Africa’s Total Strategy”, Journal o f 
Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, Vol.18/3, October, 1980, p.14.
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performance of the army. These included medical services, quartermasters, and 
strategic planners. Within these services they established different hierarchies and
Q
ranks. The British also distinguished policing from military functions. This 
organisation and the fact that they had access to new technology ensured their 
military superiority.
Military superiority allowed the British to deal more effectively with 
frontier wars against the Khoisan people, quell armed revolts of the Boers against 
their rule, and attack the two Boer Republics of Transvaal and the Orange Free 
State whenever they felt it was necessary, since there were major and minor clashes 
betwen the settlers. Among the causes of these clashes were the questions of how 
labour should be treated and disagreements over the question of representation 
between the British and the Boers. The British liberals introduced legislation 
abolishing slavery in 1834 and favoured free competition of labour.9 Sections of 
the British community, especially the missionaries, were keen to propagate liberal 
ideas of equality among human beings and favoured the education and conversion 
of Africans to Christianity. They also extended mineral licences to non-whites10 
and, when the British decided to allow a degree of self-government in the Cape, 
they insisted on a colour blind franchise. This was resented by the Boers who 
extracted most of their revenues from exploiting cheap labour. Thus, the anti­
slavery legislation meant giving up their source of profit without any apparent 
replacement. Mining activity also absorbed most of the available African labour in 
the white colonies, since work conditions and the payment were relatively better. 
However, this generated a shortage of labour, especially in the farms where
8 See Gavin Cawthra, Brutal Force: The Apartheid War Machine ( London : IDAF, 1986), p.6.
9See, for example C. Bundy, The Rise and Fall o f South African Peasantry (London, Heineman, 
1979), pp. 200-204.
10 See J.D. Ommer-Cooper, History of Southern Africa, op. cit., pp. 103-105.
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labourers were treated as slaves. This caused dissatisfaction amongst the Boer 
farmers who feared losing their labourers to mining companies, railways, industries 
and other public works which often led to confrontation. The problem of labour was 
severed by the farmers need of expanding their appropriation of land. Their 
favoured method was to squeeze native Africans off the land which was opposed by 
missionaries, land companies and landlords who extracted rent from Africans and 
merchants whose livelihood came from trading with African peasants.11
Diamond and gold were the causes of the two major Anglo-Boer wars 
(1898-1902) which culminated in the creation of the Union of South Africa in 
1910. In the early stages, diamond digging involved simple operations by 
individuals with little capital, assisted by a handful of labourers. As excavations 
became deeper, sophisticated equipment was necessary to mine lower levels and 
minimise the risk of human loss, but small scale miners did not have the capital to 
make the necessary investments. Unristricted mining made diamond prices fall. The 
largest British company proposed an amalgamation of companies which was 
opposed by small operators. Low prices of diamonds caused dissatisfaction among 
the white population. The dissatisfaction was also caused by the fact that they had
black and coloured competitors in the diggings. The white community argued that
12extending licences to non-whites made it difficult to control diamond thefts. 
Resentmeent in this issue led to revolts which disrupted mineral production and 
forced the British industrialists to complain and blame the authorities of the Boer 
Republic. The situation was worsend by the discovery of gold in the Republic of 
Trasnvaal. Gold deposits in the Witwatersrand were on average of low grade and 
were only economically viable because they were very large. Low grade deposits
11 Ibid., p. 102.
12 Ibid., p. 107.
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require an appropriate technology which was expensive and could not be afforded 
by the majority of companies which had initially acquired licences. As the 
experience in the diamond fields has shown, to stay in business they needed to be 
grouped into holdings. Labour shortages made the holdings to come together to 
regulate matters related to the recruitment of labour, measures to increase 
productivity and attract investment. However, the policies of the government in 
Transvaal worked against the interest of mining comapanies. Their licensing tended 
to raise transport costs which in turn raised the cost of equipment. The 
administrative system in Transvaal was cumbersome and unable to facilitate labour 
supplies or recruitment to the mining industry. It was unable to deal with questions 
such as gun sales to non-whites which was thought to be responsible for the 
increase of banditry around the pits and drinking habits responsible for lower 
productivity. Those problems led the British to think of a confederation in which 
they could reform the Boer state with a much more dynamic one, and unify the 
British assets in the development of South Africa. When this project was resisted 
war between the British colonies and the Boer Republics became inevitable. With 
capital coming from diamond and gold revenues and access to modem technology 
and better military organisation the British had enjoyed superiority. Revenues from 
gold and diamonds enabled them to purchase breachloading rifles, machineguns and 
artillery equipment, which allowed them to thwart any Boer resistance. Even when 
the Boers were well armed they had a difficulty to resupply because the Royal Navy 
(RN) assured that this did not happen.
There is little evidence, however, suggesting the will to totally subjugate 
each other in the wars fought between sections of the white community. On the 
contrary, these wars were often followed by the signature of treaties calling for
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truces, cessation of hostilities, reconciliation and compensation. Rebels were given
•  1  ^short periods of imprisonment and obliged to pay small fines.
News of gold and diamond deposits reached most Western European 
capitals, who were keen to increase their wealth and find raw materials for their 
industries. This precipitated a frenzied search for minerals in the subcontinent and 
massive European immigration into the region. However, the new arrivals needed 
more land and cheap labour. As a result African peasants were increasingly 
squeezed off the land and exported as labour, despite the opposition of groups, that 
had vested interests in their remaining on the land. These included missionaries, 
landlords and land companies who extracted rent from African tenants; merchants 
whose livelihood came from trade with Africans and farmers who rented their 
property to African tenants.14 The squeezing out of Africans created periodical 
revolts and rebellions. Protection, mainly of those Europeans who ventured to live 
on the white frontier became increasingly an important issue. The frenzied search 
for minerals led to the need to regulate and establish an effective control of land and 
resources so as to extract more benefits. This led the European powers to agree on 
the form in which they would share African resources in the 1884-85 Berlin 
conference.15 The European powers recognised the need for collaboration to avoid 
wars among them and enable effective control of the territories. In the Berlin 
conference, European powers established borders based on the spheres of influence 
and claims of effective occupation of the territories. The establishment of borders 
compelled them to introduce legal and political order for an effective
13 Ibid., pl66.
14 Ibid., p. 102.
15 See, D. M. Sreuder, The Scramble for Southern Africa 1877-1895: The Politics o f partition 
Reappraised (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980); see also Eric Axelson, Portugal and 
the Scramble for Africa, op.cit., pp. 64-84.
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administration. However, the occupation of territories, the control of resources and 
the extension of the administrative system was often resisted by military action, 
either by Africans or by the settlers who felt that the new order curtailed their 
privileges. The stakes involved were so high, however, that the colonial authorities 
had no option but to resort to violence. Militarisation became the answer to the 
problem and it was not beyond their capacity thanks to the regional economic boom 
in the late 1800’s and early 1900’s.
Towards a Monopoly of the Means of Violence and Power
As gold and diamonds injected fresh dynamism into the South African 
economy, it created conditions fo generating loans and subsidies to the farmers, 
thus, strengthening the unity between the farmers and the mine owners.16 The unity 
between farmers and mine owners changed the nature of conflict in South Africa. 
Class interests overshadowed ethnic divisions between the Dutch and the British. 
The richer sectors of the Boer community, now favoured reconciliation and good 
relations with the British although the poor sectors stressed nationalism. But they 
all agreed on a number of things: first, that abundant and cheap non-European 
labour was essential for the prosperity of the farms and mines; second, that the 
arming of non-white people was undesirable. In fact, in the Boer Republics, 
constitutional clauses prohibiting arms trade with non-whites were passed. The 
breachers of these clauses, suffered penalties ranging from being thrown out of the
17country, being sacked from office, to having their property looted.
16 See J. D. Omer-Cooper, History o f Southern Africa op. cit., pp. 107-108.
17 See L. Thompson, “Cooperation and Conflict: The High Veld” in Monica Wilson and Leonard 
Thompson (ed) The Oxford History o f South Africa: Vol I South Africa to 1870 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1969), p.425.
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The concentration of large non-European labour and its urbanisation, 
jeopardised the security of the white communities, it was argued, since a sudden
♦ •  1 f tuprising of underprivileged blacks was a possibility. There were real bases for 
these worries. Traders had supplied African chiefdoms with substantial quantities 
of weapons. With the money they earned in the diamond pits most Africans 
purchased guns which they carried when traversing white territories en route to the 
pits19. To alleviate their heightened fears whites demanded black disarmament and 
restricted gun selling. For the security of the pits they created security guards and 
part-time regiments. The existing army contingents were doubled and the pass laws
were reinforced to restrict the circulation of the black population in white areas and
20hence their urbanization. They also undertook measures to alleviate the dilemmas 
arising from the urbanisation of African labourers. These included bringing migrant 
labour from the so called ‘native reserves’, of Bechuanaland, Basotholand, and
Swaziland and from Southern and Northern Rhodesia, Mozambique and
21Nyasaland. Migrant labour proved to have several advantages. The labourers were 
encouraged to come without their families, which allowed companies and farmers 
to pay low wages. They stayed in camps where para-military discipline was 
introduced. Reduction of drinking habits, free movement in leisure time resulted in 
high productivity, since the workers would be available to work beyond the normal 
hours without any extra pay. The fact that they were not locals also meant that they 
would not get involved in local disputes involving land and they would keep down 
the burden of social costs that the industries would otherwise have to bear.
18 See J. D. Omer- Cooper, History of Southern Africa, op.cit., p. 103.
20 IMd'See T. D. Moodie, The Rise of Afrikannerdom (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), p. 
249
21 See Francis Wilson, Labour in South African Gold Mines 1911-1969 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1972).
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Once the problem of labour had been resolved, the major challenge the 
settlers faced was to establish a monopoly over the instruments of violence. This 
implied the disarming of blacks in the territories they occupied including 
independent chiefdoms. In the Portuguse territories disarmament also included 
backswood traders and farmers. This was accomplished through the pacification 
wars, which led to systematic violence in the whole subcontinent. The British 
fought wars against Xhosas and Zulus to subjugate them to their dominion. Their 
modem military equipment was vital for winning these wars and altering the 
military balance of power that existed until 1870 between the Zulus, small number 
of Boers and the British.
Portugal undertook a pacification campaign in Mozambique crushing the
crumbling Gaza Empire in Southern Mozambique in 1895, Sena and Barue
22resistances in the 1900’s and leaving behind large numbers of dead. In Angola 
Portugal fought a 30 years war of pacification aimed at extending its authority to the
23entire territory which culminated in the defeat of the Congo kingdom. In the 
pacification of Namibia the Germans killed 80 % of the Hereros and Nama peoples 
to accomplish effective occupation in South West Africa (Namibia)24 and 
Tanganyka around 300,000 of Maji-Maji people.25
Force became the only instrument the settlers resorted to ensure their 
security. As long as they maintained power superiority their security would be 
guaranteed. But, power superiority would also be ensured through economic
22 See T. Henriksen, Mozambique: A History op. cit., pp.75-79; see also Jeanne Penvenne “ We Are 
All Portuguese: Challenging the Political Economy of Assimilation: Louren9 0  Marques 1870-1933” 
in Leroy Vail, Creation o f Tribalism in Southern Africa, op. cit., p. 26.
23 See Gerald Bender, Angola Under the Portuguese, op. cit., p. 20
24See Tilman Dedering, “The German-Herero War of 1904 Revisionism of Genocide or Imaginary 
Historiography?”, The Journal of Southern African Studies, vol. 19 March 1993, pp. 83-84
25See John Illife, A Modern History of Tanganyka ( Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1979),
p. 200.
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discrimination, inferior standards of education and barred access to state institutions 
and limitting the circulation of the natives. The British, the Boers and the 
Portuguese were reluctant to include non-whites in the army, except when major 
wars were fought in Europe. However, even in these circumstances, Africans were 
confined to a non-combat roles.
A discriminatory system of education replicating the stratification of the 
colonial society in generations to come. In South Africa this was entrenched 
through apartheid legislation such as the Group Areas Act, the Land Act and
Reservation of Separate Amenities Act which would ensure the inherent racial
26inequality. In the Portuguese territories power monopoly also was ensured by a 
combination of policies and legislation.
Portugal lacked capital, technology and human resources, to develop its 
colonies. Portugal opted for chartering its territories to British, South African and 
German companies on a concessionary basis. The economy in its territory remained 
agriculture based and it provided service and labour to the most dynamic 
economies of the region. Chartering helped Portugal to extend its authority over the 
territories it claimed to control and reduce the threats for seizure of its terrtories by
27other powers. But this control was not effective. Warlordism and the lack of 
labour policies continued to disrupt order and was one of the reasons that kept the 
colonies poor.
Most of the white Portuguese population in Angola and Mozambique until 
the early 1900’s were exiled convicts, degradados, married locally and mixed with 
the local population. The degredados occupied posts in the army, police,
26 See J.D. Omer-Cooper, History o f Southern Africa op.cit., pp.193-96
27 Portugal faced an ultimatum from Britain in 1895 to occupy effectively its territories. A failure 
to meet this requirement would result in seizure of its territories. See details in Eric Axelson, 
Portugal and the Scramble for Africa op.cit., pp. 201-31.
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administration and controlled most of the retail trade. They had played an important 
role in penetrating the hinterland of the colonies, escorting royal expeditions and 
expanding Portuguese trade networks. They also participated in the coffee, tea, 
cotton and sisal production which brought most of the revenues to the Portuguese 
state and because of this Porugal was interested in encouraging more immigration.
Portugal passed a series of laws according privileges to settlers, especially in 
exploiting African labour, accessing the most fertile land. In the early 1900’s
specific legislation was introduced in Angola and Mozambique defining specific
28zones to be set aside for the exclusive use of Africans. This allowed European 
peasants and degredados to take over most of the farming land. Most of the land 
awarded to the settlers, however, had to be taken back at the end of the year due to
• 29their failure to cultivate the percentage defined by the state. To farm the land, 
white farmers needed cheap labour, and since the formal abolition of slavery, 
labour was not easily available. To resolve this handicap the Portuguese state
30resorted to forced labour. The 1800s legislation introduced the vagrancy clause, 
which considered all non-productive Africans as ‘vagrants’, who should be
31subjected to non-paid ‘contracts’. The definition of what was to be considered 
non-productivity was ambiguous and left to local administrators, who often found 
vagrants to fill the needs of private farmers.32 As late as 1928 labour laws stipulated 
that Africans should work for a paid wage during a certain period of each year, and
33in case they failed to volunteer to work they should be ‘contracted’ by the state .
28See Jose Gon$alo de Santa Rita, “O Contacto das Ra?as nas Colonias, Seus Efeitos Politicos e 
Sociais” Legislagao Portuguesa no Congrsso do Mundo Portugues, Vol. 15 part II, 1955, p. 47-48
29 See Gerald Bender, Angola Under the Portuguese op.cit., p. 149
30 See M. Newitt, Portugal in Africa op. cit., pp. 106-115.
31 See J. M. Silva Cunha, O Trabalho Indigena ( Lisbon: Agencia Geral do Ultrmar, 1955, 2nd 
ed), pp. 147-148.
32 Gerald Bender, Angola Under the Portuguese op. cit., p. 139
33 Ibid., p. 141
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Public works, were generally accomplished by Africans thought to fit this category. 
The Portuguese authorities also introduced a system of taxation through labour in 
which they permitted the prazeiros to ‘employ their peasants for two weaks work a 
year in lieu of tax’.34 In Mozambique African farmers were forced to grow cotton 
and other export-crops, while in Angola coffee was the obligatory crop.35. The 
labour surplus resulted from weak development of the colony was sub-contracted to 
South African companies and farms on cheap rates to allow profits for the state. 
This became one of the main sources of income for the Portuguese government. 
However, the Portuguese economy remained agricultural based and 90 per cent of 
population in the colonies depended upon subsistence agriculture.The economy of 
the colonies had no other function but serving the economy of the metropoles. In 
Angola diamonds, iron, oil and coffe plantations, all owned by the Portuguese 
funded most of the Portuguese economy.
The situation did not change much even when Salazar introduced state 
reforms in the 1950’s. Salazar’s government ensured that no African could have 
access to business. Portuguese settlers enjoyed a privileged economic and social 
status relative to native Africans but like the natives they had no political rights. No 
substantial political power was devolved to them by the metropole, since the 
majority of the settlers after World War II were peasants with little political 
ambitions when compared with settler community in neighbouring South Africa 
and Rhodesia. In fact, the Portuguese colonial authorities met any forms of 
nationalist manifestation with repression, imprisonment and torture. There were no
34 See M. Newitt, A History o f Mozambique (London: Hurst & Company, 1995), p.407.
35 See Alan and Barbara Isacman, Mozambique: From Colonialism to Revolution, (London: 
Westview, 1983), pp. 53-59.
36 See J. Marcum, “Angola: Peritous Transition to Independence” in G. M. Carter and P. O'Meara 
(eds) Southern Africa the Continuing Crisis ( Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1979), pp. 177- 
180.
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strikes, freedom of speech or of association. Absolute power remained vested in a 
governor-general appointed in Lisbon, backed by large contigents of police and 
troops and a ruthless secret police (PIDE). The Portuguese mantained that the 
education of natives would facilitate subversion and illiteracy was preferred as a 
way of mantaining the status quo. Statistics show that in Mozambique in 1964-65 
only four Africans had access to university and 636 out of the total of 8 000 
secundary students were Africans. In Angola, the government was spending 0.1 
cent per capita in 1956 on the education of natives.
Like the South African and Rhodesian armies, the Portuguese army did not 
wish to recruit among the natives. Their armies had one thing in common: they 
were there to deal with an internal enemy whose military challenge was negligible. 
However, their segregation and repressive policies and their intransigence in 
recognisisng majority rule in the territories they controled, inspired nationalist 
revolts. With his constitutional reforms to create an ‘estado novo’ (new state), 
Antonio Salazar who became the Portuguese premier in 1932 sought to incorporate 
Angola and Mozambique in the Portuguese nations by a process of assimilation. 
This included granting certain political and civil rights to native Africans who 
became honorary Portuguese citzens. Writing and speaking Portuguese and having 
four years of basic education were among the pre-requisites to become assimilado. 
The assimilados enjoyed other privileges, they had better pay than the non- 
assimilados or the indigenas as the Portuguese government used to call them. Yet, 
by 1950’s the number of assimilados both in Mozambique and Angola remained
38small: it amounted to less than half percent of the total African population. This
37 Ibid., pp. 180-181.
38 See M. Newitt, Portugal in Africa, op. cit., pp.181-188; see also Gerald Bender, Angola Under the 
Portuguese, op. cit., pp. 158-164.
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exploitation caused revolt and massive immigration of Africans into neighbouring 
countries which severely affected the Portuguese economy. However, the 
authorities managed to consolidate their power, reinforcing repression and 
discrimination at all levels.
The situation was by no means different in neighbouring Rhodesia. After 
the nineteenth century wars of conquest against Mashonas and Matabelis, 
repression and exploitation of native Africans was entrenched to allow settlers to 
consolidate their privileged position. In 1930’s a separate development policy for 
Africans and for whites was officialy adopted. Although this policy was abandoned 
on paper in the 1940’s, its principles continued to marshal Rhodesian political 
thinking and practice. The government established separate areas for development 
of the two racial groups and adopted a Land Appointment Act that excluded 
Africans from the right of permanent ownership of land in areas reserved only for 
Europeans. Under this Act the white minority was entitled to occupy more than 50 
per cent of the land which meant a further reduction of the 21 000 acres that the
391923 constitution had reserved for use by the Africans. Pass laws were also 
adopted and reinforced by successive Rhodesian governments. The colour blind 
franchise of 1898, which had been modified to give the right to vote to native 
Africans with ten years of education was substituted by a dual-roll voting system, 
which placed the settler community in the higher weight A roll and blacks in the 
lower weight B roll.40 Nationalist responses by Africans were banned. Attempts to 
create political parties with nationalist aspirations were repressed by the regime. 
Until 1977, the armed forces were an exclusive white reserve. It was the fear of
39 See, P. O’Meara, “Rhodesia / Zimbabwe: Guerrilla Warfare or Political Settlement” in G. M. 
Carter and P. O’Meara (eds.) Southern Africa: The Continuing Crisis, op. cit., p. 22.
40 Ibid., p. 23-24.
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losing the acquired privileges that led to segregationint policies. These fears also led 
to the regime’s rejection of the federation project with Northen Rhodesia (Zambia) 
and Nyasaland (Malawi). The federation meant among other things that whites 
would have to deal with a larger black majority. In fact when Zambia and Malawi 
became independent in 1963, the regime tried to secure the status quo by cutting 
links with its metropole, which favoured majority rule in Rhodesia. The 
combination of discrimination and repressive tactics, the destruction of African 
political, social and military institutions enabled the settlers to retain power 
superiority, thus enhancing their security at the expense of the insecurity of the 
Africans. However, this system rested on very shaky ground and proved difficult to 
sustain in the long run. South Africa was among the first to realise that unless its 
domestic order was accepted abroad, it would not be sustainable. This realisation of 
its liabilities led South Africa to seek from the outset, expansion of its frontiers to 
protect its core assets; its way of life, and to seek sympathy abroad.
South Africa and the Search for Regional Power Status
While Portugal developed efforts to consolidate its power in the colonies, the 
British in South Africa were more ambitious. They tried to expand their dominion 
and influence beyond their borders.
When he became the Prime Minister of the Cape colony in the 1880’s, Cecil 
Rhodes of the British South African Company was not only disapointed with the 
gold discovery in the Boer Republic of Traansvaal, but also with the German 
occupation of the Angra Pequena Bay (Namibia) in 1883. He soon initiated a series 
of diplomatic dealings with the King of Ndebeles, Lebengula to be granted 
exclusive mineral rights in their territories. A few years later in the 1890’s, the
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British flag was being hoisted in Matabeland and Mashonaland (modem 
Zimbabwe).41
However, Rhodes did not intend to stop with the conquest of Matabeland. His 
men continued to head north conquering territories across the Zambezi river42 
Strongly motivated by the search for minerals they established the British 
protectorates of Northen Rhodesia and Nyassaland. His idea was to unite the whole 
of Africa under the British flag linked by a railroad from the Cape to Cairo and a 
telegraph system.43 He recognised the importance of allying with the United States 
and Germany to dominate the world in the interest of peace progress and 
humanity.44 He saw his role as providing financial resources to those prepapred to 
carry out the expansionist project. Financial power could be acquired if organisation 
in the companies would improve through efficient and united white mle.
Rhodes’ expantionist ambitions were also due East. His primary target was 
to seize Delagoa Bay port in Southern Mozambique due to its strategic location. 
This plan was frustrated in 1875 through international arbitration by the French 
general Mac-Mahon.45 However, the Portuguese territories in Africa continued to 
feel the economic and military pressures of their neighbours which culminated in 
the British ultimatum to Portugal to effectively occupy its colonies or to face the 
danger of losing them. Rhodes’ main objective was to accomplish united white mle 
in the subcontinet, and saw as its first stage the establishment of the Union of South 
Africa. Rhodes was proved right, the consolidation of united white mle in South
41 See Robert Rotberg with Miles of Shore, Cecil Rhodes and the Pursuit o f Power ( Oxford 
Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 288-319.
42 Ibid., pp. 320-338.
43 See J. D. Omer Cooper: The History of Southern Africa, op. cit., p. 123
44 Ibid.
45 See Kenneth Grundy, Confrontation and Accommodation in South Africa op cit. pp. 26-36, 231- 
233.
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Africa had brought some efficiency in the state and allowed reforms in the armed 
forces. The commando system of the Boer army was substituted by a more 
structured type, the Union Defence Force. A 2500 Permanent Professional Force 
was established. These were to be supported by regiments made of conscripts and 
volunteers integrated into Citzens Forces relying on the farmers’ private guns. The 
establishment of the Union marked also the separation of the policing functions 
from the military.46 The Union Defence Force (UDF) was created against the 
background of containing the uprising of the majority of native Africans which, at 
the time, was percieved as the immediate threat faced by whites.47 Thus, its main 
activity was to curtail internal subversion.48 Controlling internal subversion would 
lead to internal stability and would create conditions for the country to attract more 
friends overseas, with whom the Union could do business. Attracting friends abroad 
was important for South Africa, especially after World War II, because it was the 
foreign press and in international fora such as the UN and the Commonwealth 
where complaints about South African domestic order were being made 49 This led 
successive leaders in South Africa starting with General Jan Smuts to pursue a 
vigorous foreign policy.
46 See Gavin Cawthra, Brutal Force: the Apartheid War Machine, op. cit., pp. 6-7.
47 See, The Cavalry Journal (London: 1909) pp. 188-89.
48 5000 Indians were arrested for going on strikes and demonstrating against the Supreme Court's 
decision to invalidate Indian marriages in 1912. The Defence Force and the police were called in to 
crush about 140,000 Africans and Indians in Natal in 1913 including 180,000 white miners striking 
in the Rand Region. Similar incidents were repeated in the following year when the white labour 
federation presented a list of grievances including wage cuts, poor working conditions and 
retrenchment. Strikers were besieged and the entire executive was arrested. Martial law was declared 
in the whole country. For details see: Brigdal Pachai, The South African Indian Question 1860-1971 
(Cape Town: Struik, 1971); J. Simons and R. Simons, Class and Colour in South Africa, 1850-1950 
(London: IDAF, 1983), pp. 156-61,286-96.
49 See Jack E. Spence “South African Foreign Policy: The Outward Movement”, in Christian P. 
Pholton and Richard Dale (eds) Southern Africa in Perspective ( London: MacMillan, 1972), pp. 
46-58
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Against the will of many Afrikanners, Smuts helped the British to fight the 
Germans in World War I. He occupied the German territory of South West Africa 
in July 1915 and supported the British in East Africa and in Europe. Smuts did see 
some pay-offs for this support. His security ideas were no different from Cecil 
Rhodes’. What he had in mind was to establish a hegemony in the entire region, 
expand its resources, power and influence through the incorporation of more 
territory into South Africa, especially the High Commission Territories.50 Military 
power was to play a significant role in pushing the defence lines further north, west 
and east away from South African borders. He argued that the Defence Act of the 
Union, the term South Africa referred to all of Southern Africa south of the Equator. 
He argued that the Defence line of South Africa had to be pushed as far north as 
Kenya:
... The Line o f  Limpopo cannot be held.... Our northern 
boundary cannot be held If you want to defend this 
country you will have to proceed a greater distance 
beyond it. Those who know this continent know that the 
propper line o f defence is in the highlands o f  Kenya...51
After World War I, Smuts managed to secure a seat in the Imperial War 
Cabinet and in the British War Cabinet. He managed to get the League of Nations’ 
mandate to govern South West Africa, but he failed to convince the League to allow 
its incorporation into the Union. Smuts also strengthened the UDF. In 1919 the 
British government donated one hundred aircraft to Smuts’ government. British 
officers helped train South African pilots and other officials of what later became
50Bechuanaland ( Botswana) Basotholand (Lesotho and Swaziland, were called at the time the High 
Commission Territories. They were governed by a British High Commissioner stationed in South 
Africa who, at the same time served as the Representative of the British Government to South Africa. 
South Africa tried several times to incorporate these territories into the Union but Britain in many 
occasions rejected these proposals. South africa tried also to form a confederation with Southern 
Rhodesia The last attempt was rejected in 1923.
51 Quoted in Gavin Cawthra, Brutal Force: Apartheid War Machine, op cit., p. 9.
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the South African Air-Force. The British also helped to set up the Seaward Defence 
Force in 1922 which did not develop until late in the 1940’s. The Defence of the 
coastline did not preocuppy Smuts’ government as it was left to its ally, Britain 
which was still interested in securing the sea route to India.
In the late 1940’s, Smuts helped the British to fight the Nazis and played a 
role in the founding of the UN. He then sought to enhance South Africa’s status by 
coaxing the Western powers into a defence alliance. He first made attempts for
52South Africa to join NATO when it was formed in 1949. This projection was 
based on the assumption that the West, particularly Britain, had security interests in 
Africa, namely, the colonial territories and its necessity to secure a transit base for
53military operations east of the Suez. South African leaders argued that future 
wars could take place beyond the confines of Europe in Africa, and the Western 
powers who held territories in Africa could not possibly defend them without the 
assistance of South Africa.54 Britain’s needs in the Middle East were, however, 
secured by the admission of Turkey and Greece into the North Atlantic Alliance and 
the strong American presence in the area.55
South Africa percieved itself as a Western country which happened to be, by 
chance in Africa. It has always regarded the Western powers as its security partners. 
This explains South Africa’s participation in the Berlin airlift of 1948/1949 and in 
the Korean War in 195056 and its attempt to join NATO when it was formed. When
52 See Amy Vondebosch, South Africa and the World: The Foreign Policy of Apartheid (Lexington: 
University Press of Kentucky, 1970), pp. 131-132.
53 See Ritchie Ovendale, “The South African Policy of the British Labour Government 1947- 1951” 
International Affairs, vol. 59:1, Winter 1982/83, p. 45.
54 Quoted in James Barber, South Africa’s Foreign Policy -1945- 70 (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1973), p. 82.
55 See The Foreign Policy o f the British Labour Government 1945-1951 (Notre Dame: Indiana, 
University Press, 1953), pp. 164 -165
56See Gavin Cawthra, Brutal Force, op cit. p. 12
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South Africa was not invited to join, The South African Premier, General Malan 
was prepared to settle for auxiliary status . However, South Africa’s commitment to 
racial policies impeded Britain and other Western powers from regarding it as an 
ally in the face of growing awareness of democratic values and human rights that 
followed in the aftermath of the World War II. None the less, Britain remained a 
close partner of South Africa both in bilateral arrangements and in the search for a
57multilateral defence alliance. Britain accepted South African participation in its 
proposed Middle East Defence Organisation (MEDO), a defence arrangement that 
would involve Britain and other African and Third World allies. However, South 
African membership in the Organisation was prevented by the Afro-Asian lobby, 
especially India some of whose nationals were subjected to oppression and 
discrimination in South Africa.58 As the attempt to participate in MEDO was 
thwarted, the South African government and Britain sponsored a defence- 
conference in Nairobi in 1951 to which representatives of Britain, France, Portugal 
and Italy were invited. The United States and Southern Rhodesia were present as 
observers.59 The emergence of different interests in this conference was apparent. 
South African representative spoke of a possible partnership in the event of 
communist aggression in Africa, while the British representative spoke of 
contingent plans to move equipment and people to the Middle East in case 
circumnstances required it.60 France spoke of the need to include West Africa. 
Other European powers adopted a more cautious attitude, suggesting that the
57 See details in J. Barber and J. Barrat, South African Foreign Policy, op. cit. pp. 55-61
58 See Balia Pillay, British Indians in the Transvaal: Trade Politics and Imperial Relations 1885- 
1906 (London:Longman ,1976)
59 See C. Coker, “South Africa and the Western Alliance 1949-1988: A History of Illusions” in 
Stephen Chan (ed), Exporting Apartheid: Foreign Policies in Southern African (London: MacMillan, 
1990), pp. 249-265
60 See Amy Vandebosch, South Africa and the World: the Foreign Policy o f o f Apartheid, op. cit., 
pp. 131-132
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meeting should simply make recommendations and not decisions.61 Three years 
later, South Africa sponsored another conference of this kind in Dakar which was 
attended by Britain, France, Belgium and Portugal. The conference failed once 
more to convince the European powers that South Africa faced an immediate 
danger from the communists and needed a defence alliance. The North Atlantic 
Alliance was not extended southward beyond the Tropic of Cancer and the Western 
powers retained their scepticism about South Africa.
Several reasons acounted for this. First, South African racial policies were 
met with suspicion since the European powers were preparing to decolonise Africa. 
South African’s refusal to arm blacks or to have mixed race armed forces 
undermined the possibilities of co-operation with other African and Asian states. 
All this antagonised Britain within the rest of Commonwealth. The European 
powers also feared the burden of training and equiping, since the Union had passed 
laws restricting defence expenditure to 8 per cent of the revenue budget; finally the 
fact that the South African armed forces had not been strongly developed, despite 
all the rumbling about the communist threats, suggested that the government did not
really concieve of any immediate danger. The European powers were convinced
62that all South Africa wanted was to legitimise its internal order.
With the beginning of independence, particularly when the British decided 
to grant independence to the High Commission territories, South Africans realised 
that it would have to abandon its expectations of becoming an auxiliary of Western 
countries dependent on British or Western support; Their future lay in Africa and 
their security would be guaranteed by developing ties with African states. Their 
economic and technical assistance to the new states could prevent them from from
61 C. Coker, Nato the Warsaw Pact and Africa op. cit., p.73
62 Ibid.
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being hostile to the Republic. They extended their support to states such as 
Lesotho, Swaziland and Botswana and later to Malawi with the objective of
63mobilising sympathy and gaining more acceptance. But they also tried other 
defence initiatives such as establishing a regional defence alliance with white 
regimes in the South Atlantic (SATO) to suplement the role of NATO.64 For this, 
South Africa held secret meetings and improved its ties with a number of Latin 
American countries, but the idea was eventually thwarted, once more, thanks to the 
African lobby in the UN and in the non-aligned movement.65 The other initiative 
included the development of nuclear capability. With this South Africa would deter 
a conventional warfare waged by a coalition of forces of African states and it would 
enjoy privileged security relations with the West.66 It developed closer co-operation 
with US and German firms which helped to establish a nuclear reactor, by 1965, to
67develop the skills needed to master research in the nuclear field, and it used its 
supply capacity of uranium to get access to enrichment technology. By 1975 the
Valindaba reactor and enrichment plant was already in operation and the US had
68agreed in 1974 to help to construct the Koeberg plant. Although the Valindaba 
and Koeberg were governed by the rules of the International Atomic Energy 
Association (IAEA)69, South Africa constantly refused to open the Valindaba plant
63 See J. E. Spence, South African Foreign Policy the Outward Movement, op. cit., pp. 49-51.
64 See Robert Jaster South Africa's Narrowing Option (London:IISS Adelphi Paper, 1985) pp. 
19-20.
65 See R. Rotberg, The Process of Decision Making in Contemporary South Africa, Studies Program, 
The George Town Centre for Strategic and International Studies n-22,1983.
66 See, J.E. Spence, “International Problems of Nuclear Proliferation and the South African 
Position”, Occasional Paper Series (Johannesburg: SAHA, 1980) see also J. E. Spence, “South 
Africa: The Nuclear Option” , Report in African Affairs Vol.2 n-4, 1980, p.445.
67 See details in South Africa’s Plans and Capability in the Nuclear Field, Doc. A/35/402 (New York 
: Uited Nations, 1981)
6SIbid.
69See, C. Coker, South Africa’s Security Dilemmas ( New York: Praeger for CSIS, 1987), p.87.
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for international inspection and repeatedly refused to sign the Non-Proliferation 
Treaty (NPT).70
Although South Africa never admitted publically that it possessed nuclear 
weapons and delivery capacity, the suspicion that this was the case helped to 
increase its recognition as a regional power. In any event the West accorded it a 
special status. The US, especially during the Reagan Administration years improved 
relations with South Africa, which was reflected by the level of collaboration in 
their nuclear programs and hesitation in applying sanctions against the regime. 
Periodic high-level meetings took place between the two countries which facilitated 
the flow of uranium supplies and nuclear technology. Nuclear related exports from 
the US to South Africa increased dramatically to the point that South Africa became 
in 1981, their third largest recipient.
The Impact of Nationalist Struggles
In 1961 the African nationalist forces started an armed struggle in Angola. This 
was followed by an insurrection by FRELIMO in Mozambique in 1964. The 
armed struggle caught the Portuguese by surprise since they only had about 3,000
71troops stationed in Angola and 2,000 in Mozambique. In the following six months 
the number of Portuguese troops in Angola was increased to 50,000, and in
70 See the UN Report: South Africa's Plan and Capability in the Nuclear Field, 1981.
71 See M. Newitt, Portugal in Africa: The Last Hundred Years, op. cit. p. 230.
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Mozambique from 2,000 in 1961 to 50,000 in 1965.72 The Portuguese response to 
insurgency in Angola demonstrated that it did not wish to compromise with the 
nationalists. While the troops were being flown in from Portugal, the government 
armed the settlers who organised into vigilante groups. They undertook a campaign 
of indiscriminate killings directed at the peasants and other civilians. Napalm 
bombing, imprisonment and physical annihilation of suspected supporters became 
the preferred strategy of the authorities, a strategy which proved functional only in 
the short run. The bombing of villages and the killing campaigns caused the 
peasants to flee to neighbouring Congo (Zaire). Here, they joined the nationalists 
who were re-grouping and improved their miltary organisation.74 They started 
more systematic military operations of guerrilla warfare. This change in tactics and 
the start of guerrilla warfare in Mozambique forced Portugal to change its strategy. 
It had to introduce counter-insurgency training tactics to fight an anti-bush war. 
Portugal also decided to launch a diplomatic campaign against its enemies in the 
Western capitals and international fora. For this purpose, they portrayed the 
nationalists as Soviet puppets. By this time Portugal’s military expenditure had
75claimed 15 % of its gold reserves. The new strategy also included a package of 
reforms in the colonies aimed at overcoming shorthcomings that Portugal was 
being accused of in both the domestic and international arenas. These reforms 
included the 1961 decrees which formally abolished forced labour, illegal land
72 Ibid.
73 See Gerald Bender, Angola Under the Portuguese: Myth and Reality, op. cit., pp. 158-59.
7AIbid., pp. 165-66.
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expropriation and other forms of discrimination to which the natives were 
subjected. However, in reality these decrees had very little effect because as it 
became clear later they were propaganda instruments rather than genuine reforms. 
Military strength continued to be the preferred Portuguese method of maintaining 
security of the Portuguese settlers in the colonies. At the beginning of the armed 
struggle in Angola and Mozambique troops were almost exclusively brought from 
Portugal. However, as the war continued the Africanization of the armed forces 
increased and by 1974 60% of the armed forces stationed in Angola and in
76Mozambique were Africans. From the Portuguse point of view, this strategy 
proved to have some advantages. It reduced the number of white casualties, and it 
increased the number of troops. It reduced the costs of training and transport and it 
provided a way of rebutting to the accusation that Portugal was fighting a racial war 
in the colonies. The government augmented the number of police contingents and 
para-military forces. The Portuguese secret police (PIDE) increased in number and 
powers. Among its powers was the imprisonment of any suspect without a trial for 
as long as was deemed necesary. PIDE also tried to control the population through 
the establishment of a network of spies and informers who were either forcefully or 
voluntarily recruited. Incentives to join PIDE’s network included exemption from 
taxes and a small sum monthly that could rise according to the importance of the
77mfomation they provided.
76 See Report on the Commission o f Inquiry on the Massacres in Mozambique, New York: The UN 
General Assembly Report A/9621, 1974.
77See Gerald Bender, Angola Under the Portuguese, Myth and Reality, op. cit., pp. 162-164.
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Portugal’s military strategy consisted of restricting the war to its border 
areas, far from urban centres, the main communication routes and vital economic
78centres. This strategy was facilitated by the action of the liberation movements. 
They operated from the neighbouring countries where they had their re-suply bases 
and arms depots. Their combat tactics allowed very little contact with the civilians 
inside their national territories, and limited their recruitment basis and the spread of 
the struggle. However, by 1966, a shift was noticed in their tactics. They 
intensified their recruitment and strengthened their alliance with the latter. Instead 
of concentrating their effort in one region, they spread into larger areas and 
established bases inside their national territories. This helped to push the Portuguese 
back from their rear bases. The Portuguese responded by re-locating the population 
in strategic hamlets known as aldeamentos, villages surrounded by barbed wire. 
The aldeamentos were intended to provide an organised local defence and prevent 
the nationalist guerrillas from establishing random or systematic contacts with the 
peasants., thus allowing the Portuguse forces to better plan their defence. Small 
military quarters were deployed in the aldeamentos but the bulk of the defence 
relied upon the militiamen trained by the military and equipped with bows and 
arrows and spears. These were to protect resettlement areas while the military 
concentrated on the defence of vital strategic points. They did not carry fire 
weapons because the Portuguese maintained that arming Africans would be an easy
79 »T'iway of fomenting subversion and re-supplying the insurgents. They also believed 
that fomenting divisions, and concentrating the Africans in the aldeamentos would 
help to arrest their recruitment by the guerrillas:
78 See M. Newitt, Portugal in Africa: The Last Hundred Years, op. cit., pp. 228-232.
79Gerald Bender, Angola Under the Portuguese: Myth and Reality, op. cit., pp. 161-162.
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It would be beneficial to obtain their [native Africans] 
collaboration and take advantage o f  every opportunity to 
provoke a division between them and the enemy through 
their participation in the public acts such as speeches at 
civic cerimonies and through their participation in self- 
defence, organized militia, etc. Once compromised they 
will begin to fear reprisals from the enemy and 
consequently will seek our protection.80
Indeed, this proved to be their favourite strategy but the aldeamentos were
to serve other purposes in economic and social spheres. They would allow the
provision of social and economic services that were otherwise difficult to provide
to the dispersed population. Employment opportunities, health care and education
could be enhanced in the aldeamentos. The government would also facilitate its task
of collecting taxes often disrupted by the lack of transport and access to the most 
81remote areas, but the aldeamentos also helped to vacate fertile land that could be
82allotted to new settlers arriving from Portugal. These measures failed, however, to 
stop the progress of the guerrilla struggle.
The struggle in Angola and in Mozambique sent strong signals to South 
African security planners. It reminded them that white regimes in the region were 
not immune from challenges and that the buffer white strip that had always 
protected South Africa from African encirclement could be removed. This 
compelled Pretoria to seak to increase its ties with African states and to strengthen 
co-operation with the white regimes in the subcontinent. South Africa realized that 
the developments in the region determined its security options. It began to favour 
diplomatic tactics, increased aid and trade in exchange for peaceful relations with
80 Secgao de Estudo da Secgao I, Plano de Contra-Subversao: Relatorio, Conclusoes e Sugestoes 
apresentados ao Symposium sobre Contra-Subversao, January 1969, p. 13.
81 See Gerald Bender, Angola Under the Portuguese, Myth and Reality, op.cit., pp. 163-164.
82 See Gerald Bender, Angola Under the Portuguese, op. cit., p. 64; M. Newitt, Portugal in Africa: 
The Last Hundred Years, op. cit. p. 231.
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its neighbours. These would be complemented by the signature of bilateral non­
aggression pacts which would ensure the survival of apartheid in a system of new 
relations in the subcontinent. South Africa also thought that the diplomatic missions 
the regime purported to establish with the African states would help to discourage 
the emergence of liberation movements and the spread of communism throughout
83the region. In 1968, the South African government established a special fund to 
aid friendly African governments and renegotiated the 1910 Customs Union 
agreement with Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland in 1969. The new agreement 
accorded more favourable terms to the latter.
Efforts to increase relations with African states were not all that succesfull. 
Malawi remained the only state to maintain diplomatic relations with South Africa 
no African state signed a non-agression pact with South Africa.84 Tanzania, 
Zambia and to a large extent Botswana remained unwilling to increase their 
relations with South Africa. Tanzania and Zambia were among those who mustered 
the Lusaka Manifesto, a document which committed 14 states from East and 
Central Africa, to the total liberation of Southern Africa and the rejection of
85compromise with apartheid South Africa. These states offered sanctuary and re­
supply bases, and allowed the guerrilla movements to establish training camps in 
their territories. Tanzania also hosted the headquarters of the OAU Liberation 
Committe, essentially used as a vehicle to channel the aid including military, to the
83According to James Barber, Prime Minister John Vorster, informed the Parliament that he had 
established diplomatic ties with Malawi because the communist who had infiltrated Tanzania, might 
extend their influence from East to West. See James Barber, South African Foreign Policy, 1945- 
1970 op. cit, p. 251.
84See Kenneth Grundy, Confrontation and Accommodation in Southern Africa.The Limits o f 
Independence (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973), pp. 231-266
85 See Emmanuel M.Dube, “Relations Between Liberation Movements and the OAU” in Nathan E. 
Shamuyarira (ed.) Essays on the Liberation of Southern Africa (Tanzania: Tanzania Publishing 
House, 1972), pp. 25-64.
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liberation movements. Thus, The OAU Liberation Committe was instrumental in 
shaping a collective consciousness of fighting a common enemy, domination and 
oppression in the subcontinent. The question of a common enemy raised the need 
to co-ordinate strategies and sharing training and combat tactics among the 
liberation movements. The formal and the informal meetings among the the 
liberation movements in the international diplomatic fora, cultural gatherings, 
universities and political rallies were also an important vehicle to extend mutual 
solidarity, consolidate co-operation and a common identity which laid the 
foundations for a common Southern African front against colonial domination and 
apartheid.
Given these circumstances, the bid to strengthen the alliance with the white 
regimes became the only escape route left for South Africa to strenghthen its 
security. Economic measures as well as military appeared to be essential to counter 
the advance of the guerrilas in Mozambique, Angola, Zimbabwe and Namibia.
From 1968 regular contacts between the three white governments in Southern
86Africa became more open and came to dominate regional politics. Portugal signed 
the Cunene River Basin Scheme agreement with South Africa. The plan aimed at 
irrigating 328,000 acres of land for agriculture and 865, 000 for cattle grazing along 
the Cunene River. The Cunene river project was also aimed at supplying cheap 
energy to the area and South Africa was promised the entire output of 1,200
87megawatts. With development of the Cunene basin Portugal hoped to be able to 
host 500,000 new settlers arriving from Portugal. It was hoped that ranching would 
be their main economic activity and that would rescue a ravaged economy. The
86 See M. Newitt, Portugal in Africa: The Last Hundred Years, op. cit. p. 235; see also J. E. Spence, 
“South African Foreign Policy the Outward Movement”, op. cit., p. 49.
87 See Didrio do Governo, First Series 250, Lisbon, 28 October 1970; see also Eduardo de Sousa 
Ferreira, Aspectos do Colonialismo Portugues ( Lisbon: SearaNova, 1974).
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hope was also that it would subsequently inspire development of small industries,
which could provide more jobs for Africans. These material incentives would stop
Africans from rebelling and from joining the nationalist struggle. Portugal also
sought investments for the iron mines in Cassinga and oilfields in the Cabinda 
88enclave. The oil production in Cabinda would help South Africa to meet 40 % of 
its internal needs, which had been satisfied at a very high cost since the 1963 UN
89embargo. In Mozambique, a similar project to that of Cunene was developed in 
the Zambesi Valley. It led to the construction of one of the largest dams in the 
world which would irrigate most of the valley and provide electrical power not only 
to Mozambique but also to neighbouring countries south and north of the Zambezi. 
Western investment was secured for all these projects.
South Africa also increased economic relations with Rhodesia following the 
latter’s Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI). South Africa agreed to 
initially take over 20% of Rhodesian exports which was increased to about 85% by 
1969. It also lent money to the Rhodesian reserve bank to meet the with foreign 
exchange deficit and helped to circumvent sanctions especially the oil embargo. 
Pretoria also tried to establish a free trade area with Rhodesia, Angola and 
Mozambique, as it was argued in the National Party leading newspaper Die 
Trasnvaaler:
...It is possible that the Afrikaner may attain his rightful place all the 
sooner if  he takes the lead in the formation o f  an economic bloc extending 
north o f  the Zambesi and Cunene... with eye to the security o f  the 
Republic and its economic welfare such a bloc is o f  the utmost
. 90importance...
88 See Gerald Bender, Angola Under the Portuguese, op. cit., p. 193.
89 See Jack E. Spence, “South African Foreign Policy, The Outward Movemnt”, op. cit., p.50.
90 Quoted in Robert Jaster, “South Africa’s Narrowing Security Options” in R. Jaster (ed), Southern 
Africa, Regional Problems and Perspectives, op. cit., p.54.
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However fears of domination by South Africa made Portugal and Rhodesia 
agree to cooperate only in specific security projects and indeed, economic measures 
were complemented by the military.
Pretoria dispatched 1.000 troops to Mozambique to help fight the guerrillas. 
Military officers were also deployed both in Mozambique and Angola to help 
planning, launching and coordinating military operations against the guerrilas and 
strengthen collaboration of their intelligence services.91 A joint Portuguese South 
African command centre was established to direct air strikes against the nationalist
92guerrillas in Angola in 1968. Special commandos were trained to strike against 
the guerrillas even beyond their national borders. The Smith regime in Rhodesia, 
accepeted South Africa’s offer to deploy its troops in Rhodesia in September 1967. 
South Africa then warned the Zambian government that providing sanctuary to 
guerrillas could provoke air strikes against military targets. A sizable contingent 
of police force especialised in anti-insurgency tactics was also deployed. South 
African troops in Rhodesia amounted to 2,700 in 1969 and in 1979 there were 
nearly 400094 which included two airborne units with Puma helicopters and 
equipped armoured cars.95 The three white minority regimes held regular 
consultations on military issues, coordinated intelligence and undertook joint 
military operations.96 They had a clear perception that their security depended on 
their increased co-operation among them. The increased co-operation among the 
white regimes however, stimulated increased co-operation among the liberation
91 See The Economist, London, 6 March 1969.
92 Ibid.
93 See C. Coker: “South Africa: A Military Role in Southern Africa 1969-82” in R. Jaster (ed) 
Southern Africa Regional Security Problems and Prospects op. cit., pp. 142-147
94 The Econmist, London, 6 March, 1969.
95 The Financial Times, London, 11 March 1980.
96 The Times, London, 12 March 1968.
98
movemnts and this gave rise to the spirit of confrontation and a consolidation of the 
perception of security as a zero-sum.
Consolidation of the Bloc-System
The fourth important factor to be considered in the making of the Southern 
African security complex was the new reality brought about by the independence 
of the former Portuguese colonies. This tilted the regional balance towards the 
liberation forces and led South Africa to engage in relations of confrontaion in its 
bid to safeguard its domestic order and the regional status quo. The confrontation 
involved two subregional blocs. The demise of the Portuguese empire left Rhodesia 
as the only buffer state in the north but this was also being attacked by two 
nationalist movements, the Zimbabwean National Union (ZANU) and the 
Zimbabwean Patriotic Union ( ZAPU). By the end of 1970’s Rhodesia was forced 
to negotiate a settlement which culminated with Zimbabwean independnce in April 
1980. Towards the end of the 1970’s, however, South Africa believed that its 
security could be ensured by consolidating its homeland system, at the domestic 
level, and by getting the new states to agree to join the Constellation of Southern 
African States (CONSAS) thorugh which it could extend its economic and 
techinical co-operation to the new states.
The independence of Mozambique and Angola encouraged and facilitated 
the nationalist struggles agaisnt the Rhodesian and the South African regimes. 
Mozambique allowed ZANU to establish military bases in Mozambique, and made 
an effort to unite ZANU with ZAPU combatants into ZIPRA to better co-ordinate 
their struggle. It also committed some of its troops to the struggle for Zimbabwe.
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Angola followed Mozambique’s footsteps. It provided sanctuary to 
SWAPO guerrillas and helped to establish military bases to undertake combat 
against South African forces in Namibia. The independence of Mozambique and 
Angola changed the security perceptions in the region, as South Africa came to 
accept the reality of independent African states. It expressed its desire to coexist 
with these new states provided that they did not interfere in South Africa’s internal 
affairs.97
South Africa changed this stance when it realised that the newly 
independent states were not prepared to recognise the legitimacy of apartheid and 
its proposed regional order and that they favoured the establishment of a new
• 98regional order based on equality of the sovereigns. The emerging differences 
between South Africa and the new states were responsible for shaping regional 
security relations which lasted until the 1980’s. Competition and confrontation 
became the essential features of these relations.
John Vorster, who had come to power in 1965, favoured detente in dealing 
with the new African states. Through detente he sought to assert South African 
political leadership in regional affairs using economic incentives, aid, and friendly 
relations with black African states. This would lead to stability and would prevent 
the spread of revolutionary ideas in the region. His ultimate goal was to preserve the 
status quo. He offered support and economic aid to Samora Machel’s government 
in Mozambique. Vorster was conscious of the economic advantages Mozambique 
extracted from South Africa, such as the convention to remit in gold at the official
97 See Martin Meredith, The Past is Another Country: Rhodesia UDI ( London: Pan Books, 1980) p. 
151.
98 rSee Southern Africa: Toward Economic Liberation, Declaration by the Governments of 
Independent States of Southern Africa Lusaka, April 1980. This declaration was signed by the 
Heads of State of Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania, Swaziland and 
Zambia.
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rate 60 per cent of the earnings of the migrant labour; the maintenance of the 
railways and the ports in Mozambique; the level of trade between the two countries; 
the amount of Mozambican labour in South Africa and the Cabora Bassa which 
would not be viable without the sale of power to South Africa." He quickly tried to 
renew economic and technical assistance contracts entered to at the time of the 
Portuguese rule. In relation to Angola he hoped that the spirit of co-operation and 
friendly relations would prevail, since he had little leverage over Angolan affairs. 
As a sign of a good will for new regional relations, Vorster, agreed to withdraw 
South African troops from Rhodesia that had been deployed from 1969 and decided 
to broker, together with president Kaunda of Zambia, high level secret talks with 
the black leaders aimed at resolving the Rhodesian crisis.100 The Rhodesian 
Premier, Ian Smith, came under pressure from Vorster to free the black leaders to 
take part in the talks. All these actions met the scepticism of African leaders. It was 
interpreted as an attempt to convince Africa to capitulate to apartheid. In view of 
this President Nyerere sponsored the Dar Declaration’ which was signed by 16 
African states. The Dar Declaration reinforced the OAU anti-apartheid standpoint 
and rejected any concessions to the apartheid regime. The declaration called also 
for black Africa to consider a military option, should peaceful means to end 
apartheid prove unworkable.101
The secret talks Vorster sought to broker between the natonalists leaders in 
Zimbabwe and the Smith regime collapsed in August 1975 and this also marked the 
begining of the collapse of his detente policy. Guerrilla warfare intensified in
99 A statement made by the South African Minister of Finance quoted in Africa Contemporary 
Records, 1975-1976 (London: Rex Codings, 1976)
100 See James Barber and John Barrat, South Africa’s Foreign Policy, 1945-1988,, op. cit. pp. 181- 
186.
101 See details in R. Jaster, “South Africa’s Narrowing Security Options” in R. Jaster. (ed) Southern 
Africa Regional Problems and Prospcts op. cit., p. 58.
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Zimbabwe and Namibia and so did sabotage operations in South Africa. This led 
Pretoria to tighten its security. It dedicated more attention to Namibia extending the 
application of all the legislation meant to discourage subversion. Thus the Riotous 
Assemblies Act, the Suppression of Communism Act or its renamed version the 
State Security Act were all applied in Namibian territory. South Africa also 
increased its surveillance of the border between Angola and Namibia, deployed 
police contingents who had experience in counter-insurgency and it ressettled the
frontier population in areas protected by the SADF much in a fashion of the
102aldeamentos. The period of national service for whites in South Africa and in 
Namibia was changed from one year to two years. Pretoria created special forces 
composed of different African tribes to deal with the guerrilla and in preparation to 
resist pressures for change and confront its enemies. By 1978, its military
103expenditure had increased by fourfold the levels of 1974. South Africa invaded 
Angola in an attempt to cripple SWAPO and discourage the MPLA government 
from supporting the nationalist struggle in Namibia.104 Internally it intensified its 
repression with actions such as the 1976 Soweto massacre signaling its lack of will 
to concede to pressures for change.
102 See A. du Pisani, Beyond the Barracks: Reflections on the Role of the SADF in the Region, The 
SAIIA Occasional Paper, 1989 pp. 6-8.
103 See R. Davies and D. O’Meara: “The Total Strategy in Southern Africa, An Analysis of South 
African Regional Policy”, The Journal of Southern African Studies Vol.l 1 n-2 April 1985, p .188
104South Africa occupied parts of Angola until 1984 when the Lusaka Accord was signed with the 
MPLA government. This Accord provided for South African withdrawal from Angola in an 
exchange for the MPLA government to dismantle SWAPO bases in Angola.
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Mozambique and Angola responded to these developments by strengthening 
their ties with the Soviet Union. They signed the Treaty of Friendship and Co­
operation with Moscow which committed the Soviet Union to their defence.105
If situations arise that threaten peace or break peace, 
the high contracting parties will immediately get into 
contact with each other to co-ordinate their positions 
in the interest of eliminating the rising threat or 
restoring peace
The treaty entitled them to receive equipment and benefit from the defence 
and security advice of the Soviet Union. The Angolan government invited 20,000 
Cuban troops to help deal with the South African invasion and by the mid eighties 
the number of troops had doubled. These states also increased the size of their 
armies and concentrated in the formation of popular militiamen.
Mozambique asserted that the destruction of hegemony of the two white 
bastions was a sine-qua-non condition in order for its revolution to triumph and for 
this the reduction of economic dependence on South Africa was 
necessary.106Angola, Botswana, Tanzania and Zambia echoed this demand for 
economic liberation. They also realised that their economic liberation would not be 
possible while the Rhodesian and South African regimes continued to exist. This 
led them to form, together with Mozambique, the diplomatic coalition, the 
Frontline States. This coalition was instrumental in mobilising support for ZANU, 
ZAPU, SWAPO and the ANC, to increase pressure on the South African and
105 Article 4 of the Treaty reads: “In the interest of reinforcing the defence potentials of the high 
contracting parites, They will continue developing - cooperation in the military sphere on the basis of 
appropriate agreement”
106 At independence, Mozambique’s dependence on South Africa was 20% of its imports, 45% of its 
GNP and 60% of its foreign currency earnings.
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Rhodesian regimes. They also set up a Joint Defence and Security Committee to 
coordinate their strategies against these two regimes. The Rhodesian regime 
collapsed in 1979 and the independence of Zimbabwe followed in April 1980.
However, South Africa’s internal condition continued to deteriorate. The 
Soweto massacre, and the war in Angola caused more unrest and brought greater 
dissatisfaction at the domestic level. The independence of Zimbabwe had produced 
one more enemy for the regime. At the international level, Pretoria faced an 
increasing pressure for change as sanctions, economic and cultural boycotts were 
imposed. In an attempt to appease public opinion and “win the hearts and minds” of 
its neighbours it proposed as a basis for regional order an anti-Marxist Constellation 
of Southern African States, (CONS AS) south of the Cunene-Zambezi line. This was 
its last attempt to legitimise apartheid. South Africa realised that it could not count 
on its Western allies. Its attempts to involve itself in a regional defence arrangement 
with the West had failed. Its involvment in Angola against the Marxist government 
did not attract intervention by the US or any other Western ally. South Africa was 
determined, however, to fight for its survival, even if this meant fighting on its own
107against all its enemies. The constellation was intended to be a self-sufficient
108regional security and economic bloc. Its core objective was to bring together 
South Africa - which would play a dominant role in the organization - and its 
Homeland System of Transkei, Venda and Baputhatswana together with the BLS 
states, Malawi, Zimbabwe and Mozambique. Its strong anti-Marxist overtone was 
aimed at justifying the alliance of African states with apartheid South Africa. 
Pretoria realised that apartheid was an obstacle but an anti-communist stance was an
107 See R. Price, “Pretoria’s Southern Africa Strategy “in S. Chan (ed.) Exporting Apartheid: 
Foreign Policies in Southern Africa 1978-1988, op. cit., pp. 145-188.
108See Deon Geldenhuys and D. Venter, “The Constellation of Southern African States,” 
International Affairs Bulletin, December 1979, p. 149.
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incentive to form alliances with neighbouring states.109 The anti- Marxist label was 
also intended to mobilise support from the West, since South Africa never ceased to 
see itself as the champion of Western interests in the region which included the 
promotion of economic projects between South Africa and other states in the region 
which would stop the advance of communism.110 It became clear for many that this 
was yet another attempt to protect the welfare of whites and their security by 
shielding South Africa with buffer states which should refuse to offer sanctuary, 
training and transit facilities to the anti-apartheid combatants and the opening of 
offices in their territories.111
The idea collapsed in July 1979, when the 1976 established diplomatic
alliance, known as the Frontline States (FLS), issued the Arusha Declaration
announcing their intention to create a rival organisation, the Southern Africa
Development Coordination Conference (SADCC). The idea took shape in April
1980, when the Lusaka Declaration was signed after the FLS became sure that
Zimbabwe will come to independence under Robert Mugabe. The SADCC was
formed to promote economic emancipation of its members, and reduce external
112dependence particularly dependence on South Africa. SADCC objectives are in 
line with the understanding that the security of its members depended on their 
emancipation. The SADCC project attracted Malawi, the only country which 
mantained diplomatic relations with the regime and the BLS states. It also 
mobilised considerable Western financial resources. The scenario of an independent
109 R. Davies and D. O'Meara, “Total Strategy in Southern Africa”, op. cit., pp. 189-190
110 See Deon J. Geldenhuys and Denis Venter, “Regional Cooperation in Southern Africa: A 
Constellation of States?”, International Affairs Bulletin, SAHA December, 1979, p. 52.
111 Deon Geldenhuys, “Some Strategic Implications of Regional Economic Relations for the 
Republic of South Africa” Strategic Review, Institute of Strategic Studies of the University of 
Pretoria (ISSUP), January 1981, p. 20.
112 See the SADCC Lusaka Declaration op cit., p. 1
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Southern Africa with stable economies and infrastructure opposed to apartheid was 
contrary to Pretoria’s interests.113 It percieved this as a threat to its security.
Pretoria moved quickly to adopt the military option, this time mobilising 
human and material resources, transforming its institutional capacity into what 
came to be known as the Total Strategy to protect its national aims threatened by 
communists,114 Institutional reforms resulted in a strong centralisation of power in 
the hands of the Prime Minister, diminishing the powers of the legislative bodies 
and the Cabinet. The formulation and implementation of all domestic and external 
security policy was charged to a special body -the National Security Management 
system composed of the Chief of the SADF cabinet members and senior officials of 
the National Intelligence Service (NIS), Foreign Affairs, Defence, Law and Order 
and the Commissioner of Police, answerable directly to the Prime Minister.115 The 
SADF strategies and role were also revised. New structures were put in place and it 
was equipped with new instruments. It became a highly mobile force trained to 
undertake quick anti-guerrila strikes and conventional war-fare. It was equipped 
with Special Reconaissance Commando units, mercenary units to sabotage the 
economic infrastructure in neighbouring countries and to carry out selected 
assassination of nationalists and anti-apartheid leaders.116 South Africa also found 
new tactics to deal with its neighbouring states. It adopted offensive counter­
revolutionary warfare, tactical escalation, economic bludgeoning and the utilization 
of proxy forces. New allies included UNITA in Angola, Mozambican National 
Resistance (RENAMO) in Mozambique, the Lesotho Liberation Army (LLA) in
113 See Bernard Weimer, “Europe, the United States and the Frontline States of Southern Africa: The 
Case for Closer Co-operation”, Atlantic Quarterly, Vol. 2, 1984, pp. 67-87
114 The Defence White Paper, Department of Defence, The Government of South Africa, 1977
115 R. Davies and D. O’Meara, “Total Strategy in Southern Africa” op. cit., pp. 191-192
116 Quoted in R. Davis and D. O'Meara, “Total Strategy in Southern Africa”, op. cit., p. 195
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Lesotho the Mashula in Zambia and Super ZAPU in Zimbabwe. All these groups 
were portrayed as indigenous ‘resistance movements’ and in fact, the bulk of their 
recruits were nationals of the countries concerned. However, these nationals were 
trained, equipped, directed and re-supplied by the South Africa Defence Force and 
acted like its extension. They had no political objective but to make the country
117 118ungovernable. This new tactic came to be known as destabilisation. and its 
strategic objective was now to coerce the Front Line States to comply to South 
Africa’s regional security objectives.
As South Africa interacted more with the rest of the region, patterns of 
dependence, vulnerability, alliance and identity became more distinctive showing 
the feature and contours of the Southern Africa security complex. These features 
make it difficult to isolate the security perceptions and concerns of one state from 
all the others.
117 See S. Jenkins, “Destabilisation in Southern Africa”, The Economist, London, 16 July 1983
118 Ibid.
Chapter 3
The Making of the Southern Africa Security Complex: Extra-Regional Factors
The making of the Southern Africa Security System was also influenced by extra- 
regional factors. Chief among these were: NATO’s ambiguous relationship with 
Portugal and South Africa which allowed the latter to build a large arsenal of arms; 
the bilateral relationships of some Western governments with South Africa; and the 
relationship between the Socialist bloc with Southern African nationalist 
movements.
NATO members and the Warsaw Pact states helped to create a framework 
for regional confrontation between two opposing blocs. They provided the different 
regional actors with the means which helped them to conceive security relations in 
inherently military terms.
NATO’s interest in the Azores base led it to accept Portuguese membership 
despite the fact that Portugal was not a democratic state. NATO was also forced to 
turn a blind eye to the transfer of its arms to Portuguese colonial territories and it 
was unable to stop Portugal's use of NATO arms to suppress the struggles for self- 
determination and freedom in Southern Africa. This created conditions for 
prolonged confrontation in the region, a scene reinforced by Britain’s special 
relations with South Africa.
Britain’s historic links with South Africa led the latter to believe that it 
could enjoy a special relationship with NATO. South Africa hoped that it would be 
asked to join NATO, or be granted the status of an auxiliary. NATO refused, 
however, to extend its membership beyond the Tropic of Cancer and accord South
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Africa this role, but this did not stop the Republic from strengthening its defence 
and security cooperation with Britain and other members of NATO. Britain's 
strategic and economic interests and its long- established relationship with the 
Republic led it to sign the Simonstown agreement with South Africa in 1955, and 
led NATO to establish the Silvermine Communications base, in the Republic in 
1974. The Simonstown agreement and the Silvermine Communications base as 
well as other secret arms sales allowed the Republic to develop a relatively large 
and better equipped defence force in the region. South African and Portuguese 
military powers helped to sustain the white regimes' repressive policies in the 
subcontinent and increased their perception of security albeit in zero-sum terms.
NATO’s close links with Portugal and British links with South Africa led 
the African States and the liberation movements to percieve NATO as an 
organisation not committed, if not actually opposed to the idea of self-determination 
for Africans. This perception provided an excellent opportunity for the Soviet 
Union and its allies to penetrate and explore the dividing line between regional 
actors forcing a cold war framework on regional security conceptions.
The Warsaw Pact states established and strengthened their relationships 
with the newly independent states and the liberation movements and increased their 
military capabilities. The USSR signed comprehensive Treaties of Friendship and 
Cooperation with Mozambique and Angola. These included co-operation in the area 
of defence and security which helped to shape security relations rooted in 
confrontaion. At the end of the 1980’s the superpowers began co-operating to solve 
major conflicts. This process in turn encouraged new inter-regional security 
relations, as confrontaion gave way to dialogue and the will to reinforce relations of 
co-operation.
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NATO’s Ambiguous Policies and Southern Africa
The question of expanding the NATO area south of the Tropic of Cancer, 
from the outset aroused controversy within the Atlantic Alliance. The intention to 
include Africa in the Alliance was strong in members such as Britain and France 
who had possessions in Africa. They only stopped short from pressing the other 
members on this issue, when they realised that the United States would be unable to 
persuade Congress.1 The argument that NATO’s southern flank could not be 
protected unless North Africa was included, was expressed by France many times. 
However, France failed to convince its allies to take any concrete action, even when 
its authority was being challenged in Algeria in 19542. The lack of sensitivity
shown by its partners with regard to this issue was one reason that led to France’s
withdrawal from NATO’s military framework in 1966 . The Portuguese again 
raised the issue of expanding NATO’s area, again in the 1960’s, but NATO once 
more failed to commit itself to concrete action. Indeed, if Africa was a priority for 
some members, it never was for the Organisation. NATO was about the North 
Atlantic especilly Europe which maintained important trade links with the US.4 
There was yet another motive for the Organisation to concentrate on European 
defence. The Alliance treaty committed its members to the principles of freedom 
liberty and democracy, and saw communism as the only immediate threat5. These 
principles were also contrary to the spirit of colonial domination, which was the 
reality in Africa.
1 See C. Coker, Nato the Warsaw Pact and Africa, opt. cit., p. 6.
2 1954 was the year that the struggle for independence started in Algeria.
3 See C. Coker, NATO, the Warsaw Pact and Africa, op. cit., p. 9.
4 Denis Brogan, “The Illusion of American Omnipotence” Harper's Magazine 205, December, 1952.
5 See the preamble and Articles 2, 3 and 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty, April 1949.
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Moreover, when NATO was established, four European powers (Britain, 
France, Belgium and Portugal) controlled the entire continent, which at the time, 
presented itself with no vital strategic interests for NATO. In fact, NATO, as an 
actor found little it could do that the colonial powers were unable to do on their 
own, since there were no serious threats to Western security that could arise from an 
attack on or from Africa. The principle of self-determination advocated first, by the 
League and then by the United Nations had reached Asia and the Middle East . 
There were strong reasons to believe that this would soon reach Africa. The logic 
seen from some NATO member’s perspective was to prepare for decolonisation.
These facts, however, did not stop Portugal from insisting that NATO’s 
defence perimeter should be extended to include Africa. The Alliance was never 
frilly convinced of this need, but its interest in maintaining Portugal in the Alliance 
led it into an ambiguous relationship with Portugal. The appearance of communist 
movements in Southern Europe made the US realise that it should attract as many 
Southern European states as possible into NATO, if the defence of the southern 
flank was to be ensured. Portugal was the only founding member of the Alliance 
which was undemocratic, and its own admission was controversial. The government 
of Antonio Salazar was as totalitarian as those that NATO was prepared to fight 
against. This discomforted the other founding members, such as Canada, Denmark 
and Norway. Canada was, however, the only member to oppose Portugal’s 
membership on the grounds that “ an opposition to communism was not by itself 
sufficient. Common belief in the principles of democracy, freedom and liberty were 
important6.Portugal did not subscribe to the principles of democracy, liberty and
6 See Escott Reid, Time of Fear and Hope, The Making of the North Atlantic Treaty (Toronto: 
MacLelland and Stewart, 1977), p. 199.
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individual freedom, enshrined in the 1949 Atlantic Treaty7. Its reluctance to 
recognise the right of African peoples to self-determination was embarrassing and 
made the Alliance more enemies than friends.
Matters of military consideration however, proved to be more important, 
than NATO’s political ideals. The Lajes naval base in the Azores was the main 
interest for the US in keeping Portugal in the Alliance. From this base NATO was 
able to track sumbarines within a radius of 1000 miles, a distance out of which the 
enemy's position could be detected by other US bases on its East coast. Two 
airbases were also located in the Azores archipelago in Terceira and Santa Maria. 
These bases were capable of handling 40 flights a day and were important for the 
airlift and supply the American forces serving in the Mediterranean sea and the 
Middle East.8
In the 1950’s when other members were preparing to withdraw from Africa, 
NATO realised that Portugal did not favour self-determination of the continent and 
that this could jeopardise NATO’s credibility. From 1951 until 1955 when it joined 
the United Nations, Portugal was busy with constitutional reforms which 
transformed its colonies into overseas provinces in an attempt to circumvent 
decolonisation9 and convince its allies to extend NATO’s defence perimeter to 
include Africa. It asserted that the Azores and Cape Verde archipelago were 
important for the defence of NATO’s southern flank because it was vulnerable to 
Soviet penetration should the latter occupy the Island of Sal in the Azores. It 
claimed that NATO defence lines should be extended to the whole coastline from
7 For details see Oliver Holmes, Portugal Atlantic Pact, American Perspective, Winter ,1950
8 See John Marcum, The Angolan Revolution 1950-1962, Volume I  (Cambridge, MA: Massachussets 
Institute of Technology Press, 1969), p. 183.
9 See Gerald Bender, Angola Under the Portuguese, op.cit., pp. 141-143.
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the Azores down to Angola.10 Portugal argued that “there cannot be an effective 
defence of the North Atlantic region if the South is not secure”.11 Behind all this 
rhetoric lay the fact that there were already contacts between the Soviet Union and 
nationalist forces in Algeria, Guinea (Conakry) and Mali and significant Soviet 
presence in Egypt.
In an attempt to win sympathy from its friends and show its commitment to 
NATO objectives, in 1956 Portugal placed at NATO’s disposal two airfields, 
Espinho and Montijo in continental Europe and assigned more troops to the service 
of the Organisation. However, the outbreak of war in Angola in 1961, forced 
Portugal to scale down its commitments to NATO. With the weakest economy in 
the Alliance, Portugal was unable to sustain its defence costs in Europe and in all its 
colonies. It had assumed that tying NATO to Africa would help it to secure its long 
term committment to govern the colonies which were the main source of revenues 
for the Portuguese state. However, NATO would not commit itself to fight colonial 
wars.
In the same year, Portugal called for the deployment of NATO troops in its 
colonies and pleaded for the use of NATO arms in the colonial struggle. NATO 
agreed to transfer some divisions that were initially assigned to it to the struggle in 
Southern Africa but it refused to agree on any arms transfer. However, Portugal 
transferred NATO’s arms despite the strict rules that these should only be used in 
Europe. Not surprisingly the failure to control the use of its arms in the liberation 
wars upset many African states.
10See, Franco Nogueira’s Speech (Portuguese Minister of Foreign Affairs) at NATO’s Oslo meeting, 
May 1961, Government Archives .
11 See, Geoffrey Ripon: “South Africa and Naval Strategy : The Importance of South Africa” The 
Round Table, 239, 1970, p. 308.
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The pressures exerted by the nationalist struggle in Southern Africa,
however, forced Portugal to all but abandon its defence committments in Europe
12and dedicate its attention and resources to the region. The Portuguese authorities 
never pretended otherwise even when NATO’s first command in Portugal was
13established in 1967. They insisted that their priorities were in Southern Africa.
Portugal increased its military strength in Angola and Mozambique. The 
numbers of troops deployed in these territories rose quickly . From a total of 5000 
in 1965, it reached 140,000 by the mid 1970’s when the government oof Marcelo 
Caetano was overthrown. Portuguese military expenditure rose to about 40% of the 
total budget by 196814. From the lessons of the French intervention in Algeria, it 
was clear that this situation was unsutainable in the long run, and this may have 
discouraged those in NATO who sympathised with Portugal’s claims of a lack of 
solidarity. Portugal also rushed the construction of airfields in its colonies, it 
modernised its air-force and deployed its paratroops in the colonies. By 1968, only 
a few units of the Portuguese armed forces remained deployed in Europe. The 
majority were trying to stop the nationalist struggles in Southern Africa. Those units 
that remained in Europe often found themselves in combat missions in Africa or 
transporting reinforcements to Southern Africa.15
Justifying the apparent reduction of its committment to the defence of 
Europe, Portugal asserted that its efforts were temporarily shifted to the frontline 
for the benefit of the Alliance, and whenever it had an opportunity the government 
chose to demonstrate that it remained close to the Alliance, as was the case when 
relations between Britain and Rhodesia were severed.
12 See M. Newitt, Portugalin Africa: The Last Hudred Years, op. cit., pp. 228-237.
13 See Rupert Emerson, Africa and US Policy (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1967), p.157
14See William Minter, Portuguese Africa and the West (Harmondsworth.Penguim, 1967), pp. 71-72
15 See C. Coker, NATO the Warsaw Pact and Southern Africa, op. cit., p. 53.
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When Britain applied sanctions against the Smith regime in 1965 following 
the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI), Portugal sided with Britain and 
condemned Smith. It also closed down the Lonhro owned pipeline supplying 
Rhodesia with oil. In 1969, Portugal offered NATO the use of its naval bases and 
air fields in Cape Verde, St. Tome, Luanda, Lourenco Marques (Maputo), Beira, 
and Nacala in Mozambique. The Nacala base in northern Mozambique was even 
built to the specifications of the United States. Portugal then asserted that it was 
fighting an anti-Soviet war in Southern Africa which needed the support of its 
NATO allies:
The North Atlantic Alliance should not remain indifferent 
to the preservation for the West o f vital strategic 
positions. We have never understood how one can 
separate the North Atlantic from the South Atlantic, or 
how can one ensure the security o f one without taking 
into account the security o f  the other.16
NATO refused, however, to transfer its arms to Southern Africa, although 
individual member states argued for transfers under bilateral arrangements. 
Publically, NATO insisted that the Alliance did not supply arms for colonial wars; 
and that weapons supplied under bilateral treaties fell outside its responsibilities, a 
position that the liberation movements and their supporters found it hard to 
understand. Indeed arms transfers from NATO states would not be difficult to 
secure under the auspices of the North Atlantic Treaty, since this provided for its 
members to supply arms to one another for the purpose of promoting integrated 
defence in the the North Atlantic area.17 The US also supplied arms to Portugal 
under the bilateral treaties signed in 1960 which included weapons production, the
16 Portuguese Foreign Minister, Franco Nogueira, cited in Geoffrey Ripon, South Africa and Naval 
Strategy: The Importance of South Africa, The Round Table, 239, 1970, p. 308.
17 See Article 9 of the North Atlantic Treaty ; see also William Minter, Portuguese Africa and the 
West, op. cit., p. 107.
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18exchange of patent rights and the exchange of information for defence purposes. 
The Azores bases continued to be the reason why Portugal obtained these arms:
The importance of Portugal lies primarily in the 
importance of US base rights in the Azores and
19secondary in the membership of Portugal in NATO ”
Germany also became a large supplier of arms to Portugal in addition to 
Britain and France, although the latter supplied smaller quantities and in a less 
structured way.
NATO states’ continuing supply of arms to Portugal worried the African 
states and the liberation movements especially when these enabled Portugal to make
military incursions into the neighbouring states supporting the nationalist
20struggles. Portugals intervention into neighbouring African states led to vigorous
denuciations of its colonial policies in the UN by both African and non-African
states. The attacks became an embarrassment to its NATO allies as the OAU
Council of Ministers meeting in December 1970, passed a motion of condemnation
of all states particularly NATO members who sustain Portugal in her colonial
21aggression by their continued assistance to her.
Norway, Netherlands and Denmark were among the NATO members who 
refused to sell arms to Portugal. At the same time the United States, Germany, 
Britain and France showed few signs of substantive pressure on Portugal to stop the 
use of NATO arms in the colonial wars in Africa. Norway, Netherlands and 
Denmark faced pressures at home to distance themselves from Portugal. Their
18 See J. Marcum, The Angolan Revolution, op. cit., p. 131.
19 See Maxwell Taylor, The US Policy Towards Portugal and Republic o f South Africa, 
Memorandum for Secretary o f Defence From Joint Chief of Staff, JCSM, 19 July 1963.
20 Several times Portuguse troops crossed the border into Tanzania and Zambia persecuting the 
nationalists fighting in Mozambique and Angola. But it was the intervention in Guinea in 1970 that 
caused an uproar in the United Nations.
21 See C. Coker, NATO the Warsaw Pact, op. cit., p.57.
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national constituencies found it hard to reconcile the fact that Portugal should be 
allowed to remain in the Alliance, while waging savage wars against African 
nationalists movements seeking self-determination. As a result these constituencies
forced their governments to move from imposing an arms embargo on Portugal to
22providing non-lethal support to the liberation movemnts.
Portugal felt isolated from its European allies and was forced to look for 
other alternatives in Southern Africa. It dropped the sanctions against Rhodesia and 
established cooperation with the regime in defence and security. Cooperation was 
also increased with South Africa as discussed in the previous chapter.
Portugal’s isolation did not mean cutting links with NATO. Armament from
23NATO states continued to be supplied, although in the lesser quantities until 1974. 
Indeed the West had already made substantial investment towards the end of the 
1960’s that made it difficult to cut all links24
United States links with Portugal, Britain and France’s arms sales to the 
Caetano regime, led the Southern African liberation movements and states to look 
at NATO as the main sustaining force of the Portuguese colonial empire. Southern 
African states and the liberation movements viewed with contempt the reliance of 
Western Powers solely on diplomacy which they regarded as a smokescreen 
concealing Western preference for the status quo. They wanted a clear sign that the 
West had distanced itself from Portugal’s lack of committment to self- 
determination. Furthermore, they called for Portugal’s expulsion from the Alliance 
and for Britain to use force against the Rhodesian regime. However, NATO’s 
muted response and its reluctance to stand firm on the issue of self-determination
22Ibid , pp. 66-70.
23 Ibid., pp. 110- 112.
24 See William Minter, Portuguese Africa and the West ,op. cit., pp.l 14-124, 128-144
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helped to crystalise the view, among Africans, that there was little to be expected 
from the West. If minority rule was to be brought to an end in the region, this 
would have to come through armed struggle, that is, guerrilla warfare. NATO's 
attitude left them with the only option of turning their attention to the Soviet Union 
and its allies to ask for support.
Britain and South Africa
The other important factor in the making of the Southern Africa Security System 
was Anglo-South African relations especially post World War II. These relations 
were partly historic due to the British link with the South African colonies from 
1806 onwards and partly a consequence of Britain’s understanding of South 
Africa's importance to its economy.
There were a number of reasons accounting for close British defence and 
security links with South Africa. British investments in South Africa amounted to 
£1 billion and accounted for 52% of all foreign investment. Britain also accounted 
for 30% of South African imports and 28% of its exports. South Africa was also 
the major gold producer in the world which was important for Britain's economic
Ofirecovery after World War II. Gold also helped to address the dislocations and 
imbalances in the international monetary system caused by a concentration of 70% 
of gold reserves in the United States during World War II. In the 1950’s South 
Africa had also become an important uranium producer which supplied British and 
US nuclear industries. All these factors led Britain to regard South Africa as a
25 This is when the British returned to the Cape to stay. See C. J. Omer Cooper, The History of 
Southern Africa, op. cit., pp. 101-55.
26 See Jack E. Spence Foreign Investment in South Africa, The Political and Military Fremework, 
Study Project on External Investment in South Africa and Namibia (Uppsaala, 1975), p.8
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potential ally, a country that Britain could count on in war, as South Africa had 
demonstrated in the past two World Wars. These reasons contributed to a special 
relationship for South Africa with Britain.
Britain signed the Simonstown agreement with South Africa in 1955. 
Under this agreement, Britain increased its naval co-operation with South Africa. 
The Simonstown base was expanded to allow its use not only by the Royal Navy 
(RN) but also by all ships serving the RN and its allies in any war in which Britain
27was involved. Through the agreement Britain continued to guarantee its access to 
and use of the base in a war even if South Africa was not involved. South Africa 
strengthened its navy (SAN) which effectively became part of NATO’s contingency
plans since in war time South Atlantic command was extended to include both
28South Africa and the Mozambique Channel. South Africa also gained access to 
NATO signals and NATO Naval Doctrine. The agreement facilitated the purchase 
of British ships, helicopters and provided for the training of South Africa’s Fleet Air 
army according to NATO regulations. As a result of the agreement South Africa 
enjoyed military superiority over its neighbours and gained confidence that it was 
in the region to champion Western interests. South Africa now believed that the 
West was prepared, to some degree, to turn a blind eye to apartheid and establish 
closer security links with the Republic. Above all, Pretoria felt confident that 
Britain would come to defend it in case things went wrong with its African enemies 
or communists. It believed that the agreement reached with Britain would soon be 
followed by other Western allies and this would confirm South Africa as the
29representative of NATO interests in the Southern hemisphere. Trilateral meetings
27 Ibid., pp. 9-11.
28 C. Coker, “South Africa and the Western Alliance 1949-88” in Stephen Chan (ed.), Exporting 
Apartheid, op. cit., pp. 249-265.90See J. Barber and J. Barrat, South Africa’s Foreign Policy, 1948-1988 op. cit., pp. 55-59.
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took place, at least once a year between the United States, Britain and South Africa 
but these never led to any formal admission of South Africa into NATO nor did 
they lead to the formal recognition of the Pretoria government as the NATO 
representative in Southern Atlantic seas.
Closer contacts with Britain also allowed the Republic to strengthen its 
Defence Force. This seemed justifiable in the face of new developments the 
domestic, regional and international levels which increased threats to the apartheid 
government. These developments included an increasing recognition in the 1950’s 
and 1960’s of the right to self-determination of peoples which impacted strongly on 
the domestic environment.
In the past, white South Africans only lived with a vague fear of a putative 
internal uprising of native Africans. With the emergence of nationalist groups these 
fears were real. Many African states became independent and they could wage a 
conventional war against South Africa or support the South African Liberation 
movements that would topple white rule in the region. At the UN and 
Commonwealth meetings Ghana, Liberia, and Tanganyika were in the forefront
30attacking South African racial policies. The possibility of an African conventional 
war against South Africa became the new challenge for the regime from the mid 
I960’s. South Africa responded with a military program to expand its strength. The 
Defence Minister Fouche justified this expansion as the need to meet new 
challenges and explained that in the past the SADF was intended to be a 
complementary force to the West, but that present conditions demanded that it stand
31on its own feet. However, the idea of delinking from the West in defence and 
security was never considered. Indeed, the Simonstown agreement was the vehicle
30 Ibid., pp. 60-61.
31 Cited in Eric Walker, A History of South Africa (London: Longman Green, 1957), p. 793.
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through which South Africa maintaned pressure to continue its defence and
security links with the Britain to consolidate its internal order and deter regional
enemies as Minister Fouche explained:
Our new military program is aimed at: i) preserving internal security; ii) 
support the West; iii) to counter military threats across the borders.32
The defence budget icreased from 7 per cent of the total budget in 1959- 
1960 to 17% of the total budget in 1967. The armed forces increased from 11,500 in 
1960 to 42,000 in 1967. With police and commandos the South African government
33totalled a force of 120,000 men, most of them conscripts . Regular forces were 
increased and reserve units extended. Military training was extended to the police. 
New training schools were established. The Cape Coloured units disbanded in the 
1940’s, were reinstated in 1964, though confined to non-combat roles34.
South Africa did not enjoy Britain’s support unconditionally and endlessly. 
The 1961 Sharpeville massacre embarassed even those who mantained the need for 
defence links with South Africa. The ascendance of the Labour government to 
power in Britain in 1964 meant that closer ties in defence were dramatically 
reduced. The Labour government decided to adhere in full to the 1963 UN arms 
embargo against South Africa and drastically downsized its arms sales to the
35regime . But Pretoria had anticipated the embargo and managed to secure 127 
manufacturing licences with foreign firms. British submarines, fighter bombers, 
Centurion tanks and anti-aircraft missiles were illegally sold to the regime. French 
frigates, and British helicopters found loopholes in the imposed embargo and 
strengthened the South African Defence Force. Arms manufacturing expenditure
32 Quoted in Robert Jaster, “South Africa’s Narrowing Security Options in Robert Jaster (ed.) 
Southern Africa: Regional Security Problems and Prospects ( Aldershot: Gower 1985), p. 45.
33 See Kenneth Grundy, The Militarisation o f South African Politics (London: I. B. Tauris, 1986), 
pp. 19-33.
34 See James Barber and John Barrat, South African Foreign Policy op. cit., p. 100.
35 See Christopher Coker, Nato the Warsaw Pact and Africa, op. cit., pp. 75-80.
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rose from R315,000 in 1960 to R33 million in 1964-65.36 During the embargo 
South Africa established a structure for defence production with a budget of R100 
million in 1964, which was subsequently transformed into the Armament 
Development Production in 1968 and the Armament Corporation of South Africa
37(ARMSCOR) in 1977. Its main purpose was to subcontract to major armament 
manufacturers around the world and lots of local companies. By 1964 South Africa 
was self-sufficient in small arms production such as automatic rifles; by 1966 the 
first jet aircraft (Impala) was produced in South Africa and in 1971 self-sufficiency
38was achieved in surface to air missile (Cactus) and armoured cars (Eland) .
The security interests brought a new dynamism to the economy. It showed 
remarkable growth during the late 1960’s and early 1970’s and it managed to attract 
important foreign investment. With the growing strength of the economy, Pretoria 
felt more confident and hopeful that the combination of economic growth and 
military pressure would make the world, including its enemies, accept it. South 
Africa now threatened that if Britain did not meet its responsibilities under the
39 . ,jSimonstown agreement it would find another partner. This threat generated a 
debate in British political circles, between those who advocated the maintenance of 
closer security links with the Republic and those that opposed these links.
Those who favoured links with Pretoria sang the old tune that South Africa 
was strategically located for the pursuance of West’s interests. They argued that 
South Africa could guarantee the protection of the Cape route following the 
expulsion of the British in Libya and Egypt and in other African states. The links 
appeared to be justifiable since the Cape route had become an important artery for
36 See Philip Frankel, Pretoria’s Praentorians: Civil and Military Relations in South Africa, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), p. 80
31 Ibid., pp. 81-82.
38 Ibid., p. 80.
39 See C. Coker, Nato the Warsaw Pact and Africa, op cit., p.77.
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the West’s trade with Africa, Asia and the Middle East, especially after the closure 
of the Suez Canal in 1967. Oil from the Middle East, raw materials and foodstuff 
from Asia, Africa and Australia all transited the Cape route en route to Western 
Europe. In addition to Western Europe, Australia and New Zeland were also 
heavily dependent on trade within the Indian Ocean region. They saw South Africa 
as playing an important role in protecting Western ships transiting the Southern 
oceans from a communist blockade on grounds that: i) South Africa was a stable 
polity despite the criticisms it faced from its opponents; ii) it was a highly 
industrialised society and its trade with the West was of significant importance; iii) 
its armed forces were modernised and had reached a degree of self-sufficiency in 
many areas of production; iv) in the event of nuclear warfare the South African 
navy and air forces would be invaluable in the containment and detection of sea­
borne and second strike nuclear capacity; and v) its geographical location and its 
full committment to anti-communism were fundamental for the defence of the Cape 
Route.40
South Africa argued in its turn, that it possessed the indispensable comand 
communications system for the control of operations of merchant shipping in the 
Southern oceans. While South Africas military strength and the importance of the 
Cape Route to western economies was clearly understood by the Western allies, the 
political objectives that would be achieved by a Soviet attack on Western shipments 
generated divisions amongst the allies 41 It was this reason for their reluctance to 
sign a defence pact with Pretoria. Their reluctance was further enhanced by calls in 
the UN and other international fora to put pressure on South Africa to dismantle
40 For details see J. E. Spence, Strategic Significance o f Southern Africa (London: Royal United 
Services Institute, 1970); see also by the same author, “South Africa and the Defence of the West”, 
Survival, London : IISS Vol. XIII, n-3, March 1971, pp. 79-85.
41 See J.E. Spence, Foreign Investment in South Africa op.cit., pp. 12-18
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apartheid. Thus, the British and the West in general continued to distinguish the 
defence of the Southern oceans and the defence of South Africa.
The Simonstown agreement was revised in 1967 and enabled South Africa 
to acquire new naval equipment and secure maintenance contracts. Britain 
withdrew its Command-in-Chief for the South Atltantic and the frigate which had 
been at the base since the 1950’s, but it agreed to appoint a liaison officer to be 
responsible for the command of the entire South African Navy in war time.
The provision of arms through Simonstown and the links that the Republic 
maintained with other Western states increased South Africa’s military confidence 
and gave it assurances that it was in a position to confront its enemies and develop 
the feeling that however much the West disliked apartheid, South Africa was an 
important partner, which the West could not let fall into the hands of communists. 
This perception that it was an extension of of the West, helped both its agressive 
policy and its zero-sum view of security. Needless to say, South Africa’s strong 
militarisation and its resistance to change helped to increase its antagonism with 
nationalist forces in the region and their Eastern bloc countries supporters.
On the basis of this perception South Africa renewed its claims for 
integration into NATO or some form of defence organisation with Western states, 
or help in establishing the South Atlantic Treaty Organisation (SATO) with Brazil 
and Argentina.42 The frequent visits by Soviet fleets to the Indian Ocean led South 
Africa to increase co-operation with New Zealand and Australia but this did not 
lead to any formal defence arrangement. However, the constant presence of Soviet 
fleets in the Indian Ocean added new dimensions to the West’s perception of Soviet 
intentions in the region. The West began to understand that the USSR could
42Ibid., p.12.
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threaten their interests in the Southern seas through the radicalisation of Southern 
African nationalist forces if not by imposing a blockade on Western shipments. This 
perception led to an agreement within NATO to establish a commmunications base 
at Silvermine, a short distance from Simonstown in 1974. This base was built by 
Germany and installed with the NATO codification system but possessed 
equipment supplied by Britain, Germany and the United States. These included 
communications equipment necessary to acquire data and to mantain a continuous 
picture of all ships traversing the Indian Ocean region up to New Zealand and on 
the Atlantic side up to Brazil. Silvermine was also equipped with offices to 
accommodate NATO naval officers in war time.43
Silvermine added to the the Simonstown agreeement's impact on South 
Africa’s security. It helped South Africa maintain surveillance of maritime traffic 
in the Southern Oceans. Through Silvermine, South Africa acquired information 
about the type and size of ships and the size of their mobile navies far from its 
maritime frontiers. By knowing the type and size of ships, South Africa could also 
learn about the discharging of war materials in the region, hence anticipating its 
enemies military capabilities. However, more importantly, both Simonstown and 
Silvermine signaled to South Africa that the West considered it as an ally. This and 
the licences it acquired to produce armaments locally despite the UN arms embargo 
helped it to restructure its security forces at the domestic level and to pursue policies 
of repression. Its links with the West, although ambiguous, and its relative military 
superiority helped to raise its confidence in choosing to confront its enemies rather 
than searching for a compromise and accept to reform apartheid.
43 See C. Coker, “South Africa and Western Alliance”, op. cit., pp. 260-265
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NATOs links with colonial Portugal and Western links with Pretoria, 
helped to shape the view that the West was engaged, through Portugal and later 
South Africa, in an agressive imperialist war against the Africans, a view exploited 
by the Soviet Union when it established links in the region. This view helped to 
consolidate the divisions within the region into two opposing blocs: those in favour 
of the liberation of Africa and those who opposed it.
The Socialist Bloc and Southern Africa
The Soviet Union and its allies’ involvement in the region is the other factor 
to be accounted for in the making of the Southern African Security complex. This 
involvement started in the early 1960’s with the beginning of the nationalist armed 
struggle in the subcontinent. Soviet interests in the subcontinent, however, are best 
understood in terms of its security interests.
After the 1917 revolution, the Soviet Union proclaimed itself as the leader 
of the socialist-bloc and established the Third Communist International (Cominter).
By the mid 1950’s the USSR had acquired nuclear weapons and a superiority of 
conventional forces which conferred upon it the status of a super-power.44 As a 
superpower, the Soviet Union understood its security, among other things, in terms 
of its ability to have a global reach; its capacity to export the Soviet socialist model 
beyond its borders; the consolidation of its position in the global economy and 
finally, its ability to fight imperialism and convert capitalist states to socialism 45
44 See D. E. Albright, “Moscow’s African Policy of the 1970’s in D. E. Albright (ed.) Africa and 
International Communism (London: Macmillan, 1980), pp. 37-38
45 See D.E.Albright, Sub-Sharan Africa in the 1980's (Washington D.C.: Centre for Strategic and 
International Studies, 1983), p.78; see also Sam Nolutshungu, “Soviet - African Relations : Promise 
and Limitations” in Robert Cassen (ed.), Soviet Interests in the Third World (London: Royal Institute 
of International Affairs, 1985), pp. 72-86.
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All these factors led it to conceptualise its interests in southern Africa in zero-sum 
terms. The USSR’s goals in the region were to be achieved through its support to 
the liberation movements, since these provided an excellent opportunity to further 
its goals in the global security equation
Southern Africa could supply the Warsaw Pact states with raw materials 
already scarce in their internal reserves;46 and the consolidation of socialism in the 
region would improve the prospects for long-term economic relations since it would 
increase the number of socialist states around the globe with which trade could be 
maintained. With the independence of the Southern African colonies, the Soviet 
Union could enhance its security and that of the Warsaw Pact states since it would 
expand its sphere of influence. The mineral riches, found in Southern Africa made it 
especially attractive to Soviet ambitions because it could ensure the long term 
survival of its industries including the military 47 Its ultimate objective in spreading 
its tentacles to the region was to win allies and eventually convert them into 
socialist states. Realising this objective would increase its power and undermine 
that of its enemies, therefore enhancing its security.
It was not until China began to lend support to the regional liberation 
movements, however, that the Soviet Union showed interest in supporting them. 
Indeed, when socialist revolutions in Africa emerged in the late 1950’s, they had 
ceased to be a priority for Moscow. In the 1920’s the Bosheviks had shown their 
interest in colonial independence because they assumed it would accelerate the 
socialist revolution in the metropoles. They were soon faced with the question as to
46 See V. Bryshinkov, “Raw Materials Resources of Africa”, International Affairs, Moscow, 
December 1974, p.28
47 The Soviet conomic relations with newly independent states in Southern Africa were centred in 
mining. In Mozambique, Soviet interest centred on pegmatite minerals (sources of Tantalum and 
Niobium) and some radioactive metals and rare earths. In Angola, Oil was the key commodity. Both 
in Angola and Mozambique, the Soviet Union showed little interest in the search for diamonds.
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whether they should sponsor communist and socialist parties in the colonies or the 
nationalist movements. At its Second Congress, the Third Communist International 
decided to support the bourgeois nationalists because these were more likely to
48succeed in the bid for independence. The liberation movements recieved support 
rather than the local communist parties where these existed. Marxist parties which 
took over in various parts of the world in the 1930’s recived no substantial support 
from Moscow. This policy was to be changed, however, after 1933, because the 
USSR has turned its attention towards the establishment of collective security 
system in Europe; and it concentrated its efforts on combating fascism49. In Europe 
it recommended broad coalitions between communists and any forces that opposed 
fascism, and in the colonies an anti-imperialist popular force against the European 
powers.50 This represented a contradiction in terms, because the European powers 
that the USSR was trying to fight in the colonies through its support to anti­
imperialist forces, were the same as those with which it sought to ally with in 
Europe to fight Nazi-Germany.51 This made Soviet Union decide against the 
liberation struggle and concentrate its efforts in Europe. After World War II, 
support to the liberation movements continued to be minimal. The Soviet Union 
concentrated on economic recovery and the consolidation of its position in Eastern
52Europe. The situation remained unchanged until the 1950’s when Khrushchev 
came to power. Krushchev held that the ex-colonies and the socialist countries were 
‘natural allies’. They fought the same enemy, imperialism. If the Soviet Union
48For details see Demitrio Borsener, The Bolsheviks and the National Colonial Question 1917- 
1928 (Westport: C.T. Hyperion Press, 1982).
49 See S. Neil MacFarlane , “Success and Failure in Soviet Policy Towards Marxist Revolutions 
1917-1985” in Mark Katz (ed), The USSR Centre for Scholars (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1990), pp. 6-50.
50 See Margot Light, Moscow’s Retreat from Africa, The Journal o f Communist Studies Vol. 8 n- 
2, June 1992, p. 24 .
51  T L - J
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provided support to liberation movements, after independence they would remain 
Soviet allies. This led Kruschev to renew his efforts towards supporting liberation
53in Africa . Egypt was the first state to benefit from Soviet aid and arms transfers 
but the record of this support left deep scars in Soviet policy toward Africa. Nasser 
proved to be unreliable. He did not make any effort to transform Egypt into a 
socialist state. On the contrary he persecuted communists and left them languishing 
in jails despite Soviet pleas for clemencey54. Egyptian involvement in the Suez 
canal conflict was the second set-back for the Soviet policy. It was a conflict with 
great powers that could only be faced with immense Soviet Support. The fact that 
Moscow would not provide this support, meant that it would inevitably lose 
prestige in the region.55 The liberation movements that emerged in the 1950’s were 
to suffer the effects of the Egypt syndrome.
Indeed, when in the late 1950’s it had become clear for the African 
nationalists from the Portuguese colonies exiled in Tunisia, Morocco and Algeria, 
that Portugal was not willing to concede independence to its colonies, they 
approached Soviet Embassies in North Africa to request support in order to start an 
armed struggle. After consultations with Moscow, the Embassies informed them 
that the Soviet Union was unable to lend any material support. The little experience 
it had with African states had shown how the lack of a strong proletariat made it 
difficult to envisage a socialist revolution in Africa, since the potential pool for 
recruitment for a revolutionary army would be the peasantry.56 The Soviet refusal of 
support led the African nationalists to turn their attention to China which
52 See Margot Light, Soviet Theory o f International Relations (Brighton : Wheatsheaf, 1988), pp. 
44-64.
53 See Margot Light, “Moscow’s Retreat from Africa”, op. cit., p. 25.
54 See Brian Porter, The USSR in the Third World Conflicts: Soviet Arms and Diplomacy in Local 
Wars 1945- 1980 (Cmbridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), pp. 16-17.
55 Ibid., p. 26.
56Interview with the late Mdrio de Andrade, First president of MPLA, in September 1988.
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immediately provided financial support and offered to train nationalists in guerilla
57warfare techniques.
Within a few years, armed struggles were launched in Angola, 
Mozambique, Cape Verde and Guinea. Chinese military instructors were sent to 
several training camps in Africa. In Southern Africa, they were stationed in 
Tanzania. In fact, Tanzania became the place where most of the Southern African 
liberation movements gathered for their military training and political co-ordination. 
The Chinese guerrilla tactics were acceptable for the African guerrillas because they 
were largely based on the mobilisation of peasants as had been the case in the 
Chinese revolution. Their pragmatism in fighting wars with light weaponry and
58small groups of men made it even more popular . Maoism also offered a different 
interpretation of Marxism and a different path of development. Maoists argued that 
it was possible to go from feudalism to socialism without the intervening phase of 
capitalism. This made Chinese ideas more attractive to most Southern African 
liberation movements since their societies were not industrialised and were largely 
composed of peasants. Chinese tactics seemed to be more appropriate to the 
liberation movements due to their ability to adjust to local conditions59. Indeed, the 
question of introducing modifications to Marxism-Lenisnim to enable it to adjust to 
local conditions became the fundamental point of difference and source of conflict 
between Peking and Moscow during the 1960’s.60
Maoist China criticised the USSR for its new standpoint of peaceful co­
existence with the West. It accused the USSR of practicing revisionism and
57 Interview with Marcelino dos Santos, Frelimo’s vice- President 1969-1977, March 1990.
58 Eduardo Mondlane, quoted in Mozambique Revolution, Dar-es-Salam, 1 December 1963, p. 
190.
59 See K. Grundy, Guerrilla Struggle in Africa (New York: Grosman, 1971), p.51, 55.
60 Mark Simpson, The Soviet Union and Afro-Marxist Regime: The Path to the Treaty of 
Friendship and Cooperation, Ph.D Thesis, LSE, 1989, pp. 154-155
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capitulating to the enemy, since it had abandoned the original Marxist-Leninist 
doctrine of inevitability of war against capitalism. Chinese involvement in Southern 
Africa made the USSR realise that China, instead of the Soviet Union, could be the 
patron of Africa liberation which in the long run could undermine Soviet leadership 
of the Socialist bloc and jeopardise its position as a global global power. This 
forced the USSR and its allies to intervene in support of the liberation struggle. Its 
main policy objective was to undermine Chinese efforts, to introduce Soviet 
thinking in the liberation movements and win them over from Chinese influence. In 
the mid 1960s, the USSR expressed solidarity with the nationalist struggle and 
provided the liberation movements with material support including weapons.61
Except for a few cases such as Mozambique where the Sino-Soviet rivalry
62was not allowed to penetrate the movement , from the mid 1960’s Soviet 
intervention meant creating a parallel or rival liberation movement. In the eyes of 
the USSR, Chinese efforts needed to be countered to prevent it from becoming a 
serious contestant of the Soviet-bloc in its search for global power status and its 
position as a patron of African liberation. It is in this context that the Soviet Union 
decided to provide material support and strengthen links with the MPLA in Angola 
which already had ties with Moscow through the Portuguese Communist Party, 
rather than the FNLA and UNITA which mantained links with China. The USSR 
provided substantial support to Frelimo in Mozambique while it sought to
63undermine its Maoist inclination. In Zimbabwe, ZAPU became its main client 
rather than ZANU which had links with China; and in South Africa, the USSR
61 See for example Alaba Ogunsanwo, China’s Policy in Africa 1958-1971 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1974, pp. 98-107.
62 Frelimo leadership sought to mantain equidistance in its dealings with China and the USSR. See 
for example Mark Simpson, op. cit., p. 153-159.
63 Ibid., p. 167; see also S. Kulik, “Mozambique: On the Road to Progress, New Times, n-15, Moscow 
April 1977, p. 26.
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supported the ANC and not the PAC which also mantained links with China. The 
material support they provided was enough to convince Southern African 
nationalists of the Soviet and Warsaw Pact allies committment to African self- 
determination.
Support was not only material. The USSR also provided military instructors 
and strategists to help with guerrilla tactics. Since Soviet strategists had little 
experience with guerrila tactics, Cubans and Algerians were brought in to help the 
nationalists in Southern Africa64. With Frelimo and MPLA Moscow developed a 
strong relationship to the extent that it provided them with political scientists to help 
them shape their ideology and draw them closer to Soviet ideology in preparation 
for the creation of socialist state in the post independence period. It trained their 
cadres in military strategy, economics and in political science.
Following the increase in incursions by Portuguese and Rhodesian forces 
into Zambia and Tanzania in the late 1960’s and early 1970’s, the USSR and its 
allies increased their material support in quality and quantity. From rifles, hand- 
granades and mines, the liberation movements were now being equipped with 
heavy mortars, machineguns, anti-aircraft guns. By 1970’s the majority of weapons 
used by the guerrilas in Mozambique and Angola were Soviet65.
The confrontation between the liberation movements and Portuguese forces 
escalated during the 1970’s, and by 1974 support from the Soviet bloc had 
contributed in undermining Portuguese military strength which demoralised 
Portuguese troops and led to the coup in Portugal itself. The coup provided a 
framework for negotiations which culminated in independence for both 
Mozambique and Angola in 1975.
64 See K. Grundy, Guerrilla Struggle in Africa op. cit., pp.53-54
65 See, M. Simpson The Soviet Union and Afro-Marxist Regimes, op cit., pp. 137-144, 200-206
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After the independence of Mozambique and Angola, the USSR and its 
European allies sought to consolidate their relations with Frelimo in Mozambique 
and the MPLA in Angola. While China did not detach itself from Frelimo its 
influence on the movement had decreased and its relationhip with Angola was 
undermined by its controversial support to UNITA and the FNLA during the 1975 
struggle for power between the three nationalist movements. Since the FNLA and 
UNITA maintained close links with Pretoria the support they recieved from China 
helped to jeopardise China’s relations with the rest of the subcontinent.66
The USSR had accomplished its objective with respect to China. It could 
now turn its full attention to the support of the MPLA and Frelimo which were
• • 67identified as Marxist organisations. Brezhnev realised that not supporting them 
would create a vacuum to be filled by one of its enemies, China or the United 
States. This led him to intensify Soviet support for these countries to become 
socialist states. By this time, support included also their bid to power. Thus, Soviet 
support was crucial for the MPLA government to come to power and defeat its 
main contenders, UNITA and FNLA.
In 1977, Frelimo transformed itself from a coalition of nationalists into a 
Marxist-Leninist party, while the MPLA proclaimed itself a workers’ party. From 
then on the two parties concentrated on buiding socialism in their respective 
countries. The relations of these two states with the USSR and its Eastern European 
allies continued to grow significantly. The level of trade between these two states 
and socialist bloc countries increased substantially, and as Angola and Mozambique 
faced a shortage of hard currency, this was conducted through barter schemes.
66 Ibid., pp. 193-196.
67This term was preferred by Brezhnev to non-capitalist development; see Margot Light, “Moscow’s 
Retreat from Africa,” op. cit., p. 26
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Their collaboration in the area of defence and security also increased. The 
USSR supplied these states with weapons, it helped them to organise their defence 
forces and trained their officials. It advised them on the size of the army and helped 
to set up defence schools in their territories. It supplied Angola and Mozambique 
with aircrafts carriers, bombers, helicopters, radarscopes and anti-aircraft 
equippment. It trained their pilots and their engineers. Military supplies to Angola
/ o
and Mozambique in the 1970’s totalled $ 1,3 billion. The Soviet navy surveilled 
their coastlines and it helped to structure their navies. Moscow signed Treaties of 
Friendship and Cooperation (TFC) with the two countries signalling a long term 
committment to their cause. As mentioned in the previous chapter, these treaties 
provided for consultations and co-operation in the area of defence and security and 
committed the USSR to co-ordinate strategies in the event of external aggression.
The involvement of the Socialist bloc increased in the late 1970s. Other 
Eastern European allies of the USSR were also brought in to help these new states 
in education, health and to run several branches of their economies. The record 
shows that the members of the Warsaw Pact performed different roles and 
functions in Moscow’s security strategy towards Africa.69 Besides seeking to 
strengthen economic ties, The German Democratic Republic (GDR) was involved 
in military advice and training, ‘in-situ’ and in the GDR. The GDR was also 
charged with specific military missions, such as organising an armed opposition in 
Zaire in 1978 and 1982, and running the intelligence services of its African allies. 
There is little evidence of Bulgaria’s involvement in intelligence and defence, apart 
from training military officers and supplying arms. Other states such as, Hungary,
68 See David Albright, Soviet Policy Toward Africa Revisited (Washington D.C.:Centre for 
International and Strategic Studies, 1987), pp. 15-17.
69 See Christopher Cocker, “Pact Pox or Proxy : Eastern Europe’s Security Relationship with 
Southern Africa”, Soviet Studies Vol. XI. 4 October 1988, University of Stellenboch, pp. 573-584
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Czechoslovakia and Romania confined themselves to economic activities which did 
not rule out arms sale, since the expansion of trade with Southern Africa became 
one of the top priorities of the socialist bloc states in the 1970’s. The USSR was 
also involved in local conflicts that tended to jeopardise its security in the overall 
balance. The West became suspicious that the Soviet Union had used detente to 
penetrate the areas which traditionally fell within the Western sphere of influence. 
This precipitated Western support to local parties that opposed communism and 
forced the Soviet Union to become further involved beyond its economic capacity 
in situations where its allies could not force a military solutions. As Margot Light 
observes, the situation was such that Moscow could not pull-out without
70endangering the position of its allies.
Increased trade with Africa also proved to be problematic. Africa did not 
have the hard currency to pay for the goods imported from the WTO states, while 
foreign exchange was important for the WTO imports from Western economies. 
Foreign exchange was key for the modernisation and competitiveness of the Soviet 
economy which for long time had remained technologically backward and stagnant. 
But hard currency was also necessary for the African states to import accessories 
from the West to service most of their equipment and the industrial installations 
inherited from the colonial days. This meant that the support to African socialist 
oriented states became expensive and unaffordable for the Soviet Union. Trade with 
Southern African socialist oriented states demanded large subsidies which the 
Soviet Union could not sustain. This fact prompted revision of Soviet policy toward 
Africa.
70 See Margot Light, “Moscow’s Retreat from Africa”, op. cit., p.27.
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Indeed by the end of 1970’s it was clear that Soviet expectations were far 
from being achieved. There were many examples of the socialist-oriented states 
having their economic conditions deteriorated from the moment they adopted 
socialist reforms. In the 1980’s, Soviet theorists began to recognise particualr 
problems in the socialist oriented states such as the the increased level of poverty, 
the undifferentiated class structure, and the high rates of illiteracy which hampered 
the functionig of the vanguard parties. They also realised that although the 
leadership of these parties could easily articulate Marxist-Leninist ideology, the 
masses could hardly follow what they were talking about. This had a negative 
effect. Parties existed only at the ‘superstructure’ level thus creating a gulf between
71the masses and the ruling elites. They admitted that tribal divisions and nepotism 
by the ruling elites hindered the establishment of true Marxist-Leninist parties and 
concluded that pluralism was an appropriate way through which true Marxist parties 
could emerge. The lack of an independent technological base tied socialist oriented 
states to the Western economies. This implied that socialist states could be easily 
built if the new states were closely assisted by their metropoles. Thus, development 
and modernisation were a global problem which required interdependent
72solutions. In other words, the attempt to build socialist states in Africa was a futile 
exercise. These states remained highly indebted and survived only through the 
Soviet aid which contributed to ruin the Soviet economy. In addition to this there 
were new ideas about security. Soviet thinkers maintained that military means 
alone could not ensure security which was a political problem. Indeed security 
could only be achieved by political solutions, that is to say, political co-operation
71 See details in Alksei Kiva, Socialist Orientation: Reality Illusions, International Affairs, 
Moscow, 1988 n-70, p.86.
72 See David Albright, “Soviet Economic Development and the Third World”, Soviet Studies 
Vol. 43:1 1991, pp. 27-59.
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rather than confrontation was one way of overcoming a zero-sum conception of
73security.
When Gorbachev came to power in the mid 1980’s, the issue of supporting the 
socialist oriented states in Africa was weighed against the issue of the security of 
the Soviet state. The decison was taken to enhance the security of the Soviet state. 
This meant stopping getting involved in local conflicts in the Third World, since 
these were expensive and increased rivalry between the USSR and the West.74 The 
USSR concluded that the Treaties of Friendship and Cooperation were very 
expensive and could not be maintained. It abandoned its 1970’s strategy of 
concentrating support on socialist-oriented states and radical liberation movements 
and adopted a more pragmatic approach. It saw no advantage in insisting on a 
centrally planned economy and the socialist project. It allowed its African partners 
to undertake reforms and embrace a market economy while it sought to maintain 
strong influences in the area of defence and trade. It cut its long term committments 
with the region in favour of short term ones. It extended its relationships to non- 
traditional allies such as Zimbabwe, Botswana and Lesotho on a more commercial 
basis.75 By the mid 1980’s, the USSR could do very little but establish a symbolic 
presence in Southern Africa. It had failed to transform its allies into socialist states. 
Although its global security concerns contributed to alter the nature of relations in 
the region from domination to confrontation, in the long run this confrontation 
became unsustainable, since the TFCs were unable to protect African allies against 
the undeclared war waged by South Africa and its surrogates. The US$ 1.5 billion
73 Cited in Margot Light, “Moscow’s Retreat from Africa”, op. cit., p.30
74 See A. Kolosvisky, “Regional Conflicts and Global Security”in Steve Hirsh, (ed.), MEMO: New 
Soviet Voices on Foreign and Economic Policy (Washington, D.C.: BNA Books, 1989), p. 503- 
515.
75 See C. Coker, “Pact, Pox or Proxy: Eastern Europe’s Security Relationship with Southern Africa”, 
op cit. p.582.
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of military aid channelled to the region between 1980 and 1985 could not address 
the most fundamental needs of economic development of the Southern African 
states.
The Replication of the East-West Divide in Southern Africa
Soviet support for the liberation movements, NATOs ambiguous relations with 
Portugal and Britains historic links with the South African Republic contributed to 
the region to entering the mid 1970’s with opposing blocs, thus replicating the 
bipolar structure of the international system.
Although the West built the Silvermine Communications base in 1974, 
British defence and security links with South Africa were drastically reduced 
throughout the rest of the decade. The Conservative government which replaced the 
Labour government in Britain in 1970 suffered an imense pressure in the
76Commonwealth to reduce its close links with South Africa and indeed, the only 
formal military tie between Britain and South Africa, the Simonstown agreement, 
was halted in 1974. South Africas intervention in Angola in 1975-76 and the 
massacre it prepetrated against children in Soweto in 1976 thwarted Britain’s and 
US efforts to persuade the Frontline States (FLS) to cooperate with South Africa in
77forcing the Rhodesian regime into negotiations with its nationalists opponents.
South Africa began to enter a period of international isolation as its 
domestic unrest shook its relative stability. These facts helped to shape the South
76 See J. E. Spence, “The West and South Africa” in R. O’Neill and R. J. Vincent (eds), The West 
and the Third World ( London: MacMillan, 1990), p.l 11.
11 Ibid., p. 112.
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African view in 1979, that the free world was facing a Marxist ’onslaught' 
orchestrated by Moscow in Southern Africa.
In view of this situation, South Africa called for an economic and political 
alliance of moderate states to counteract the Marxist ‘onslaught’. The alliance 
would among other things, signal that the West was wrong in dismissing the 
communist assault because of its imperial guilty conciousness motivated by 
exploitation of blacks. The alliance included co-operation in economic projects. The 
success of economic aspects in the anti-Marxist constellation would constitute an 
incentive to win over the African states away from socialist influence. The alliance 
would then be consolidated by the signing of non-aggression pacts which would
no
then lead to the establishment of mutual defence pacts. These defence pacts and 
economic ties would then deepen relations between South Africa and the African 
states thus consolidating avenues for Western interests in the region. The ultimate 
objective of the proposed alliance, as explained by the then Foreign Minister Roelof
79Botha, was to have a common regional approach to security.
Although South Africa’s argument was not fully accepted in the West, 
Soviet-inspired activity in Southern Africa raised increasing concerns there. The 
Cape route argument was re-opened, and there is no doubt that Soviet intervention
in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Afghanistan, the Gulf and Angola in 1975 , alrmed the
80West. In addition, there was a build- up of the Soviet Navy in the Southern 
oceans, continuing Socialist-bloc support for the liberation movements in South 
Africa, Rhodesia and Namibia and the significant presence of Cuban troops in 
Angola. All this led to an increased east-west view of politics. Indeed, it raised
78 See D. Geldenhuys and D. Venter, “Regional Cooperation in Southern Africa”, op. cit. p.52
79 Ibid ., p. 54
80 The Minsk cruiser cum aircraft carrier visited Angola in April 1979 while President Neto was 
abroad. See details in J. Barber, J. Blumefeld and C. Hill, The West and South Africa (London: 
Routledge for the Royal Institute for International Affairs, 1979), p. 12.
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Western suspicion that the Soviet Union could disrupt the defence of Western
Europe if it imposed a blockade on oil shipments in the Indian ocean. Added to
Western economic interests in South Africa, this led to the West’s sheltering of the
South African regime even if it disagreed with its apartheid political philosophy.
Evidence for this conclusion includes the fact that while the West and Britain in
particular showed an increasing interest in resolving the question of majority rule in
Rhodesia, they were not convinced that South Africa could follow the same route.
The view was hardened especially after the ascendace to power of Ronald Reagan
in the US and Mrs. Thatcher in Britain, both of whom viewed the world in terms of
81competing power blocs. This view increased the geopolitical, economic and 
military importance of Southern Africa in which South Africa re-surfaced as a 
Western ally. Even if the region did not represent vital Western interests, it was 
something to be denied to the USSR and its allies. The ascendance of Reagan 
reinforced this view by basing its policy toward Southern Africa on the 1969 
National Security Council Memorandum (NSSM 39), which placed an emphasis on 
the role of regional powers in helping to defend and assert Western interests in 
contest with the USSR.
South Africa’s proposal for an anti-Marxist constellation of states was 
rejected by the newly independent African states since, at the domestic level, the 
proposal did not address the fundamental problem of apartheid, while at the 
regional level it showed no signs of changing the patterns of military and 
economic domination. Added to this strategic set-back, Britain and other Western 
allies distinguished between their will in maintaining economic relations with S.A 
from an unconditional support of the regime. Their economic and cultural links
81Ibid., pp. 10-11.
82 See J. E. Spence, Foreign Investment in South Africa, op. cit., pp. 32-35.
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with South Africa were already being contested at home, while the claim of a 
Marxist ‘onslaught’ failed to convince the West that its interests would be 
jeopardised if a formal military alliance with South Africa was not established. 
Among the Marxist states the West distingushed those which had a significant 
presence of foreign Marxist combat troops, i. e. with an offesnive capability, and 
those who embraced Marxism from their own convictions but without any
83offensive capacity. Even those that had this offensive capacity fell short of posing 
a threat to Western interests. They advised that the solution in dealing with either of 
these two types of states lay in negotiations. Instead of supporting South Africa’s 
led CONSAS they advocated change and imposed cultural boycotts and selective 
sanctions to press for this change. As a result, apartheid South Africa felt 
increasingly isolated.
These factors would not deter South Africa from carrying out its plans. On 
the contrary, they were a greater incentive for apartheid’s struggle for survival. 
South Africa understood the dilemma of its Western allies. Although Western states 
could not come to its support they were not prepared to put their material interest at 
risk. South Africa exploited this dilemma because it sensed that the West would 
continue to provide covert support even though it could not guarantee open support. 
The South African government effectively blackmailed those who had commercial 
interests in the country by threatening to retaliate if sanctions were imposed. On a 
different front, South Africa used its economic and military power to coerce 
neighbouring states to accept its objectives. It introduced reforms in the state 
machinery which allowed its regional foreign policy goals to be determined by the
83 See, P. Baker, The United States and South Africa: the Reagan Years (Washington, D.C.: South 
Africa Update Series, 1989), pp. 12-28.
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military under the Total Strategy. Its military was increased with the 
development of special forces, such as the Reconaissance Commandos, Ethnic 
Battalions, and surrogate forces to meet the costs of developing new armaments in 
areas where vulnerability was felt.
The Reconaissance Commandos and the Ethnic Battalions were charged 
with conducting raids against neighbouring states in support of the surrogate forces 
whose main task was to make these states ungovernable. These forces became vital 
instruments for the implementation of South Africa’s destabilsation policy.85 Under 
this policy, South Africa conducted raids into neighbouring countries against 
military, economic and civilian targets and sabotaged transport routes and other 
economic and social infrastructures. South Africa also applied selective sanctions 
against neighbouring states through the reduction on the level of their migrant 
labour in South Africa, and forcing delays in their exports and imports from or via 
South Africa. With this South Africa aimed at increasing the SADCC states' 
dependence on South Africa with the hope of ultimately making the SADCC 
project unviable. The intention was to keep neighbouring governments busy at 
home and so prevent them from staging attacks against the Republic. This would 
consequently enhance its security. To validate the proposition that South Africa
faced a Marxist onslaught, the government concentrated its destabilisation efforts
86on Angola and Mozambique, the two declared Marxist states in the region.
84 See K. Grundy, “The Rise of the South African security Establishment: An Essay On the 
Changing Locus of State Power Bradlow Series n-1, South African Institute of International Affairs, 
1983, p. 39
85 See, A. du Pisani, Beyond the Barracks, op. cit., pp. 4-8; see also R. Davis and D. O’Meara, “Total 
Strategy in Southern Africa”, op. cit., pp. 201-206.
86 The 1988 UN Economic Commission for Africa Report assessed destabilisation to have caused 
$60 billion of damages. See South African Dstabilisation, The Economic Cost o f the Frontline 
Resistance to Apartheid, op. cit., p. 8.
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The FLS states tried to resist this coercion by strengthening SADCC 
through an increased mobilisation of international support to SADCC projects 
especially those in the transportation sector. Their response also involved 
strengthening their diplomatic community by reaffirming their committment to the 
principles of emancipation of the peoples of the region, their opposition to racism 
and to domination. They were able to obtain support for their economic projects 
from Western financial sources while the bulk of their defence capability still came 
from the Soviet Union and its allies. They called for increased co-ordination of 
their strategy in the struggle against apartheid and decided to increase their co­
operation in the area of defence and security and reassessed their tactics. South 
African policies towards the region have led them to conclude that they faced a 
common enemy and that their security could not be ensured until apartheid was 
completely dismantled. Their Ministers of defence now met regularly to assess 
developments in the region and to coordinate strategies against apartheid. They now 
decided that Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe should facilitate the struggle of 
their regional allies in South Africa and Namibia who would carry out the struggle 
from inside as the Chinese did, while the rest concentrated on economic
87stabilisation.
The understanding that they fought a common enemy led Mozambique to 
facilitate the infiltration of the ANC guerrillas through its Natal and Transvaal 
borders and allow their rear bases to be established on its territory. Angola 
undertook the same steps in relation to SWAPO, while Zambia and Tanzania 
allowed these movments and others including the PAC to establish training camps 
and schools for exiles.
87 See Julius Nyerere, “North - South Dialogue”, The Third World Quaterly Vol.6, n-4 , 1984, p. 
836.
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In response to the ANC’s increased sabotage operations, South African
president P. W. Botha, warned:
... We wish to extend non-agression pacts to any
neighbouring state... we have no quarrel with the forces
o f  peaceful neighbours but we do have a quarrel with
terrorists who use the neighbouring states as spring boards
to launch attacks against South africa, and if  a
neighbouring state allows itself to be drawn into the
aggressive behavior o f terrorists, it will have to pay the 
• 88  price-
In January 1981, following increased destabilisation by Renamo, the Government 
of Mozambique was forced to sign a defence pact with Zimbabwe. This led to the
deployment of 1200 Zimbabwean troops along the Beira corridor in November
1982. Mozambique also established a defence pact with Tanzania in May 1981 
which would allow Tanzania to help its ally against what was considered aggression 
by reactionary forces against the free world :
... The attacks on Mozambique pose a threat to the 
whole o f free Africa, especially neighbouring states. So 
we shall do what we can. At the very least we stand to be 
counted on the side o f freedom... we have come to the 
conclusion that the problems caused by internal 
reactionary forces supported by imperialist forces can 
only be overcome through military and economic 
cooperation.89
Tanzania committed 2 batallions to help train the Mozambican Armed 
Forces (FPLM). Both Zimbabwean and Tanzanians troops participated in joint 
operations against Renamo. Botha's warning was followed by a raid to Maputo in 
January 1981. The Maputo raid forced the FLS to reassess their strategy against
88 Quoted in Neil Marais “South Africa’s Foreign Policy and International Practice During 1980 as 
Reflected in Speech and Parliamentary Statements and Replies” South African Year Book of 
International Law (Pretoria: Verloren van Themaat Centre for Intenational Law, 1980), p. 186.
89 See the Tanzanian Daily News, 5 May 1981.
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South Africa. They came to conclude that South Africa would not respect the policy 
of stabilization90. This forced them to increase the level of their committment to the 
struggle in South Africa and step up military support for the ANC. International 
support was mobilised on behalf of the ANC to enable it to intensify the armed 
struggle. This opened up an opportunity for the USSR to increase its support for the 
ANC, supplying it with new arms. The USSR also stepped up its support to the 
Frontline states. MI-21 helicopters and fighter bombers MIG 21 and MIG-23. The 
Soviet Union also stepped up their military support to Zambia and Tanzania.
The number of Cuban troops in Angola continued to increase. In view of the 
situation the West was faced with the dilemma of continued confrontation and 
escalation in the region or pressing the South African regime to dismantle 
apartheid. The regime was facing condemnation from every quarter and indeed, it 
had become an embarrassment for any state to maintain close ties with it. The 
Southern African states were now calling for mandatory global sanctions against the 
regime. The West percieved the danger that not supporting reforms in South Africa 
could radicalize the domestic conflict inside South Africa and the conflict between 
South Africa and its neighbours. The radicalisation of the conflict could lead to the 
possible destruction of economic and political interests which would take years to 
restore. However, if reforms were to be conducted in an uncontrolled manner there 
was also a risk of jeopardising Western interests in the region. This led the West to 
shelter South Africa once again. The argument continued to be the same as in the 
past. Isolating South Africa from the international community did more harm than
90 See, Julius Nyerere “North and South Dialogue”, op. cit., p. 836.
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good, in fact this would prevent the West from exerting a positive influence, since 
cutting links left it without any political clout.91
On the other hand, the wars in Mozambique and Angola were having 
disastrous consequences.The confrontation had led the region to economic 
stagnation if not deprivation. Most of the equipment received by the Frontline 
States was inappropriate to stop incursions by South African commandos and the 
guerrilla activities pursued by its surrogate forces. Destabilisation affected the 
SADCC project as the war deteriorated in Mozambique and Angola and other states 
were hit by occasional raids arid selective sanctions applied by South Africa.
The US advocated diplomacy to remedy the situation. Under the Nixon 
Doctrine, South Africa was seen as a traditional ally. This view was now re­
assessed. Although National Security Memorandum 39 became the basis for US 
policy, its premises were changed. The argument that there were no hopes for the 
blacks to gain political rights and that constructive engagement could only come 
through the white regimes in Southern Africa was abandoned. The view that the US 
strategic interest in the region emanated from the need to secure the use of the 
Simonstown base was no longer credible. Instead the the Reagan Administration 
concentrated its analysis on Africa’s fragile political institutions. They noted that 
what was necessary in Africa was strong, more durable and less politicised 
institutions. They envisaged a wider role to be played by the US to encourage 
changes and to create solid institutions. Their main idea was to engage 
constructively in Southern African affairs bringing the opposing parties together, as 
oposed to backing one side only:
It is difficult to see how interests in racial 
accommodation expanded markets and resource access, 
and improved standards of human welfare can be 
advanced by taking a back seat in Africa whenever its
91 Indeed there is no difference between the argument of the 1980s and that of the past years with 
respect to South Africa,See for example, Ritchie Ovendale, The South African Policy of the 
British Labour Government, 1947-1951”, International Affairs, Vol.59, Winter, op. cit., note 53. 
Chapter 2. above.
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tensions explode into conflict. By the same token, US 
interests will suffer if the doctrine of African solutions to 
African problems is translated to mean that American 
policy will back whatever changes emerge on the ground
92without U.S. participation.
This became the focal point of 1980’s US foreign policy towards the 
region, currently known as constructive engagement. In outlining the policy, 
Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Chester Crocker, stressed that the 
case for a constructive engagement lay in the stark choice ‘between the twin 
dangers of abetting violence in the Republic or aligning ourselves with the cause of
93white rule’. Opting for either of these two extremes seemed to be inapropriate for 
US policy.
The constructive engagement policy created a climate for negotiations between 
opposing blocks in the region. Faced between ruin and compromise, the 
government of Mozambique was forced to sign a non-agression pact with South 
Africa known as the Nkomati Accord in March 1984. The Nkomati Accord 
committed South Africa to stop its support of Renamo in exchange for the 
Mozambican government’s dismantling of ANC bases in Mozambique. The 
Nkomati agreement was followed by the signature of the Lusaka Accord between 
Angola and South Africa in May 1984. This provided for South African withdrawal 
from the Angolan territory in an exchange for dismantling of SWAPO bases in 
Angola. In neither cases did South Africa honour its part of the agreement. In 
Mozambique it continued to supply Renamo long after the signature of the Nkomati 
Accord, while in Angola South Africa stepped up its support to UNITA following
92 See Michael A. Samuels et al. Implications o f Soviet and Cuban Activities in Africa for US Policy 
Washington D.C.:1979, pp. 59-63
93 See Chester Crocker, South Africa: a Strategy for Change, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 59:2 1980, pp. 
323-351; see alo Chester Crocker, African Policy in the 1980s Washington Quarterly, Summer 
1980, pp. 72-86.
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the government offensive against UNITA’s main base in Mavinga. South Africa 
interrupted its withdrawal and came to rescue UNITA. Confrontation in Angola 
increased following US support of UNITA after the repeal of the Clarke 
ammendment by the US Congress in 1986. By supporting UNITA the US aimed at 
forcing a ‘mutual hurting stalemate’94 in Angola and to force the MPLA
. . 95government mto negotiations .
However, US support to UNITA coincided with a change in Soviet foreign 
policy towards Southern Africa, as the Soviet Union began to face domestic 
economic crisis. Indeed, by the end of the 1980’s Soviet political clout in 
Southern Africa declined to a point where its policy was de-ideologised. Thus it 
reversed its long term committments to short term ones. This rationale forced it to 
extend its relations with non-traditional partners such as Zimbabwe, Lesotho and 
Botswana.96
As regards the South African conflict, the USSR adopted a more pragmatic 
approach. Instead of concentrating its support on the coalition of the South Africa 
Communist Party (SACP) and the ANC, they sought to extend it to other black
97organisations such as the Inkatha Freedom Party . Soviet policy planners began to 
admit that black movemnts apart from the ANC had an important role to play in the
98struggle against appartheid. They began to establish contacts with apartheid 
leaders and other white organisations since they reached the conclusion that there
94 The Constructive engagement policy was predicated on the assumption that there should not be 
losers in the process of regional conflict resolution. The reaching of mutual hearting stalemate was 
seen as the key factor in addresing the regional conflict in Southern Africa. For details in theory see 
I. W. Zartman, Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1989)
95 See, Chester Croker, High Moon in Southern Africa, Making Peace in a Rough Neighbourhood 
(New York: Norton &Company) 1992, pp. 72-73.
96See Margot Light, “Moscow’s Retreat From Africa”, op cit. pp. 33-36.
97 Cited in David Albright, Soviet Policy Toward Africa Revisited, op. cit., pp. 5-6
98 Ibid.
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were sections of the white population who no longer upheld apartheid Foreign 
Minister Schevemadze attended celebrations of Namibia’s independence in March 
1993. There, he held a private meeting with the US Secretary of State James Baker 
to agree on a framework which would lead to the resolution of the Angolan civil 
conflict. Schevemadze also held a meeting with President de Klerk of South Africa 
to explore grounds for future diplomatic relations with South Africa. 
Schevemadze* then travelled to Mozambique, Zambia and Tanzania to explain the 
changes that had taken place in the Soviet policy.
The painful experience of its involvement in Southern Africa and in 
Afghanistan accelerated Soviet disengagement from Southern Africa as domestic 
constituencies began to question the rationale of Soviet committments abroad.
The changes in US and Soviet foreign policies in the region enabled their 
cooperation with regard to the resolution of regional conflicts. They had come to the 
conclusion that neither had vital strategic interests in the region although both had 
legitimate interests." Their cooperation stimulated a process of negotiations 
culminating in the signature of the New York Accord that provided for the 
independence of Namibia and the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. This 
was followed by a process of negotiation that led to the 1991 Bicesse agreement in 
Angola between UNITA and the MPLA government and the 1992 Rome agreement 
in Mozambique that brought together the Frelimo government and Renamo. At the 
same time, Pretoria was brought to the negotiating table with nationalist forces, a 
process which culminated in free elections in April 1994 , bringing apartheid to an 
end in South Africa.
99 This spirit was reflected in the Communiquee signed by President Konstantine Chernenko and 
President Mengistu Haile Mariam of Ethiopia during the latter’s visit to Moscow in March 1984. 
See, Pravda, 3 April 1984.
149
All these factors contributed to shaping security relations in the region. 
While the 1970’s and the 1980’s were marked by competition and rivalry, the 
1990’s were characterised by the will to reduce the confrontation and create a basis 
for reconciliation. Three decades of confrontation in the region have produced 
animosities and concerns, alliances and enemies. The interaction of different actors 
also stressed common vulnerabilitites in the region and highlighted common 
aspirations. The interaction of state and non-state actors in the region and the 
interaction between regional and non-regional actors produced a pattern of specific 
security relations which can be considered security complex.
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PART II
LEGACIES AND INADEQUACIES OF TRADITIONAL 
APPROACHES TO SECURITY
C h a p ter  4
The Legacies of the Southern African Security Complex
This chapter discusses the legacies of the Southern Africa security complex 
which include, weakened states, military, economic and social problems. It argues 
that these legacies will remain the major sources of insecurity in the region and 
that, until they are addressed, a pattern of regional interaction promoting regional 
stability and greater prospects for security cannot be fully attained.
The State and Security
As we saw in Chapter 1, the state is widely regarded in the International Relations 
literature as a source of security. Thinkers such as Hobbes recognised that the 
state of nature and foreign invasions posed threats to human beings and that the 
constitution of a state was the only way to avoid war of all against all.1 The state 
as a source of security is also acknowledged by Locke who postulated that the 
“desire of men to put themselves under government is to defend their property 
(including lives, liberties and estates)”. Recent writers such as Buzan, argue that 
the state is the “principal referent object of security because it is both the 
framework of order and the highest source of governing authority”. Indeed, in 
most recent societies the role of the state as a source of security is taken for 
granted, and, for a long time, the debate revolving around the state has been about 
finding an ideal type of state, that is, the kind of state that can best guarantee 
security for the people living in it. Hobbes, argued for a maximalist state,
1 See Thomas Hobbes, The Leviathan, op. cit., p. 275.
2 John Locke, Second Treatise o f Government, op. cit., p. 406-407.
3 See B. Buzan, An Agenda for International Security Studies, op. cit., p. 22.
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founded on a social contract between individuals and the Leviathan. Hobbes saw 
the concentration of power in an overall sovereign, as the necessary pre-condition 
for advancing the well-being of any human collectivity, while Locke, believed 
that the minimalist state, resulting from a social contract between rulers and 
ruled was the best option. Although the advocates of maximalist and minimalist 
states differed in their conceptions, they shared the basic assumption that the 
order and stability of societies can only be achieved through some form of supra- 
individual organization binding people together in a state.
Thus, the importance of the state to security stems from the fact that at 
the domestic level the state is the overarching source of order and authority which 
claims to represent the interests of the whole society. It is assumed that it has the 
monopoly of the means of violence which makes it the only organisation capable 
of maintaining order by mediating relations between members of society and of 
providing protection to its citizens against foreign aggression. The fact that the 
state is also the basic unit of the international system establishes a close 
connection between domestic and international security, since the domestic 
condition of the state has an impact on the international system and vice-versa.
This is not to say, however that all states are capable of guaranteeing 
security to their citizens. As Buzan argues, some are not only unable to provide 
security, but are themselves a source of insecurity.4 He asks what conditions 
states need to fulfill in order to become sources of national security? He depicts 
three components of the state which he believes are important for the formulation 
of the concept of national security. They are: i) the idea of the state; ii) its 
physical base; and, iii) its institutions. As Buzan explains, the idea of the state 
refers to the political identity existing in the minds of its people. It encapsulates 
the sense of purpose, what binds together the collectivity, what the state exists to 
do and its relationship with society it contains. To provide a strong sense of
4 Ibid., pp. 39-54.
152
national security, Buzan argues that the idea o f the state needs not only to be
coherently articulated, but to be widely held,5 since:
... a state without a binding idea might be so 
disadvantaged as to be unable to sustain its existence in 
a competitive international system.6
The physical base of the state is understood as being the geographical 
extent, the population, its physical assets including what is owned by the people 
and both the authorities. The institutions comprise governing bodies in executive, 
legislative and judicial branches of the state.7 Buzan distinguishes strong states - 
i.e., those with strong socio-political cohesion - from weak states with weak 
socio-political cohesion.8 He argues that when the idea and institutions of the state 
are both strong, the state will be in a better position to act as a coherent unit 
seeking security in an anarchical international system. Conversely, when the idea 
of the state and institutions are both weak, “then that state is in a very real sense 
less of a state”, and it will be more vulnerable to many kinds of threats, internal 
and external than strong states, therefore unable to pursue national security:
Where the state is strong, national security can be 
viewed primarily in terms o f  protecting the components 
o f  the state from outside threats and interference....
Where the state is weak only its physical base and 
sometimes, not even that, may be sufficiently well 
defined to constitute a clear object o f  national security.
Because its ideas and its institutions are contested to the 
point o f  violence, they are not properly national in 
scope, and do not offer clear rererents as objects o f  
national security, because by definition, they are not 
properly national scope....Because o f  this, it can be more 
appropriate to view  security in weak states in terms o f  
the contending groups, organisations and individuals as 
the prime referents o f  security.9
Buzan’s discussion raises a fundamental question regarding the concept of 
national security which I shall return to in subsequent chapters. However, it is
5 Ibid., p. 82.
6 Ibid., pp. 64-65.
7 Ibid., pp. 57-66.
8 Ibid,, pp. 97-107.
9 Ibid., pp. 97-101
appropriate here to comment upon his suggestion that national security is a 
function of the strength of the idea and institutions of the state. While a 
correlation between the strength of the institutions, their legitimacy and their 
stability can be established, these factors, cannot be attributed to the fact that the 
purpose of the state is popular and widely held as Buzan claims. Buzan’s 
formulation leaves one under the impression that state institutions are a result of a 
constant plebiscite between governments and their societies with respect to what 
the state exists to do. However, empirical evidence suggests that governments 
hardly concern themselves with this question.10 Their main concern and that of 
civil society are ideas that can be provided to the institutions to maintain and 
expand their power rather than to obtain consensus on the purpose of the state.11 
Tax collection, policing, the provision of education and health, conscription or 
professional recruitment of youngsters for the army are not dependent upon stable 
government or on providing a clear answer to the question what does the state 
exist to do? Rather it is the manner in which these functions are conducted that 
determine social-cohesiveness. Once institutions are established they follow their 
own dynamic and become less preoccupied with ideas underpinning their 
existence. Indeed in many cases governments go and come while institutions 
continue unabated with their routine functions that binds the society together. By 
and large, the percentage of citizens which knows details about what the state 
exists to do, even in the developed societies of the West, is very small, yet state 
institutions enjoy legitimacy and stability. In Africa, high illiteracy rates, and the 
lack of an open society tradition make this percentage even smaller. This fact 
permits institutions to manipulate state ideology making it responsive to wishes 
of governments regardless of whether the ideas underpinning the state are popular 
or not. Nazi Germany’s ability to wage war against the great powers of Europe
10 See for example, Samir Al-Khalid, Republic of Fear: The Politics o f Modern Iraq (Hutchison: 
California University Press, 1989).
11 See Michael Mann, “The Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins, Mechanisms and 
Results” in John Hall (ed) States in History (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), pp. 115-122.
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and the United States and use its citizens to commit atrocities epitomises the 
extent to which institutions can be manipulated to suit the interests of the 
dominant elites and the way their efficiency can be used to mold the society rather 
than the popularity of the idea underpinning the state. The power of Nazi 
institutions played an important role in knitting German society together behind 
Nazi objectives, thus making it impossible for any counter-acting ideology to 
emerge.12 However, whether these institutions became stronger due to the 
coherence and popularity of Nazi ideology is open to question. The other point 
weakening Buzan’s argument is that historical evidence shows that state ideology 
swings like a pendulum and take the masses along with it. The Bolsheviks who 
led the revolution that culminated in the creation of the Soviet state enjoyed 
popularity among the majority of Soviets; so did the idea of the Soviet state. 
However, this popularity crumbled over time when institutions failed to deliver 
what the state had set for itself to do.
This suggests that the idea of the state does not have the importance that 
Buzan seeks to accord in the definition of strong and weak states, that is to say, 
for strong or weak socio-political cohesion. Indeed, it is taken for granted that 
states exist to mediate relations among human beings and provide protection for 
all people contained in them. The problems of many states start when this 
perception drifts away or when there are perceptions that state power can be 
usurped to serve sectional interests and not the other way around. Indeed while 
the perception that states are there for all its citizens prevails, strong or weaker 
socio-political cohesion becomes a function of the efficiency of institutions and 
less of the coherent idea of the state. This efficiency is determined by a number of 
factors, such as culture, level of training of civil service, type of discipline 
introduced in these institutions and the availability of resources to make them 
work. Indeed the strength of the modem state is not its ideology but its capacity to
12 See Zygmunt Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust (Oxford: Blackwell ,1989), pp. 151-168.
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of resources and people and the bureaucratic machinery that makes each one of its
13citizens inescapable to its pressures. Modem states in the majority of the Third 
World show greater insensitivity to peoples’ opinions and new ideas to the point 
that the impact of government policies on state institutions is minimal, unless 
there is a revolution or a total break down.
Buzan’s discussion on state and security provides, however, a useful 
framework for analysing the nature of states and their role in security in Southern 
Africa. >
Southern African States
On Buzan’s criteria, Southern African states are weak states. Even the relatively 
powerful South Africa would be considered a weak state. With the partial 
exception of South Africa, they are all successor colonial states. They resulted 
from the recognition by the major victorious powers of World War II, of the right 
to self-determination of peoples of the colonies and belong to the category that 
Robert Jackson calli^‘quasi-states). They have juridical sovereignty as a result of 
recognition by the rest of international society, but their empirical statehood is 
either weak, ill-functioning or non existent.14 These states have been weakened 
by several internal and external factors. Their physical bases, socio-political 
cohesion and institutions were severely affected by either colonial policies, 
internal disputes or by regional wars. Therefore, they face difficulties in 
realising their security objectives, primarily in terms of protecting the components 
of the state from domestic and external threats; and secondly, in terms of 
protecting the region from intra-regional and extra-regional threats. Although the 
degree of vulnerability varies across the region, taken together, the Southern
13 See “Politics as a Vocation” in H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (eds.) From Max Weber: Essay 
in Sociology (London: Routlege, 1991) pp. 78-128.
14 For details about quasi-states, see R. Jackson, Quasi States: Sovereignty, International 
Relations and the Third World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press ,1993).
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African security complex show high vulnerabilities to both military and non­
military threats.
The apartheid state in South Africa is an example of a weak state whose 
purpose was contested right from the outset. It effectively created a peculiar 
situation of one state within another. A state that existed to protect white minority 
interests in a Republic supposed to be shared by all races. Although successive 
defence papers (1973, 1977, 1979) identified the Republic of South Africa, the 
‘country’ and the community who live in it to be the objects of its national 
security policy,15 this was not reflected in the domestic policies of the apartheid 
government and in the country’s legislation. In the domestic realm, the apartheid 
state distinguished the white population from the blacks. In fact the terms 
‘Republic’, ‘country’ and community implied as objects of national security in 
the White papers on defence were euphemistically used as synonymous for the 
white minority. From South African government’s list of threats to its security it 
becomes clear that its conception of the purpose of the state was a threat to one of 
its essential components, the physical base since these threats included:
...leftist activists, exaggerated humanism, 
permissiveness, materialism and related ideologies... 
black racism, exaggerated individual freedom, one-man- 
one vote...boycotts, isolation, demonstrations, 
undermining activities and limited violence.16
While apartheid's conception of the purpose of the state was strongly held 
by a majority of a small minority, it found no echo with the vast majority of non­
white South Africans.17 Thus its concept of national security became a target of 
internal and external sources and could only be expressed in terms of divergent
15 See South African Government, White Paper on Defence, 1973, p. 8.
16Ibid.,p.l.
17 See, Alexander Johnston, “Weak States and National Security: The Case of South Africa”, 
Review o f International Studies, Vol. 17: 1, 1991, pp. 149-169.
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group interests. Moreover, the particularistic purpose of the state articulated by 
the minority conflicted with the majority’s idea, and their security interests 
threatened necessarily those of the remaining South Africans. Conversely, the all- 
inclusive idea of the state articulated by the South African Communist Party- 
African National Congress (SACP-ANC) coalition antagonised the Afrikaners 
and their conception of national security. Yet, the exclusivist idea of self- 
determination propounded by the PAC and Black Consciousness movements 
threatened not only the interests of the Afrikaners but even the whites within the 
ANC. All these allowed the concept of national security to be expressed in terms 
of divergent group interests.18
Although the end of apartheid paved the way for the creation of an all- 
inclusive and unitary state in South Africa, a shared purpose of the state continues 
to face challenges from many quarters. Chief among these are different 
expectations and weak socio-political cohesion, which encourages different 
political formations to articulate different ideas of the state. Specific interests of 
conservative and extremist Afrikaners, exclusive interests of Zulus and other 
radical black organisations lead to opposing views of the nature of the state that 
should be created away from all the unifying factors around the concept of 
national security.
The other factor affecting the idea of the state in South Africa pertains to 
the politics of redistribution. Years of apartheid have created deep economic 
asymmetries within South African society.19 Although most South Africans agree 
that these asymmetries need to be resolved, there is not yet a consensus on how 
they should be addressed. While the underclass resulting from years of 
domination, favours a state which will address their particular condition, the 
coalition government that was established following the 1994 elections was
18 See, H. Giliomee, “Afrikaner Politics 1977-87: From Afrikaner nationalist Rule to Central 
State” Hegemony in J. Brewer, (ed.) Can South Africa Survive? Five Minutes to Midnight, 
(London, 1989), p. 132.
19See, T. Ohlson and S. Steadman, The New Is Not Yet Born, op.cit., pp. 265, 266.
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sensitive to dangers of any radical policies. This form of competition tends to 
reinforce the argument that national security in the weak states cannot primarily 
be seen in terms of protecting the state against external threats.20
The Successor Colonial States
The rest of Southern Africa consisted of colonial states, primarily 
conceived to safeguard the interests of the colonial powers. Consequently they 
sought to undermine the interests of societies in which they operated. It should be 
noted however, that Imperial Britain introduced in the nineteenth century, the 
principle of paramouncy which sought to safeguard the will of the local 
population. None the less, the colonial authorities never questioned the 
legitimacy of their rule or the nature of their relationship with domestic societies.
Most of the political and the administrative power was concentrated in 
the hands of civil servants who came from the metropoles. Colonial authorities 
made little effort to incorporate natives in state functions and their main concern 
was to set up a small structure to undertake functions such as the collection of 
revenues, infrastructure organisation, education and health provision, and the 
maintenance of public order. When undertaking these functions, civil servants 
did not seek to legitimise their action through political activity. They saw no need 
for political action because they could govern through decree without meeting 
serious challenges to their authority. In fact political action was thought to be 
unnecessary as Kasfir indicates:
Political culture bequeathed by colonialism contained 
the notions that political activity was merely a disguised 
form o f  self-interest subversive o f  the public welfare.21
20 B. Buzan, An Agenda for International Security Studies, op.cit., pp. 79-99.
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The legitimation of policies in the colonial state relied on extensive 
military force backed by the police force including the secret police. These were 
called in from time to time to quell insurgent nationalist forces, workers revolting 
because of low pay and harsh working conditions and claims of injustice.22
The continuing alienation and repression of Africans created the 
conditions for the colonial states to be viewed as an alien organisation designed 
to dominate the natives. This situation allowed the emergence of nationalist 
movements which articulated alternative views of the state. Thus, the colonial 
state failed to attract popularity among the majority of Africans, thus allowing the 
concept of national security to be expressed only in terms of divergent interest 
groups.
As elsewhere in Africa at independence, southern African statesmen were 
confronted with a number of problems which contributed to weaken the state in 
their countries .^Independence in Southern Africa, meant the transfer of power to 
political elites but with little change in the nature of states. African statesmen 
virtually replaced the colonial civil service with Africans but the nature of 
institutions and political structures remained the same. As Chazan observes: I
The formal agencies transferred to African hands were 
alien in derivation, functionally conceived, 
bureaucratically designed, authoritarian in nature and 
primarily concerned with issues o f  domination rather 
than with issues o f  legitimation.
The colonial inherited structures were inadequate to meet the aspirations of those 
who expected to improve the quality of their relations with the state by having a 
government composed of active nationalists. These structures were increasingly
21 See N. Kasfir, “Designs and Dilemmas: An Overview in Philip Mahwood” (ed.) Local 
Government in the Third World: The Experience o f Tropical Africa (New York: John Wiley, 
1983), p. 34.
22 See for example: M. Newitt, Portugal in Africa, op. cit., pp. 106-120; see also J. D. Omer- 
Cooper, The History o f Southern Africa, op. cit., pp. 149-150.
23 See Naomi Chazan, et al. Politics and Society in Contemporary Africa (Boulder, Colorado: 
Westview Press, 1992), p.43.
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seen as illegitimate, as sub-national loyalties weakened national unity and 
consequently the state. Internal disputes over participation and resources, and 
civil wars, disrupted the processes of nation-building and the attempts to create 
unitary and all-inclusive-states. The prevailing idea about the purpose of the state 
left it challenged and subsequently weakened by those who felt excluded in the 
national process. As a consequence, the idea of national security became 
synonymous with the security of governments and its agencies.
The Physical Base and Institutions
The importance of the physical base of the state to the concept of national 
security stems from the fact that it constitutes its physical foundation. No state 
can exist without population, territory and other physical assets. The destruction 
of its assets, or the seizing of its territory can threaten the collectivity of 
individuals living in it.
The importance of the interconnection between the physical base of the 
state, its institutions has already been established.24 Institutions are a physical 
expression of the state. They regulate the realm of society defining norms through 
which the members of a collectivity should interact and develop mechanisms for 
the protection of the physical base of the state. According to Buzan, these 
functions, however, can only be legitimised by the idea of the state itself. Buzan 
adds that in cases where this idea is so weak that it cannot legitimise state 
institutions the concept of national security, is likely to be only expressed in 
terms of governments' interests:
... is it possible to have a state in which the idea o f  the 
state is very weak or non- existent, and in which the 
institutional component has to take up all its 
functions?... In this situation the interests o f  the state 
would be defined solely in terms o f  the interests o f  the 
ruling elite, and, the coherence o f  the state would be
24 B. Buzan, An Agenda for International Security Studies, op. cit., pp. 62-69.
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preserved by  instituting the state’s coercive power 
against its citizens.25
Johnston sees Buzan's postulation as representing an extreme case, since 
the reality, as the South African example shows, is translated by cases in which 
institutions tend to compensate for the idea of the state.26 In fact when institutions 
are strong, little room is found for self-expression of the idea of the state. 
However, in most Southern African states, institutions themselves are weak. They 
have a limited geographical extension, very few resources and untrained 
personnel. Illiteracy rates in some of these states are as high as 70%, which is 
reflected in the poor quality of the civil service. The lack of a qualified civil 
service affected some states in the region since independence, following the 
massive exodus of expatriates after the independence. Tanzania for instance, had 
only 10% of the civil servants it needed when it became independent.27 Poor 
education and poor training of natives made the task of state-building in the post­
independence period almost impossible.28 Decolonisation meant solely the 
transfer of decision-making centres from metropoles to African capital 
However, the new decision-making centres had no previous experiences of policy 
design and implementation. With the exception of South Africa in which imperial 
capacities were maintained and eventually improved, most Southern African 
states had to train their civil servants initially from scratch. The other exception 
is represented by states such as Zimbabwe and Namibia whose independence 
came late and where therefore, there was time to train the civil service and reduce 
the illiteracy rate.29 These states also had much lower rates of professional 
emigration than elsewhere in the region. However, the general pattern was for 
state institutions to be stronger in the capitals and a few urban centres. The
25 Ibid., p. 83.
26 See, Alexander Johnston, “Weak States and National Security: The Case of South Africa in the 
Era of Total Strategy”, Review of International Studies, Vol. 17:1, 1991, p.158.
27 See R. Hodder Williams, An Introduction of Politics to Tropical Africa (London: George Allen 
and Unwin, 1984), p. 86.
28 See C. Thomas, In Search o f Security, op. cit., p. 15.
29See Naomi Chazan et. al., Politics and Society in Contemporary Africa, op. cit. p. 43.
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further one moved away from the capital, they tended to weaken until they 
became virtually non-existent.
This situation is worsened by the lack of resources to develop 
infrastructure such as roads and railways that would facilitate communication 
between the urban centres and the countryside.
The absence of state institutions in some areas meant that the idea of the 
state could not be extended to citizens living in these areas. As a result, sub­
national loyalties in these areas tended to overshadow state objectives, since the 
absence of the state allowed the development of local politics, riddled with a 
<1 value system and priorities that most times did not coincide with the values and 
I priorities of the state. This tended to reinforce the differences between the local 
and the national which often led to internal conflicts between governments and 
different interest groups. Such conflicts, often exacerbated by the necessity for 
governments to adjust to a hostile international environment at the same time they 
were struggling to secure their legitimacy at home made it difficult for them to 
act as representatives of an homogeneous population.30 To curb conflicts, some 
governments chose to introduce pluralist institutions, while others continued with 
the authoritarian structures inherited from colonialism. Those who adopted 
pluralist institutions, such as Botswana soon discovered that these collided with 
the way their political understanding was shaped,31 as these institutions tended to 
exacerbate sub-national divisions and required some balancing with traditional 
institutions.32 Those who opted for authoritarian rule such as Malawi seemed to 
their fellow citizens little better than the previous colonial rulers. Both these 
options attracted a lot of criticism and provided room for domestic challenges 
which further deepened the fragmentation of societies. These divisions were 
exacerbated by economic conditions of dependence on the former colonial powers
30 See C. Thomas, In Search o f Security, op. cit. pp. 10-35
31 See Bogosi Otlogile “How Free and Fair” in Mopho G. Molomo and Brian T. Makopakgosi, 
Multiparty Democracy in Botswana, ( Harare: SAPES, 1990), pp. 23-38.
32 See Naomi Chazan et. al., Politics and Society in Contemporary Africa, op cit, p.45.
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which prevented African governments from building a national economic base 
which could help them to win legitimacy from the different constituencies. Thus, 
the formation of national consciousness in these states was hampered from the j
33 'ioutset, and as a consequence state-building failed to market itself as a viable ; 
project.
Thirty years of confrontation in Southern Africa tended to reinforce the 
weak character of Southern African states. Peculiarly, the South African state in 
some aspects is an exception to this rule. The case of South Africa seems to 
confirm the rule that ‘War is the great stimulus to state building’.34 The constant 
threat of confrontation against neighbouring states and the putative threat of a 
black uprising domestically provided South Africa with an opportunity to create 
a strong state. The confrontation caused the state to become more efficient in 
revenue collection; it forced apartheid leaders to improve administrative 
capabilities and created a climate and symbols to unify its main base, that is, 
white society, through the promotion of Afrikaner ideology and the imposition of 
discriminatory legislation. The environment of constant threat throughout 
Southern Africa also forced the state to militarise the society and provided the 
military establishment with an opportunity to gain direct access to power. This 
situation further stimulated the participation of the military establishment in the 
decision making-process in all areas of civil life. The idea of confrontation 
further stimulated the South African state to strengthen its security forces and its 
domestic institutions of law and order. It also stimulated the development of a 
nationalist oriented economy.
The situation in the rest of the Southern African states was different. 
Regional confrontation forced the other states to shift their attention from state 
and institution building to face the impact of war and destabilisation. They were
33 See Yves Person, “L’etat nation en Affique”, Le Mois en Afrique 190/191, 1981, pp. 27-35
34 See, S. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1968), p.123.
forced to spend their scarce resources improving their military capabilities. None 
the less, they remained weak and were unable to face stronger armies such as the 
SADF and its surrogates. But as South Africa inflicted more damage on their 
countries, they continued to overspend on defence. The diversion of resources 
into military activity led to a further polarisation of societies as resources shrank 
while the needs of different national constituencies increased. The climate of 
confrontation wrecked the economies of some states and made the region less 
attractive to foreign investment. As a result economies showed levels of 
continuing decline and stagnation reaching the lowest levels in the 1980’s.35 This 
forced them to become more dependent on foreign aid. Aid dependence sustained 
their juridical sovereignty, but their empirical sovereignty became increasingly 
restricted.
The years of confrontation severely reduced the state’s ability to provide 
security to the population. State institutions were further weakened and the 
physical infrastructure was left to crumble and decay. The consequences were 
diverse. States that were not directly affected by war remained unable to reduce 
their vulnerability to poverty, natural disasters and epidemics, while those directly 
affected faced the disintegration of their societies to a point which increasingly 
approximated the Hobbesian state of nature. In countries such as Mozambique 
and Angola, the state was forced to physically withdraw from the countryside as 
its infrastructure was destroyed and its officials forced to abandon state 
functions. The withdrawal of its functionaries from the countryside left behind 
large areas without any state institution to undertake basic functions, such as 
administration, the maintenance of law and order, the provision of education and 
health services, the regulation of trade, the organization of productive capacity 
and tax collection. This situation exacerbated the flooding of the population from
35 See details in South African Destabilisation: The Economic Cost o f Frontline Resistance to 
Apartheid, op.cit., pp. 3-18; see also Children in the Frontline, The Impact o f Apartheid 
Destabilisation and Warfare on Children in Southern Africa, UNICEF, 1989, pp. 34 - 39.
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the country-side to urban areas. Uncontrolled population movements further 
undermined the security of these states, by disrupting their productive capacity, 
increasing the level of unemployment, criminality and the deterioration of public 
health. In the end, some of these states faced the challenge of building credible 
political structures that could guarantee the participation of all and legitimate 
institutions that could assure order and stability, other faced' challenges of 
extending those institutions to all parts of their national territory and to improve 
their performance. However, their capacity to do so would depend upon other 
factors including their economic recovery.
Military- Related Legacies
The military-related legacies of the Southern Africa security complex include 
weak and fragile armies and police forces, proliferation of large quantities of 
light weapons outside the control of state authorities, the existence of large pools 
of demobilised combatants; and, military asymmetries between states. Weak 
security forces make it difficult for the states to maintain domestic order, deal 
with internal crises and curb domestic threats, whereas the existence of large 
numbers of demobilised but still armed combatants in an environment 
characterised by a socio-economic deprivation leads to the rise in crime and 
instability. On the other hand, the existence of pronounced military asymmetries 
may leads the states to renew their efforts toward militarisation at the expense of 
development. This situation tends to increase insecurity.
The armies of Zimbabwe, Namibia, South Africa, Mozambique and possibly 
Angola are the product of mergers of formerly rival forces with different 
doctrines, levels of discipline, ethnic composition, organisation and structures. 
The process of merging these groups into a coherent functional structure has been 
problematic. Although the nature of the problems varies from one country to
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another, taken together, in a regional context, they result in a complex matrix 
threatening the stability of the entire region.
The end of apartheid and confrontation has provided the states with an 
opportunity to re-asses the role of their security forces and to restructure them to 
meet the challenges of the new strategic environment. These are identified by 
many as: i) the defence of the nation against foreign aggression; ii) to deal with 
internal crisis and uphold constitutional rule; iii) to control national borders.36 
There is general consensus across the region that to fulfill these functions the 
armed forces should be professional, depoliticised and non-partisan.37
The willingness of the states to end regional confrontation is signaled by 
their membership in multilateral institutions such as the UN, OAU, and SADC 
which bind their members to settle their disputes amicably.38 Furthermore the 
chances for a stable Southern Africa are strengthened by the ratification of the 
Non-Proliferation Treaty by all governments in the region. However, the stability 
of the region partly depends upon the nature of the armed forces being created, 
their ability to curb internal crises and conflicts starting in other states. For this, 
they need to acquire the necessary legitimacy in the eyes of the people. In 
Southern Africa, legitimacy is also related to the ethnic and racial composition of 
the armed forces, which implies the need to recruit from all quarters and to 
reconcile and integrate the former contenders into an effective structure. This 
process would not be easy even if criteria such as professionalism, non­
36 See for example: L. Nathan, The Restructuring and Reorientation o f the South African Defence 
Force, Paper Presented at the Conference on Peacekeeping and Peacemaking in Southern Africa, 
Institute of International Education, Harare June 1993 pp.12- 15; see also W. Gutteridge, “South 
Africa’s Defence and Security Forces: The Next Decade” in J.E. Spence (ed.) Change in South 
Africa, (London: RIIA/Pinter), pp. 59-63; Susan Willet, South African Defence Forces: How 
Much Real Change? Paper prepared for the Wilton Park Conference on The New South Africa , 
March 1995, pp. 3-7.
37Ibid., see also Protocol VI of the October 1992 Rome Peace Accord signed by the Government 
of Mozambique and Renamo; the Bicesse Accord between the MPLA Government of Angola and 
UNITA. This principle was reaffirmed during the Lusaka Accord signed between the Angolan 
government and UNITA in 1994.
38 See Article 6 of the UN Charter, Article 3 of the OAU Charter and Article 12 of the SADC 
Treaty, Annex II in this study.
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discrimination, the maintenance of standards, and equal opportunities could be 
established as guiding principles. As Gutteridge observes, there will always be 
quarrels substantiated and unsubstantiated:
Non discrimination is easy to assert but difficult 
to exercise and even more difficult to prove to those 
who believe themselves victimized or discriminated 
against.39
The process of integration of previously opposing military forces has 
followed different routes in the region. Although the majority of states followed 
the principle of creating new national armies by retraining parts of the different 
military forces involved in conflicts, there were variations on the procedure. 
Zimbabwe, opted for training potential leaders of the new army from selected 
members of ZANLA and ZIPRA and providing an equal opportunity to any 
former guerrilla, or member of the Rhodesian army wishing to be part of the new 
army.40 Mozambique followed the procedure of retraining the new defence force 
(FADM) to which each of the warring factions would contribute 50 %.41 
However, South Africa chose to integrate the former members of the ANC and 
PAC military wings and members of TBVC armies into the structure of the 
SADF.42
The creation of new armed forces through mergers involved bringing together 
people of different ethnic groups and races, different cultures, and forces with 
different training experience, traditions of recruitment, motivation, discipline and 
operational experience. In states such as Zimbabwe and Mozambique, these
39 See W. Gutteridge, “South Africa’s Defence and Security Forces: The Next Decade”, in Jack E. 
Spence,(ed) Change in South Africa op. cit., p. 55.
40 See T. P. Toyne-Sewell, “Zimbabwe and the British Military Advisory and Training Team”, 
Army Quarterly and Defence Journal, January 1991, p. 54.
41 See Protocol IV of the General Peace Accord signed in Rome between the Government of 
Mozambique and Renamo, October 1992.
42 See “Soldiers Threaten to Resume Armed Struggle”, South Scan, Vol. 9:43, 18 November, 
1994, p. 338.
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mergers meant blending almost a dozen military traditions into one. In 
Mozambique, eleven politicaly and culturaly diverse countries, namely, the 
Soviet Union, Britain, Cuba, North Korea, the People’s Republic of China, 
France, Portugal, the German Democratic Republic, Tanzania and South Africa 
were involved either in training sections of armed forces, or of the dissident 
forces. Bringing people trained under different military traditions into an efficient 
structure has proved to be a difficult task since it affects the homogeneity of the 
force and their operational capacity.
The process of merging in Southern Africa faced a number of problems 
which tended to undermine the quality of the armed forces. The principles of 
quality, military merit, non-racialism, non-partisanism established as guideline for 
the creation of the South African Defence Force were often not observed. 
Unqualified individuals were appointed as high ranking officers on the basis of 
their political allegiance to the ruling party, to the detriment of better qualified 
individuals. Elsewhere in the region the process also allowed the domination of 
the armed forces by certain ethnic and racial groups, and, by individuals trained 
by a specific military school and tradition. These factors undermined unity within 
the armed forces and their capacity to act as coherent institutions. Instead, they 
were transformed into juxtaposed clusters of individuals with different allegiances 
and different motives. The consequence was widespread corruption since these 
armies were penetrated by nepotism and run by mafia-style groups.43
The process of integration that followed the creation of the South African 
National Defence Force was problematic since it has not led to any significant 
restructuring. In fact the structure of the new SANDF has remained the same as 
its predecessor the SADF. Although the SANDF is now subordinated to a civilian 
controlled Department of Defence, the procurement of weapons is still under the
43 See, G. Mills, The Process o f Integration o f National Armies in a Post Conflict Situation: 
Lessons from Other Countries, Paper prepared for the Conference on “Mozambique Post-War: 
Challenges and Realities” of the Instituto Superior de Rela?5es Intemacionais, December 1992, 
pp. 4-6
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responsibility of ARMSCOR, which remains outside the Department of Defence. 
Both the SANDF and the ARMSCOR continue to be dominated by the Afrikaner 
old guard. The situation has attracted criticism and complaints, especially from 
former MK, APLA and TBVC members.44 Their grievances include, among other 
things, the continuing dominance of whites of the SANDF and the subsequent 
discrimination to which lower ranking black and coloured officers are subjected. 
While the senior cadre of MK were accorded high ranks and good working 
facilities, junior officers on the lower ranks were subjected to poor living and 
working conditions. This caused protests and complaint that culminated in the 
Wallmannstal base incidents in October 1994.45 It has been suggested that the 
discrimination of ex-members of the MK was a tactical move by the SADF old 
guard to keep power and control of the SANDF by dividing senior ANC cadre 
from their men.46 However, the SANDF senior establishment argue for the need 
to maintain the standards and the quality of the armed forces, and, they see this as 
the main impediment to recruiting amongst blacks who are generally less well 
educated.47 None the less, this explanation does not seem to satisfy those who 
believe that the discrimination they suffered under apartheid was the reason 
behind their failure to get access to quality education. Pragmatism and affirmative 
action have been recommended as a solution to the problem. However, these still 
do not address the question of reconciliation. The Africanisation of SANDF, the 
attempts to restructure it, and affirmative action have caused frustration and
44 See W. Gutteridge, “South Africa’s Defence and Security Force”, in J. E. Spence, (ed) Change 
in South Africa, op. cit., pp. 52-53.
45 About 2000 MK who had joined the SANDF stayed away without leave in protest o f the 
discrimination they were subjected to in the Walmannstal base. They were consequently expelled. 
The Commission of inquiry set to investigate the incidents found their grievances justifiable. See 
for example, “Crime Fears as over 2000 MK Fighters Leave Camp”, South Scan, Vol. 9:42, 11 
November, 1994, p. 330.
AeIbid.
47 The South African former Minister of Education, Kobie Coetzee announced during the 
parliamentary debate on September 1993 that an initially one-year call up of volunteers would be 
introduced and that if the number required was not complete a ballot system drawing on males 
from all races who had reached Standard 10 of education would be introduced.
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dissatisfaction, especially among white officers who see their jobs being 
threatened by less competent black political appointees to SANDF ranks.48
The integration and restructuring of armed forces in Zimbabwe, Namibia, 
Mozambique, and Angola showed a number of particular problems, as the 
transformation of the guerrilla army into a national army required strict routines 
of financing, accountability and logistical organisation which their governments 
were not capable of offering.49 One particular aspect of these difficulties was to 
determine the criteria for the allocation of ranks. The guerrilla forces had an 
unclear military ranking structure and lacked objective criteria through which 
progress in the military was to be achieved. Regular forces were better structured 
and had clearer ranking generally based on military merit, but deciding on the 
designation of ranks still proved difficult, since different forces had different 
ranking systems. The translation of one rank structure into another including 
military educational requirements generated more conflict than agreement.50 Thus, 
the maintenance of standards within the armed forces became a contentious issue. 
It is viewed by some as blocking affirmative action and integration, while others 
fear undermining professionalism. Although professionalism is regarded as 
important, the experience in the region shows that there are risks of defining it in 
a very narrow sense which may jeopardise settlements and inspire conflict.
However, the dangers of harming professionalism are many. Politicization 
of the armed forces or some sections of them is a real possibility. Most armies in 
the region result from a transformation of guerrilla forces which operate through 
political mobilisation involving its members. These forces are used to intervene 
in politics and some may continue to do so. In Mozambique and Angola and to a 
certain extent South Africa, the picture is worsened by the fact that the forces
48 See “MK Soldiers Threaten to Resume the Struggle”, op. cit. p. 328
49 See G. Mills, The Process o f Integration o f National Armies In a Post Conflict Situation: 
Lessons from Other Countries,op. cit., pp. 3-12.
50 Ibid.; see also L. Nathan, “Marching to a Different Drum,” The Centre for Southern African 
Studies Working Paper Series, University of Western Cape, 1991, pp. 10-19
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forming the core of national armies, have for a long time, operated under different 
political allegiances.51 Although the spirit of corporate neutrality is enshrined in 
the doctrines and constitution of most states region, their practice is yet to be 
observed. However, it can be anticipated that the potential for different political 
parties to exert their influence on sections of the armed forces is high which can 
severely affect professionalism and neutrality. This will tend to increase 
instability since the democratically elected governments cannot count on the full 
backing of their armed forces to uphold constitutional rule.
The other aspect affecting the quality of armies is the high rates of 
illiteracy in the majority of states. These rates impede the ability of the armed 
forces to recruit among the best educated cadre, as they have to compete with 
civilian and economic sectors for personnel with secondary and tertiary 
education. As a consequence, the number of officers who would qualify for high 
level training is tiny. This situation affects the most specialised sectors, those 
needing special skills. The end result is that often only infantry battalions are 
often fully operational. Sections such as logistics, maintenance of equipment and 
mechanized divisions are the most affected and reduce the operationality of the 
armed forces. The situation encountered by one Zimbabwean MP sums up the 
general state of the regions armies:
... Our visit to various brigades and various battalions 
was an eye opener... Some o f  our armed forces actually 
are squatting... But what is probably most disturbing is... 
the state o f  immobility o f  the armed forces. Throughout 
our tours, we encountered hundreds o f  unserviceable 
vehicles, engines and other equipment... In every unit we 
visited the soldiers told us that i f  war were to break out 
today we would find it very difficult to defend the 
country. The situation is so bad that barely a unit or a
51 Until the new constitution was promulgated in 1990, The Mozambican Armed Forces (FPLM) 
were subordinated to the ruling party Frelimo, and until the implementation of the Bicesse 
Accords in Angola the Angolan Armed Forces were subordinated to the MPLA. The loyalty of 
the SADF to the apartheid project of the national party has also been long established; and the 
Commander of the armed forces and most high ranking officers in Zimbabwe and Namibia were 
members of ZANU and SWAPO.
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brigade has got more than a third o f  its requirements and 
even that is an exaggeration. I would say a quarter o f  its 
fleet o f  vehicles is on the road.52
The situation described in Zimbabwe is a common phenomenon in Zambia and 
Tanzania, but seems to be worse in countries such as Mozambique and Angola 
due to the impact of war and destabilisattion.53
The prospects for improving this situation are limited, since most of these 
states lack the financial resources to invest in the improvement of domestic 
training facilities and education of officers. Indeed, these armies suffer from 
budgetary constraints which are also likely to impede the armed forces from 
meeting the requirements for restructuring in order to enable them to take up their 
new functions. Modernisation of ground air and naval equipment and their 
servicing appears to be crucial for the new domestic and regional security 
functions. Budgetary constraints will also tend to reinforce military asymmetries 
which will impede arms control and confidence building. Current figures indicate 
that South Africa’s military expenditure accounts for two thirds of the total 
defence expenditure in sub-Saharan Africa. This implies that disarmament in the 
region cannot be realized unless unilaterally. However, pressures for the reduction 
of military expenditure in South Africa encounter resistance in the military 
sectors.
Military asymmetries tend to heighten threat perceptions. The existence of 
militarily superior neighbours especially in an environment whereby friendly 
neighbouring governments are likely to be replaced by hostile ones cannot but 
help to raise the level of mistrust. This fact may force states who feel militarily 
disadvantaged to abandon their disposition to conceive their defence in terms of 
minimal deterrent force, and, encourage them to look into ways of raising their
52 Quoted in Parliamentary Debates, Harare, Government Printing and Stationary Office 18, 57 
col. 4114-4116.
53 See for example, A. M. Zacarias, Relagoes Entre os Militares e Civ is na Mitigagao do Conflito 
Mogambicano Paper Presented to XII Lisbon International Conference on Democracy and 
Integration of Lusophone Countries, December 1992.
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military might. The opportunity cost of military expenditure in these states is 
already high particularly in relation to prevailing levels of economic development 
and the socio-economic needs of the people. More military spending will 
certainly be at the expense of development resources. The likely result is 
domestic insecurity and conflict with a high risk of spill-overs beyond national 
borders.
The process of creating new armies forced the retrenchment of large numbers 
of former combatants. The paradox is that while unemployment figures and the 
fragility of the societies press for the maintenance of the present size of armies, 
these seem to be too large for their security needs.
While on the one hand, demobilisation becomes an important tool for the 
reduction of military confrontation, throwing into civilian life large numbers of 
individuals who have nothing but military skills enhances the prospects for 
instability. The largest number of demobilised combatants in the region comprises 
semi-skilled and unskilled people.54 Some were trained in guerrilla tactics of 
sabotage, others in repressive and aggressive tactics, yet others were part of hit 
squads, clandestine groups involved in cross-border operations, arms deals and 
other covert operations. For the demobilisation to fulfill its function of conflict 
reduction it needs to be accompanied by the process of reintegration of former 
combatants into society. This means, among other things creating conditions for 
their employment. However, experiences of the process of demobilisation 
throughout the region show limited capacity for integration of former soldiers in 
the civil sphere. Due to lack of skills, most of them have been encouraged to 
engage in agriculture while few others were given the opportunity of starting 
small businesses or to seek employment in cities. However, a large number of
54 See for example, J. Coelho and A. Vines, Pilot Study on Demobilisation and Re-integration of 
Ex-combatant in Mozambique, Refugees Studies Programme, University of Oxford.; See also S. 
Willet, South African Defence: How Much Real Change? op. cit., p.5.
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those demobilised have already learnt to enjoy urban life and shown reluctance to 
live in the countryside.55
Reintegration of the demobilised into the productive sphere is further 
hampered by the declining and stagnant nature of economies in the region. The 
economies are unable to generate jobs and provide the large numbers of 
demobilised with employment opportunities. This situation increases the 
likelihood that the demobilised will engage in criminal activities, including 
syndicate crime. The potential for cross-border syndicate crime cannot be ruled 
out especially in situations where armies are weak and are not properly equipped 
either to contain conflicts within state borders or prevent criminal syndicates from 
spilling-over into their territories from neighbouring countries. This enhances the 
propensity for demobilisation to increase regional instability and conflict.
The prospects for instability are worsened still further by the proliferation 
of weapons outside the control of the authorities responsible for law and order 
especially light weapons such as AK-47 rifles.56 The wars of the 1970's and 
1980's encouraged the importation into the region of weapons by the warring 
factions, which they distributed to individuals whose records are not known. The 
loss of legitimacy by the state, the erosion of its power, coupled with economic 
hardship, created conditions for corruption in the armed forces. The lack of 
control led to huge illegal sales of armaments and other military equipment.57 
Recent peacekeeping operations in Mozambique and Angola and internal 
peacekeeping in South Africa revealed how difficult it is to disarm not only 
former factions but also members of the public. The challenges involve, on the 
one hand, the creation of incentives for the civilians to give up their arms and 
establish disincentives to violence, on the other. The evidence is that the warring
55 J. Coelho and A. Vines, op. cit., pp. 53-57.
56 See G. Mills and C. Clapham, “Southern African Security After Apartheid: A Framework for 
Analysis”, The Centre for Southern African Studies o f the University o f Western Cape, Working 
Paper Series n-8, 1991 pp. 3-8.
57 See, G. Mills, The Process o f Integration o f National Armies In a Post Conflict Situation: 
Lesson from Other Countries op. cit. p. 6.
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factions never disarm completely and the impact of incomplete processes of 
disarmament is felt long after the peace process is terminated. However, the level 
of reconciliation at the domestic level is fragile and continues to threaten to 
plunge states back into conflicts. The threat of protracted conflicts is enhanced by 
the absence of strong domestic institutions and regional institutions that can 
mitigate conflicts through mechanisms such as crisis prevention, crisis 
management and conflict resolution.58
Economic Legacies
For the last three decades Southern Africa has been a laboratory for the 
most diverse development strategies ranging from radical views based on Marxist 
theory to neo-liberal theories of market forces. With few exceptions these 
strategies have produced few positive results. Southern African economies are 
characterised by a low and declining GDP per capita, and negative or stagnant 
growth rates. In 1992, two countries in the region, Mozambique and Tanzania had 
the lowest per capita GDP in the world,59 while other indicators such as illiteracy 
rates, infant mortality, disease and malnutrition place Southern Africa among the 
poorest regions in the World.60
The factors accounting for the low performance of Southern African 
economies have been well documented.61 They range from economic to non­
economic. The non-economic factors include the inability of the region to deal 
with natural disasters such as droughts, floods and cyclones which periodically 
affect agricultural production. Natural disasters have damaged physical
58 See, T. Ohlson, “Trick or Treat, Conflict Resolution, Security and Development in Post- 
Apartheid Southern Africa”, The Centre o f Southern African Studies o f the University o f Western 
Cape, Occasional Paper 3, 1992 pp. 24.
59 See the World Development Report, The World Bank 1994, p. 162.
60 Ibid.
61 See for example Gavin Maasdorp and Adrian Saville, “The SADC Economies Waiting for 
South Africa”, The South African Institute for International Affairs, Occasional Paper Series n-2, 
July, 1994.
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infrastructure and caused severe losses of food and cash crops and livestock. In 
addition political instability caused by domestic strife in countries such as South 
Africa, and, the impact of destabilisation on South Africa’s neighbours has taken 
its toll.62 The destruction of transport infrastructure in states such as Mozambique 
affected the regional trade since Mozambique is used as a gateway for four of the 
landlocked countries in the region.63
The second factor found to be responsible for the lower performance of 
the Southern African economies are government interventionist policies. These 
resulted in inefficient resource management and allocation, establishment of 
economically unviable parastatals and over regulation of the private sector. This 
set of policies limited the initiative of the private sector and expanded the state 
sector and consequently state consumption.64
However, the major cause for economic decline in Southern Africa is the 
lack of personnel with skills including management skills. After independence 
most of the countries in the region saw a massive exodus not only of colonial 
civil servants but also of skilled manpower.65 Some governments attempted to 
replace experienced expatriates with nationals with little experience in economic 
management. Low performance of these economies is also due to the falling of 
international prices of primary product exports which are the region's main source 
of revenue.66 Foreign debt and high rates of inflation also account for the low 
economic performance, as Maasdorp and Saville observe:
Apart from exchange controls, governments have also 
followed policies o f  price, wage, investment and 
interest rate controls. The net result has been a general
62 See South African Destabilisation: The Economic Cost to the Frontline Resistance to 
Apartheid, op. cit., pp. 19-23.
63 See G. Maasdorp and A. Saville “SADC Economies Waiting for South Africa” op. cit., p.3
64Ibid.
65 See Regional Relations and Cooperation Post-Apartheid: A Macro Framework Study Report, 
Southern Africa Development Community, 1993, p. 14-15.
66Ibid., p. 15.
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stifling o f  private sector activity which has been 
worsened by high individual and corporate tax.67
The factors discussed above led the region to become less attractive for 
foreign investment especially in the last decade in which foreign investment 
. reached its lowest level.68 However, from the late seventies on, only Botswana 
experienced positive economic growth, while the rest of the region showed either 
stagnant or declining growth rates.69 Poor economic performance increases the 
chances for further polarisation of societies, since some of these economies are 
still unable to provide the basic needs of food and health to their people. It also 
raises the levels of unemployment and enhances the chances for criminal activity. 
In an environment where resources are scarce, while the competition over their 
allocation and distribution is fierce, the result is likely to end in a domestic 
conflict.
Southern African economies also suffer from dislocations which need to 
be adjusted. The IMF World Bank Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) that 
most states have adhered to place a special emphasis on adjustment of exchange 
rates, reduction of budgetary and balance-of payments deficits through 
liberalisation and de-regulation of markets. However, as the experience of 
Tanzania, Zambia, Mozambique and Angola show,70 the time frame required for 
recovery is longer than had been anticipated. Creditor states have not allowed 
sufficient debt relief to the countries implementing SAPs to enable them to 
devote their resources to development rather than debt servicing. This has made
67See G. Maasdorp and A. Seville, “SADC Economies Waiting for South Africa”, op. cit., p. 6.
68 See A. Hawkins, “Economic Development in the SADC Countries” in G. Maasdorp and A. 
Whiteside (eds)Towards a Post-Apartheid Future, Political and Economic Relations in Southern 
Africa (London: MacMillan), 1992, pp. 105-131.
69See R. Bethlehem, “Economic Development in South Africa” in G. Maasdorp and A. Whiteside 
(ed.) Towards A Post-Apartheid Future, op. cit., pp. 62-81; see also the World Bank National 
Economic Indicators and National Estimates for 1994”, World Development Report, World Bank 
1993.
70 See the country concerned of the Economist Intelligence Unit Country Profile 1993/1994; C. 
Colclough “Zambia: Economy”; M. Smith Morris, “Mozambique: Economy” and L. Van Buren 
“Tanzania: Economy” all in Regional Surveys o f the World: Africa, South o f Sahara (London: 
Europa Publications, 1993)
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the financial resources available for the programs inadequate. As a consequence, 
cuts in public spending in sectors such as education, health, security and defence 
have been recommended which not only cause socio-political strain but also 
stimulates chaos.71 The more vulnerable sectors of the population, mainly in urban 
areas, are thus forced to live in absolute poverty, as a direct consequence of rises 
in import prices and interest rates. The poorest sectors of the urban salaried have 
been unable to benefit from any assistance from the state since this is forced to 
cut public spending.72 Governments also feel strained and cannot decide on 
resource allocation according to what they believe to be a priority. The result of 
SAPs in many countries has ranged from demonstrations, strikes, absenteeism, to 
the most violent forms of rioting and looting, as in Zambia in the mid 1980’s.73 
Cuts in defence and security spending have prevented governments from 
addressing some of the basic issues in the security forces such as the 
improvement of logistics, payment of adequate salaries and the modernisation of 
armed forces. This makes the maintenance of law and order within the state 
borders very hard. The situation of permanent instability does not allow the for 
the consolidation of national consciousness and national identity which is crucial 
for the survival of states. Poor conditions in the security forces have forced some 
members to abandon the service, to organise mutinies or to protest against low 
pay and their working harsh conditions.
The strain caused by the implementation of SAPs on the vulnerable 
sectors of the population also stimulated the emergence of large informal sectors. 
These sectors often are not subjected to taxation which disrupt the normal market 
structure. The situation is worsened by the existence of parallel exchange rates 
which are higher than the official rates and have encouraged bribery, corruption in
71 See Regional Relations and Cooperation Post Apartheid : A Macro-Framework Study Report 
SDAC. op cit. pp. 14-15.
72 See for example B. Walker and G. Dava, The Social Dimensions o f Adjustment (SDA) In 
Mozambique, One World Action Report, September 1994, pp. 3-15.
73 See for example Austin M. Chakaodza, Structural Adjustment in Zambia and Tanzania 
(London: Third World Publishing Company, 1993).
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state institutions and economic inefficiency. Angola, Malawi, Mozambique, 
Zambia and Zimbabwe show parallel exchange rates higher than the official rates 
at 500%, 55%, 15 %, 26 %, and 18 % respectively.74
One of the striking features reached by any analysis of the Southern 
African economies is their asymmetry. While the South African economy is 2,5 
times larger than the rest of SADC economies taken together, the gap between 
South Africa and the weakest economies of Malawi and Mozambique and 
Tanzania and the rest of the region is even larger. Economic asymmetries have a 
twofold impact. One, is that they may increase fears of domination by the strong 
economies on weaker economies which hinges on regional arrangements; and, 
second, it encourages the emergence of economic refugees. Economic refugees 
emigrate from the poorest and less prosperous countries to the richest and more 
stable parts of Southern Africa. These most stable parts feel threatened by this 
emigration since the refugees add to the already existing socio-political strain. 
South Africa has been an obvious target for economic refugees. It had attracted 
refugees not only from neighbouring countries such as Mozambique, Lesotho and 
Zimbabwe, but also from distant countries such as Angola and Zaire. Economic 
refugees may encourage domestic unrest and xenophobia, since they are in 
competition with natives for employment. This may lead governments to pass 
tough emigration laws which in turn, may jeopardise regional relations.
The other economic legacy worth mentioning is the existence of 
overlapping and competitive regional integration institutions. The oldest of all is 
the South African Customs Union (SACU) whose membership comprises, South 
Africa, Botswana, Lesotho Swaziland and Namibia; the Southern Africa 
Development Community (SADC) includes the members of SACU plus 
Mozambique, Angola, Tanzania, Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe; and the 
Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) includes a total of
74 See, Africa Analysis Current Checklist, n-192, 1994a.
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19 countries stretching from the Horn of Africa to Southern Africa. Botswana and 
South Africa are the only non-members.75 Although conflicting membership 
exists only between COMESA and SACU, different states have shown 
preference for membership of some institutions over others. Zimbabwe for 
instance, the dominant member in COMESA, has tended to show more devotion 
to this institution than other states in the region, while South Africa decided to 
join SADC and reject COMESA. However, at the time of writing, South Africa is 
negotiating new terms for SACU. These negotiations are considering some issues 
that are dealt with within the framework of SADC, such as energy, transport and 
communications while SADC is planning to move towards trade liberalisation, an 
area considered to be SACU and COMESA responsibility. This situation can not 
but lead to stalemate, unnecessary competition and misapplication of the scarce 
regional resources. The fact that some countries are members of some institutions 
while others are not, makes it difficult to maximise regional co-operation and may 
lead to institutional rivalry. This may force states to opt for bilateral arrangements 
with South Africa to further their own national interest. Indeed, some countries 
have proposed the establishment of bilateral trade agreements with South Africa 
while institutions are working to establish multilateral mechanisms.76 Apart from 
pre-empting regional arrangements, this may increase regional inequalities, 
exacerbate the levels of poverty, domestic and regional conflict.77
The socio-political, military and economic legacies discussed above 
impinge upon the domestic security of Southern African states in a complex web 
of inter-relations overlapping colonial and recent conflicts. The nature of these 
conflicts is not easily identifiable in each state. However, the fact that states are
75 See G. Maasdorp, “The Role of the South African Economy in SACU, CMA and Other 
Regional Organisations”, in A.M. Zacarias (ed) Repensando Estrategias Sobre Mozambique e 
Africa Austral,( Maputo: ISRI), 1990, p. 289.
76 See R. Davies, Building a New Relationship in Southern Africa: The Challenge Facing South 
Africa's Government o f National Unity”, A paper prepared for the for United Nations University/ 
World Institute for Economic Research The New Regionalism and International System, 
Jerusalem, April 1985, p.5.
11 Ibid., p.6.
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weak means that they will have difficulty in maintaining the order and stability 
necessary for peaceful relations in the region. Weak armies and police make it 
difficult for states to curb criminal activities, e.g. syndicate crime. Weak states 
find it difficult to contain national conflicts within national borders. Southern 
African states will find it hard to prevent the movement of refugees and the 
spread of dangerous diseases such as AIDS. The disease has already reached 
epidemic level in some countries.78 The spread of AIDS puts an additional strain 
on the already poor health facilities available in the region and threatens the 
productive force. The number of HIV positive in the region is very high with 
Malawi, Tanzania and Zimbabwe being the most affected. The most affected age 
group is that between 20-39, i.e., the most productive population group79. The 
movement of refugees turns the task of controlling AIDS at national levels very 
difficult and threatens the stability of the entire region.
The situation described above shows that the recipes prescribed to remedy 
the economic problems of the subcontinent are conflict- prone since they advise 
strong cuts on the state sector, which implies that the prospects for strong states 
in Southern Africa are remote. The absence of a strong state will impede 
economic efficiency since it implies that the distortions of the market cannot be 
regulated. It will also tend to stimulate domestic conflict reduction since the state 
will not be able to intervene to correct market imbalances and dislocations. This 
situation stimulates chaos and an environment of constant unrest and instability. 
The fact that Structural Adjustment Programs impose reductions on defence and 
security spending will also curtail the capacity of states to maintain stability, law 
and order, addressing the question of disarmament of civilians, control of the 
circulation of illegal weapons, combat crime and violent dissent. Violent dissent 
becomes a real possibility, particularly in situations where political tolerance has
78See S. Cross and A. Whiteside, Facing Up to AIDS: The Socio-Economic Impact in Southern 
Africa (London: St. Martin's Press ,1993), p. 15
79 Ibid., pp. 17-18.
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not yet been entrenched in the minds of citizens and where socio-economic 
conditions are appalling. If the situation continues, it is unlikely that foreign 
investors may be attracted and without foreign investment it is also unlikely that 
socio-economic conditions may improve.
Certainly the effort to remedy the situation should come primarily from 
the states concerned and indeed it is impossible to conceive any remedies in 
which they would not play a primary role. However, what needs to be done seems 
to go beyond their national capacity.
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C h a p ter  5
T h e In ad eq u acies o f  the T rad ition a l C on cep t o f  S ecu rity
This chapter re-examines the application of the traditional concept of security in 
Southern Africa. It argues that states in Southern Africa are weak and unable to act 
as the sole mediators of relations between domestic societies and the outside world 
in areas pertaining to security. Indeed, they find it increasingly difficult to provide 
the most basic public goods. They are also plagued with socio-economic problems - 
different in each case- that surpass their capacity or are difficult to curb within the 
confines of the territorial state. This makes the traditional concept of security, which 
is primarily oriented to deal with external threats and vulnerabilities of the state, 
difficult to apply.
The chapter is divided into three sections. Part one discusses the 
inadequacies of the traditional concept. The second section demonstrates why states 
in Southern Africa are not suitable to implement the traditional concept and why the 
traditional concept is inadequate for Southern Africa. Section three focus on the 
endemic nature of domestic problems faced by the state. The chapter argues that the 
nature of states and their endemic domestic problems are the main difficulty for the 
application of the traditional concept.
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T h e T rad ition a l C on cept
As indicated in Chapter 1, traditionally security is taken to mean the absence of 
threats, especially military threats to states. It is predicated on the assumption that 
the insecurity of people living within a given state can only come from outside. It 
assumes that citizens and all other actors in domestic society agree with both the 
prevailing order and the nature of justice within their own state. Therefore, in the 
traditional approach, security is conceived of as the state’s ability to preserve its 
core values; to defend itself from potential aggressors; or to have strong military 
capability. This idea is best captured in Lipmann's statement:
a nation is secure to the extent to which it is not in danger 
o f having to sacrifice its core values, if  it wishes to avoid 
war, and is able, if  challenged, to maintain them by 
victory in such a war.1
The major problem with this conception is that it is “status quo” oriented. 
The obvious implication when the challenge to the prevailing order and status quo 
come from within, is that the conception of national security, which is 
conceptionally outward looking, is not easily applicable. Indeed, when threats to the 
state come from within its borders, it often redirects its power against internal 
groups. Under these circumstances, the notion of national security is viewed in 
terms of one group against the other. Since the traditional concept places an
1 See W. Lippmann, US Foreign Policy: Shield o f the Republic (Boston: Little Brown, 1943) p.51
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emphasis on power particularly military power, groups who feel threatened by 
others will seek power superiority or monopoly as a way of assuring their security 
which is too much war-prone. Because the traditional concept places an emphasis 
on military power, it also tends to neglect socio-political aspects equally pertinent 
to security such as social cohesion, economic stability and justice.
Critics such as Walt, have pointed out that military power does not 
guarantee the well-being either of the individual or of the society and that non­
military phenomena can also threaten states and individuals.2 Hence, any 
conceptualisation of security that does not entail the well-being of the society and 
individuals is at best incomplete. In fact, the view that security should be 
understood as a multidimensional concept that should include topics such as 
poverty, AIDS, border control, environmental hazards, drugs abuse and the like, is 
recurrent in recent theoretical international relations literature.3 Buzan has 
subdivided the concept into 5 main sectors of social interaction, namely political, 
military, social, economic and environmental.4 This subdivision of the concept, 
although valuable in indicating where the vulnerabilities of the state lie, raises a 
number of problems:
The subdivision implies that security is divisible to the extent that 
individuals, communities or states may be able to say that they are secure 
politically, but insecure economically and socially which is not always possible. In 
weaker states such as Angola the economic causes of insecurity are so entwined
2 See Stephen M. Walt, '“The Renaissance of Security Studies”, International Studies Quarterly, 
Vol. 35:3, 1991, pp. 211-239.
3See N. Brown, “Climate Ecology and International Security”, Survival, Vol. 31, 1989, pp. 519-532
4 Buzan, “New Patterns of Global Security In the Twenty First Century” International Affairs, Vol. 
67:3 ,1991, pp. 429-431.
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with political causes of insecurity and vice versa.. The subdivision also raises the 
question as to whether a hierarchy of sectors should be established. That is, which 
aspect of security is more important, economic, political, social or military? By 
compartmentalising the concept, one misses out on the dynamic of interaction 
between sectors whose outcome defines security. While the method appears to be 
useful to establish the different degrees and types of vulnerability of the state, it 
does not tell us much about the condition of security. In other words, the 
subdivision undermines the fact that security results because of several interacting 
factors, military, socio- economic and political.
In addition, Buzan, only recognises the state as a source of security, that 
security can only be assured within the state framework. He does not acknowledge 
the autonomous role of individuals and other social forces in affecting the security 
of others. Because of this, other scholars have suggested that the state, acting alone, 
is unable to address all the security requirements of its citizens and that 
development and international co-operation are vital for the attainment of a greater 
sense of security, at the national, regional and global levels.5
Adding to the criticism, Azar and Moon have argued that focusing attention 
on the security environment and on ‘hardware’, that is to say, on threats and 
capabilities respectively, distorts the real security problem of the Third World. More 
attention needs to be paid to the software side of security, which includes the 
political context, and policy capacity through which national values are defined and
5 See for example, R. Ulman, “Redefining Security” International Security Vol. 8:3, 1983, pp. 129- 
153; J. Mathews, “Redefining Security”, Foreign Affairs Vol. 68 n-2, 1989, pp. 162- 179; T. 
Sorensen, “Rethinking National Security” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 69:3 1990, pp. 1-18.
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threats and vulnerabilities are perceived.6 The focus on legitimacy, national 
integration and policy capacity reveal the complexities involved in defining 
security in the Third World.7 This approach is supported by Ayoob who stresses 
that security should be defined in terms of vulnerabilities that threaten, or have the 
potential to weaken significantly the state structure, both territorial and 
institutional.8 The more a state or regime falls toward the invulnerable end of the 
vulnerable-invulnerable spectrum, the more secure it is.9 Although these two 
approaches shift the focus away from military power, they are still hostage to the 
competition of the international system in rigid billiard-ball terms. On this view the 
state is inevitably seen as the single referent object of security. Ayoob’s approach is 
also faced with the difficulty that there is nothing to measure vulnerabilities against 
that can help to reveal the condition of security. While vulnerabilities of a certain 
state can be established when that state is compared to another, it is still difficult to 
establish whether that vulnerability means insecurity to the state in question. In 
other words, one can only say that referent A is vulnerable in aspect x when 
compared with referent B, but one can never determine the conditions making A 
vulnerable when a comparison is not established. In applying Ayoob's concept, in 
Southern Africa, for example, one would need to agree on the account of what it is 
to be vulnerable and invulnerable. This would perhaps involve a comparison with 
strong members of the present society of states. This comparison would necessarily
6 See E. Azar and C. Moon, “Legitimacy, Integration and Policy Capacity: The Software Side of 
Security” in E. Azar and C. Moon (eds.) National Security in the Third World: The Management of 
Internal and External Threats (Aldershot: Edward Eglar), 1988, pp. 77-98.
7 Ibid.
8 See Mohammed Ayoob, “The Security Problematic of The Third World” World Politics, Vol. 43:2 
1991, p. 259.
9 • j
lead to the conclusion that communities and states in Southern Africa have reached
a status of absolute insecurity due to the number and degrees of vulnerabilities they 
face. This conclusion would be misleading because states and communities in 
Southern Africa are not on the verge of disappearing from the international system 
although they are troubled.
The need to broaden the concept has also been expressed by Southern 
African scholars who see the end of apartheid as providing an excellent opportunity 
to redress interstate relations: from relations of confrontation to relations of co­
operation.10 They call for an adoption of a broad concept of security founded on co­
operation and development.11 Others have suggested a framework of co-operation 
identical to the CSCE/OSCE as a solution.12 However, little attention has been paid 
to the agents of this new security thinking. The paradox is that the new thinking 
criticises state-centrism while it relies on the OSCE institutional framework 
founded on inter-governmental co-operation. None the less, the question of agents, 
particularly the state, is fundamental for any conceptualisation of security. And, as it 
will be shown in the next section its malfunctioning is one of the main reasons why 
the traditional concept cannot work in Southern Africa.
10 See, L. Nathan, Towards a Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in 
Africa, Prepared for Asian Peace Research Conference, New Zealand, 1992; see also A. Du Pisani, 
“Security and Peace in Post-Apartheid Southern Africa, International Affairs Bulletin n- 1992 pp. 5- 
15; and P. Vale, “The Case for Conference on Security and Co-operation in Southern Africa 
(CSCSA)” in Van Nieukerk & Van Staden (eds) Southern Africa at the Cross Roads: Prospects for 
the Political Economy of the Region (Bramfontein: SAHA ,1991), pp. 154-71.
11 P. Vale, The Case for Co-operation in Southern Africa ( CSCA)” op. cit., pp. 154 - 171; see also 
A. du Pisani, “Security and Peace in Post-Apartheid Southern Africa in International Affairs 
Bulletin, Vol. 16, n.3, 1992, pp. 5-16, South African Institute for International Affairs; A. Du 
Pisani, Security and Peace in Post Apartheid Southern Africa, Paper Prepared for a Conference on 
Security and Peace in Post Apartheid Southern Africa, Arusha, Tanzania, 20-23 July, 1992
12 See P. Vale, The Case for Conference on Security and Cooperation in Southern Africa, op. cit., pp. 
154 -71; P. Vale, The Case for Baskets: The Watershed Years (Cape Town: Leadership Publication, 
1991), pp. 152-4; B. Weimer, “South Africa and the Frontline States: From Confrontation to 
Confidence Building”, Harare, SAPEMMagazine, August 1990.
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1. T h e n atu re o f  th e state
The fundamental reason rendering the traditional concept of security 
inadequate in Southern Africa is the nature of the state. While in some parts of 
Angola and Mozambique the state is not a socio-political reality,13 in other parts 
they have been weakened to the point that they only maintain juridical sovereignty. 
They continue to exist because the rest of the international community continues to 
recognise them as independent political entities and because their domestic societies 
have not found alternative sources of order or of the ‘common good’. They exist by 
default rather than by merit. They lack an empirical statehood14 in the sense of 
European states. Their capacity to mobilise resources, collect taxes, and provide 
protection to their citizens is very limited. As Jackson argues, states such as those in 
Southern Africa have fewer means and resources with which to implement and 
enforce their decisions and consequently must face harder choices in relation to 
what they concentrate their resources on.15
Jackson’s concept of ‘quasi- states’, however, places states such as 
Somalia, Lesotho and Angola in the same category, whereas there is a need to 
distinguish between them. There are states that have collapsed, such as Somalia;
13 State institutions tend to have a strong presence in the capital cities, in urban areas and a weak 
presence in rural areas. In fact in some remote areas, the state is not represented and it does not 
provide normal state functions, such as maintenance of law and order, tax collection, and health 
care, etc. Some of these functions are carried out by local community structures outside the 
framework of the state.
14 The term empirical statehood is borrowed from Robert Jackson. See Robert Jackson, Quasi 
States, International Relations and the Third World, op.cit., pp. 26-31.
15 Ibid., p. 177.
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some regions but not in others, and states whose statehood resulted from the 
‘benevolence’ of international society, such as Lesotho and Swaziland but still 
enjoy several restrictions on their internal sovereignty such as Lesotho or 
Swaziland.
Although there is a need to differentiate among states in Southern Africa, 
there is a common root to many of their problems. They are all states in gestation 
whose governments find it hard to consolidate and acquire internal legitimacy.16 
Ayoob argues that, contrary to their European counter-parts, states in the Third 
World have not been allowed sufficient time to consolidate. They are still in the 
stage of primitive accumulation of power and legitimacy. If they are given a 
sufficient amount of time they will be able to develop to the extent of the European 
states.17
While the argument about time is plausible, there is no evidence that the 
situation is likely to improve in the foreseeable future. In fact, the evidence seems to 
indicate quite the contrary. One of the fundamental factors impeding the 
consolidation of post-colonial states is the nature of the international system. It has 
been demonstrated that the European statehood was developed in the context of a 
competitive international environment, whereby states needed to mobilise resources 
and collect taxes to continue to defend their existence.18 This meant that they needed 
to become infrastructurally strong in order to mobilise resources for war making. In
16 See details in C. Thomas, In Search for Security, op.cit., pp. 15 - 26.
17 See Mohammed Ayoob, “The Security Problematic of the Third World”, World Politics, Vol. 43, 
January 1991, pp. 257-83.
18 See C. Tilly, “Making and State Making as Organised Crime” in P. Evans, D. Ruechmeyer and 
Theda Skocpol (eds) Bringing the State Back In (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 
pp. 169-74.
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the process they generally became despotic.19 Despotism at the domestic level 
became the way they ensured the eradication of their domestic rivals, strengthened 
their ability to make war and protected their chief supporters.20And war making 
ensured their continuation in the international21 system by yielding enemies’ armies, 
navies and supporting services. Their domestic environment had little interference 
from external forces because in order to defend and protect their existence, they had 
to eliminate internal opposition by force.22 Tilly demonstrates how the development 
of a mercantile class in the European states was a dialectical process: mercantile 
class strengthened state-making in Europe and vice-versa property owners sought 
protection of those who had instruments of violence, but in order to provide 
protection, the owners of instruments of violence needed to develop instruments of 
surveillance and control within their territory. It was the need to have an organised 
war making machine that brought fiscal, accounting structures and other institutions 
into being.23 Tilly’s work is complemented by Stepan’s analysis of the rise of 
bureaucratic authoritarian regimes in Latin America. He concluded that the 
repressive methods used by these regimes were important for the reduction of 
internal opposition and the power of civil society which resulted in the 
consolidation of state power and ideology.24 However, statehood in the Southern 
Africa developed out of the recogniton by the international community of the right
19 See, M. Mann, “The Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins, Mechanisms and Results”, op. 
cit., pp. 109 - 136.
20 See, C. Tilly, “War Making State Making as Organised Crime”, op. cit., p. 181.
21 Ibid.,?. 181.
22 Ibid., p. 174.
23 Ibid., pp. 169-74.
24 See A. Stephan, “State Power and the Strength of Civil Society in Southern Cone of Latin 
America”, in P. Evans, D. Ruechmeyer, and T. Skocpol ( eds) Bringing the State Back In, op. cit, pp. 
316-340.
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to self-determination.25 Although some nationalist forces confronted armed 
resistance to their independence, the international environment in which they 
operated was favourable to their existence provided they accepted the colonial 
borders and did not threaten already established states.26 At the time of their 
creation, they lacked a strong mercantile, or business classes that could finance 
activities aimed at consolidation of the state. Yet their domestic environment was 
plagued by rival political claims that impeded governments to articulate all- 
inclusive national projects. Thus, the contemporary international system presents a 
different environment than what was the case when most European states 
developed in the sense that international predators are discouraged. Viable states 
coexist with unviable, powerful and weak are also allowed to coexist by the system. 
In most cases, it is not empirical statehood, but the reverse, i.e., juridical that is 
encouraged by the system.
Although the international environment in which the majority of Southern 
African states were established was not militarily hostile,27 it was hostile in many 
other ways. The right to self-determination was not fully acknowledged by the 
already established international system. Self- determination was often translated in 
a right to a territory, a government, and juridical sovereignty, but with little room 
for empirical sovereignty’. This situation is contrary to the contention made by 
many international theorists, of an international system consisting of equally 
sovereign states, with anarchy maximising their independence and allowing room
25 See R. Jackson, Quasi States, op. cit., pp. 22-25.
26 See, James Mayall, Nationalism and International Relations, op. cit., p. 42.
27 The term ‘non-militarily hostile’ here is used to denote a situation of absence of other state willing 
to wipe out from the international political map other states as in the Imperial Europe.
193
for security.28 Sovereignty for the newly created states in Southern Africa, was 
limited. Jackson points out, they had a negative concept of sovereignty29 imposed 
by a system founded on hierarchical power relations. This is demonstrated, for 
example, by the difficulties these states had in exercising political freedom. Marxist 
neighbours were unacceptable to South Africa and the United States and indeed 
they had strained relations with the majority of Western powers. The system in 
which new states were to operate and the rules of engagement had already been 
established and they could not be changed as demonstrated by the oil crises in 1973 
and 1979.30 To maintain international legitimacy and recognition these states had to 
conform to these rules, yet at the domestic level, competing ideas on how the state 
should be organised and run and, what issues should have priority left little room 
for governments to legitimise their policies.31 The Cold War context in which most 
of these states were created forced these states to choose sides between the main 
Cold War contenders, which not only polarised further their domestic societies but 
increased their vulnerability to the external interference.
This interference compromised the security interests of their domestic 
societies since issues pertaining to the Cold War took precedence over domestic 
concerns. Their political space was often transformed into a battle ground of 
external actors’ ideas and interests while their own, were kept in silence.
28 See B. Buzan, “Is International Security Possible?” in K. Booth (ed) New Thinking About Strategy 
and International Security (London: Harper Collins), 1990, pp. 31-55.
29 See Robert Jackson, Quasi States, op. cit., p. 21.
30 The attempt by members of OPEC to raise the oil prices was met by the increase in prices in 
many manufactured goods, that most developing countries could not afford.
31 See C. Thomas, In Search of Security, op. cit., pp. 10-38.
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This interference was facilitated by their economic dependence upon their 
former colonial powers. Their economies had been conceived as auxiliary to that of 
their metropoles to which they sold primary commodities. They had to deal with a 
structure in which trade, banking, shipping, port facilities and insurance were 
controlled by foreigners.32
A variety of factors ranging from inadequate policies, economic sabotage, 
and indebtedness to natural disasters and wars impeded them from developing.33 
Foreign aid remained the only way they could be maintained in the system. This 
situation further curtailed their de facto sovereignty.34
In the 1980's the level of external intervention increased as a consequence of 
deteriorating social and economic conditions. At the inter-state level, aid 
conditionality imposed by international financial institutions and foreign 
governments became one of the most powerful forms of intervention. Aid 
dependent states in southern Africa lost their decision-making and policy 
formulation capacity to the point that their national budgets could not be internally 
agreed prior to consultation with donor institutions.35 Western states and their 
agencies ran democratisation programmes as part of their aid programs. These 
Programs required them to tell recipient governments how to govern their countries, 
which human rights constituted priority and which did not, under the so called
32 See for example, A. Zacarias in “The New Has to Be Struggled For” Silver Jubilee Papers n. 12, 
Sussex Institute of Development Studies, 1991, pp. 3-4.
33 See for example A. Saville and G. Maasdorp , “SADC Economies Waiting for South Africa”, op. 
cit., pp. 3-5
34A de facto sovereignty, refers to empirical sovereignty.
35 States with huge debts who are currently undergoing an IMF/ World Bank Structural Adjustment 
Programs such as Angola, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe have 
an annual meeting with a group of donor countries which impose cuts in their budgets and define the 
conditions of rescheduling their debts.
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agenda for good governance.36 They defined how aid money and borrowed money 
from international donors was to be spent. Therefore they helped to shape domestic 
polities empowering social agents who they though would support the prevailing 
system. This determined the way the polity is organised and gave an international 
criteria priority over domestic concerns whenever the two were in conflict.37 Their 
governments were powerless and unable to produce a centralised source of 
authority responsive to the needs of different constituencies in their countries.
One of the essential requirements for the emergence of a strong state, is the 
national consensus especially during the gestation phase. The embryonic phase, as 
the European case demonstrates, requires an accumulation of central state power 
rather than its diffusion.38 However, in situations where national consciousness has 
not been consolidated and entrenched and where the available resources are not 
sufficient to assure the subsistence of most members of a society, multipartyism and 
liberalisation tends to encourage centrifugal forces that seek allies abroad rather 
than the intended plurality of ideas.39
The IMF and World Bank have also been instrumental in undermining the 
power and domestic legitimacy of these states since their adjustment programmes 
are based on demands of international markets rather than on needs of domestic 
societies. Although Maasdorp remarked that ‘Sub-Saharan’ Africa’s economic 
problems should not be blamed on SAPs and that the position would have been
36See, Helen O’Connel, Good Governance: Report on One World Action Seminar, London, One
World Action, 1994, pp. A1-A10.
yjlbid.
38 See Yossef Cohen, B.R. Brown, and A. F. K. Ogasnki, “The Paradoxical Nature of State Making: 
The Violent Creation of Order”, American Political Science Review, Vol. 75, n-4, 1981, pp. 901-910
39 See details in Marina Ottaway “Democratisation in Collapsed States” in I. W. Zartman (ed) 
Collapsed States (London: Lynne Ryner, 1995), pp. 235-250.
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worse without them’,40 their immediate effects have failed to produce incentives for 
the domestic societies to support them. This further contributes to the inefficiency 
of the state and to alienation of its population.
Significant interference in the domestic arena is achieved through expatriate 
Non-Governmental Organisations (NGO's) and Charity Organisations. The main 
rationale for their actions is humanitarian due to the incapacity of the state to 
extend its services to all sections of the society. However, these organisations often 
have their own policy agendas and often do not design their programs to 
complement the activities of the state. They usually target certain sectors of a 
society and certain locations rather than the whole country and society. They are 
also often unaware of similar efforts made either by the state or other NGO’s. This 
situation has in many instances, resulted in duplication of efforts or implementation 
of projects that cannot be continued by the state and local community structures. 
Because the state in some parts of Southern Africa has been unable to provide basic 
functions to all its citizens such, as education, protection, and health care, including 
emergency relief, or because it is reckoned to have no financial capacity, it is often 
alienated and put in a situation in which it has to compete with the external Non- 
Governmental Organisations for a political space. This situation has also tended to 
retard the state-making process.41
40 See G. Maasdorp and A. Saville, “The SADC economies Waiting South Africa”, op. cit., p. 13
41 See for example, Reginald H. Green, ‘‘Poverty Rehabilitation and Economic Transformation: The 
Case o f Mozambique”, Paper presented at the Institute of Social Studies, The Hague, 1 November 
1990; see also Joseph Hanlon, Mozambique: Who Calls the Shots (London: James Currey) 1991.
197
The experience of European states cannot be replicated in Southern Africa. 
The inconvenience of authoritarianism,42 as a method of state-making although not 
totally eradicated from the international system, is increasingly being recognised. 
Authoritarian Marxist regimes, such as those in place in Angola and Mozambique 
until the 1990’s and totalitarian regimes such as those of Malawi, met hostile 
external opposition. The role of this opposition was instrumental in developing and 
shaping the internal opposition to authoritarianism.43 As a result, authoritarian states 
in Southern Africa found it difficult to maintain the monopoly of violence, and 
impose themselves on their opponents by force, while they remained heavily 
dependent economically on external sources. They were therefore forced to yield to 
external pressures and compromise through constitutional reforms. By the 1990’s, 
authoritarian regimes were regarded as illegal in Southern Africa. Indeed their, 
continued use was regarded as justification for external military intervention, as the 
case of October 1994 crisis in Lesotho shows.44 This, in part, explains the rush 
towards constitutional reform undertaken by Southern African states at the 
beginning of the present decade.45
In most Southern African states, constitutional reforms came before the 
consolidation of the bureaucratic state and its institutions. The consolidation of the 
bureaucratic apparatus would ensure routine state functions in a multiparty domestic
42 Often the term authoritarian is equated with the single party structure. This assumption is not 
accurate because it implies that power is centralised in one individual, while there are 
opportunities for decentralisation, and sharing of power in a single party system.
43 Support, provided by the Soviet-Union and its allies to wage war against dictatorial regimes in the 
region is well documented, see for example C. Coker, “Proxy Pox and, op cit. pp. 573-584. On the 
other hand it is also known that Renamo, UNITA, FNLA and Super ZAPU, LLM received support 
from external sources to topple their governments under the pretext that these were authoritarian.
44Details of this crisis are provided in Chapter 7.
45The reforms sweeping across the sub-continent started with Zambia's adherence to multipartyism. 
It was followed by constitutional reforms in Mozambique, Angola, Tanzania, and Malawi.
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arena. However, multipartyism has not led to the efficiency of the state. It has 
tended to reinforce the interests of political party elites, that is, personal benefits 
rather than the common good.
The fact that states have not been able to consolidate their power, due either 
to the present international setting in which it is considered important to comply 
with the human rights agenda or to continued interference by external agents in their 
domestic environment impedes them from conceiving of national security in the 
traditional fashion of protecting domestic society vis-a-vis the outside world. States 
have been unable to seal-off societies from external threats or to act as the sole 
mediators of relations between the domestic society and the outside world - e.g. 
expatriate NGO's interact directly with sections of societies without any control by 
the state- foreign governments have direct access to their public political arena, 
economic dependence also poses severe restrictions for autonomous policy 
development. These states are often on the defensive, left to perform minimal 
functions. They are thereby rendered unsuitable to carry out the functions of 
required by the traditional concept of security.
2. The endemic nature of problems impinging on Security
The other reason for the inadequacy of the traditional concept for Southern 
Africa is the abundance of intractable societal problems within the territorial 
confines of the state. There are those that are the legacy of 30 years of 
confrontation, such as low economic performance, the proliferation of light
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weapons, large numbers of demobilised soldiers and high levels of crime 
threatening to spill-over into the entire region. Added to this are patterns of 
dependency and interdependency resulting from decades of interaction in the area 
of labour, transport systems and trade; and vulnerabilities caused by the AIDS 
epidemic, frequent natural disasters such as droughts, cyclones and floods, whose 
consequences threaten even the most stable parts of the subcontinent. No state has 
the capability to deal with these issues on its own. They require a transnational 
approach, while the traditional concept is nationally focused. Syndicate crime 
involving drugs and light weapons has already been shown to require a co-ordinated 
strategy and co-operation of the security forces of various states; while the lack of 
framework for co-operation in the use of region’s water resources is already rising 
tensions between Mozambique and Zimbabwe and between Mozambique and 
South Africa.
Poor economic performance in the region has been associated with several 
factors, economic and non-economic. They range from natural disaster, political 
instability, economic mismanagement to inappropriate macro- economic policies.46 
While some of these factors such as economic mismanagement could well be 
addressed by individual governments, political instability and natural disasters may 
not be resolvable within the national frontiers. The political instability of the past 
was associated with apartheid destabilisation policies, and of the present, with its 
legacies. Because state macro-economic policies, are largely dependent on foreign 
exchange availability to stabilise the terms of trade,47 they cannot be resolved by a
46See G. Maasdorp and A. Saville, “SADC Economies Waiting for South Africa”, op cit. pp.3-9.
47Ibid., op. cit., p.8.
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single state. Natural disasters such as cyclones, droughts and floods although not 
predictable, are frequent in the region and states have inadequate capacity for 
dealing with their effects on their own. The 1992 drought affected the entire 
subcontinent and required the co-operation of most regional members to deal with 
its effects.
The proliferation of light weapons and the existence of large numbers of 
demobilised ex-combatants effected several states. While arms circulate from one 
country to the other, demobilised ex-combatants pose similar threats, by raising the 
level of violence and increasing crime in different states. Because of their potential 
disruption in the entire region, they require a common or a co-ordinated strategy 
and a co-operation between security forces.
The level of dependence and interdependence is also an important reason for 
abandoning the traditional concept and embrace a co-operative approach to security. 
Migrant labour has a long history in the region. From the last century South Africa 
and Zimbabwe developed into the most dynamic economies and attracted most of 
the labour from other parts of the region.48 However, at the beginning of the present 
century things began to change. South Africa became the only country that 
continued to attract migrant labour. By the 1970's the number of migrant labourers 
in South Africa totalled 500,000.49 This figure however, does not include large 
numbers of illegal immigrants working in the farms and other industries. The 
pressures to introduce technological innovation as well as the need to address the
48See Libby, The Politics o f Economic Power in Southern Africa op. cit., p. 19.
49 See Alan Whiteside, “Labour Flows, Refugees, AIDS and the Environment” in G. Maasdorp and 
A. Whiteside (eds), Towards, a Post-apartheid Future, op cit., p. 156.
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growing problem of unemployment within the black population50 have compelled 
the South African authorities to reduce drastically the number of immigrants. This 
is taking place at a moment when the region faces increasing demands for 
employment opportunities caused inter alia, by population increases and low job 
creation. Lesotho for instance can only employ 5.7% of its work force, while 
Zimbabwe, can only provide jobs to 1.6 % of the total of 120,000 leaving school 
every year, and, the unemployment rates in South Africa among the black 
communities is over 50%.51 However, the reduction in the number of foreigners in 
South Africa has not solved the problems. In fact it has led to an increase in the 
number of illegal immigrants who are more difficult to control. The dependency of 
the states of Southern Africa upon South African labour markets, created over the 
years is not negligible since it is likely to increase the vulnerabilities of some states 
in case labour relations are radically altered. The increase of misery and crime in 
these states would be the most likely outcome with a high probability of making 
whole region unsafe and unstable.
Patterns of dependence and interdependence are also strong in the area of trade. 
After World War II, South Africa, through its mineral riches, was able to pursue 
import substitution industrialisation in which the development of manufacturing 
sector played a key role. As the South African manufacturing sector grew, regional 
markets became important. South African manufactured products were not 
competitive in international markets and the lack of transport infrastructure in the
50See F. de Vletter, “Foreign Labour on the South African Gold Mines : New Insights on an Old 
Problem” International Labour Review, 126(2), 1987. p. 200; see also P. Pillay, “Future 
Developments in the Demand for Labour by the South African Mining Industry” International 
Migration for Employment Working Paper 34, Geneva: International Labour Organisation, 1987.
51 See Alan Whiteside, “Labour Flows, Refugees, Aids and the Environment”, op. cit., p. 159.
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region made it difficult for Southern Africa states to access competitive products 
manufactured overseas. South Africa was able to increase its regional markets for 
its manufactured products, often selling at almost monopoly prices.52 In 1990 for 
example, Southern Africa absorbed about 10 % of South Africa's total exports and 
around 32 % of its manufactured products,53 while South Africa absorbed only 5% 
of the rest of Southern Africa exports. The trade among the other SADC states is 
also 5%.54 However, this trade imbalance is unsustainable in the long run, since it is 
one of the factors responsible for regional economic stagnation. The growth of 
South Africa’s exports to regional markets is significantly affected by the rate of 
overall growth of the whole region.55 In fact, it is difficult to see the region growing 
without an increase in intra-regional trade, particularly the trade with South Africa. 
For this reason the economic recovery of South Africa is very much tied up to 
regional markets. These facts point to the need to restructure regional trade and 
orient towards a more balanced and sustainable economic growth.
The instability of the region is increased by the question of refugees. In 
1990 there were over 1,7 million refugees in Southern Africa, in addition to a 
substantial number of internally displaced people.56 Most of these were political 
refugees attempting to escape the horrors of war and destabilisation, but some were
52 See R. H. Green, How to Add Ten And One: Some Reflections on Attaining Creative Economic 
Interaction, Between Africa and the New South Africa, Paper Prepared for Africa Leadership 
Conference in Windhoek, Namibia, 1991.
53 See R. Davies “Emerging South African Perspectives on Regional Cooperation and Integration 
After Apartheid”, in Bertile Oden (ed.) Southern Africa After Apartheid (Uppsaala: Nordiska 
Afrikainstitutet, 1993), p. 73.
54 See A. Hawkins, “Economic Development in SADCC Countries,” in G. Maasdorp and A. 
Whiteside, Towards a Post- Apartheid Future, op. cit., pp. 105-131.
55See R. Kamplisnky, “The Manufacturing Sector and Regional Trade in a Democratic South 
Africa”, in G. Maasdorp and A. Whiteside (eds) Towards a Post-Apartheid Future, op. cit. p. 98.
56 See the Economist, 23 December 1989; The Economist, 4 January 1990.
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economic refugees escaping poverty, and natural disasters.57 Since 1993, the 
number of political refugees has tended to diminish despite the war that followed 
the collapse of the first multiparty elections in Angola. However, the number of 
economic refugees has increased as a direct consequence of economic decline and 
stagnation. In addition to disrupting the process of development and the stability of 
their countries of origin, refugees drain the resources of host countries, since they 
require land, shelter, food and health care which often are not readily available. 
They also strain the existing infrastructure. Recent developments in the region, 
especially in South Africa, have proved that economic migration from the less 
prosperous states to the most prosperous is difficult to control through the policing 
of borders. It requires a radical and comprehensive strategy which would entail 
among other things, poverty alleviation, job creation, and a transfer of capital from 
the most prosperous to less prosperous areas in order to prevent refugees from 
leaving their countries of origin. Examples such as the agreement between the 
Government of Mozambique and Afrikaner farmers, to provide the latter with 
arable land in Mozambique seem likely to produce positive results reinforcing 
security.58 Projects of the sort entail the transfer of technology and capital from 
South Africa to Mozambique and helps to create jobs and increase regional food 
production. They are therefore likely to stop the flow of refugees from one country 
to another.
Closely linked with the problem of refugees is the question of natural 
disasters which are frequent Natural disasters have frequently destroyed social and
57 See A. Whiteside, “Labour Flows, Refugees, and Environment” in G. Maasdorp and A. 
Whiteside (eds) Towards a Post Apartheid Future op. cit., pp. 164-165.
58See AIM Report, London, Mozambique News Agency, n-65,24 August 1995.
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economic infrastructures and reduced agriculture and livestock production, hence 
affecting the capacity for food security.59 Natural disasters, have also caused 
environmental stress by destroying habitats and ecosystems and forcing populations 
and animals to migrate. They force the resettlement of these populations in new 
areas not previously destined for habitation and agricultural production. The 
resettlement of populations has often led to environmental damage such as 
deforestation, imposed by the need to farm land for agriculture purposes and the 
need for energy.60 This further leads to prolonged droughts and desertification. 
Poverty has prevented adequate protection and rational utilisation of the 
environment, thus, jeopardising the long term survival of the human species.
The rational utilisation of the environment is further hampered by the focus 
on national interest which is also likely to produce conflict. The claims of 
Zimbabwe and Mozambique on the use of Pungue water resources provides a stark 
example of possible conflictual situation. Zimbabwe wants to use Pungue river to 
supply the city of Mutare. However, this would reduce the flow into Mozambique 
thus affecting the water supply to the Mozambique’s second largest city, Beira. Low 
river flow would also mean that the sea water from Mozambique could reach 
further areas upstream which would destroy sugar cane plantation in the 
Mafambisse region.61 Resolving problems such as these requires looking beyond the 
national borders and state self-fulfilling interests.
59 See G. Maasdorp and A. Saville, SADC Economies Waiting for South Africa op. cit., p. 13.
60See R. K. Dutkiewicz, Progress Report of the Energy Sector, prepared for the Southern African 
Fund for Economic Research (SAFER), Energy Research Institute, University of Cape Town, 1992.
61 See AIM Report, London: Mozambique News Agency n-65,24 August, 1995.
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The AIDS epidemic is also an important threat to regional security. AIDS 
drain resources and threatens the productive capacity of states and therefore their 
existence. Although there are only two states in the region which the disease has 
reached the level of an epidemic, Malawi and Tanzania,62 the lack of adequate 
resources coupled with constant flow of refugees and illegal migrants make it 
difficult to control the spread of the disease thus threatening to expand to the entire 
region.
The issues discussed above, namely, the weak nature of states and their 
ability to act as the main mediators of relations between domestic societies and the 
outside world; the endemic nature of the socio-political and economic problems 
which impinge on security make the traditional concept of security inadequate for 
Southern Africa. Below an new concept of security, which seems more likely to 
lead to stability is introduced.
62 See D. W. Fitzsimons, The Global Pandemic of Aids in S. Cross and Alan Whiteside (ed.) Facing 
Up to AIDS: The Socio Economic Impact in Southern Africa, op. cit., pp. 13-33.
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PART III
TOWARDS NEW APPROACHES TO SECURITY
Chapter 6
Towards a New Concept o f Security
This chapter introduces a new way of thinking and approaching security in light of 
the present reality in Southern Africa. It argues that because security problems in 
the region are endemic and interconnected in a complex web of interdependencies, 
security is best approached from theoretical perspectives and philosophical idealism 
pertaining to the ‘good life’. Since security also implies predictability of the ‘good 
life’, these theoretical perspectives should place an emphasis on processes and 
structures that can assure this predictability.
In the new approach it is assumed that human beings are the only referent 
objects of security rather than states as in the traditional concept. However, this 
assumption, in itself is not sufficient to guarantee security. It is the quality of 
structures that mediate the relationship between human beings, processes and 
mechanisms designed to assure security that matter. These play an important part in 
the creation of environment for security. Therefore building security in an 
environment such as Southern Africa, implies focusing primarily on processes.
The point of departure in this enquiry are questions raised by Buzan 
regarding national security in the Third World. In discussing Buzan’s ideas in this 
section, my intent is to show why his analysis is an inadequate basis for 
reconceptualising security in the subcontinent. Buzan’s main argument is that 
domestic threats in the Third World cannot be considered part of national security,
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since they are endemic in states with no machinery for political succession1. He 
suggests that it might be easier to apply the concept of state security as opposed to 
national, for the conditions of the Third World countries, since the former is less 
ambiguous than the latter . It ‘puts more emphasis on the state as centralised 
governing organisation, and less on individuals and social groups existing within 
the state’.2 For Buzan, national security means “the security of whole socio-political 
entity. It is about country as well as about states. It concerns the way of life, of self 
governing people, including their social, cultural, political and economic modes of 
organisation and their right to develop themselves under their own rule”3. Buzan 
concludes his analysis observing that “because the countries of the Third World 
are mostly weak states, it is much harder to identify the referent object of security 
than in the case of strong states of the West ... under such conditions national 
security may define a long term aspiration but is not achievable in short term and it 
does not anyway capture the revisionist aspirations that govern policy in many 
Third World countries”4 In an earlier work, Buzan indicated that the term ‘national’ 
implies that the referent object of security is the nation5. He is clearly aware of the 
tensions raised by the question of national security, that is, whether it pertains to 
state or nation. In an attempt to resolve these issues he sees the nation-state, as one 
in which political boundaries coincide with ethnic and cultural boundaries, and he 
regards this coincidence as the ideal source for national security6: “when the 
territories of the sate and nations coincide, one can look for the purpose of the state
1 See Barry Buzan, “The National Security Problem in the Third World”, op. cit., p. 23
2 Ib id , p. 16
3Ibid., pp. 16-17
4Ibid., pp. 40-41
5See B. Buzan An Agenda for International Security Studies, op.cit. p.70. Buzan works with a 
concept of nation understood as a ;a group of people sharing the same cultural, and possibly 
ethnic and racial heritage, who normally constitute the majority population of the same core 
territory.
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in the protection and expression of an independently existing cultural entity”7. 
Buzan stresses that the concept of national security becomes harder to define as one 
goes from strong states (those with strong social cohesion) to anarchic states ( those 
with very weak or no cohesion at all), because an obvious referent of national 
security can not be found8.
Buzan’s argumentation raises a number of questions. First is whether it 
makes any sense to define the concept of national security in such a rigid and 
narrow manner, denying the countries of the Third World to aspire to it in the short 
term. Buzan’s preference to work with the concept of state security in the Third 
World also raises a number of questions: first, whether the concept of state security 
gives a better account of what security entails in this part of the globe; second, 
whether the differences he observes in the nature of states are sufficient to justify 
the preference for state security; and third, whether the concept of state security 
offers better insights of approaching security in the Third World.
Viewing national security in Buzan’s terms is problematic and misleading. 
Indeed, it is difficult to substantiate his argument. European and the Third World 
History is full of examples of coalitions that were especially formed to face up to 
external threats. These were not threats directed to state machinery. Governments 
mobilised coalitions because the threats were seen to be directed at all individuals 
living in a certain territory and their way of life, regardless of whether or not this 
was homogeneous. Unravelling the question of the way of life in Western societies, 
does not always points to homogenous cultural expression that needs to be defended 
from external threats. Often in these societies, there are different and most times
6Ibid., p. 19.
7Ibid., p.70.
8See B. Buzan, “The National Security Problem in the Third World”, op. cit., p. 23.
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competitive ways of life. Those who think of themselves as belonging to the 
Moslem nation in the USA, they see their way of life different from that defended 
by Republicans and they do not seem to share the view point that their security is 
threatened from outside. A similar argument can be made with respect to a large 
number of inhabitants of Quebec. Both the US and Canada cannot be expected to 
ignore questions pertaining the internal order in their discussions of national 
security.
The argument is also misleading in other respects. It cannot be 
substantiated , on very solid grounds, that the primary referent of security in Japan 
is more clearly defined than in the United States, because the former is a nation­
state and latter is not9; and it is difficult to show why and how a nation-state such as 
Denmark would be a better source for security than a state nation, such as 
Switzerland. The flaw in the argument arises from the fact that Buzan works with a 
very rigid concept of nation, which is far removed from the reality of the present 
world. He seems to rely upon the notion that ethnic and linguistic and cultural 
affinity leads to a greater socio-political cohesion, hence to a greater security. There 
is a lack of historical and actual evidence to support this view. Indeed, while the 
idea of strong social cohesion seems essential for a number of individuals to think 
of themselves as a community it does not follow from here that nation-states are 
better sources for national security. The term civil war is itself a denial of this line 
of argument and it describes wars fought within nations such as the English civil 
War in the seventeenth century and the Portuguese civil war (1832-1834). Both 
were wars fought within the same nation.10 The category ‘Bosnians’ as opposed to
9 Buzan considers the US a state-nation and not a nation-state
10See details in Gerald Bender Angola Under the Portuguese, Myth and Reality, op. cit., p.63.
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‘Moslems’ used in Bosnia Herzegovina, was invented to distinguish people who 
shared a cultural heritage, language, history and ancestry.11 On these grounds, the 
primary outward orientation of the concept of national security, to deal with 
external threats becomes absurd. Indeed, nations fought civil wars to define the 
national interest, i.e., to define what is ‘national’ and in this sense national security 
is about the national question, what binds the nation together. Moreover, the idea of 
nation-states as the best referents of national security is also inadequate since 
pushed to the extreme, it means that ethnic cleansing is a pre-condition for security. 
The implication of this is an international system composed of smaller units, often 
politically and economically unviable which could not escape stronger predators. 
Buzan’s criteria leads inevitably to the conclusion that there can be no security in 
the Third World, until nation-states or ‘strong states’ are formed.12 It should also 
be added that there are no obvious reasons as to why the concept of national 
security would work better in the Third World, since state-making has proved 
difficult as nation-building13
Buzan’s concept of national security is very much centralised on the state 
and it treats it as a completely separate entity, which has little to do with society at 
large. It does not pay sufficient attention to actors that do not approximate to either 
state or nations; or those within the state that have an influence on security, while 
human collectivities organised along the lines of ethnicity, gender, class and other
nThis is the current definition of nation. See details in A. D. Smith, National Identity (London: 
Penguin Books, 1988), p. 14.
12Strong States in Buzan’s conception means those with strong socio-political cohesion. See Buzan 
An agenda for International Security Studies, pp. 96-97.
13 See Caroline Thomas, In Search for Security the Third World and International Relations, op. 
cit., pp. 10-35.
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interests have generated security concerns.14 Indeed Buzan’s concept of national 
security subordinates individual security to states and inter-state relations. As 
Smith observes, Buzan sees states as ontologically prior to other candidates.15 The 
problem with this is that the collectivities of human beings or individuals are 
prevented from knowing what is going on with regard to their security until they 
are constituted in states or nations, while they may be daily preoccupied with their 
survival. It should also be noted that his observation about the sources of 
insecurity in the domestic arena of the Third World countries is under-explored. 
Buzan assumes that insecurity in these countries is solely caused by illegitimacy of 
governments, ethnic rivalry, and adoption of wrong ideology, a view too simplistic 
to represent the whole Third World. Yet, the Third World security problems also 
include economic development, state and nation-building, excessive external 
dependence, and interference interacting in complex webs. This observation 
suggests the absence of obvious reasons why a concept of state as opposed to 
national would work better in the Third World. Buzan’s view of national security 
as a concept organising around the nation does not reflect the present world. An 
alternative view could be derived from James Mayall’s proposition of the national 
idea16. On the basis of this proposition national security would not necessarily have 
an external orientation . It would continue to deal with classical issues such as 
territorial integrity, sovereignty, lives and cultures of the people,17 but would also 
seek to value, consolidate and protect what holds together the community that
14 Here the term national security is used in a lose sense as pertaining to the community living in a 
certain territory. It has also to do with the way of life, and values, but is not necessarily externally 
oriented.
15 Steve Smith, ‘Mature Anarchy’, quoted in Martin Shaw, Global Society and International 
Relations : Sociological Concepts and Political Perspectives, op. cit., p. 86.
16 See James Mayall, Nationalism and International Society, op cit. p.3.
17 See B. Buzan, The National Security Problem in the Third World, p.24.
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shares the same territory and aspirations as a result of the national idea. These are as 
important as the classical issues. Buzan’s concept of national security is essentially 
state centric and top down preoccupied only with the external environment. 
However “states are diverse in character, and some are in business of security while 
others are not”, as Booth observes. 18 In fact, in parts of Southern Africa states are 
still being built. This makes Buzan's analysis an inadequate basis for the 
reconceptualisation of the concept in Southern Africa.
Ayoob tries to deal with Buzan's query by shifting the focus of his analysis 
to vulnerabilities and threats. He sees security as the absence of these in the 
economic, political and social spheres. He believes that internal threats and 
vulnerabilities become part of national security if they are acute enough to take on 
political dimensions, threatening state boundaries, state institutions or regime 
survival19. Ayoob, is only interested in the nature of threats and vulnerabilities 
where these are capable of affecting the status quo. He is not interested in the 
conditions that lead to security, which makes it difficult to understand conceptually 
security. Like Buzan he sees the security of human beings as subordinate to and 
derived from the state.
Ayoob, like Buzan, deals with the negative definition of security: 'the 
absence of threats and vulnerabilities' which can only lead to reactive and short term 
problem solving approaches rather than the conceptual ones. Thus, his approach 
fails to capture the diversity of people's aspirations and concerns since the concept 
of vulnerability loses its heuristic value.
18 See Ken Booth ‘Security and Emancipation’, op. cit., p. 320.
19 See Mohamed Ayoob, “The Security Problematic of the Third World”, World Politics,Vol. 43 
January 1991, p.259.
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The negative conception of security, coupled with state centrism and 
outward looking primary orientation are reasons behind Buzan's doubts whether or 
not internal threats in the Third World are part of the national security. If there is a 
shift on the focus from the state to people, as suggested by Booth, it will not be 
difficult to see that domestic threats are part of national security. This is because the 
primary referent then becomes the entire population living in a state20.
There is therefore a need to move from the negative to positive conception
of security which implies a change on the focus from the state to the political
process as a source of security and a change of the primary referent from the state to
people, since as Bull argues individuals are:
“...the ultimate units of the great society... individual 
human beings which are permanent and indestructible in a 
sensein which groupings of them of this or that sort are 
not”21
This view is echoed by Vale and Booth who, inspired by the Kantian idea, 
that people should be treated as ends and not means, argue that security should be 
viewed as emancipatory, a freedom from any political constraints to fulfil human 
aspirations.22 Using this proposition, I define security as a condition of continuous 
fulfilment of human aspirations as guaranteed by a certain enabling environment, in 
which the human beings who inhabit it, are assured that it will not be disrupted 
especially by human action. However, making the assertion that security is about 
human beings is not sufficient. The ultimate object of security for Hobbes and other 
realists would still be human beings, yet security was not assured. Therefore,
201 do not use the word ‘national’ in a strict sense of Buzan. I use it to refer to an concerning
internationally recognised territorial boundaries.
21 See Hedley Bull, The Anarchical society, op.cit. p.22.
22 See, P. Vale and K. Booth, Security in Southern Africa: After Apartheid, Beyond Realism, 
International Affairs, Vol. 71: 2, 1995, pp. 285-304.
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placing human beings at the centre of the conception requires reinforcing conditions 
enabling human beings to realise security. But, in order to better understand the 
nature of these conditions there is a need to address the question of foundation of 
security. The concept of security, discussed below, may be applicable to other parts 
of the world, but as Southern Africa is my subject, I will confine my discussion to 
this region.
The foundations of the concept of Security and their relationship
The notion of security rests on three pillars: order, justice and peace. The 
term order here refers to a predictable pattern of relations which may or may not 
involve a hierarchy. This pattern is achieved through a commitment of individuals 
to a certain level of repression. The repression we are talking about here is minimal 
and it is aimed at assuring the existence of an organised society at all. It is distinct 
from surplus repression, i.e, one aimed at assuring a particular sort of society.23 The 
difference is fundamental since the latter tends to limit severely freedom and 
creativity. As Marcuse observes, in the absence of surplus repression, basic human 
needs and drives are transformed from being egotistical and self-centred to co­
operative and creative24. Co-operation and creativity are essential to security, since 
no human being, alone, is capable of realising all human necessity by him/herself. 
However, co-operation and creativity are unlikely to bring fruits to bear in the 
society in the absence of an organised framework. What makes an organised 
framework, different from a non-organised one is the existence of order, rules and
23 See Herbert Marcuse, Eros and Civilisation (London: Sphere) 1969, p. 203
24 Cited in Raymond Plant, Modern Political Thought (Oxford: Blackwell) 1992, p.63
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norms that govern the behaviour of its members. Order can not be achieved if 
members do not regulate their behaviour by agreed norms and rules founded on 
certain principles. In the absence of norms competitive and individual desires may 
take precedence over society goals. In a an environment in which everyone behaves 
according to his/her competitive instinct and desires there can be no common 
accepted principles. The non-existence of common principles results in chaos, lack 
of common expectations and predictability25. However, common expectations are 
important for the predictability of relations and an assurance that obstacles for the 
fulfilment of human aspirations, i.e. security can be overcome.
The concept of justice fits Gallie’s description of essentially contested 
concepts. As he explains, these are “ concepts the proper use of which inevitably 
involve endless disputes about their proper use on the part of their users”.26 The 
implication is that it is very difficult to arrive at any conception which is 
substantially founded, value free and neutral. Partly because the concept of justice is 
shaped by many factors, material and non-material, and subject to many 
interpretations of a subjective nature, which depend upon perceptions and culture, it 
is often seen as contextual and not automatically replicable. Never the less, justice is 
one of the most prevalent political virtues at core of any societal life. It is the basis 
of order and it determines the stability of relations in a society. The concept of 
justice is prominent and overriding in social life yet it is so contested. This makes it 
difficult to present a view of justice widely accepted, that can claim neutrality 
before rival claims27 Because there are different levels of analysis and different 
spheres where the concept operates it makes people see it differently. There are
25 See Evan Luard, International Society (London: MacMillan, 1990), pp. 61-65, 201.
26 See W.B. Gallie, Philosophy and the Historical Understanding (London: Chatto and Winds 
1964) p.158 the argument is developed in the entire chapter, 8 ,i.e., pp .157-191.
27 See Tom Campbell, Issues in Political Theory ( London: MacMillan 1988), p. 3.
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those who adopt a legalistic view, seeing it as concept only valid within a certain 
legal framework.28 There are also those who look at justice as a ‘set of principles 
assigning rights and duties in the basic institutions of society and defining the 
appropriate distribution of benefits and the burdens of social co-operation,29 or as a 
summation of social values achieved through dialogue or justice as rights.30 Never 
the less, each of these views, carries the risk of arriving at a restrictive analysis 
which excludes rival claims. However, by no means should this be taken to suggest 
that an agreement on a collective view of justice can not be reached. Indeed, the 
evidence suggests quite the contrary. Collective views have been arrived at by 
imposition, indoctrination, education and dialogue. However, these can be of 
different nature and their impact on security is varied. They can be restrictive, 
contentious and unpopular thus, leading to insecurity as the apartheid system; or 
widely accepted, less contentious and popular such as the idea of equality among 
sovereigns thus leading to security. However, there are collective views of justice 
which are widely accepted that can lead to disasters. The ‘ethnocide’ in Rwanda 
conducted by the Hutu majority against the Tutsi minority, although it can be 
considered an exceptional extremist case, reveals some of the risks carried by some 
collective views of justice. These risks can be minimised by grounding the 
collective views on princples that value human beings; encouraging processes that 
are all-inclusive and by the creation of institutions that can promote and protect 
human values. However because justice is such a contested concept, a collective 
view which will bring order can be obtained only through the definition of a
28 Ibid., p. 5.
29 See J. Rawls, A Theory o f Justice ( Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971), p.4.
30 cited in Tom Campbell, Issues in Political Theory op.cit., pp. 36-57, 96-117.
framework and overarching rules within which people can conduct the inevitable 
disputes over the meaning of justice.
Like justice the term peace can be employed to mean different things: the 
classic absence of war; peace as justice; peace as stability and tranquillity, peace as 
order;31 absence of structural violence32 or a political process of conflict 
management.33 However, in all these cases it refers to the minimal condition of 
understanding between real or potential adversaries in which co-operative effort 
becomes possible. Implicit in the condition of absence of war, is the fact that 
former contenders co-operate by complying to the rules of coexistence; while the 
present absence of structural violence in South Africa means that blacks and whites 
may co-operate in carrying out society interests together. Similar meaning could be 
ascribed to the understanding of peace as justice, stability or process of conflict 
management.
When these concepts are reduced to their practical meaning their common 
denominator is the possibility for co-operative effort. When it is said that a peace 
accord has been signed in Angola it does not mean that the conflict that opposed the 
MPLA government to UNITA has been resolved, that they have reached tranquillity 
or that they have reached an equitable, i.e. ‘just’ redistribution of wealth. It means 
that parties to the conflict have committed themselves to undertake certain actions 
that will allow members of Angolan society, to pursue collectively in different 
ways, society interests, that is, they have created a basis for co-operative effort 
between members of the society. Peace is essential to security because it defines
31 See different perspectives of peace in Howard Kainz (ed) Philosophical Perspectives on Peace: 
An Anthology o f Classical and Modern Sources (London MacMillan, 1987); see also Michael 
Banks, “Four Conceptions of Peace”, op. cit., pp. 258-274.
32 See Johan Galtung, “Peace and Peace Research” Journal of Peace Research, 1969, Vol. 6:3 
pp.167-191.
33 See M. Banks, “Four Conceptions of Peace”, op. cit., p. 269.
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the environment in which co-operation, creativity and predictability of life 
becomes possible. In fact the relationship between these three pillars to security is 
symbiotic. Order is important because it provides the framework for the realisation 
of justice; while justice legitimises the existing order; and, peace provides the 
comfort that the virtues of justice can be enjoyed, that is to say, the assurance, that 
human beings can realise their aspirations. However, framing the problem in this 
way is not sufficient, building security in Southern Africa is finding the right 
equation as much as devising solutions.
These three pillars, order justice and peace need to coexist in a society, in a 
condition of equilibrium in order for security to be realised. They are therefore the 
building blocks of the environment for security. No state or community can claim to 
have reached security without these three pillars coexisting in a condition of 
equilibrium. By equilibrium, I mean that they should lead to stability by not 
undermining each other.
States that tended to see security as synonymous with order, particularly 
Hobbesian order and neglect justice, such as the Soviet Union, failed to create this 
environment; while those that insisted in a certain type of justice such as South 
Africa and Rwanda during Habyarimana34, have also failed to provide the 
environment for security. On the other hand, communities which insisted on a 
certain type of peace that tended to ignore order and justice; and sought absolute 
harmony, personal tranquillity and absence of conflict, such as advocated by the 
hippies in the late 1960's failed to achieve security. As Michael Banks observes, 
“their practice was not more than self-indulgent diversion, since conflict in a
34Habyarimana undertook a policy of discrimination against the Tutsi minority in Rwanda on the 
basis that he was doing justice to the Hutu Majority. See for example, Gerard Prunier, The 
Rwanda Crisis 1959-1994: History o f Genocide (London: James Currey, 1996), pp. 74-92.
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society is both inevitable and necessary and pretending that it does not exist does 
not solve the problems of the society”.35 However, the observation that conflict is 
necessary is open to question as it requires clarification as to what level of conflict 
is tolerable and necessary. Clearly, violent conflict is undesirable, and indeed some 
levels of conflict has to be accepted in the interest of open society and freedom and 
certainly preferable to the theoretical security that might be provided by a 
totalitarian regime.
The equilibrium among pillars is not static; it is a dynamic one. It changes 
over time. It changes because perceptions change. People’s concerns, priorities and 
interests change over time and the environment has to be able to accommodate 
these changes. In fact in the process of interaction with the environment different 
people will attempt to influence it to their advantages and according to their 
capabilities, in most diverse ways. In this attempt, the pillars are affected and 
change. The Hobbesian conceptions of order and peace, the idea of colonial 
domination, or the division of labour between man and women once regarded as 
just are today rejected in most states. Providing it is assumed that justice is an 
essentially contested concept, order a result of regulated pattern of laws and rules 
and that peace is a process of conflict management these changes should not 
surprise us. The changes express the evolutionary character of the society. The 
pillars also affect each other in their interaction and this allows their mutual 
accommodation. That is to say, the view of what constitutes justice in a society 
requires to be accommodated by the intended order and the conditions of peace and 
vice-versa. However, in order to produce an environment for security, the change in
35 See Michael Banks, “Four Conceptions of Peace” op. cit., p. 260.
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the conceptions should not disrupt the equilibrium among the pillars. On these 
grounds, it is argued that the security of people is realised if the environment 
resulting from this process of interaction and change can still assure the same or 
better conditions for fulfilment of human aspirations. Approaching security form 
inquiring about its environment, allow us to learn a little bit more about the effect 
of the policies that have been devised and the structures on the collectivity of 
human beings living in territorial state. Having defined and discussed how security 
should be approached I will now turn to the question how the coexistence of order, 
justice and peace can be assured.
How to guarantee an equilibrium between pillars ?
The equilibrium among pillars, that is to say, the creation of an 
environment for security is assured by the quality of the political process, that is, an 
interaction amongst various social agents aimed at making decisions that affect all. 
The nature of the political process determines what should guide the functioning of 
the society and which values are important and need protection. It defines the 
allocation of resources, which development projects may be executed, the size of 
the army and police force and the priorities. The political process ultimately 
determines whether or not there will be peace; whether or not the existing order is 
favourable for justice and whether or not the existing notion of justice is widely 
accepted so as to legitimise the existing order. Therefore building security implies 
concentrating on the improvement of the quality of the political process, since this 
is the ultimate determinant of the security environment.
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By a political process, here, I mean the interaction amongst various social 
agents (state and non-state), aimed at reaching decisions about society goals. In 
order to ensure security this process needs to allow predictability that there will not 
be an impediment in the realisation of human aspirations. In other words, the 
process needs to be effective in dealing with society problems and responsive to its 
aspirations.
The implication for Southern Africa is the acceptance of the principle of 
replacing old values, those inspiring conflict, war and instability by those inspiring 
peace, stability and prosperity. There is also a need of assuring the compatibility of 
these values among people and societies. This can be achieved through building 
institutions that can propagate and protect these values and ensuring the 
participation of most in the decision-making process and common culture. Common 
values are important because they provide the reason why a society should remain 
together; aspirations provide the motivation to strive for these values. Finally, 
culture provides symbols that help to shape identities that bind together a society. It 
has been demonstrated that symbolic acts of powerful forces can lead to the 
emergence of culture of war. These may include the manipulation of sentiments of 
citizenry by honouring or rewarding those willing to fight and punishing those who 
are reluctant; indoctrinating youngsters, or creating role-models to be emulated thus 
influencing the behaviour of other members. These symbolic acts and processes 
help to change the belief system of a community or a society36. As M. LeCron 
Foster observes, 'warfare is not a natural phenomenon like earthquakes and floods; 
it is a human institution, institutionalised and sustained by means of symbolic
36See Walter Goldschmidt, Inducement to Military Participation in Tribal Societies in Robert A. 
Rubinstein and Mary LeCron Foster (eds) The Social Dynamics o f Peace and Conflict: Culture in 
International Security ( Boulder: Westview), p. 58.
222
structures which are mutually reinforcing'37. The implication is that this symbolic 
structure can be changed by the conscious effort of members of the society. Most 
cultures have changed over time as a result of new perceptions, influence or by 
revolution. The compelling reason for changing a symbolic structure is the fact that 
people in Southern Africa share a recent history of decades of confrontation, 
destruction and racial hatred. This recent history has resulted in nothing but 
insecurity and economic backwardness. It is therefore an example of what should be 
avoided. A deep-seated culture of peace is likely to deter individuals and 
communities from resorting to violence in settling their disputes; offending each 
other; nations from waging wars against others. It is the ultimate tool providing 
confidence to all members of the society that war and violence are not an option. 
The point being made here is that security is not a self-creating structure. It is built 
through a conscious effort of the community of people recognising the benefits of 
living in a society and strive for its betterment. Building security in this sense 
requires engaging in a conscious effort of shaping the environment for it, that is to 
say, reinforcing, peace, order and justice and their coexistence. The experience 
shows that societies founded on principles of pluralism and tolerance, of either 
Western or non-western character, an equilibrium among order, peace and security 
is more likely, while those founded on authoritarianism and totalitarianism the 
equilibrium is undermined, and conflicts and instability have occurred.38 This 
observation suggests that there are compelling reasons for encouraging processes 
promoting pluralism, full participation and all-inclusiveness especially in
37 See Mary LeCron Foster, “Expanding the Antropology of Peace and Conflict” in Robert A. 
Rubinstein and Mary LeCron Foster (eds), The Social Dynamics o f Peace and Conflict, Culture in 
International Security, op. cit., p. 188.
38 Here I am referring to the developments of the beginning of the 1990’s that sought to replace 
authoritarianism, and one party system by pluralism. For a general reference of the argument, see 
Karl Popper, The Open Society and its Enemies (London: Routlege, 1995).
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fragmented societies, or with history of civil war such as those of Southern Africa. 
In fact the promotion of tolerance and pluralism in these societies is part and parcel 
of building security. Exclusive process or those that are not transparent are likely to 
generate conflicts, while those encouraging ample participation and transparency 
tend to be more stable. Openness and transparency accord legitimacy to the process, 
while ample participation assures that the diversity of ideas and interests is taken 
into account. Transparency also allows members of the society to understand the 
process, to recognise its strengths and weaknesses, to question it or to propose 
changes. Processes that are open, flexible, all-inclusive and transparent are in better 
position to accommodate changes, since they guarantee an independence of 
opinion, creativity and freedom either to concede or to extend solidarity to other 
members of society. Voluntary concessions and solidarity reduce polarisation and 
fragmentation and allow unity around common objectives, which enhances 
stability. In the final analysis, the quality of the political process will be assessed 
through, the values it promotes, its openness, transparency and its ability to meet 
society’s goals. However, these objectives cannot be guaranteed if the quality of 
agents can not be assured. The quality of agents is important in the process of 
building security since these are the mediators of relationships of human beings. In 
fact the notion of the ‘good life’ and the question of its predictability can not be 
addressed without discussing the nature of agents, an issue that I discuss in the next 
section.
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T h e N atu re  o f  A gents:
1. Changing the Nature of the State
The new proposition of approaching security, forces a re-examination of the 
nature of agents since these, as I argued above, play an important role in defining 
the environment for security. Indeed, a pertinent question, at this juncture, is who 
are the agents of the new approach? Does the state in Southern Africa, given its 
weakness and inability to resist the pressure of the international system, act as a 
source of domestic ‘common good’ and have a role to play? Weberians might even 
argue that some states in Southern Africa, lack some of the main conditions of 
statehood, such as the monopoly of instruments of violence and a capable 
bureaucratic machinery. Others might also argue, convincingly, that the state does 
not have a full autonomy in establishing the concept of order it wishes as it is forced 
to negotiate domestic conditions with other actors in the international system; and 
that the prevailing concepts of order, justice, and peace in the domestic societies are 
thus, sanctioned by various foreign actors.
However, despite these objections the answer to the same question is yes; 
the state continues to have a fundamental role. In fact it would be untenable to 
suggest that any political community can be viable in the present international 
system without meeting the fundamental criterion of being a state. It is merely the 
primacy of the state in any given circumstances as a referent or source of security 
that is questionable. As pointed out above, understanding security and the concept 
of national security in terms of individuals versus the state is an inadequate 
rendering of the problem. Both the state and the individuals living within its 
boundaries, form a collective entity whose relations are mediated by many agents 
including the state. The state should be seen rather as a facilitator of relations
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among human beings and security a result of these relations. In this context the state 
is important for the creation of an orderly environment reducing the injustices and 
inequalities in the society. It is still an important instrument for various social 
agents such as classes, interest groups, corporations, individuals, etc., who can not 
find a better alternative to it as a source of the common good. These social agents 
find it important to operate in a legal framework created by the state and want it to 
legitimise their activities, despite the disputes in regard of whether or not it can 
adequately perform certain functions. Transnational corporations seek state 
protection for their interests in the domestic environment but especially abroad and 
the claimants of justice resort to it in their plea for justice in the domestic arena.39
Other members of the international society still regard the state as an 
important counterpart to mediate their interaction with domestic societies 
elsewhere. Tasks such as the maintenance of order, observance of international 
conventions and rules and maintenance of peace still cannot be entrusted to other 
entities than states. For other members of the international system, the state is the 
only guarantor that order among domestic social agents will prevail or, if mutated, 
international rules will be obeyed. As Fred Halliday observes, revolutions and 
social upheavals make established states apprehension.40 In other words, states 
prefer homogeneity in the international society as it legitimises their domestic social 
orders, as the example of Southern Africa suggests. In the 1980’s Marxist regimes 
in Southern Africa became intolerable for the system; in the 1990's the single party 
states were forced to organise multiparty elections and undertake economic
39 See Fred Halliday, “State and Society in International Relations: A Second Agenda” op. cit. p. 
200-203.
40 Ibid., p. 204
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liberalisation41. In fact the debate surrounding the state is more about the type and 
quality of the state rather than the attempts to find alternatives for it. The 
implication being that rather than supplanting the state, there is a need to improve 
its quality, make it more legitimate and effective in the role that it is assigned to it.
As we saw in chapters 1 and 4, states in Southern Africa have been 
illegitimate partly due to their colonial history, and partly due to the bipolar 
structure of the international system, which tended to privilege, in their domestic 
society, the interests of the great powers rather than of their peoples. However, the 
waning of the Cold War brought a new international environment, while the 
demise of apartheid brought a new climate offering a window of opportunity for 
restructuring relations and making states more legitimate.
The state will be legitimate if it is seen as protecting the interests and 
aspirations of its citizens and act as a source of their ‘common good’ and it will be 
effective if it can assure that citizens problems and aspirations are dealt with in the 
most satisfactory manner. The effectiveness and legitimacy of the state are 
important for the quality of the political process, and as mentioned above, this 
legitimacy is not acquired only by what the state does or purports to do, but how it 
does it. What makes the difference in the quality of the state are ideas, institutions, 
leadership and values that sustains it. Ideas are important to identify what the region 
needs in long term in order to feel secure and leadership to undertake concrete 
actions leading to where people desire to be. Southern Africa offers few examples 
of this capacity and leadership in dealing with its problems as epitomised by the
41 Angola, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia were single party states and 
pressure was exerted on them by external state and non-state actors to undertake political and 
economic liberalization.
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way regional conflicts and the question of apartheid were solved.42 In fact, a few 
years ago it was difficult to imagine a peaceful transition in South Africa from 
apartheid to a multiracial democracy. It required leadership to lay down the 
fundamental steps for peace and courage to implement them. Leadership was also 
required for settling most regional conflicts, by identifying concrete steps leading to 
peace, either by disarming rival armed groups or creating conditions for their 
transformation into political parties or pragmatism that demanded political 
concessions.43 Leading ideas are also required in identifying concrete steps leading 
to security.
As most experiences show, however, leadership alone is insufficient. It 
needs to be complemented by the action of institutions with the capability of putting 
ideas into practice and suggesting polices that make these ideas more effective. 
Institutions are also key for the promotion and protection of society values. This 
implies that governments have a special task of strengthening states institutions. 
These institutions are in the final analysis, the ultimate guarantors of the quality of 
the political process. It is through their activities that it can be assessed whether or
42 In 1980, the independence of Zimbabwe was achieved. It required holding talks at Lancaster 
House in London which included observers of the region about the future of Zimbabwe; In 1984, 
two accords were signed the Lusaka Accord aimed at bringing the cessation of hostilities between 
the South African and Angolan governments; the Nkomati Accord that provided for the cessation 
of hostilities between the Mozambican and Angolan government; In 1988, the New York 
agreement, between South Africa, Angola and Cuba, was reached and provided for the 
withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola, and paved the way for the independence of Namibia; in 
1990 The South African government started to negotiate with the ANC and other parties 
mechanisms of ending apartheid; in 1991 the Bicess Accord was reached between the Angolan 
warring factions and in 1992 an the Rome Accord was reached between the warring factions in 
Mozambique.
43 The Rome peace agreement signed between the Government of Mozambique and Renamo in 
October 1992, provided for the International Community to help to transform Renamo into a 
political party. The operation costed over $ 17 million. Substantial political concessions were made 
by the National Party Government and the ANC in order to secure peaceful elections in South 
Africa.
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not society’s interests are marginalised or neglected; whether order and justice are 
practised; or whether peace and harmony is promoted.
Strengthening the Civil Society
However, the state is not and it should not be the only agent of security. It 
has limited initiative and resources. It does not constitute the totality of social life. 
There are other agents equally important for security that complement the 
activities of the state and it is their empowerment that it is likely to make a 
difference in security. These include societal organisations such as civic, charity, 
and the various other interest groups normally referred to as civil society. For 
example, the evidence shows that the position of women and homosexuals in 
Western societies has been improved by social movements rather than on the state’s 
initiative. Similarly, the influence of the peace movement on questions such as the 
Nuclear Disarmament in Europe, reduction of Conventional Forces in Europe, 
human rights, and environmental concerns and other range of issues dealt with in 
the Helsinki process framework, should be recognised. The activities of these 
organisations and the like, have enhanced individuals’ participation in the socio­
political process and empowered them to interact better with the fellow human 
beings and with the state in setting up the security agenda. In Southern Africa, tasks 
such as education, health care, clean water, emergency relief are not solely dealt 
with by the state. A substantial number of individuals rely on community 
organisations, which are sometimes independent national and sometimes 
transnational NGO’s. Some of these have made positive contributions in enhancing 
the profile and dealing with the issues pertaining to the security of communities.
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They have also enhanced the ability of individuals to interact among them and with 
the state. Their actions have resulted in making the state more responsive to human 
needs and aspirations. In the final analysis, they have helped to strengthen the 
political process. There are risks, however. Some of these organisations are guided 
by self interest , and ideology and pursue a particularistic agenda that may 
jeopardise the common good of the entire society. Some fundamentalist religious 
groups, those preaching a racial ideology, ethnic separation and cleansing are likely 
to disrupt the process of security building. This is why the state is still important to 
mediate the relations between individuals, to define values and assert principles that 
safeguard the common good of all, that is to say to balance between freedom or 
sectional interest and security.
Never the less, risks are not only confined to organisations representing 
sections of the society. Buzan has illustrated various ways that the state can threaten 
the security of other sections of the society44 and this problem is expected to be 
even more acute in the case of illegitimate states. In order to assure security, a right 
balance, between sectional interests and the common good of the whole society; 
and the power distribution between the state and other social organisations, need to 
be found. It is this balance that allows ‘good life’ and its predictability hence, 
security. It was pointed out elsewhere in this text that the balance is assured by a 
political process. However, particular arrangements need to be made in each 
society to ensure that the political process is conducive to society goals. Indeed, the 
question of strengthening other social organisation raises the question of who is 
going to do it, especially in states with weak institutions and poor organisational 
record.
44 B. Buzan, An Agenda for International Security Studies, op.cit., pp. 43-50.
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The strengthening of the civil society demands responsibilities at state and 
non-state levels, that is to say, private organisation and the donor community. The 
state is responsible for creating a legal framework, supervising the rule of law, 
promoting values and ideas, that is, an environment in which civil organisations 
and other popular initiatives can thrive. These initiatives were precluded during the 
colonial and post-colonial period, because of the high degree of statism45 
particularly in security and foreign policy agendas, which allowed very little or no 
input from the base. It was this lack of input from the base that encouraged states to 
pursue their self-interest disregarding people’s concerns for security. To benefit 
from the input from the base the state would have to undertake measures to ensure 
that an appropriate environment which will encourage social organisations is 
created. Individuals in the society and concerned groups will need to put forward 
their ideas, and learn the skills of organisations to achieve their society goals. Their 
organisation may be hampered by things such as high illiteracy rates and economic 
hardship discussed in chapter 4. This is where the role of the international donors 
can become important. They can provide support to various popular initiatives 
provided that these are aimed at enhancing stability and security. They can help 
with education programs aimed at strengthening the community, the economy, 
peace, social values and political stability. The need for this seems to be paramount 
in societies with long histories of division and fragmentation46 such as those of 
Southern Africa, to assure balance between competing interests
45This term is employed here to describe the belief by some governments that there is no politics 
beyond the state, which made them only rely on the opinions of the bureaucrats for their policies.
46 The term fragmentation is used to mean the lack of homogeneous political culture in a 
particular society, i.e., lack of consensus on the governmental structure and process. See for 
example, Gabriel A. Almond, “Political Systems and Political Change”, American Behavioural 
Scientist VI, June 1963, pp. 9-10.
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How to assure the Balance between competing Interests
The study of societies, with a history of civil wars , beset by deep suspicions and 
divisions, or characterised by a fragmented political culture threatening social 
cohesion shows that special arrangements based on ‘consociation’ need to be made 
to ensure an environment of co-operation and stability47. These arrangements are 
designed to enhance mutual confidence of the elites from different political 
subcultures to compromise their views so as to reduce the causes for conflict, avoid 
mutual domination and exploitation and co-operate in the creation of a stable 
system, enjoying the legitimacy of all. This co-operation becomes possible thanks 
to psychological cross-pressures resulting from individuals memberships in 
different groups with diverse interests and outlooks, which leads them to moderate
48attitudes. Thus consociation relies upon moderation to build social stability and it 
is based on the understanding that the lack of co-operation between various 
political subcultures brings disadvantages and may lead to crises and this constitute 
an imperative to remove the immobilising and unstabilising effects of culture 
fragmentation.49 Co-operation at the elite level can lead a country to a degree of 
stability out of proportion to its social homogeneity.50 Thus Belgium in the 
nineteenth century and Austria after World War I are examples of this co­
operation. The recognition of these benefits are among the main motives for 
consociation. Lijphart points out that special conditions have to be met for the
47 For See for instance Arend Lijphart, “Consociational Democracy”, World Politics, Vol. 21 n-2; 
1969 pp. 223-33. For general reference see also Donald Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985).
48See Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man: The Social Basis o f Politics (New York: The 
Garden City, 1960), pp. 88-89.
49 See Arend Lijphart, “Consociational Democracy”, op.cit., pp. 224-25.
50 See, Arend Lijphart, The Politics of Accommodation: Pluralism and Democracy in the 
Netherlands, ( Berkeley : University of California Press, 1968)pp. 1-15, 197-211.
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consociation to work : first, the elites have to have the ability to accommodate 
divergent interests and demands of the subcultures; second they should have the 
ability to transcend cleavages and thirdly, they have to be competent and committed 
to maintain the system. Mutual confidence is thus likely to be enhanced if the 
elites involved perceive the established political environment as just, the state as 
legitimate and that political process leading to decisions affecting the entire society 
as just. However, in order to create a more solid base co-operation needs to 
transcend the elite level down to the grass-roots organisations and masses. Indeed if 
co-operation is replicated in all levels of society, when conflicts erupt at the elite 
level the basic structure of co-operation will remain in place. Consociation can take 
various forms: it can take a form of coalition as it was the case of Austria, after the 
World War II;51 equal representation in the constitutional committees, co­
participation in the branches of government, equity in the legislative bodies, 
constitutional arrangements that maintains balance among elites as its main goal. 
However, consociation may bring frustrations if the decision-making structure is 
cumbersome and ineffective, without any apparent advantages. Some consociation 
arrangements may also be too rigid, that is, not allowing a space for other political 
forces, which are not party of the agreement to operate.
However, consociation suggests a wider participation in the decision 
making process, transparency a and pluralism. This may be advantageous to apply 
in societies with tendency for fragmentation along racial and ethic lines such as 
South Africa as well as those plagued by deep suspicions resulting from long 
history of civil war, such as Angola. In order to achieve this in Southern Africa 
governments need to make efforts to de-centralise state power. Decentralisation
51 Kirchimer, “Waning of Opposition in Parliamentary Regimes”, quoted in A. Lijphart, 
“Consociational Democracy”, op.cit., pp. 228-229.
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would act as confidence building measure reducing conflicts on resource allocation, 
insensitivity, tensions on regional and ethnic domination and exploitation. The 
decentralisation of power also ensures ample participation. This would mean that 
power not only should be decentralised vertically but also horizontally, not among 
echelons of government but to include other organisations, such as cultural, civic, 
professional and community organisations in the decision making process. That is 
to say, that decentralisation can follow different models, territorial or community 
based, its essence is to ensure participation of all in the decision-making and to 
build bridges between various political subcultures. If some of these subcultures are 
not represented in the political process or if their concerns or the needs represented 
by these are not considered , it will be difficult to talk about security for all within 
the same country.
There is a certain measure of consociationalism enshrined in the South 
African constitutions, both the one operated during the transitional period as well as 
the one envisaged to come to force in 1994. An important amount of power is 
devolved to the regions and local governments, there is a protection of rights of 
minorities, especially cultural rights, and special clauses have been included to
52impede that simple majority is used as pretext for domination. Consociation was 
also behind the Lusaka Protocol signed between the Angolan Government and 
UNITA in 1994. The protocol provides for power sharing in the central offices, 
provincial and district levels, diplomatic missions in addition to police and armed
52See Bill: Constitution o f the Republic o f South Africa, 23 April 1996. Article 177 makes a 
special provision of the constitution to strengthen constitutional democracy such as : Public 
Protector, The Human Rights Commission, Commission for the Promotion of Rights of Cultural, 
Religious, and Linguistic; Commission for Gender Equality, Auditor Commission and Electoral 
Commission.
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53 rr-^ 1forces. The accord has found practical implementation due to personal ambitions 
of the Leader of UNIT A, but the fact that it succeeded in bringing about peace in 
Angola since 1994, suggests that it address the fundamental problems that have led 
both UNITA and the MPLA government to confrontation. However, measures of 
the sort need to be complemented by the creation of institutions that can help to 
exercise a qualitative judgement on the society values, including those capable of 
divulging and protecting these values. Institutions to deal with crises are also 
necessary to manage conflicts. However, as Burton argues, ‘provention,54 is a better 
approach than prevention. The former seeks to eliminate the causes by looking 
ahead and dealing with their sources55. Focusing on sectional interests, or placing 
the state at the centre when theorising about security is inadequate, because it does 
not reveal the dynamics in the society which exposes different individuals or 
groupings to security and insecurity. This approach will tend to dismiss internal 
causes of insecurity as unimportant or not part of the concept of national security. It 
follows from adopting a rigid definition of ‘nation’ and an understanding of the 
international system in accordance to the notorious billiard ball model. However, 
national security viewed as a consequence of the national idea allows also an inward 
orientation of the concept of national security whereby the primary referent is not 
the state, but the society in general including the state. An inward looking concept 
of national security allow us to look at all internal problems jeopardising the
53 See the Annex III of Lusaka Protocol on the Bicesse Accords, specifics of division of power 
are detailed in Document Relating To Unita’s Participation in the Central, Provincial and Local 
Administration and in the Diplomatic Missions in Accordance with Article of the Modalities of 
National Reconciliation.
54This term was reinvented by John Burton as a means of distinguishing decision-making aimed 
at merely “preventing” conflicts by coercive means such as police in the streets from those that 
seek to eliminate the causes of conflict. “Pro” has a connotation of looking forward rather than at 
the present see, John Burton, “Conflict Provention as a Political System” in John A. Vazquez et 
al (ed) Beyond Confrontation, Learning Conflict Resolution in Post Cold War (Michigan, 
University of Michigan Press, 1995), p.l 15.
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condition of human life or the one impeding the fulfilment of human aspirations as 
national security problems. The endemic nature of the sources of insecurity in 
Southern Africa,56 forces us to approach the problem of security from the spirit of 
philosophical idealism and political theory pertaining to good life. This implies 
focusing on political processes ensuring the creation of an environment of security. 
This environment can be assured if these processes lead to the coexistence of order, 
justice and peace. This will require building legitimate states and a conscious effort 
of political accommodation.
This approach would be preferable for Southern Africa because states 
show weak social cohesion and are threatened with disintegration which looms over 
societies across Southern Africa, menacing to worsen the security condition of 
people. The violence in the province of Natal in South Africa partly results from 
fears of domination of the Kwazulu by the central government in Pretoria, thus 
posing the challenge of finding the right measures bridging the Inkatha Freedom 
Party and the ANC government, so as to remove the causes of the political 
immobility in Natal. There are also residual fears of domination in the Afrikaner 
community by the back majority, especially among those who have traditionally 
championed extremist views. This has made them demand a separate state, a 
volkstaat. The civil war in Angola has exposed deep divisions between the Southern 
and Northern communities. While armed groups representing minorities such as 
Frente de Liberta9ao de Cabinda (FLEC) still threaten the country with secession. 
Across the region countries are still beset by resentments arising from the 
distribution of resources, power and opportunities which have caused faultlines
55Ibid., pp. 115-130.
56 See Greg Mills and Christopher Clapham, “Southern African Security After Apartheid: A 
Framework for Analysis”, op cit., pp. 1-6.
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within and among communities. These circumstances of Southern Africa call for 
the adoption of a security approach which takes into account all its problems, i.e. 
social, political military, economic and environmental.
States in Southern Africa need to reduce social conflict, rationalise, 
resources and strengthen their domestic institutions. They also need to rationalise 
resources, make savings and concentrate on economic development to 
improvement of their standards of living. Given these circumstances and others 
affecting the societies of Southern Africa discussed in chapter 4 , it is very difficult 
to see how can all this be achieved without adopting a wider view of security, that 
is, as a matter of ‘good life’.
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C h ap ter 7
F rom  C om p lex  T o  C om m u n ity  o f  Security  ?
This chapter examines the implications of adopting a new approach to 
security with regard to the current efforts at building a security community in 
Southern Africa. It argues that the process of building a regional security 
community requires an encouragement of processes that can help to overcome 
constraints, such as power instability, political fragmentation, economic imbalances, 
and fears, that is to say the vagaries in the variables1 of the Southern African 
Security system. This is because the nature of changes in these variables 
determines whether the ‘security community’ is likely to be strengthened or 
weakened. The inconsistencies in the variables are likely to be eliminated if 
regional order is founded on compatible values, common principles and interests. 
However, this should be ensured at the domestic level.
Deutsch defines a ‘security community’ as a group of people which has 
become integrated. That is to say, a group of people which has attained a sense of 
being bound together by an agreement that common social problems must and can 
be resolved by process of peaceful change; and attained institutions and practices 
strong enough to assure for 'long' time dependable expectations for peaceful 
change . According to Deutsch and his colleagues a ‘security community’ is 
created by mutual compatibility of values; strong economic links and expectation 
of more; multifaceted social, political and cultural transactions; a growing amount
1 The term variables is used in Buzans sense meaning significant factors affecting conceptions and 
policies. See Buzan et. al. The European Security Order Recast: Scenarios for the Post Cold War, 
op. cit., p. 165.
2 See K. Deutsch et. al. Political Community and the North Atlantic Area (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1957), p. 5.
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of institutionalized relationships; mutual responsiveness, greater mobility of people 
and mutual predictability of behaviour.
These conditions, however, are not yet in place in Southern Africa. The 
region is faced with constraints such as weak states in which communities are 
poorly integrated, domestic politically fragmented, with weak institutions and a 
lack of financial resources. The nature of these constraints requires an adoption of 
policies that can easily be implemented by governments and supported by people, 
while serving as a building block for further co-operation. This points to the 
necessity of building a ‘security society’ as a first stage of building a ‘security 
community’.
The term ‘security society’ is derived from Hedley Bull's concept of a 
society of states, which according to him, exists
“... when a group o f  states, conscious o f  common interests 
and common values form a society in the sense they 
conceive themselves to be bound by a common set o f  
rules in their relations with one another, and share the 
working o f common institutions”4
However, the term security society goes beyond Bull’s conception of society 
because it implies the establishment of reactive institutions with an intervening 
capacity to deal with crises whenever they occur in one member of the society.
This chapter is divided into 3 sections. The first part examines past and 
present attempts at regional community building and highlights the reasons of their 
failure. The second section discusses the main variables affecting the Southern 
African System and the necessary transformations; and the third part attempts to set 
at the stage the way their management could lead to the 'security community'.
3 Ibid., pp. 115-154.
4See Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society, op. cit., p. 13.
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T h e R egion  and  the idea  o f  com m unity: stren gths an d  w eak n esses
Attempts at building a ‘security community’ in the region have been 
underway since the beginning of this century. The agreement establishing the 
South African dominated Southern African Costumes Union (SACU) between 
South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland, in the 1910, epitomises this effort. 
In the 1970's South Africa led a new effort which resulted in the establishment of 
the Rand Monetary Area (RMA) which included Lesotho and Swaziland. A third 
attempt came with the Frontline States (FLS) in 1980 when they established the 
Southern African Coordination Conference (SADCC). All these attempts and others 
mentioned elsewhere in these text have failed to establish a security community. At 
the core of the reasons for failure was the lack in their members of compatible 
values, the existence of weak social, economic, political and cultural links and 
mobility of people. These factors and the severe shortage of financial resources in 
case of SADCC curtailed efforts towards further cooperation and spillover. This 
impeded the predictability of behaviour of the members, hence the existence of the 
security community.
By virtue of being the largest economy in the region, with the largest and 
thriving white population, surrounded by an unfavoured black majority, South 
Africa has always sought to legitimise its domestic situation by increasing its 
acceptance abroad. This fact led it to conduct a number of regional initiatives. One 
such initiative was the Southern Africa Customs Union, established to expand trade 
in the area of the Union. Namibia which had been a member by virtue of being a 
South African colony, formally joined the Organisation after its independence in 
1990. It provides for free movement of goods and services among member
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countries and the application of common external tariff to non members. However, 
South Africa’s domestic policies impeded membership expansion and to the 
strengthening of co-operation.
Soon after World War II, South African efforts were aimed at gaining 
recognition from its Western allies as a regional power. Its intention was to act as 
the guardian of Western interest, thus influencing the course of events in the 
dependent African territories5. In this regard, the South African Prime Minister, Jan 
Smuts, proposed the creation of a commission composed of colonial powers and 
those that had economic and military interests in Africa to devise a common policy 
for Africa6. This idea was met with the suspicion by South Africa’s potential allies. 
The adoption of apartheid as an official state policy and South Africa’s campaign 
against decolonisation proved to be the main disincentives. The idea of cooperation 
with black Africa gained a new momentum in the 1950's, when Verwoerd and 
Strijdon recognised the importance of Africa for South Africa’s future.7 They 
spoke of technical co-operation, as a way of preserving South Africa's white 
identity and establish mutual trust and understanding. The idea took a practical 
form through South Africa’s participation in organisations such as the Commission 
for Technical Co-operation in Africa South of Sahara and in the Scientific Council 
South of Sahara and the Inter-African Bureau for Soil Conservation. However, the 
idea of South Africa acting as Africa’s power collapsed when the OAU was formed 
without South Africa in 1963, and the organisation absorbed most of the function
5 See for example, J. Barber and J Barrats, The South African Foreign Policy : The Search for 
Security, op cit. p. 6
6Quoted in G. Mills, “The History of regional Integrative Attempts: The Way Forward”, in Greg 
Mills and Alan Begg (eds.), South Africa in a Global Economy ( Bramofontein: South African 
Institute of International Affairs, 1995), p. 217.
7 Foreign Minister Eric Louw spoke of South Africa’s future as one of African power but taking 
care not to break the ties with the West. See for example, Jack E. Spence, Republic Under 
Pressure ( London Oxford university Press, 1965), p.74 .
8 See James Barber, South Africa’s Foreign Policy op.cit., p. 106.
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that South Africa had set for itself. Its apartheid legislation of the late 1940's and 
the 1950's and the Sharpeville massacre kept the rest of Africa distant. SACU 
remained the only transnational arrangement in which South Africa participated. Its 
membership was kept due to economic incentives provided for by South Africa. In 
1969 SACU was re-negotiated. South Africa conceded more advantages to its 
partners but these were not sufficient to attract new members. Southern Rhodesia, 
Zambia Malawi and the colonial Mozambique kept apart. The situation did not 
improve even with the signing, of the 1974 agreement establishing the Rand 
Monetary Area between South Africa, Lesotho and Swaziland.9 This arrangement 
provided for free capital flows and implementation of common exchange controls in 
the area of the Union.
RMA/CMA like SACU rested only on common economic interests and 
could not lead to a community of states. It was not founded on a compatibility of 
values among the members. In fact, apartheid underscored the existence of 
different values between South Africa and its partners. The question of apartheid 
discouraged social, cultural and political links, a greater mobility of people and the 
development of strong institutional relations. Among members common rules and 
the predictability of peaceful relations could not be assured. The BLS supported the 
opposition to apartheid and South Africa raided their territories in search of its 
opponents. In fact co-operation between South Africa and its partners in the area of 
security and defence lacked foundations. Political unity with the rest of Africa was 
contrary to the philosophy of apartheid. In fact, South Africa and the rest of the 
members were divided as to the motives that led them to adhere to the 
organisations. While South Africa was seeking a legitimation of its internal policies,
9This was replaced by the Common Monetary Area in 1986, see details in for example, Gavin 
Maasdorp Trade Relation in Southern Africa : Changes Ahead, in Gavin Maasdorp and Alan 
Whiteside, (eds) Towards a Post Apartheid Future, op cit. pp. 142-144.
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the rest of the members saw a possibility of extracting benefits from cooperating 
with the dynamic economy in the region. These integrative attempts represented a 
compromise defining a survival ‘modus vivendi’ rather than an expression of 
cooperation founded on common values, objectives and principles.
The first attempt at building a community of security in the region, based on 
shared common principles came with the creation of SADCC. The Lusaka 
Declaration10 called for the economic liberation of Southern African states and for 
economic cooperation and integration as an important sequel of the political 
emancipation of the region which had already been attained.11 In order to achieve 
this goal the Southern Africa states designed a strategy aimed at: i) reducing 
economic dependence, particularly, but not only on South Africa; ii) forging links to 
create genuine and equitable regional integration; and iii) mobilising resources to 
promote the implementation of national and regional policies. SADCC viewed the 
pursuance of the dependence-reduction strategy as a way of creating just economic 
relations in the region. It argued that the existing economic relations in the region 
were not a result of natural economic interaction or driven by market forces. They
were a result of the deliberate policies of incorporating the majority of the Southern
12African states into colonial and sub-colonial structures . This justified its twofold 
objective of, on one hand, fostering the economic development among its members 
and reducing, on the other hand, the dependence on South Africa.
The effort to reduce economic dependence on South Africa, however, 
distorted and eventually undermined SADCC's development efforts. SADCC's 
substantial effort was re-directed to counteract the impact of South Africa's 
destabilisation policies aimed at undermining its development. Although SADCC
10 See the SADCC Lusaka Declaration, op. cit., pp. 1-4.
11 See the preamble of the SADCC Lusaka Declaration, April 1980.
12 Simba Maconi, the SADCC Executive Secretary, addressing the SAPES Annual Meeting in 
Gaberone, February 1991.
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was founded on the principle of equality among sovereigns, shared economic 
interests, prosperity and promotion of stability and emancipation of the region, 
political values of the members were heterogeneous. Liberal democracies such as 
Botswana coexisted with dictatorships such as Malawi; unrepresentative 
monarchies in Lesotho and Swaziland, coexisted with the Marxist regimes in 
Angola and Mozambique and single party states with mixed economies, like 
Tanzania and Zambia. In fact the question of political values could not be raised 
since it represented a sensitive point that might jeopardise the entire arrangement. 
Thus, political cooperation was limited, while the lack of resources imposed limits 
on economic and cultural links and mobility of people. SADCC's cooperation 
methods were based on decentralised sector coordination. It showed inability to 
develop supranational functional institutions. The non-existence of a binding treaty 
regulating the activities of the members within SADCC, impeded compliance to 
common rule.
SADCC lacked the necessary ingredients to become a security community. 
Poor institutional capacity, lack of political convergence, feeble integration of 
domestic communities, and weak states could only turn SADCC to an inter­
governmental co-operation institution with weak foundations. Thus, for a long time 
SADCC was confined to governmental circles, very alive in its annual meetings, 
but almost non-existent on a day to day basis. While the lack of political 
convergence, for instance, did not impede the countries from working together, it 
was a key factor in impeding transnational cooperation outside governmental circles 
and compelled member states to approach co-operation on the basis of lowest 
common denominator. While communications and transactions grew modestly 
there were few economic assets and links that could ensure a full committment of 
its members to SADCC policies of reduction of dependence on Southern Africa.
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Indeed a combination of military, economic and political pressure against some 
SADCC members made them yield. As a result, the predictability of peaceful 
behaviour of its members could not be assured. This can be illustrated by the 
example of Malawi, which harboured, for a long time, an armed opposition against 
the government of Mozambique, as a result of pressures from South Africa. 
However, the end of the Cold War introduced a new dispensation in the region 
which gave rise to renewed efforts at building a security community.
In August 1992, the Heads of State and Government of SADCC signed the 
treaty establishing the Southern African Development Community (SADC). The 
Declaration accompanying the treaty identifies the existing cultural and social 
affinities, common historical experiences, common problems and aspirations as 
constituting their motivation to 'promote regional welfare, collective self-reliance
13and integration in the spirit of equity and partnership' as important steps for the 
attainment of the economic well-being, improvement of the standard and quality 
of life, freedom and social justice, peace and security.14
In contrast to SADCC, the inter-relations of SADC were regulated by a 
treaty. This treaty established supranational institutions such as the Summit of 
Heads of State to make and direct policy and control SADC functions; the Council 
of Ministers, to oversee the policy implementation, the functioning and 
development of SADC; special commissions answerable to the Council, to guide 
and coordinate policies and programs in designated sectoral areas; the Standing 
Committee of Officials to advise the Council on policies; the Secretariat to plan,
13 See Towards The Southern African Development Community, A Declaration by the Heads of State 
or Governments of Southern States, Windhoek, August 1992, Annex I in this study.
14 Ibid, p.l.
manage and implement Community programs and the Tribunal to oversee all legal 
aspects related to its activity and settle the disputes between members15.
While the treaty defines certain principles, sets specific goals and identifies 
certain aspirations and interests of the peoples of the region, its foundations are not 
laid on existing reality. It does not seek to protect existing or acquired values. These 
are simply aspirations. The compatibility of values is yet to be assured, within the 
national boundaries as well as among the states. Lesotho and Swaziland are still 
unrepresentative monarchies, yet the rest of the members have opted for multiparty 
democracy. In fact, even in the multiparty states, democratic values cannot be 
assured to be shared by all people. Republican constitutions coexist with autocratic 
lineage structures, testifying the existence of a two value system. SADC also faces 
financial problems. Like its predecessor SADCC, about 90% of SADC projects are 
externally financed. Locally generated funding proves to be difficult since the 
economies of the region are either facing stagnation, modest growth, or are still yet 
to recover from the impact of past confrontation. The modest recovery of the 
economies has limited cross-border cooperation among business groups, political 
parties and other private initiatives. The lack of financial resources also poses 
constraints in the development of institutions, thus affecting policy formulation 
capacity, co-ordination and implementation. This suggests that policy-making is 
likely to continue to be haphazard and decision-making processes unclear. The lack 
of clear policy and deficient control mechanisms means that SADC programs may 
not be fully implemented, while members cannot be held accountable.16 Although 
bodies such as the Standing Committee and Secretariat are charged with the
15 See Articles 9-16 of the Treaty of Southern African Development Community ratified in Windhoek 
August, 1991 Annex II in this study.
16 See the address of president Masire of Botswana at Lusaka Summit, August 1991; see also 
SADCC The Second Decade, Enterprise Skills and Productivity, SADCC Conference Document 
1990.
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responsibility of designing and implementing projects, they face functional 
difficulties. While the Standing committee meets only once a year and the officials 
in charge may not dedicate their full time to SADC business, the Secretariat does 
not have sufficient powers or mechanisms to control the progress of ongoing 
projects or to act quickly to correct possible errors in these projects. It has to await 
the decisions of the Council or Summit that only meets once a year.
These factors hamper attempts to establish priorities of projects within 
SADC which could allow effective use of funds to strengthen the community. The 
shortage of financial resources thus limits economic, cultural, social and 
institutional links and the mobility of people, hence, the consolidation of 
community.
The efforts to strengthen the community are also hampered by institutional 
duplication and overlap. There are several institutions in the region attempting 
regional integration in many different manners. Besides SACU and SADC, there is 
also the Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) which 
includes states such as Djibouti in the Horn of Africa down to South Africa. 
COMESA is aimed at promoting trade among member states through removal of 
barriers and the applying of a common tariff to products manufactured outside of 
the region. The great difficulty COMESA has faced is that of the lack of tradable 
goods. States such as Kenya, Zimbabwe, Mauritius and South Africa which already 
have a manufacturing sector in place are likely to benefit more from COMESA than 
those whose exports are confined to primary products. It should be noted however, 
that the former three states, are unlikely to compete with South Africa in COMESA 
in conditions of full liberalisation of trade. Morever, institutional duplication in the
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• 17region has contributed to competition , rivalry and inefficient use of region’s 
resources.
The prevailing tendency of encouraging interstate institutions, based on the 
assumption that these will lead to a greater co-operation and security has not been 
matched by similar efforts at the domestic level. Since its creation SADC has taken 
important steps in the area of security. Its 1993 programme of action recommended 
a strategy for advancing regional security which includes : the adoption of wider 
definition of security ; the establishment of a forum for mediation, arbitration and
1 ftreducing the level of military expenditure. These steps were followed in 1994 by 
an agreement to create a sector on Politics, Diplomacy, International Relations 
Defence and Security19; in 1995, talks were underway to create the Association of 
the Southern African Security to deal with the operational side of security; and in
1996, the idea of establishing AS AS was abandoned to give way to the Organ for
20Politics Defence and Security functioning under SADC. However, these measures 
have not been sufficient to deal with the vagaries of - power, fear, interdependence 
and political fragmentation - the variables of the Southern African Security System, 
operating at domestic as well as at the regional level. Unless these variables are 
positively affected, security is unlikely to prevail in the region.
17 SADC Secretariat wishes to push the organisation to introduce trade liberalisation, and it has 
prepared a proposal to be tabled in the SADC Summit in 1997. However, COMESA believes 
trade relations it is its exclusive area. There are also frequent quarrels between the Secretariats of 
both organisations accusing each other of blocking co-operation between them. See for example, 
Joe Chilaizya and Lewis Machipisa “Tension Mounts Between Rival trading Blocs” Weekly Mail 
and Guardian, 8-14 November, 1995.
18 See “ Southern Africa: A Framework and Strategy for Building the Community”, SADC 
Secretariat, Gaberone, pp. 24-25.
19 See “Military and Economic Pressure from South Africa forces King Yield” South Scan, Vol. 9, 
16 September, 1994, p. 270.
20 See the BBC, Summary o f World Broadcast AL/2515 A/3 22 January 1996.
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The Variables
Power, fear, political fragmentation and interdependence are identified as 
affecting the Southern African security system. Whether the security community 
aspired to by SADC can be achieved, will be determined by the nature of changes 
taking place in these variables. The question posed therefore is whether these 
changes can be oriented towards reinforcing co-operation, consensus, and stability 
thus, strengthening the sense of community? Or on the contrary will they continue 
to unleash domestic political fragmentation, fierce regional competition and 
national self-interest thus, strengthening the patterns of conflict and instability?
Power
Power, defined as aggregate capabilities in the social, political, military and
21economic sectors to conduct state and community interests internationally is also
an important variable in the Southern African security system. Buzan drwing on
Waltz outlines the condition of being powerful as follows:
“ ... to possess a broadly-based relatively large and 
reasonable economy; controlling advanced technology 
and supporting a sufficient military establishment to 
sustain a plausible self-defence against other powers; 
having a sufficient socio-political cohesion so that these
assets can be maintained , controlled and their influence
22turn outward.”
The implication of this conception, as Buzan points out, is that “the locus of power
23is a cohesive and centralized political entity” The application of this criterion to 
determine the status of power in Southern Africa, assumes a consensus that South 
Africa can act as a regional power. In the post World War II period South Africa
21 See For example, Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations op. cit., pp. 86-96, see also Kenneth 
Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading Mass: Addison Welsly, 1979), pp. 131,192.
22 See for example, Kenneth Waltz, Theory o f International Politics (Reading Mass: Addison- 
Welsely 1979), pp. 131, 192; see also Buzan et al. The European Security Order Recast op. cit., p. 
166.
23 B. Buzan et al., The European Security Order Recast, op. cit. p. 166.
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consolidated its position as a regional power thanks to its mineral riches which 
financed the quick development of its manufacturing sector.24 At present, its GNP
• 25per capita is 2.5 times the average regional per capita GNP , while its defence 
expenditure is 3 times the rest of Southern Africa added together26 It also 
possesses a manufacturing sector far more advanced than the rest of the region. 
However, in the past, its military and economic strength could not be effectively 
used to secure domestic socio-political cohesion so as to maintain and control the 
assets of power and turn their influence outward. South Africa's adoption of 
apartheid in 1948, proved to be a liability preventing it from developing a strong 
and cohesive domestic society. Apartheid faced opposition at home and abroad, 
thus South Africa's power assets could not be directed to further accumulation of 
power. In fact significant amounts of its resources were diverted to deal with the 
opposition at home and abroad.
The domestic opposition to apartheid continued to increase and in the 
1960's coinciding with an increase in anti-colonial struggle. In fact from then on, 
the status of power in the region has been strongly determined by the intent to 
protect the system of apartheid in South Africa and resist decolonisation elsewhere. 
This forced South Africa to seek alliance with the remaining white regimes in the 
continent and increase its co-operation with them in the economic, military and
27security frame . This alliance determined the mobilised resources, re-orientated 
domestic policies and economic strategies and increased its military capabilities to 
face its opponents.
24 See for example R. Bethlehem , “Economic Development in South Africa” in Gavin Maasdorp 
and Alan Whiteside (eds) Towards a Post Apartheid Future, op cit., pp. 62-64.
25 See G. Maasdorp and A. Saville, The SADC Economies Waiting for South Africa, op cit. p. 16
26 See the Military Balance, London, International Institute of Strategic Studies pp. 249-55
27 See C. Coker, “A New Military Role In Southern Africa 1969-82” in R. Jaster (ed) Southern 
Africa: Regional Security Problems and Prospects, op. cit., pp. 142-50.
This changed the regional power configuration as it precipitated further 
increases to the opposition's power. The anti- colonial and anti-apartheid forces did 
not have fully indigenous sources of power and they could not rely on the support 
of the newly independent states. Most of these states were economically and 
militarily weak in comparison to South Africa and its regional allies. But they were 
politically strong, since they could foster large political solidarity. Their political 
strength enabled them to mobilise significant resources and people in the region for 
the struggle against colonialism and apartheid. Indeed, their political power was 
gradually transformed into a military power which enabled them to challenge the 
colonial and apartheid regimes.
The fact that the newly independent states and other anti-colonial and anti­
apartheid forces in Southern Africa, did not have an independent source of power, 
meant , however, that their strength could only be enhanced by drawing on the 
support of foreign powers. The Cold War context facilitated this support and 
replicated its pattern in the region. The Soviet Union and its allies and China lent
their support to the newly independent states and the anti-colonial and anti-
28apartheid forces, while South Africa, Rhodesia and colonial Portugal continued to
29maintain close economic and defence links with the West. The regional duopoly 
emerged and was consolidated as the adversarial spirit increased.
The environment of confrontation enhanced the region's militarism. South 
Africa consolidated its strength by acquiring the capacity to manufacture military 
hardware, increasing co-operation with the West and finding loopholes to the arms 
embargo. However, its economy was affected and went from modest growth to 
stagnation as the environment of domestic unrest discouraged investment and
28 See W. Kuhne, “ Africa and Gorbachev’s New Realism” in I.W. Zartman and F. Deng, (eds) 
Conflict Resolution in Africa (Washington DC: Brookings Institution, 1991), pp. 42-67.
29 See C. Coker, South Africa: “A New Military Role in Southern Africa 1969-82”, op. cit. pp. 142- 
48.
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30technological renovation . Its domestic society also remained fragmented and 
polarised.
The newly independent states, the anti-colonial and anti-apartheid forces, 
relied upon arms supplied by the Eastern bloc countries. The fire power they 
acquired was sufficient to pose enormous military and economic pressures on 
Portugal and Rhodesia who eventually subsided during the mid 1970's.
Their economies, however, remained either stagnant or experienced sharp 
declines increasing their levels of poverty. The environment of confrontation and 
the vagaries of the use of power helped to increase the fragmentation of their 
societies, eroding their political power base. The amount of destruction caused by 
regional wars increased the power gap between South Africa and its neighbours, a 
feature which became salient at the end of the Cold War.
The end of the Cold War had an adverse impact on the regional power 
structure. On the one hand, it alleviated South Africa from excessive defence and 
security spending and helped to reduce the burden of sanctions on its economy. It 
thus provided South Africa with an opportunity to consolidate and increase its 
power. On the other hand, the end of the Cold War increased the vulnerability of the 
rest of Southern Africa states, since they could no longer rely on barter schemes 
from the Eastern bloc countries to maintain their military power and obtain 
economic aid. The withdrawal of the Soviet bloc’s support to most Southern 
African states helped to pave the way for South Africa’s re-emergence as the single 
dominant power. The task of building a ‘security community’ depends in part on 
the ability to employ this power to elicit positive change and restrain fears.
The variable power in the region, however, is to a large extent a result of 
interaction between regional members and the international system, especially in
30See R. Bethlehem, “Economic Development in South Africa”, op. cit., pp. 64-79.
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the domain of finance, technology and military capabilities. The major sources of 
finance, technological innovators and arms producers, are not located in the region. 
The question as to whether Southern Africa can develop a rapport leading to large 
capital inflows, transfer of technology and arms remains a question mark. Arms 
sales and technology transfers can only be expected to take place if they do not 
represent a danger to their suppliers.
Fear and Fragmentation
Fear, in the context of this chapter is related to the idea of domestic or 
regional polarisation and inter-state conflict caused either by military attacks or any
31other forms of domination. This includes concerns of weak states being 
overwhelmed or undermined by strong states in multilateral fora and their 
reluctance to surrender some of their sovereignty.
The recent history of instability in Southern Africa is not associated with 
wars caused by border disputes, entrenched rivalry between states, peoples or tribes, 
but to colonialism and apartheid. Indeed, from the late 1970’s instability, and the 
fear and fragmentation it generated were particularly related to apartheid’s struggle 
for survival and led to South Africa's hegemonic ambitions.
These ambitions were spawned by fears of a privileged white minority 
completely surrounded by a black majority and black- ruled majority states. This 
white minority lived under the fear of losing all priviledges it had acquired. To 
protect its priviledges, it sought to consolidate its power at home through 
repression and through expanding its dominion in the region. As seen in chapter 2,
31 Buzan et al, European Security Order Recast: Scenarios for the Post-Cold War, op. cit., p. 168
32 The Boer nationalism and Zulu nationalism in South Africa epitomises the reasons for fears of 
fragmentation.
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it attempted to incorporate parts of Mozambique, Rhodesia and the High
* • 33Commission Territories into the Union. When incorporation became impossible, 
the fears led South Africa to resort to strategies such as getting its neighbours to 
agree to peaceful coexistence with apartheid. The strategy sought to include South 
Africa in regional arrangements where its economic muscle could silence opponents 
abroad thus legitimising its policies at domestic level. The resulting arrangements, 
were thus motivated by historic economic ties rather than genuine political will and 
remained a pragmatical arrangements, a strategy of survival for the weaker and 
strong members alike. Indeed, the empirical evidence34 shows that the hostilities 
suffered by SACU members from South African, attacks is relatively low when 
compared with amount of destruction in the non SACU members. This suggests 
that SACU and RMA helped to shield the BLS countries from South African’s 
bellicose policies since Pretoria had a direct interest in them. None the less, these 
institutions did not succeed in stopping South Africa's constant intimidation. The 
BLSN states were raided several times by South Africa in search of its opponents 
and were threatened with sanctions and military retaliation if they provided
35sanctuary to them. Fear continued to drive South Africa’s regional policy 
throughout the 1970’s and 1980’s. In 1979, Smuts idea of ‘knitting together the 
parts of Southern Africa’ was revived in Botha’s Constellation of Southern African 
States (CONSAS), which was a renewed attempt at perpetuating the existence of 
apartheid and relations of domination, subordination and inequality in South 
Africa and in the entire region.36
33 See J. D. Omer-Cooper, History o f Southern Africa, op. cit., pp. 188-211.
34 See South African Destabilisation The Economic Costs o f Apartheid Resistance, op. cit., pp. 36- 
43.
35 See for example David Martin and Phyllis Johnson, Destructive Engagement (Harare: SARDC, 
1988).
36 See R. Davies and D. O’Meara “Total Strategy in Southern Africa: An Analysis of South African 
Regional Policy since 1978” op.cit., pp. 183-207.
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Fear precipitated political fragmentation as the South African regime tried to 
appease domestic opposition by creating the Homelands system and encouraging
37subversion and dissidence in neighbouring countries. This action enhanced the 
division of communities in these states into sub-national structures, thus hampering 
the emergence of national communities.
Fear also played a part in the policy and actions of the other Southern 
African states. Military and economic domination by South Africa has always been 
a possibility and this drove most of their policies. It took the creation of the 
diplomatic loose coalition, known as the Frontline States, to coordinate policies 
against apartheid. They also created among themselves a Defence and Security 
forum to exchange information and enhance cooperation in this domain. Fears of 
economic domination led these states to create SADCC to reduce economic 
dependency, particularly the dependency on South Africa. Fears also led the BLS 
states, to join a rival organisation which sought to reduce dependence on South 
Africa. Indeed South African goods dominated the markets of non-SACU and rest 
of SACU members and to the extent that it had to pay compensation to the latter for 
their poor industrial development. SACU's revenues, excise duties and import 
surcharges were also administered by the South African Reserve Bank which
39showed little sensitivity to the concerns and interests of other members. As 
McCarthy remarks, “in contrast to other schemes of integration in the Third World, 
the objective of developing other SACU members was not entrenched in the 
customs union history of Southern Africa”40 which shows the intention of
37 Ibid., 184-189.
38 See G. Maasdorp, “Trade Relations in Southern Africa -Changes Ahead” in G. Maasdorp and A. 
Whiteside (eds.) op cit., pp. 132-155.
39 See S. G. Hoohlo, “The Southern African Customs Union and the Post Apartheid South Africa: 
Prospects for Closer Integration in Seohai Santho and Mafa Sejanemane, Southern Africa: After 
Apartheid? ( Harare, SAPES Trust, 1991), pp. 96-98.
40Colin McCarthy, SACU in the Changing Economic and Political Environment, unpublished paper, 
Stellenboch University, 1991.
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continuing domination of their markets by South African goods. South Africa’s 
neighbours also feared that South African action of fomenting subversion and 
proxy wars could result in further fragmentation of their polities.
The end of apartheid brought to an end the ideological and identity clash in 
the region thus eliminating fears of military aggression by South Africa. With the 
exception of Swaziland and Lesotho, multipartyism has been adopted by all states 
in the region, thus reducing the chances for inter-state political conflict. Market 
economics has also been embraced by all Southern Africa states as their economic 
philosophy, which eliminates the conflict between centrally planned and liberal 
economics.
Residual fears of economic domination by South Africa, however, still 
persist and are likely to continue as the gap between the South African economy 
and those of the rest of the region remain large. Fear in the region also remains in 
relation to those states riven by protracted domestic conflict, such as Angola, or 
those that reached a fragile peace such as Mozambique, Lesotho and Zambia. The 
problems in these countries may remain a permanent destabilising factor impeding 
change conducive to greater security, and are likely to spillover into neighbouring 
countries thus leading to regional instability. South Africa, the strongest regional 
economy fears migration from neighbouring countries and other African countries 
and the fact that its resources may drain away in financing regional initiatives. 
Fears are also caused by military asymmetries, even though there is not an obvious 
military threat in the region. This fact, however, continues to encourage countries 
such as Botswana, Mozambique, Zambia, Zimbabwe, to increase their military 
budgets41 since they continue to feel disfavoured in relation to Zimbabwe and South 
Africa. Although these states agree in participating- in regional arrangements, they
41 See The Military Balance, International Institute of Strategic Studies 1995/1996, pp. 248-268
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argue that it would be better if they participated on equal footing, rather than on 
subordinate position.42 Part of fears arise from issues not completely resolved in 
some states, such as the existence of dissident groups in Mozambique threatening 
to attack Zimbabwe, the continuing fighting in parts of Angola, the existence of 
large numbers of readily available weapons, violence and secessionist movements 
in parts of South Africa.
Interdependence
The other important variable in the Southern Africa security complex is 
interdependence which in this text is used to describe mutual dependence between 
members of a system or as Nye and Keohane put it, “reciprocal effects among 
countries or among actors in different countries” 43 However, as they explain 
interdependence does not mean that the dependence is symmetrical. It only 
expresses the capacity of mutual affect to different degrees among members of the 
system. The assumption being made here is that interdependence and the behaviour 
of governments affect each other mutually. While interdependence may condition 
the behaviour of government in formulating its security policies, government 
activities, may affect the degree of interdependence making it stronger or weaker 44
Conventional wisdom argues that because interdependence is founded on 
mutual interest it restrains conflict and correlates inversely with the pattern of
42 Interview with the Director for Defence Policy in the Mozambique’s Ministry of Defence, 7 
December, 1995.
43 See R. Keohane and J. Nye, Power and Interdependence, World Politics in Transition (Boston: 
Little, Brown, 1971), p.8.
44 Ibid
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military fear: “When fear is high, interdependence will be low ; unless fear is low 
interdependence is unlikely to be high”.45 The implication of this is that strong 
interdependence within a system, will act as a deterrent to military attack, and 
would reduce military fears, therefore enhancing security.
The Southern African case, however, does not seem to fit accurately into 
Buzan's formulation. There was a significant level of interdependence between the 
Frontline states and South Africa particularly in the area of trade, migrant labour 
and transport routes. Although the degree of interdependence impeded the Frontline 
states from taking a firm stand in favour of sanctions against South Africa, it was 
not sufficient to prevent conflict between the Frontline states and South Africa. The 
Frontline states were militarily weaker and extracted more benefits from South 
Africa than the latter from them. Yet this did not stop them from harbouring anti- 
apatheid combatants, waging international campaigns against apartheid and seeking 
ways of reducing their dependence on South Africa. The example of Southern 
Africa, thus suggests that it is not sufficient to have a significant level of 
interdependence to restrain conflict, but its nature, which is important. Whether it 
binds states around common principles thus, creating committment; or it is based 
on fears. Although the levels of interdependence was significantly high, the type of 
regime established during the years of apartheid became ethically unacceptable to 
the majority of South Africa's neighbours and subsequently became a source of 
conflict.
Amongst the Frontline states interdependence was low. The levels of trade, 
capital and labour flows from one state to another were insignificant, and despite 
the fact that Malawi had a history of collaboration with what other states regarded 
as the common enemy, this did not inspire violent conflict between Malawi and the
45 See B. Buzan et al., The European Security Order Recast: Scenarios for the Post cold War, op. 
cit. p. 171.
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rest of Southern Africa. Paradoxically, interdependence was high between 
Mozambique and Rhodesia. Mozambique collected important revenues from 
Rhodesia, since a significant amount of Rhodesian trade was transmitted through 
Mozambican ports.46 It also controlled oil supplies to Rhodesia through its pipeline 
linking Beira and Machipanda. However, this did not restrain conflict between these 
two countries 47 Mozambique closed its borders to Rhodesia in 1976 and it provided 
support and sanctuary to Zimbabwean guerrillas. The Rhodesian government 
stepped up its hostilities to Mozambique and set out to create an armed resistance to
48topple the government of Mozambique. The example of Southern Africa shows 
that interdependence does not always restrain conflict, especially if it is regarded as 
a historical accident, not founded on mutual interests and common values. It leads 
one to conclude that it can only be a strong incentive for co-operation and 
integration if it is perceived to promote the common good and common interests. 
However, the level of interdependence in the region is still low and economic 
inequalities high. The low level of interdependence does not encourage cooperation 
while economic inequalities generate flows of refugees from less prosperous to 
more prosperous areas.
The post-independence era in Southern Africa was marked by 
developments that tended to increase interdependence among the newly 
independent states. The creation of SADCC was founded on the principle of 
emancipation and equity, regarded by the leaders of Southern Africa as necessary 
conditions to reduce conflict, promote stability and prosperity 49 SADCC became 
an important forum of consultation and concertation of strategies and an important
46 See William Winter, Apartheid’s Contras: An Inquiry into the Roots of War in Angola and 
Mozambique (London: Zed Books, 1995), pp. 27-28,264-267.
47 See for example, Ken Flower, Serving Secretly (London: John Murray, 1987).
48 Ibid.; see also William Minter, Apartheid’s Contras, op. cit. pp. 264-267.
49 See The Lagos Plan of Action, Organisation of African Unity, Addis Ababa 1981; and see also the 
SADCC Lusaka Declaration, April 1980.
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centre for political, diplomatic and economic interaction between the region and 
the external world. It managed to maintain a strong sense of political solidarity 
among its members and to mobilise an investment of $ 3 billion. Most of this was 
applied in the development of infrastructure in the area of transport and 
communications, energy, mining and fisheries50. Modest achievements were also 
attained in the co-operation between universities, trade unions and business groups.
The demise of apartheid is likely to strengthen further the level of 
interdependence since it reduces barriers to racial harmony and cooperation. The 
fact that South Africa and Mauritius joined SADC in 1994 and 1995 respectively 
indicates that there is a strong regional convergence on the necessity to build the 
community. There is certainly a chance for South Africa to play a positive and 
influential role, sharing its resources, skills , technology and experience with other 
members. The question remains, however, whether interdependence can be 
strengthened by increasing co-operation aimed at promoting the common good.
Managing the Variables
The task of building a ‘security community’ in Southern Africa implies 
adequate management of the variables power, fear, political fragmentation and 
interdependence in order that stability, harmony and positive change can be 
achieved. The variable power needs to become stable to reduce fears and 
inequalities. Excessive concentration of power in one regional member is likely to 
maintain or induce further dislocations, imbalances and rivalries. Indeed, states will 
find it difficult to stop the flow of refugees from the least stable and least
50See E. Maphanyane, “SADCC Future Challenges, in Bertil Oden (eds) Southern Africa After 
Apartheid, Regional Integration and External Resources, op. cit., pp. 174-183.
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prosperous parts to the most stable and prosperous if efforts at reducing the 
inequalities of economic power are not made. There is a limit to the reduction of 
power imbalances and dislocations. Both form their territorial extension, population 
and resources, states such as Lesotho and Swaziland cannot aspire to become as 
powerful as South Africa. What they need to be assured of for their security, is that 
their fate and aspirations is not dependent on how the power holder in Pretoria and 
elsewhere use their economic and military muscles. They need not to be afraid of 
having powerful neighbours. This implies that governments need to adopt policies 
and make an effort to remove all the threatening aspects of power. Unrestrained 
power may also encourage relations of domination and subordination which 
heighten fear, dissidence and conflict. When fears are high co-operation is low and 
integration can only be achieved through force rather than concord. Therefore, the 
variable fear needs to be kept low. As indicated, the demise of apartheid is an 
important step towards lowering fears, but it is insufficient to encourage further co­
operation, peace and the building of community.
Interdependence needs to be strengthened to the point that the settlement of 
disputes between states by force becomes not only unviable but unthinkable and 
peaceful relations predictable. Strong interdependence is also crucial to strong 
regional identity and harmony. As seen above, to lead to security, interdependence 
needs to based upon common principles, values and shared interest. The spirit of 
interdependence is likely to enhance security if it can guide relations between states, 
peoples and individuals.
The stability of power, low fears and the increased interdependence can be 
achieved through increasing co-operation between states at economic, social, 
political and military levels. But this is assuming that states have the ability to do it 
both in terms of resources and institutional capacity; that their domestic
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environment is stable and that the threats to their security result from differences 
with their neighbours. Indeed, the idea of integrated community of states 
presupposes the existence of integrated domestic societies which allows states to 
interact as single cohesive units. However, national integration is not yet a given 
reality in Southern Africa. Common values, interests and strengths to participate are 
yet to be assured within the same territorial state, while domestic peace is not yet 
predictable. Multifaceted social, political and cultural transactions and 
institutionalised relationships within the national borders of states are still also 
weak. States are still ravaged by suspicion, disputes over the distribution and 
allocation of resources and institutional rivalries and these are a liability to the 
process of regional community building. Unlike the European example in the late 
1950’s, political fragmentation in domestic societies did not exist In fact, state and 
non-states institutions were largely functional. Southern Africa is still characterised 
by strong economic inequalities with few assets to integrate. Europe had also 
displayed technological advancement, low illiteracy rates and higher levels of 
education.
The constraints faced by organisations such as SADC include the lack of 
financial resources; poor institutional capacity at the domestic and regional level; 
difficulty in identifying priority tasks51 and guiding co-operation towards actions 
that can serve as building blocks for further co-operation while eliminating residual 
fears. This situation poses the challenge of identifying policies that can be easily 
implemented by individual states and institutions that can assure solid and gradual 
progress towards the building of community. It does not suffice to have policies 
that are popular at regional level. They also need to reflect the reality and be 
popular at the domestic level, while institutions need to assure all the communities
51 See Anthony Hawkins “Economic Development in SADCC Countries” in G. Maasdorp and
Alan Whiteside (eds) Towards a Post Apartheid Future, op. cit. pp. 105-131.
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that steps taken towards co-operation bring joint rewards. Regional institutions and 
policies will be popular if they are not seen as alien but as a continuation of 
domestic institutions and policies. In other words, it becomes meaningless for the 
conditions of Southern Africa to have a regional forum for conflict resolution if 
institutions that can ensure conflict management on a daily basis are not in place in 
domestic communities. It also becomes difficult to think of a strong regional 
community if national communities are poorly integrated or, if political actors in a 
given state do not share the same outlooks of the region. Domestic integration must 
be ensured if the regional community is not going to be merely a community of 
governments. In fact weak domestic institutions and weak national integration are 
likely to delay the process of regional integration Moreover, it is difficult to talk 
about integration when there is little that can be integrated. Financial resources need 
to be generated to allow the creation and guarantee the functioning of all necessary 
regional institutions and fund economic projects that strengthen security. The 
policies need also to deal with regional economic imbalances, poverty, epidemic 
diseases and frequent natural disasters.
This implies that the logic of moving from the present conditions to an 
integrated security community in Southern Africa is untenable. In fact, 
concentrating on regional institutions, as a way of building security in Southern 
Africa is to continue to admit the existence of serious inter-state threats and is to 
accept that a prima outward orientation of the concept of security; and in the final 
analysis is to prioritise the security of government and states. An understanding of 
security as an environment allowing the predictability and the continuing 
fulfillment of human aspirations would require a different approach. An approach 
that allows the rationalization of what can be achieved and that this be matched with 
the amount of resources that can be mobilised and obstacles that may be
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encountered and here lies the limit of the idealistic approach. The assessment of 
these difficulties as well as the level of resources suggests that Southern Africa
52would be better off if it aimed to establish a ‘security society’ as the first stage of 
building the security community. As noted above, the concept of ‘security society’ 
differs from Hedley Bull’s conception of ‘society of states’ in the sense that it 
would allow members of that society to intervene formally on each other’s affairs 
whenever crises occur in one or more members of the society. It does not therefore 
entail amalgamation of communities, nor does it imply the integration of states, or 
insensitive relations, but collective responsibility of relations between members. It 
implies agreeing to certain rules and conventions that ensure that principles and 
values underpinning the society and its interests are protected. Therefore, far from 
forcing states to hasten integration only at governmental level, this approach seeks 
to encourage them to work towards assuring each other that common interests and 
values are shared by all or by the majority of members in their domestic societies.
How to Ensure a Security Society
The idea of building a ‘security society’ has practical implications for 
encouraging processes of structural transformation and institutional building at 
domestic and regional levels. Among these, processes and institutions that can 
reduce conflict, fragmentation and polarisation in domestic societies, as well as 
those that can help to raise confidence of people by improving their standards of 
living and drawing them closer to each other should be given priority. They pave 
the way for greater stability and contribute to solid foundations for integration. It 
also implies that states should act more responsibly in relation to each other by
52See the introduction to this chapter, p. 245.
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observing the principles on which society is founded and by ensuring that their 
resources are spent in the development of environment assuring the existence of 
order justice and peace. The creation of a security society, will thus require 
transformations at the military, political and economic levels. For the specific 
conditions of Southern Africa this implies responsibilities by states, the civil society 
and the international donors:
States
States are primary responsible for transformations at the military level 
ensuring that power will only be used to elicit positive change and not for 
domination and subordination of others, since this is an essential condition to 
restrain fears. One such step capable of raising confidence of people and ensure the 
use of power for positive change is increasing military interdependence by 
committing states and communities to comprehensive non-aggression.
The spirit of comprehensive non-aggression goes beyond the signature of 
non-aggression pacts. It implies refraining from fomenting dissension and 
subversion in neighbouring countries; it requires states to harmonise their foreign 
policies and to avoid disruptive conduct to each other; and it requires states to 
promote military transparency. This could be achieved through an agreement 
specifying the type and quality of equipment to be deployed in the region; 
establishment of joint training centres for officials; adoption of similar military 
doctrines; undertaking joint military exercises, and opening military installations 
for mutual inspection.
Strengthening the spirit of non-aggression at the domestic level will require 
an effective representation of regions, races and the various ethnic groups in the 
national army and police forces. Since these are important symbols of national
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unity, the military structures and their force level need to be arranged in such a way, 
that no region, community or ethnic group, should offset the others, yet the
53combination of the military capability should be sufficient to defend the country.
However, the spirit of non-aggression also means responsibility of not 
letting the domestic conflicts reach crises or affect others. Situations such as the 
1992 post-election tragedy in Angola and the 1994 Rwandese tragedy are examples 
of what the spirit of security society should seek to avoid. The fundamental 
implication here is the need to reach agreement on when the principle of respect for 
sovereignty should not apply; agreeing on the responsibilities of the intervenor and 
on the conditions to reinstate it. This also imply the creation of capacity to deal with 
crisis, such as peacekeeping. However, to respond effectively to crises, Southern 
African states need to develop a regional capacity and mechanisms through which 
their actions can be facilitated, and seen to comply with the rule of law. There is no 
better lesson in this regard than the recent experience of Southern Africa. When the 
political situation deteriorated in Lesotho following the military coup in 1994, 
South Africa, Botswana and Zimbabwe applied pressure to restore constitutional 
rule and avoid the development of further crises.54 Following this event, the 
Frontline States met in Harare a few days before the 1994 October Mozambican 
multiparty elections to assess the possible post-elections developments. Having 
reached the conclusion that peace might be disturbed by virtue of one of the 
contenders rejecting the results, they sought to prevent a further deepening of the 
crisis. They warned the contending Mozambican parties elections of their 
willingness to do everything in their hand, including military actions, to restore
53 Here the Suiss experience can be relevant, since no Canton is allowed to have a number of 
permanent force above the levels that have been agreed to.
4 See “Military Intervention Recedes” , South Scan Vol. 9:32 ,2  September 1994, p. 253
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peace, should one of the parties undermine the peace progress55. When Renamo 
attempted to boycott the elections, the Frontline states sent a high level delegation 
to Maputo to reaffirm its position and dissuade Renamo56. Their actions proved to 
be a major deterrent for further crises in Mozambique, since it curtailed Renamo's 
chances of following Unita’s footsteps replicating the Angolan post 1992 elections
57tragedy. The Frontline states’ action also sent signals to the rest of world that 
they repudiated the deepening of crisis in the region and that they were prepared to 
do everything to stop this from happening.
The Frontline States’ ‘gun boat’ diplomacy sounded convincing because the 
states involved had the capacity to take military action. However, it did not result 
from an existing arrangement in the region. The Frontline states acted on an ad-hoc 
basis having assessed low risk in the countries where their ‘gun boat’ diplomacy 
was tried. They had no contingency plans in case the situation deteriorated. They 
also lacked instruments and mechanisms that would facilitate corporate military 
action, like the availability of contingents and logistics. They also lacked legal 
instrument through which they could justify their actions. In addition lack of 
planning would have made their response difficult and exhausting should the crises 
have deepened.
The committment to non-aggression, can therefore create conditions for the 
variable power to remain stable and be used to foment positive change. The spirit of 
non-aggression also reduces the fears for military conflict and domination between 
states, thus enhancing the potential for co-operation. It also establishes the basis for 
a reduction in military spending and the enhancement of co-operation in the area of
55See “South African Delegation Runs Home Message Stability”, South Scan Vol. 9:42, November, 
1994, p. 335.
56Ibid.
57 After elections held in September 1992, one of the Angola warring factions, UNITA refused to 
accept the result of elections. Angola was plunged back to civil war that destroyed most o f the 
country and killed millions.
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disarmament, collective defence, thus ensuring that regional resources are correctly 
applied to the defence of the region. It also discourages the adversarial spirit among 
regional members brought about by offensive defence and it restrains arms build-up 
since it would also encourages agreements on the type of armament to be deployed 
in the region, schemes and mechanisms for their acquisition or development
States will need to take practical steps aimed at strengthening 
interdependence. This is justified by the endemic nature of security problems in 
military, political, economic and social spheres, and the lack of capacity in the 
individual states, to deal on their own, with these problems. The strengthening of 
interdependence implies measures at domestic and regional levels. At the domestic 
level, interdependence among communities is important for national cohesion and 
identity. This can be achieved by encouraging cooperation and transactions between 
different communities. The state has a particular responsibility in creating a legal 
framework and investment in the development of infrastructure that would facilitate 
the transactions since Deutsch observes the essence of community building is
58improving and increasing social, cultural and political communication.
Indeed, the need to increase the level of social communication in Southern 
Africa, starts at domestic level. In fact, large numbers of people in remote areas 
have few contacts with their fellow nationals, and because of artificial borders and 
in some cases because of alienation by the state they can not even distinguish 
whether they are citizens of one state or the other, yet few will know they have a 
capital city and central government responsible for their security59. The lack of 
adequate systems of transport and communications have increased the isolation of 
communities within national boundaries and strengthened differences rather than
58 See K. Deutsch et. al. Political Community and the North Atlantic Area p. 149.
59 See I.B. Lundin, “Projecto Autoridade Tradicional, Documento Pesquisa, DAA/UEM, 1992 
pp.3, Unpublished Report, Centre of Strategic and International Studies, Maputo.
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similarity and cohesion. Cultural exchanges sports and business, tourism, 
consolidation of national identity can not take place without extending transport and 
communications to the use of everyone. Building a security society also implies 
improving transport facilities and communications network within the national 
borders and across the region.
States have responsibilities in improving transport and telecommunications, 
since these are crucial to the increase of intra-regional trade, and essential to keep 
the idea of community alive. However intra-regional trade is largely dependent on 
transportation routes and communications within national borders, since these are 
key to bringing goods from the most remote areas to their getaways and vice-versa. 
This strengthens the sense of interdependence and community.
Strengthening interdependence also requires an identification of 
mechanisms in which regional co-operation can be increased further. Some parts of 
Southern Africa are richer in some resources than others; while others have more 
skills in certain areas than others; yet others possess better infrastructure. When 
states are taken individually, some show greater weaknesses in some areas than 
when the region is taken as a whole. Indeed, when regional resources, infrastructure 
and skills are added together, it enhances the region’s potential and capacity to 
ensure security. Through SADC, the Southern African states have made important 
progress in improving transport, port facilities and communications networks, 
which strengthens interdependence among them. However, the improved system of 
communication still needs expansion, so as to bring domestic communities closer. 
The example of SADC projects in the mining sector needs to be encouraged. 
Mining projects have sought to increase participation of the people in their domestic 
environment by encouraging small scale mining. While this has helped to alleviate 
the problem of unemployment and allowed the development of small business, little
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has been achieved, however, in terms of adopting a common- strategy for the 
development of mining. The existing mineral wealth of the region justified the 
establishment of regional plants for mineral beneficiation, which apart from creating 
new jobs would increase the value added of minerals, thus contributing for the 
economic prosperity and greater security.
Regional projects such as the one aimed at constructing a power grid across 
the region from the Cape to Zaire;60 water resources management, such as the 
project bringing together South Africa and Lesotho61 have the merit of increasing 
regional interdependence promoting complementarity and providing jobs to a large 
numbers of people. Similar initiatives have followed between Mozambique and 
South Africa and are vindicated by the provision of fanning land in Mozambique to
South African farmers to help Mozambique to increase its food production and
62exports. The other idea involves the development of the Maputo corridor with the 
object of setting agrobusinesses and petrochemical industrial complexes in the 
corridor linking Mozambique and South Africa. Joint economic rewards are the 
major spur for this undertaking involving transfer of resources and technology from 
the most developed to the least developed members. Cheap production and 
transportation costs and the prospects of enlarging market are the major incentives 
to the investors. The security motivation for these projects is that they help to stop 
the flow of refugees form less prosperous to the most prosperous areas. Projects of 
the sort help to improve the quality of life in the region as they create better 
incentives for people to live and work together. They generate income which can 
support further cooperation in other areas including the consolidation of national
60 See, R.K. Dutkiecz, Progress Report of the Energy Sector, SAFER op cit. in chapter 5 of this 
study.
61 Cited in Booth and Vale, “Security in Southern Africa: After Apartheid, Beyond Realism” op. cit., 
pp. 285-304.
62 See “Extensive Pact Agreed Ahead of October Elections” South Scan, Vol. 9 29 July 1994.
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and regional defence and security institutions. Co-operation in the area of defence 
or policing can only bring positive results if economic co-operation is successful. 
However, no economic success can be guaranteed without the minimal conditions 
of order and peace, and the sharing of resources, co-ordination of strategies and 
common clear political objectives. The process of building a security society in 
Southern Africa also means identifying policies aimed at strengthening national 
communities.
The civil Society
Economic transactions in the region are likely to increase if greater 
emphasis is placed on community development. Community organisations together 
with states share the responsibility of encouraging production based on simple 
technology, local raw materials which is capable of enhancing creativity. The 
attainment of this objective requires that special attention is paid to education, 
particularly the education of women, since they play a special function in the 
education of children, especially at pre-school age thus shaping the learning 
environment of the new members of the society. Women are the major contributors
63of food production, and they are key to the attainment food security. Indeed, their 
role in food security, goes beyond farming to encompass hygiene, health, nutrition 
and welfare of the family, yet most development policies are male-orientated.64 The 
civil society has a special responsibility in getting those responsible for the 
development policy to redirect or balance these policies in order to enable women 
to improve their skills and capacity in food production to reduce poverty in the
63 See R.M. Mkandawire, “Women, Food Security and Agriculture Policy in the SADCC Region: 
A Case Study of Malawi”, in R. Mkandawire and Khabele Matlosa (eds) Food Policy and 
Agriculture in Southern Africa ( Harare: SAPES, 1993), pp. 209-218.
M Ibid., p.213.
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region and provide better education to children. Education is also key to enhance 
creativity and participation of all human beings in the production and other society 
goals. The increase of production and creativity enhances the potential for 
transactions, mutual economic benefits and better quality of life.65 These act as 
catalysts for regional integration.66
Civic organisations such as Youth can play an important role in enhancing 
stability, by promoting educational programs promoting peace, human rights, other 
social values, sports and other activities that would keep the youth away from 
criminal activities. Human rights organisations have a special task of assuring that 
states, and other members of civilian society comply with respect for human rights 
and this has an implication of broadening the agenda of security, by a constant 
interaction with the state and raising people’s concerns.
The civil society has yet another responsibility in assuring the improvement 
of civilian-military relations. Although progress towards the neutralisation of the 
use of force in the region has been made, truly democratic civil-military relations 
are not yet a reality. The military still are not trained to respect human rights, indeed 
in many states, defence and security are secret preserves of the state. However, 
behind the spirit of secrecy lie the opportunities for misusing public funds, 
practicing illegality and inappropriate using of military power other security forces, 
which threatens democracy. The civil society can help to bring about democratic 
civil-military relations, making sure that the military are accountable to the civilian 
authority, the public and the parliament by promoting debate over the defence and 
security issues such as military professionalism, the role and responsibilities of the 
military in society, weapons policy, armament industry, encouraging academic and 
non-academic research on issues such as military doctrines and threat perceptions.
65 See K Deutsch et al., Political Community and North Atlantic Area p. 141.
66 Ibid
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These actions are likely to enhance the respect of legality, restrain violent 
behaviour in soldiers and correct application of public funds for security and 
defence policy.
Finally if the civil organisations can build regional networks, and co-operate 
with their counterparts, they would strengthen their capacities thus improving the 
potential for a better interaction between the civil society and the state across the 
region.
The role of International Donors
Power and fears at regional level can also be managed by a positive 
influence of extra-regional power and their committment to the spirit of non­
aggression. The impact of states such as the permanent members of the UN Security 
Council, and other members of the group of G7 on regional systems can not be 
ignored. As Bull noted, major powers play an important role in maintaining order
67by seeking to limit and contain conflicts. The number of conflicts in the region 
aggravated by some form of intervention of major powers is significant, as it is the 
list of conflicts that were resolved thanks to their efforts. Furthermore, the number
of examples showing the failure of regional arrangements to resolve regional
68conflicts is also high. The reasons for this failure are varied. They range from the 
lack of resources, lack of skills and mechanisms, inability of winning trust of the 
parts to the conflict, to the lack of regional solutions. These are reasons to rely on 
outside help provided that this help can strengthen regional arrangements and 
initiatives.
67 See Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society, p. 207.
68The ECOMOG intervention in Liberia is an example of the failure of regional arrangements in 
resolving local conflicts; other example is the 1982 OAU intervention in Chad.
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Extra- regional powers can therefore, act as brokers in stalemate situations. 
They can also generate ideas leading to long lasting peace, apply a variety of 
pressures and force positive changes. They can also act as arbiters of regional power 
relations by establishing defence pacts either in bilateral arrangements or 
multilateral such as the Commonwealth that can help to raise confidence of people 
by improving their standards of living and draw them close to each other.69 They
70can also conduct preventive deployment to stop the escalation of crises.
To perform these tasks effectively, however, they would also have to be 
fully committed to non-aggression. This means that they can enter formal 
agreements with regional and sub-regional organisations supporting the repudiation 
of dissension and subversion. This includes, among other things, not supplying 
arms outside the officially established schemes and channels of military co­
operation, either bilateral or multilateral. They can also play a role in encouraging 
multilateral agreements regulating arms trade and improving the control 
mechanisms of armament circuits and agreeing on certain levels of armament 
production and international inspection.
The international donors can also help in developing capacity and 
institutions for crises prevention and management that is, institutions for peace 
making and peacekeeping. The post 1991 crises in Angola show how hazardous and 
costly it is to rely on the UN mechanism for peacekeeping. Had the region had a 
capacity to intervene, crises might have not escalate as they did. Yet, the 
peacekeeping experience in Somalia provided a pretext for the reluctance of the 
states to send troops in peacekeeping missions to places where peace is not there to
69 This experience seemed to have produced good result in the ASEAN countries. See for example 
Michael Leifer, ASEAN, and the Security o f South East Asia (London: Routlege, 1989), pp. 52- 
87.
70 Preventive deployment was applied in Macedonia in 1993 and deterred further crises from 
escalating. See the report of the UN Secretary General, S/24923, 9 December 1992
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be kept. This justifies the development of a regional capacity to manage crises. The 
Great Powers could help states to establish regional centres, train peacekeepers, 
develop the communications network, and organise logistics. As seen in previous 
chapters regional states lack resources and skills to this capacity.
International donors do not have a role to play only in interstate relations. 
Governments have their agendas and preoccupations which often do not coincide 
with that of the civil society. Therefore strengthening the civil society might not be 
their priority. As we argued in chapter 6 and in the above sections, building 
security in Southern Africa requires, a vigorous civil society to better interact with 
the state and define a security agenda that it takes into account all people. The role 
of the international donors in strengthening the civil society is very important, in 
providing funds for the organisations promoting peace, human rights, community 
development, encouraging the various organisations to meet with their counterparts 
in the region and abroad and encouraging them to hold national debates on issues 
pertaining to security. The intent is to empower them so that they can better interact 
with state and fulfill their role in the society.
Building security cannot only be charged to states. It is a responsibility of 
all those living or participating in the development of a society such as state 
functionaries, civic organisations individuals and foreign donors. The recognition of 
the role of each one of these agents is likely to lead to better policies which can lead 
to the strengthening of the regional community.
The identification of clear political objectives and co-ordination of strategies 
requires that states function effectively at the domestic level and that they devise 
regional policies that can enjoy support at home. This support is unlikely to come 
if policies aimed at reducing polarisation, fragmentation and isolation of domestic 
communities from one another are not adopted. This implies that strengthening
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Chapter 8 
Conclusions
This study of the security concept in Southern Africa and prospects for the post­
apartheid era has sought to answer two questions: first whether the traditional 
concept of security can work for the conditions of Southern Africa; and second if it 
cannot work what are the alternatives that allow us to draw some general 
conclusions.
This study makes four central claims.The first is that Southern Africa, 
partly due to its peculiar colonial history and that of apartheid and partly due to the 
region’s links with the great powers, embraced the traditional concept of security 
which was unsustainable and inappropriate for its specific conditions. This concept 
was state centric, inherently militaristic, nationally focused, and narrow in scope. Its 
application to Southern Africa led to regional confrontation, instability and hence 
insecurity rather than security. Thus, the region needs to adopt a new concept of 
security. The second claim of this study is that the adoption of new concept of 
security requires breaking with past traditions, attitudes and ways of thinking about 
security in favour of views deriving from philosophical idealism.1 Philosophical 
idealism allows us to question our assumptions and methods independent of the 
constraints imposed by reality and is clearly a way of searching for ideal solutions.
1 We understand as the Kantian tradition associated with the project for perpetual peace and the 
proposition advanced by human rights thinkers that rights should form the foundation of any 
political process.
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The third claim of this study is that Southern Africa should aim at building a 
‘security society’ as a first approach of building the community. This approach 
seeks to assure that common values and aspirations are shared by all and that 
efforts to regional do not undermine or overshadow the domestic political process 
of integration and finally the foruth claim is that ensuring security implies building 
legitimate states and breaking the state monopoly over security.
The climate of confrontation that characterised regional relations over the 
last 30 years was founded on disagreement over alternative projects of regional 
order. These were, first, the colonial order that opposed native peoples and the 
settler community; and second, the order designed by apartheid South Africa to 
perpetuate relations of racial domination, subordination and inequality which met 
the opposition of the newly independent, majority-ruled states. This conflict of 
interests and outlooks was responsible for the region to embrace the traditional 
concept of security.
This study argues that the traditional approach to security is a reflection of 
negative thinking, i.e., about the threats to and the vulnerabilities of the state. This 
view of security cannot but lead to short term problem-solving approaches which 
hamper the development of a long term conceptual framework of thinking about 
security. Yet the situation in Southern Africa, such as the weak nature of states and 
the endemic character of the political social and economic problems faced by these 
states, and the lack of functional institutions, requires new thinking, concepts and 
approaches. Concepts that will need to approach security in all its social, political,
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military, economic, social and environmental dimensions This makes security an 
issue to be dealt with from political perspectives associated with theories about the 
‘good life’. However, because theories of the ‘good life’ lead to holistic 
approaches, they often mask the question of predictability which is the key to 
security. Looking at the problems of the subcontinent from the security angle has 
the advantage of identifying what needs to be done to ensure the predictability and 
progress in the ‘good life’. The proposition which has been advanced in this study 
is that the changes at the conceptual level should consider people as the only 
referent object of security and see states and other social institutions as vehicles 
mediating the interaction among the main referents of security. In other words 
states and other social institutions are simple instruments creating an environment 
for security.
The proposition that people are the end objects of security, is not new. 
Thinkers such as Hobbes and all other apologists of the theory of balance of power 
were fully aware that the ultimate objects of security were human beings, and their 
theories were aimed at ensuring people’s security. However, the difference betwen 
the approach advocated by this study and classical realist theory lies in the 
mechanism devised to assure security. Hobbesian prescriptions of surrendering 
sovereignty to a Leviathan do not themselves provide any checks to the 
development of and the nature of order established. This fact opens the way to 
tyranny, oppression and all forms of totalitarianism; while theories of balance of 
power led states to self-fulfulling exercises rather than focusing on people’s
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priorities. The lesson to be extracted from the observations is that good intentions 
are not enough to ensure security. Special attention should be given to mechanisms 
designed to ensure the attainments of goals. Placing people at the centre, therefore, 
requires focusing on environment enabling security rather than on threats or 
vulnerabilities of the state. The implication of this proposition is thus the need to 
build regional and domestic institutions that can deal with the historical legacies, 
the present reality while securing an improvement in the quality of life of human 
beings. This requires structures and institutions that can smooth the interaction of 
human beings while allowing them to predict the improvement in the quality of life 
and the nature of changes and the social dynamics, since it is in this interaction that 
the question of security arises. In other words, building security requires that special 
attention is given to the political process through which the continuing demands of 
order, justice and peace can be reconciled. The coexistence of order, justice, and 
peace define the security environment. This coexistence, however, needs to be in a 
dynamic equilibrium, i.e., it must accomodate both changes in the people’s 
perceptions of the environment and changes in relationships amongst the three 
pillars of the environment. The political process will lead to the intended security 
environment if it is opened to the participation of all political actors in society and 
if a common good is given primacy in politics. In the final analysis, a people 
centred approach, therefore, requires focusing in improving the quality of the 
political process by empowering different actors than those traditionally around, if 
not merely agents of the state, and by reconciling and and synthesising divergent
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projects aimed at serving the common good. In the past there were many reasons 
which impeded states to serve the common good.
The nature of the states was one primary factor. In South Africa the state 
was there to serve sectional interests, dichotomising politics along racial and ethnic 
lines. Some colonial states in the rest of the region sought to take into account local 
people’s interests . The general rule, however, was to promote the settlers’ interests. 
The successor state found it difficult to restructure and serve the domestic interests 
of their peoples. The second reason was the structure of the international system in 
the post- World War II period. In searching for balance between the global and 
domestic order, states were forced to take sides in the bipolar structure of the world, 
priviledging the global rather than the domestic order. The third reason was that in 
post-colonial period, politics became a preserve of small circles of politicians 
placed at the top of party echelons in a single party systems. Although one may 
argue that party leaders consulted frequently with masses, this was over a prior- 
agreed agenda issue. The approach was top down, and reflected the views and 
priorities of the leadership rather than of the eintire people. This approach also 
allowed very few inputs from the base which, was often amorphous. This lack of 
organisation of the masses according to the diversity of interests led to a weak 
interaction between the state and the civil society, and facilitated states to pursue 
their self-interests rather society’s goals. The post-Cold War international
2 Here we refer to the principle of paramouncy adopted by the imperial Britain with respect to its 
colonies, which stated that aspirations of the majority of local pople should be paramount in the 
pollitical decisions. See details in chapter 4.
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environment offers an opportunity to create legitimate states and take a wider view 
of security and regard politics as decision-making mechanism for society goals in 
which agency is the entire society.
In order to achieve this, governments and the civil society need to adopt a 
philosophical idealism. Of course, idealism creates tensions between what is 
desirable and what is likely, since at most times the ideal is not likely to be arrived 
at. The reality in the region vindicates this claim in spite of the acceptance by all 
SADC members of the need for change at the conceptual level and the actions 
undertaken by SADC towards the strengthening of regional security relations.3 
Indeed, while the developments of the last five years, such as the end of the Cold 
War, the end of apartheid and other conflicts provide the region with an 
opportunity to rethink its security relations and replace confrontation by co­
operation, it is still faced with the many dangers well capable of plunging it back 
into the insecurity of the past. Historical and Cold War legacies ( see chapter 4 
above) and the great demands for resources for institutional development and 
transformation are likely to affect the process of building security. The advent of 
practical difficulties impeding the realisation of the ideal leads to the necessity of 
placing an emphasis on and arguing for a strategy that does not lie beyond the 
capacity of states and other political actors. Implicit in this argument is the attempt 
to caution the tendency to recommend policy frameworks not sustainable in the
3 See for example, Creation o f an Organ on Political Co-operation, Peace and Security, Report 
5 of the SADC Council of Ministers Meeting 28-29 January, 1996, Johannesburg, South Africa
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long run. Experiences such as the short lived Eastern African Community (EAC) or 
the hesitation revolving around the adherence to monetary union by some European 
states are clear indicators of the need to reflect on and recommend institutions and 
policies consonant with expectations and implementation capacity of states. No 
state will be able to support institutions if these are not seen to bring benefits to it. 
Therefore, examples such as those of the EAC are clearly cases to be avoided since 
they discourage further co-operation. They increase the lack of confidence of 
governments and people in the need for co-operation and its institutional 
framework : as Haas observes, the decision to proceed with regional co-operation 
institutions is strongly determined by the expectation of gains of the actors 
involved4. To increase regional co-operation will require certain responsibilities by 
the state.First to realise that regional integartion is unsustainable without domestic 
integration and second, that integration is about intergovemamental institutions as 
well as civil society institutions and other private sector interests. In addition to 
governments agreeing on principles guiding interstate relations, they need to define 
legal frameork facilitating civil society’s initiatives. They also need to agree on 
principles regulating the relations of various civic organisations, support those 
promoting good causes and define the way in which they can recieve external help 
to limit donors’ disruptive influence in the domestic environment.
Regional intergovernmental institutions are important in the task of building 
security, as argued above (see Chapters 6 and 7) They guarantee the transition from
4 See E. B Haas, The Uniting o f Europe, op cit. p. 13.
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a system of security to a community of security, provided they are strongly backed 
by people concerned. Regional intergovernmental institutions are required for the 
elimination of the security dilemma and to render obsolete the balance-of-power as 
a mechanism of maintaining security. These institutions are also important for the 
formation and consolidation of a regional identity which helps to reduce interstate 
conflict and bring closer different communities within and between states. Regional 
intergovernmental institutions would also facilitate the sharing of resources, 
experiences and capacities; and would facilitate the process of confidence building 
by providing a forum for the discussion of common problems and adoption of 
common approaches to problems affecting the region. Regional intergovemamental 
institutions appear to be particularly necessary due to the endemic nature of security 
problems that cannot be dealt with within the confines of nation-states or by each 
individual state (see chapter 4).
Ideal institutions for Southern Africa are those that can help to build and 
consolidate a ‘security community’ that is to say, institutions facilitating the 
reduction of civil and inter-state violent conflict and regional integration.5 
However, the experience of European integration shows that certain pre-conditions 
need to exist for the process to begin to unfold. Chief among these is the 
compatibility of values. In fact, Western European states after World War II were 
already liberal democracies when they embarked on integration. Multipartyism and 
parliamentarian politics had already been adopted when the first steps towards
5 See K. Deutsch, The Political Community and the North Atlantic Area, op cit. pp. 5, 141
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integration were taken. Political parties, trade unions and other civic organisations 
were also in place, and helped integration by framing domestic and regional 
politics. Market economics was a reality in all the European states that established 
the European Coal and Steel Community and their industrialisation had also 
reached a certain level of development in addition to a considerable degree of 
interdependence in the coal industry, energy and transport sectors6. In other words, 
the Europeans had soomething to integrate in addition to a reason for integration set 
by the Franco-German problem , the questions related to the creation of the North 
Atlantic Organisation, and the will to remain independent from United States 
hegemony all of which provided compelling motives for the Europeans to embark 
on integration7.
The situation in which Europe found itself at the end of World War II 
contrasts with the present situation in Southern Africa in ways that are likely to 
impede the realisation of the ideal. To date, not all states in the region have 
embraced multipartyism8. Although multipartyism has been introduced in the 
majority it is not yet consolidated, which means that common political values are 
not yet shared by the entire region. Unlike the situation in Europe, state institutions 
cannot be assumed to exist or to function normally. While in some countries they 
need to be strengthened, in others they need to be re-created. Civic organisations
6See E. B. Haas The Uniting o f Europe op. cit., pp. 4-19
7 Ibid.; see also J. Groom and P. Taylor, Framework for International Co-operation, op. cit., 
especially chapters 8-11
8When the present study was being conducted Swaziland and Lesotho were still absolute 
monarchies.
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acting outside the political space occupied by the state need to be consolidated in 
some countries while they need to be created from scratch in others. The region also 
shows high rates of illiteracy which are an obstacle to the functioning of state 
institutions and communication of political ideas. The level of interdependence in 
the region is not as high as the level of dependence which facilitates the salience of 
South Africa as a regional hegemon. Thus South Africa is likely to behave like any 
other hegemon regardeless of the fact that a majority government is in power. This 
is likely to occur especially if South Africa senses that it gains very little from co­
operation with unequal partners. These are factors that need to be taken into account 
when thinking of building a security community through a creation of 
intergovermental institutions that may lead to integration. An important aspect of 
this process is that institutions and policy frameworks have to match the capacity of 
the region to create, consolidate and implement the devised policies. This makes the 
full application of the European integration experience inadequate for Southern 
Africa and by implication, any scheme recommending outright integration of units 
impinging on security. In fact while the idea of integration is full applicable, the 
approach to it needs to readjust to local conditions. Regional integration in Southern 
Africa, needs to be accompanied by a process of national reform conducive to 
national integration. This is a fundamental step if the region is to move from 
intergovernmental co-operation to integration of sectors and communities. 
Intergovernmental co-operation is unlikely to sustain itself in the long run, if it is 
not largely supported by people or the majority of national elites, who will provide
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legitimacy to government policies and the actions of institutions. The lack of 
peoples participation in the process of integration is likely to replicate a top down 
model of approaching security which past experience has showed to be conflict 
prone and unsustainable for the region.
Southern Africa is still inundated by regional inter-govemamental 
groupings competing with each other in the task of regional integration.9 
Rationalisation and complementarity would seem more approapriate for the 
circuntances of the region for maximisation of co-operation and correct application 
of resources. This is another responsibility charged to governments.
As implied above, regional institutions should go beyond the domain of 
governments. This can be achieved by mutual support of the various civic 
organisations and NGO’s across the region and overseas and by the help of foreign 
govememts. Some states have a more vigourous civil society than others, and some 
civic organisations are stronger in some countries than the others. In the interest of 
regional security, there is a need to increase co-operation among these 
organisations. The Trade Unions in South Africa have a better organisations than 
most countries in the region, yet women organisations in places such as Malawi and 
Mozambique seem to have a stronger organisation than their counterparts in the 
region. Co-operation among them could level the standards of organisation, 
agendas and priorities thus helping to build a vigourous civil society across the
9 See Joe Chilaizya and Lewis Machipisa, “Tension Mounts Between Rival Trading Blocs”, 
Weekly Mail and Guardian, 8-14 September, 1995
287
region. The Peace Movemnt and Human Rights Organisations in Europe, for 
example, have accumulated the experience in campaigning against nuclear 
confrontation and human rights abuse. Civil society in Western states has also made 
contributions in bringing about stable and democratic civil-military relations, and 
pursuing certain levels of disarmament in their own states. If their experience is 
passed on to their counterparts in the region it may help to strengthen the capacity 
of the civil organisations. Finally, some governments in the West have already 
succeded in creating an atmosphere reducing the potential for inter-state 
confrontation, creating domestic stability and regulating their private sectors, and 
enhancing civil society initiatives. They could help to build security in Southern 
Africa if some of these experience can be passed to their counterparts, and relevantc 
civic organsations. They can also help to build security by promoting co-operation 
between civic organisations and NGO’s in the region and their counterparts 
overseas.
The fact that conditions for integration in Southern Africa is the reason for 
claiming that Southern Africa should aim at building a ‘security society’ as a first 
stage of building the community. The task of building a security community will 
primarily require the establishment of agreements assuring regional constitutional 
order and the reign of the spirit of non-aggression aimed at assuring the existence of 
common shared values. While an important step for assuring non-aggression is the 
signing of comprehensive non-aggression pacts ( see chapter 6 above) this act is not 
per se a guarantee that aggression will not take place. Concrete action aimed at
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conflict reduction and the assuring the predictability of peace is required. SADC 
has initiated cooperation in key areas such as energy, transport, agriculture, mining, 
and human resource development, but the benefits of this cooperation have not yet 
enhanced the security of the majority of people in the SADC states. SADC’s action 
is faced with the challenge of laying out foundations for long term relationships 
which can function as building blocks for security. This is dependent upon its 
ability to encourage and strengthen co-operation in areas that can be easily 
integrated while mobilising the interest and participation of all states.
Security building also needs an increase in the level of investment to 
improve the economic condition of the region which is unlikely unless political 
stability can be guaranteed. This implies the need to identify the point in which this 
vicious circle - the lack of economic development leads to insecurity and insecurity 
can not ensure the necessary climate for investment- related to the security 
problematic can be broken. This suggests that the priority lies on guiding efforts 
towards the consolidation of peace. The task of building security will be facilitated 
if steps leading to the consolidation of acquired peace can be assured. This requires 
socio-political undertakings such as political accomodation and creation of 
legitimate structures and institutions; military and policing measures to guarantee 
order and protection of what has been achieved; and economic measures to restore 
people’s confidence, legitimation of policies and reduction of material causes of 
conflict. Neo-functional theory teaches that integration of some sectors generate
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spillovers, thus expanding cooperation into other areas10. However, as the European 
example shows, certain economic and social acts do not spill-over into political 
sectors. Their increased functional integration in economic and social areas have 
failed to expand cooperation into common defence policy11. In fact cooperation in 
this area appears to be a matter of political will rather than a mere consequence of 
functional cooperation. The implication is that cooperation and integration in the 
area of security and defence is largely determined by the existence of clear benefits. 
In this case, it is whether the model of security community can guarantee both 
security and independence of defence in times of crisis. This suggests that political 
will is likely to be enhanced if co-operation and integration can quickly bring 
tangible benefits to serve as incentives for peace consolidation and further 
cooperation.12
As the European example suggests, regional integration without national 
integration is untenable. Therefore, efforts aimed at bringing communites living in 
the same national borders closer are indispensable. Building security requires 
strengthening domestic institutions and infrastructures of the states. The reality of 
Southern Africa thus points towards the need to opt for the path of strengthening 
the security system rather than creating hollow institutions of regional integration.
10See E. B Haas, Beyond the Nation State ( Satnford: Stanford University Press, 1969) p. 47
11 Ibid.
12 See James. E Dougherty and Robert L. Platzgraff, Jr. Contending Theories o f International 
Relations (New York: Harper and Collins, 1991), p.459
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The thrust of the argument of this study leads inevitably to the conclusion 
that security in Southern Africa can only be ensured by building legitimate states, 
and breaking the monopoly that these have in setting up agendas and defining 
priorities on security.13 The breaking of the monopoly entails sharing 
responsabilities in decision making with civil society, and this is particularly 
necessary to talk about the security of people. Legitimate states are key to the 
strengthening of political process by strongly interacting with society and being 
responsive to their interests and needs.
The state will continue to be the key agent of security as long as the state- 
system in international relations prevails. In fact, the argument voiced by the 
International Political Economy theorists that the state is withering away, as a result 
of expansion of global capitalist market14 accounts for only one side of the history. 
The state does not seem likely to disappear in the near future. As Fred Halliday 
observes, the list of arguments pointing to the weakening of the state in the present 
society is as long as the one pointing to its strengthening.15 The state provides a 
framework for order in which people and other society agents operate. Individuals 
and other agents of society also seek its protection and legitimation of their
13 Breaking the monopoly of the state on security, should not be understood to mean that the 
state should cease to have monopoly over the meeans of violence. Instead, it means that 
procedures and rules regulating the use of means of violence, priorities and the security agenda 
should be established in consultation with agents other than those around the state.
14 See for example Susan Strange, “Political Economy and International Relations” in Kenneth 
Booth and Steve Smith (eds.), International Relations Today, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995), p. 
169.
15 See Fred Halliday, “State and Society in International Relations: A Second Agenda” op. cit., pp. 
200-203.
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activities abroad.16 In security the state provides the balance between freedom and 
security. Therefore, no clear substitute for the state in the near future seems likely. 
The state, however, needs to be increasingly seen as a promoter of common good 
and source of common justice,17 rather than pursuing a self-fulfilling agenda at the 
domestic and at the international level. It needs to recover its decision-making 
capacity, by strengthening its institutions and embracing popular policies. It should 
find widely accepted norms and principles for the use of its instruments of physical 
power. States in Southern Africa need to reverse situations such as those of finding 
their legitimation primarly in the implementation of policy demands of the 
international donor agencies rather than on their domestic constituencies. States' 
domestic legitimacy is a pre-condition for a sound political process, one deeply 
rooted on the will of their domestic societies.
The legitimacy of states is not solely achieved by correctly identifying state 
objectives, but also by devising appropriate mechanisms to check and change 
ways in which things are done. This makes paramount the necessity to guarantee 
the transparency of the process and enable members of a given society to 
understand it and critically assess what is being done. The opportunity to 
participate, including in the modification of the process, is important for the 
outcome and the stability of the society. It is through participation that people
l6Ibid
17This passage refers to the Lockean common good, whereby the state performs the task of manager 
of the people will. For details see for instance, Iain Hampsher - Monk, A History o f Modern Political 
Thought (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992) pp. 69-116.
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recognise the merits and difficulties, the strengths and the weakenesses of the 
process and on basis of which they concede, make sacrifices or extend their 
solidarity to other members of the society. If it is accepted that the logic of 
participation in a processs helps to reduce conflict, ample participation can lead to 
an expanded stability hence enhancing security.
Ample participation will need decentralisation of power and empowerment 
of different social actors, however, to allow their full engagement in the political 
process. Several models of de-centralisation have been applied in societies that 
experienced problems of the sort troubling Southern Africa. They vary from 
completely decentralised systems with central authority performing symbolic 
functions, to models entailing a balance of power between the centre and regional 
units. Suitable models of decentralisation can be identified and applied according 
to the specific situation of a given state and in conformity with the will of the 
citzens and political actors. There are, however, some general principles that should 
be observed in pursuing decentralisation. Its general rationale is the mitigation of 
intra-state conflict by largely sharing power with the members of society, 
establishing clear mechanisms for the use of state power, therefore avoiding a 
situation in which the states embark on self-fulfillling exercises. This becomes a 
pre-requisite for building security in societies divided by tensions, of fear of 
domination, ethinic or regional rivalry, and it implies the identification of viable 
units to which power can be accorded. Secondly, decentralisation should also seek 
to safeguard larger units (region, province, state or community) having equal power
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in order to avoid attempts of mutual domination; and thirdly, the system resulting 
from decentralisation should be functional and benificial to all units to guarantee 
co-operation amongst them and safeguard the viability of the state as whole.
This study also stresses that the state is not the only agent. Grass-roots 
organisations, civic associations, individuals and other organisations operating in 
the social sphere independent of governments are also agents. They are promoters 
of people’s aspirations and are essential in raising the awareness of governments 
about the important areas and issues impinging on security. Issues such as 
education, particularly the education of women are not often associated with the 
security building, but in Southern Africa they are essential for the stability of the 
society and for a balanced political process. The organisations composing the civil 
society need to be strengthened, by mutual support, and increasing co-operation 
with their counterparts abroad and overseas, to allow a greater interaction with the 
state and among states. The strengthening of agents other than those around the 
state will strenghten the political process, by allowing the society as a whole to 
make choices over what is best for the common good. As argued in the present 
study such interaction will accord more legitimacy to the state, and is likely to lead 
to a more orderly, peaceful and stable environment.
To summarise, the traditional concept of security is inadequate for 
conditions such as those of Southern Africa. What makes the traditional concept of 
security difficult to apply in Southern Africa is the primacy accorded to the state. 
Most states, as it is argued elsewhere ( see chapter 5) are weak, they are unable to
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sustain large military expenditures and are plagued by many domestic problems. In 
vast areas of some countries state institutions are barely in existence and people live 
without state structures providing minimal functions such as education, health, tax 
collection and protection. The majority of states have also lost autonomy for policy­
making and policy implementation and are economically heavily dependent on 
external sources. They are therefore unable to embrace a primarily outward oriented 
concept of security. States in Southern Africa have to negotiate with the external 
agents the conditions for their security. In fact, states such Angola, Malawi, 
Mozambique not only lost their regulatory capacity in their domestic environment, 
they no longer monopolise the instruments of violence.
This study notes that at present, most sources of insecurity in Southern 
Africa come from within the state and not from outside. This is a strong reason to 
advocate the adoption by the governments of a new concept of security which will 
take into account the domestic reality and the external environment. A concept 
enabling the understanding of the dynamic and factors for security and sources of 
insecurity at the domestic as well as at the external level.
The need for new approaches to security is shared by a considerable 
number of scholars who argue that the new concept, needs to go beyond the 
traditional concept which places an emphasis on military aspects. These scholars 
share the view that, at present most sources of insecurity are domestic and non­
military and that states can not individually deal with the challenges they pose. 
They advocate, in addition to the expansion of the traditional concept to include
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non-military phenonema, the adoption of a transnational and people’s centred 
approach While the present study agrees with the need for new conceptions and 
approaches and the assumption that the objects of security are people, it seeks to go 
beyonnd the proposition that the important thing is the shift in the centre from state 
to people. To ensure the desired goals it requires concentrating on the mechanisms 
making the environment secure, i.e., the political process.
The proposition, of broadening the concept of security to include military 
and non-military phenomen raises a fundamental question about the boundaries of 
the field of security, in other words, when should a non-military phenomenon 
become a security concern. Indeed, pushed to its extremes, this conception implies 
that issues such as pollution, drug abuse, child abuse, disease, economic recession, 
border control and the like, become security problems. However, the excessive 
expansion of the concept of security to include non-military phenomea, as Walt 
points out, leads one to regard everything as a security problem. This conception, in 
addition to destroying the intellectual coherence of the discipline, makes it 
intractable in any logical sense, since its boundaries can no longer be defined18.
This points necessarily to the need to establish a criterion enabling us to 
distinguish when a non-military phenomenon should become a security problem, 
and who should make the decisions on this.
18 See Stephan D. Walt, “The Renaissance of Security Studies”, International Studies Quarterly, 
1991, p. 212.
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The traditional criterion used to differentiate security from non-securtiy 
issues has been their capacity to cause physical damage, or threaten core values of 
communities, their way of life and/or existence. War and threats to war 
automatically qualify as security issues because they are perceived as capable of 
either causing physical damage, disrupting the core values of society or peoples' life 
styles. However, factors capable of causing damages and threats similar to those 
caused by wars or their threats are not limited to military phenomenon. Issues such 
as epidemic disease, natural disaster, policy measures can cause the same level of 
threat. For example, if AIDS reached an epidemic level as is the case of Uganda, or 
Tanzania19, a public policy, of the same level of importance as that caused by war 
will be required to deal with the problem. Similarly, if natural disasters such as 
droughts affect a state or a region, because they can cause death tolls as high as 
wars they will also require public policy. Policy measures such as the increase in 
maize prices, as the Zambian experience showed in the 1980's, has led to riots, 
looting and instability in the country20. In fact, it would not be an overstatement to 
suggest that some wars have caused fewer deaths, and posed fewer threats than 
some non-military phenomena. Ethiopia's 1985 famine, for example jeopardised 
more lives than the Ogaden War. Thus, evaluating from results it is difficult to 
argue a strong case why the Ogaden war should constitute a security problem for
19 See Alan Whiteside, Facing Up to AIDS: The Socio Economic Impact in Southern Africa, op. cit.,
pp.16-18.
20 See Reginald Green, “Neo-Liberalism and the Political Economy of War: Sub Saharan Africa as 
the Case Study of Vaccum” in Cristopher Colclough and James Manor (eds) States or Markets ? 
Neo- Liberalism and Development Policy Debate (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 238- 
258.
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Ethiopians and not the famine. In fact, it would be untenable to suggest that the 
impact of non-military phenomena is less, or that it potentially causes less damage 
than the military. Although in some cases, one may say that wars have the potential 
of making everyone vulnerable within a short amount of time, this would not be 
applicable to every war. Most guerrilla wars in Africa were fought far from their 
capital cities. People in urban areas were often oblivious to these wars since they 
made very little impact on their everyday lives. Guerrilla warfare was also 
conceived as prolonged war, thus without any capacity to place everyone in the 
country in the same danger. This feature of war is shared by the non-military 
phenomena such as droughts, floods, diseases and policy measures, which past 
experiences in Southern Africa show to have had a strong impact on the stability of 
parts of the society, but not the whole. Thus the criterion allowing the classification 
of military phenomena as security issues and non-military phenomena as not, 
cannot be argued on the basis of potential results but on the scale of damages that 
non-military phenomena can cause.
In an attempt to address the question as to when a non-military
phenomenon should become a security concern, Ayoob suggests concentrating on
analysis of vulnerabilities as implied in his definition of security :
... Different types o f  vulnerability including those o f  
economic and ecological varieties,become integral 
components o f  this definition o f security only if  and when 
they become acute enough to take on overtly political 
dimensions and threaten state boundaries, state 
institutions or regime survival...in other words debt 
burdens do not become a part o f security calculus for the 
purpose o f this definition unless they threaten to have
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political outcomes and that affects the survivability o f  
(either in territorial or the institutional sense or both) or 
o f  governing elites within those states21
Ayoob’s suggestion, however, provides little insight regarding the reasons why the 
problem of the Rwandese refugees should be treated as a security problem. Whether 
it is because of their impact on state institutions of the neighbouring country; their 
own state; or possibly because of their own plight. His writings suggest that they are 
a security problem because they threaten state institutions and the regime's survial 
in their own state let alone in the neighbouring countries. The paradox is that, at 
present, the state of Rwanda still exists and indeed, there are very few people who 
may have thought that it will disappear following the 1994 catastrophe. Very few 
people may also have thought that its borders were threatened. State institutions 
may have been affected by the flight of refugees but they still exist. However, it is 
difficult to claim that if the Rwandese in Zaire, or Tanzania drop their refugee 
status and go back to Rwanda they would live in security, since the state of Rwanda 
and its institutions still exist. This seems to suggest that the reason why the 
Rwandese refugees constitute a security problem is not primarily due to their 
potential impact on state institutions, state boundaries or threats to regime survival, 
but to their own plight. In fact it was due to their plight that the international 
community was motivated to lend its support rather than the threat they posed to 
states and state boundaries. However, it is difficult to find anything in Ayoob’s
21 See Mohamed Ayoob, “The Security Problematic of the Third World” op.cit., p. 259.
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definition suggesting their plight as a security problem. In this defenition, agents 
and the ultimate objects are silent if not completely absent. Ayoob’s concept seems 
to places an emphasis on the phenomenon, but it is silent on the condition of the 
agent and object of security.
Because security is an outcome of relations and expresses a condition of the 
object in a relationship, this study suggests an approach which focuses on 
conditions enabling security. Concentrating on conditions enabling the realization 
of security avoids the distinction between the importance of military and non­
military phenomena. It treats both as equally important and according to their 
potential impact on the environment for security, i.e. according to their impact on 
order, justice and peace.
Concentrating on the environment for security also allows people to have 
degrees of freedom in interpreting their relationship with the environment and 
establishing their hierarchies on what constitute security priorities. It also allows 
approaching security from conceptual framework rather than from a problem 
solving approach.
Many reasons were expounded above explaining why the traditional 
concept of security can not work in Southern Africa, while a proposition of focusing 
on the environment, i.e., on the political political process, ensuring the existence of 
order, justice and peace is advocated. This study does not claim to have discovered 
a panacea for the security problems of Southern Africa. It offers instead a different 
perspective of looking into the problem of security within the region. Therefore, the
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view of security expounded in this study needs to be improved and complemented 
by further research, especially in areas such as instituion building, improvement of 
the quality of pillars of security, and on the political processes.
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ANNEX I
TOWARDS THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN 
DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY
A
DECLARATION
BY
THE HEADS OF STATE OR 
GOVERNMENT OF 
SOUTHERN AFRICAN STATES
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In the Declaration: Southern Africa: Towards Economic Liberation, adopted in Lusaka, 
Zambia, on 1st April, 1980, the Heads of State or Government of independent States of 
Southern Africa committed themselves to pursuing policies aimed at economic 
liberation and integrated development of the economies of the region. This Declaration 
gave rise to the establishment of the Southern African Development Co-ordination 
Conference (SADCC).
Our common cultural and social affinities, common historical experiences, common 
problems and aspirations, remain a firm and enduring foundation for common actions to 
promote regional economic welfare, collective self-reliance and integration; in the spirit 
of equity and partnership. This firm foundation is necessary for the attainment of our 
cherished ideals of economic well-being, the improvement of the standard and quality of 
life, freedom and social justice, and peace and security, for the peoples of Southern 
Africa.
We, the Heads of State and Government of the Southern African States hereby commit 
ourselves and our governments to the establishment of a SOUTHERN AFRICAN  
DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY (SADC) to achieve these ideals, and to serve as a 
vehicle for the development and integration of the region. We also offer and commend 
this Declaration to the peoples of Southern Africa, and call upon them to make the same 
commitment, and to participate fully in the process towards regional integration. 
Furthermore, we call upon the international community to continue to support the efforts 
of the countries of Southern Africa to realise this ideal.
SOUTHERN AFRICA IN CONTEXT
Since the adoption of the Lusaka Declaration, Southern Africa has changed, and is still 
changing. The quest for democracy and popular participation in the management of 
public affairs is entrenched, and spreading fast and wide. The management of 
economic affairs is being reformed to allow for efficiency, economy and 
competitiveness, and to enable individuals to innovate and to take the responsibility for 
improving their own lives and their communities.
The attainment of independence and sovereign nationhood by Namibia, formally ended 
the struggle against colonialism in the region, in the other countries, concerted efforts to 
end internal conflicts and civil strife are bearing positive results.
In South Africa, the process is underway to end the inhuman system of apartheid, and to 
bring about a constitution dispensation acceptable to the people of South Africa as a 
whole. It is, therefore, only a matter of time before a new South Africa is welcome to 
join the family of free and majority-ruled States of the region.
The developments outline above will take the region out of an era of conflict and 
confrontation, to one of co-operation; in a climate of peace, security and stability. These 
are prerequisites for development, and for the improvement of the standard and quality 
of life of the peoples of the region.
These changes taking place in the region are also bringing about a greater convergence 
of economic, political and social values across the region, and will help create the 
appropriate environment for deeper regional co-operation.
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On the African continent, efforts continue, principally under the auspices of the 
organisation of African Unity (OAU) to promote closer economic relations.
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Both the Lagos Plan of Action of 1980, and the Treaty establishing the African 
Economic Community, signed by OAU Heads of State or Government, in June 1991, 
make Regional Economic Communities (RECs) the building blocks for the continental 
community.
We, therefore, view our efforts at regional integration in Southern Africa as part of this 
continental effort.
On the global scene, fundamental and far-reaching political and economic changes are 
taking place. The cold war has ended, and world affairs are increasingly being managed 
of the basis of consultation and consensus, rather than confrontation and competition.
In addition, economic and social progress in the world is increasingly based on the 
master of science and technology, advanced human skills and high levels of 
productivity.
Integration is fast becoming a global trend. Countries in different regions of the globe 
are organising themselves into closer economic and political entities. These movements 
towards stronger regional blocs will transform the world, both economically and 
politically. Firms within these economic blocs will benefit from economies of scale 
provided by large markets, to become competitive both internally and internationally.
Colonialism, racism, especially apartheid, and destabilisation have left Southern Africa a 
legacy of wide disparities, deep economic dependence and social dislocation. This 
situation is neither desirable nor sustainable in the long term, because it is both unjust 
and wasteful. It is also a potential source of tension that could lead to future instability 
in the region. There is, therefore, an urgent imperative to restructure regional economies 
and relations towards balanced, equitable and mutually beneficial growth and 
development.
THE SADCC EXPERIENCE
SADCC was established as a vehicle for the reduction of economic dependence and for 
equitable regional integration; an appropriate sequel to the political emancipation of the 
regional. SADCC has made commendable achievements since its founding in 1980, 
particularly seen against the national economic problems, the hostile international 
economic environment and the massive destabilisation and military aggression of the 
apartheid regime in South Africa. Of all the contributions SADCC has made to regional 
development, the greatest has been in forging a regional identity and a sense of a 
common destiny among the countries and peoples of Southern Africa .
However, progress towards reduction of the region’s economic dependence, and towards 
economic integration, has been modest. The Organisation has, so far, not been able to 
mobilise to the fullest extent possible, the region’s own resources, for development. Yet 
this is one of the central objectives, as well as strategies, for effective and self-sustaining 
regional development. This requires political commitment and effective institutions and 
mechanisms to mobilise the regions own resources.
A SHARED FUTURE
In the light of its peculiar circumstances, and international changes in the organisation of 
production and trade, Southern Africa needs to arrange and manage its affairs in a
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manner that will provide opportunities to all its peoples, on the basis of equity and 
mutual benefit; to invest and to become effective actors in the regional and intentional 
market places.
The economies of Southern African States are small and under-developed. The 
countries of the region must, therefore, join together to strengthen themselves 
economically and politically, if the region is to become a serious player in international 
relations. No single country of Southern Africa can achieve this status on its own.
Southern Africa has also been an arena of conflict and militarisation, associated with the 
struggle for political liberation, and the fight against apartheid and racism, aggression 
and destabilisation. A new Southern Africa, concerned with peace and development, 
must find a more abiding basis for continuing political solidarity and co-operation, in 
order to guarantee mutual peace and security in the region; and to free resources from 
military to productive development activities.
The countries of Southern Africa will, therefore, work out and adopt a 
framework of co- operation which provides for:
a) deeper economic co-operation and integration; on the basis of balance, equity
and mutual benefit, providing for cross-border in vestment and trade, and freer
movement factors of production, goods and services across national borders;
b) common economic, political, social values and systems, enhancing enterprise
and competitiveness, democracy and good governance, respect for the rule of law
and the guarantee of human rights, popular participation and alleviation of poverty;
c) strengthened regional solidarity, peace and security, in order for the people of
the region to live and work together in peace and harmony.
There is, therefore, a critical need to develop, among all the countries and peoples of 
Southern Africa, a vision of shared future, a future within a regional community.
STRATEGIES
a) Human Resources. Science and Technology
The most binding constraint to development of the region is inadequate 
professionally and technically qualified and experienced personnel, to plan and 
manage the development process efficiently and effectively.
Human development is a life-long process of developing an individual’s 
potential to the fullest, through education and training, improved health, ability 
to earn a decent living, the exercise of economic and political choices,
and guaranteed basic human rights; to afford him/her full involvement in the 
development process.
The region also lacks an adequate scientific and technological base, and is 
substantially dependent on imported expertise and technology.
A high priority for the region must, therefore, be to develop effective national 
and regional policies on science and technology, setting realistic goals and
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identifying practical, cost-effective instruments for achieving these goals. In 
formulating policies and programmes, close links will need to be developed with 
the business sector which utilises the technology and skilled people.
Appropriate measures will be taken to improve the region’s scientific and 
technological base, through curricula improvement; establishment of centres of 
specialisation and concerted efforts in the promotion of research and 
development.
Polices will also be implemented to release the innovative potential and 
entrepreneurship of the peoples of the region, and to encourage self-application 
and a strong work ethic.
b) Food Security. Natural Resources and Environment
Land, agriculture and food security are synonymous with life and livelihood. 
Most of the people of Southern Africa remain dependent on agriculture as a 
source of food and income. Agriculture is also critical to the industrialisation 
of the region, by ensuring availability of raw materials for local industries, and a 
source of purchasing power for the people. Agricultural development will, 
therefore, need to provide for increased production and productivity, and intra- 
regional trade in food and other crops, to guarantee food security and enhance 
the quality of life of the peoples of the region.
The exploitation and utilisation of natural resources, especially land, water and 
minerals will contribute to human welfare and development. However, such 
exploitation requires good management and conservation, to ensure that 
development does not reduce or impair the diversity and richness of the regions 
natural resource base and environment.
In this context, policy measures will be taken, and mechanisms instituted to 
protect the environment, and manage natural resource utilisation with a view to 
achieving optimum sustainable benefits for the present and future generations of 
Southern Africans.
c) Infrastructure and Services
In order to enhance services to the peoples of the region, to support industrial 
development and growth, and promote intra-regional trade; the rehabilitation 
and upgrading of existing, and development of new transport and 
communications and energy systems will remain a priority.
Emphasis will also be placed on increased and effective operational co­
ordination, towards efficiency, cost-effectiveness and competitiveness; in order 
to ensure economic viability of the system.
d) Finance. Investment and Trade
The creation of an environment conducive to increased investment, particularly 
in the material productive sectors of the regional economy, is central to the 
strategy for regional integration.
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The experience gained in regional co-operation so far, shows that collective self- 
reliance with respect to the mobilisation of regional resources, is one of the 
areas where the gap between the declared aims and practice has been widest. 
Appropriate measures will be instituted urgently to address this issue, in order 
for the region to achieve its aims and objectives.
Although the creation of a regional market under existing circumstances could 
lead to only a modest increase in intra-regional trade, its most important impact 
will be to spur new types of investment in more productive and competitive 
industries, to supply the regional and international markets.
Continuing policy and management reforms, the restricting of production at 
higher levels of enterprise, productivity and competitiveness; are accordingly 
identified as the main pillars to a strategy capable of engendering increased 
investment in production and trade.
It is evident that for this to take place, the countries of Southern Africa will need 
to harmonise their economic policies and plans, and ensure that regional 
integration becomes an intrinsic and integral part of the management of national 
affairs. In this regard, particular attention will be given to factors which 
impinge on inter-regional investment and trade flows, such as payments and 
clearance, monetary and financial relations, and mechanisms for the 
mobilisation of the region’s own resources.
e) Popular Participation
Regional integration will continue to be a pipe dream unless the peoples of the 
region determine its content, form and direction, and are themselves its active 
agent.
Measures will, therefore, be taken, and appropriate mechanisms and institutional 
framework put in place; to involve the peoples of the region in the process of 
regional integration.
f) Solidarity. Peace and Security
War and insecurity are the enemy of economic progress and social welfare.
Good and strengthened political relations among the countries of the region, and 
peace and mutual security are critical components of the total environment for 
regional co-operation and integration.
The region needs, therefore, to establish a framework and mechanisms to 
strengthen regional solidary, and provide for mutual peace and security.
INSTITUTIONS
Successful regional integration will depend on the extent to which there exist national 
and regional institutions with adequate competence and capacity to stimulate and 
manage efficiently and effectively, the complex process of integration.
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Integration will require mechanisms capable of achieving the high level of political 
commitment necessary to shape the scope and scale of the process of integration. This 
implies strengthening the powers and capacity of regional decision-making, co­
ordinating and executing bodies.
Integration does imply that some decisions which were previously taken by individual 
States are taken regionally, and those decisions taken nationally give due consideration 
to regional positions and circumstances. Regional decision-making also implies 
elements of change in the focus and context of exercising sovereignty, rather than a loss 
of sovereignty.
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INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATTON
This Declaration is a Statement of commitment and strategy, aimed at economic 
development and integration of Southern Africa, on the basis of balance, equity and 
mutual benefit. However, Southern Africa is still a developing region which will 
continue to need the support of the international community to realise its plans and 
aspirations. Every effort will, therefore, be made to consolidate the goodwill which the 
Southern African States have established with their international co-operating partners, 
and to justify and stimulate enhanced practical international co-operation, for mutual 
benefit.
COMMITMENT
Underdevelopment, exploitation, deprivation and backwardness in Southern Africa will 
be overcome only through economic co-operation and integration. The welfare of the 
peoples of Southern Africa, and the development of its economies, require concerted 
and higher levels of co-ordinated regional action.
The primary responsibility for upliftment of the welfare of the peoples of this region 
rests primarily with them and their Governments. Member States recognise that the 
attainment of the objective of regional economic integration in Southern Africa will 
require us to exercise our sovereign right in empowering the organisation to act on our 
behalf and for our common good. This is the challenging mission of SADC.
This Declaration is produced in two original copies in the English language, and two in 
the Portuguese language; all of which are equally valid.
Done in Windhoek, Republic of Namibia on 17th August, 1992.
PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA
KINGDOM OF LESOTHO
REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE
KINGDOM OF SWAZILAND
REPUBLIC OF ZAMBIA
REPUBLIC OF BOTSWANA
REPUBLIC OF MALAWI
REPUBLIC OF NAMIBIA
UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA
REPUBLIC OF ZIMBABWE
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ANNEXn
TREATY OF THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN 
DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY
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PREAMBLE
We, the Heads of State or Government of:
The People’s Republic of Angola 
The Republic of Botswana 
The Kingdom of Lesotho 
The Republic of Malawi 
The Republic of Mozambique 
The Republic of Namibia 
The Kingdom of Swaziland 
The United Republic of Tanzania 
The Republic of Zambia 
The Republic of Zimbabwe
HAVING REGARD to the objectives set forth in “SOUTHERN AFRICA: 
TOWARD ECONOMIC LIBERATION - A Declaration by the Governments of 
independent States of Southern Africa, made at Lusaka, on the 1st April, 1980”;
IN PURSUANCE of the principles of “TOWARDS A SOUTHERN AFRICAN 
DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY - A Declaration made by the Heads of State 
or Government of Southern Africa at Windhoek, in August, 1992,” which 
affirms our commitment to establish a Development Community in the Region;
DETERMINED to ensure, through common action, the progress and well-being 
of the peoples of Southern Africa;
CONSCIOUS of our duty to promote the interdependence and integration of our 
national economies for the harmonious, balanced and equitable development of 
the Region;
CONVINCED of the need to mobilise our own and international resources to 
promote the implementation of national, interstate and regional policies, 
programmes and projects within the framework for economic integration;
DEDICATED to secure, by concerted action, international understanding, 
support and co-operation;
MINDFUL of the need to involve the peoples of the Region centrally in the 
process of development and integration, particularly through the guarantee of 
democratic rights, observance of human rights and the rule of law;
RECOGNISING that, in an increasingly interdependent world, mutual 
understanding, good neighbourliness, and meaningful co-operation among the 
countries of the Region are indispensable to the realisation of these ideals;
TAKING INTO ACCOUNT the Lagos Plan of Action and the Final Act of 
Lagos of April 1980, and the Treaty establishing the African Economic 
Community signed at Abuja, on the 3rd of June, 1991;
BEARING IN MIND the principles of international law governing relations 
between States;
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HAVE DECIDED TO ESTABLISH AN INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATION 
TO BE KNOWN AS THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT 
COMMUNITY (SADC), AND HEREBY AGREE AS FOLLOWS:
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CHAPTER ONE
ARTICLE 1 
DEFINITIONS
In this Treaty, unless the context otherwise requires:
1. “Treaty” means this Treaty establishing SADC;
2. “Protocol” means an instrument of implementation of this Treaty, having the 
same legal force as this Treaty;
3. “Community” means the organisation for economic integration established by 
Article 2 of this Treaty;
4. “Region” means the geographical area of the Member States of SADC;
5. “Member State” means a Member of SADC;
6. “Summit” means the Summit of the Heads of State or Government of SADC 
established by Article 9 of this Treaty;
7. “High Contracting Parties” means States, herein represented by Heads of State
or Government or their duly authorised representatives for purposes of the
establishment of the Community;
8. “Council” means the Council of Ministers of SADC established by Article 9 of 
this Treaty;
9. “Secretariat” means the Secretariat of SADC established by Article 9 of this 
Treaty;
10. “Executive Secretary” means the chief executive officer of SADC appointed
under Article 10 (7) of this Treaty;
11. “Commission” means a commission of SADC established by Article 9 of this 
Treaty;
12. “Tribunal” means the tribunal of the Community established by Article 9 of this 
Treaty;
13. “Sectoral Committee” means a committee referred to in Article 38 of this 
Treaty;
14. “Sector Co-ordinating Unit” means a unit referred to in Article 38 of this Treaty;
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15. “Standing Committee” means the Standing Committee of Officials established 
by Article 9 of this Treaty;
16. “Fund” means resources available at any given time for application to 
programmes, projects and activities of SADC as provided by Article 26 of this Treaty.
CHAPTER TWO
ESTABLISHMENT AND LEGAL STATUS 
ARTICLE 2 
ESTABLISHMENT
1. By this Treaty, the High contracting Parties establish the Southern African 
Development community hereinafter referred to as SADC).
2. The headquarters of SADC shall be at Gaborone, Republic of Botswana.
ARTICLE 3 
LEGAL STATUS
1. SADC shall be an international organisation, and shall have legal personality
with capacity and power to enter into contract, acquire, own or dispose of movable or 
immovable property and to sue and be sued.
2. In the territory of each Member State, SADC shall, pursuant to paragraph 1 of
this Article, have such legal capacity as is necessary for the proper exercise of its 
functions.
CHAPTER THREE 
PRINCIPLES. OBJECTIVES AND GENERAL UNDERTAKINGS
ARTICLE 4
PRINCIPLES
SADC and its Member States shall act in accordance with the following principles:
a) sovereign equality of all Member States;
b) solidarity, peace and security;
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c) human rights, democracy, and the rule of law;
d) equity, balance and mutual benefit;
e) peaceful settlement of disputes;
ARTICLE 5 
OBJECTIVES
1. The objectives of SADC shall be to:
a) achieve development and economic growth, alleviate poverty, enhance
the standard and quality of life of the peoples of Southern Africa and support
the socially disadvantaged through regional integration;
b) evolve common political values, systems and institutions;
c) promote and defend peace and security;
d) promote self-sustaining development of the basis of collective self-
reliance, and the interdependence of Member States;
e) achieve complementary between national and regional strategies and 
programmes;
f) promote and maximise productive employment and utilisation of
resources of the Region;
g) achieve sustainable utilisation of natural resources and effective
protection of the environment;
h) strengthen and consolidate the long standing historical, social and
cultural affinities and links among the peoples of the Region;
2. In order to achieve the objectives set out in paragraph 1 of this Article, SADC 
shall:
a) harmonise political and socio-economic policies and plans of Member
States;
b) encourage the peoples of the Region and their institutions to take
initiatives to develop economic, social and cultural ties across the
Region, and to participate fully in the implementation of the programmes and
projects of SADC;
c) create appropriate institutions and mechanisms for the mobilisation of
requisite resources for the implementation of programmes and
operations of SADC and its Institutions;
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d) develop policies aimed at the progressive elimination of obstacles to the 
free movement of capital and labour, goods and services, and of the
peoples of the Region generally, among Member States;
e) promote the development of human resources;
f) promote the development, transfer and mastery of technology;
g) improve economic management and performance through regional co­
operation;
h) promote the co-ordination and harmonisation of the international
relations of Member States;
I) secure international understanding, co-operation and support, and
mobilise the inflow of public and private resources into the Region;
j) develop such other activities as Member States may decide in
furtherance of the objectives of this Treaty.
ARTICLE 6 
GENERAL UNDERTAKINGS
1. Member States undertake to adopt adequate measures to promote the 
achievement of the objectives of SADC, and shall refrain from taking any measure 
likely to jeopardise the sustenance of its principles, the achievement of its objectives 
and the implementation of the provisions of this Treaty.
2. SADC and Member States shall not discriminate against any person on grounds 
of gender, religion, political views, race, ethnic origin, culture or disability.
3. SADC shall not discriminate against any Member State.
4. Members States shall take all steps necessary to ensure the uniform application 
of this Treaty.
5. Member States shall take all necessary steps to accord this Treaty the force of 
national law.
6. Member States shall co-operate with and assist institutions of SADC in the 
performance of their duties.
CHAPTER FOUR
MEMBERSHIP
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ARTICLE 7
MEMBERSHIP
States listed in the Preamble hereto shall, upon signature and ratification of this Treaty, 
be Members of SADC.
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ARTICLE 8 
ADMISSION OF NEW MEMBERS
1. Any State not listed in the Preamble to this Treaty may become a Member of 
SADC upon being admitted by the existing Members and acceding to this Treaty.
2. The admission of any such State to Membership of SADC shall be effected by a
unanimous decision of the Summit.
3. The Summit shall determine the procedures for the admission of new Members 
and for accession to this Treaty by such Members.
4. Membership of SADC shall not be subject to any reservations.
CHAPTER FIVE 
INSTITUTIONS 
ARTICLE 9 
ESTABLISHMENT OF INSTITUTIONS
1. The following Institutions are hereby established:
a) The Summit of Heads of State or Government;
b) The Council of Ministers;
c) Commissions;
d) The Standing Committee of Officials
e) The Secretariat; and
f) The Tribunal.
2. Other institutions may be established as necessary.
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ARTICLE 10
THE SUMMIT
1. The Summit shall consist of the Heads of State or Government of all Member 
States, and shall be the supreme policy-making Institution of SADC.
2. The Summit shall be responsible for the overall policy direction and control of 
the functions of SADC.
3. The Summit shall adopt legal instruments for the implementation of the 
provisions of this Treaty; provided that the Summit may delegate this authority 
to the Council or any other institution of SADC as the Summit may deem 
appropriate.
4. the Summit shall elect a Chairman and a Vice-Chairman of SADC from among 
its Members for an agreed period, on the basis of rotation.
5. The Summit shall meet at least once a year.
6. The Summit shall decide on the creation of Commissions, other institutions, 
committees and organs as need arises.
7. The Summit shall appoint the Executive Secretary and the Deputy Executive 
Secretary, on the recommendation of Council.
8. Unless otherwise provided in this Treaty, the decisions of the Summit shall be 
by consensus and shall be binding.
ARTICLE 11 
THE COUNCIL
1. The Council shall consist of one Minister from each Member State, preferably a 
Minister responsible for economic planning or finance.
2. It shall be the responsibility of the Council to:
a) oversee the functioning and development of SADC;
b) oversee the implementation of the polices of SADC and the proper
execution of its programmes;
c) advise the Summit on matters of overall policy and efficient and
harmonious functioning and development of SADC;
d) approve polices, strategies and work programmes of SADC;
e) direct, co-ordinate and supervise the operations of the institutions of
SADC subordinate to it;
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f) define Sectoral areas of co-operation and allocate to Member States
responsibility for co-ordinating Sectoral activities, or re-allocate such
responsibilities;
g) create its own committees as necessary;
h) recommend to the Summit persons for appointment to the posts of
Executive Secretary and Deputy Executive Secretary;
I) determine the Terms and Conditions of Service of the staff of the
institutions of SADC;
j) convene conferences and other meetings as appropriate, for purposes of
promoting the objectives and programmes of SADC; and
k) perform such other duties as may be assigned to it by the Summit of this
Treaty.
3. The Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the Council shall be appointed by the 
Member States holding the Chairmanship and the Vice-Chairmanship of SADC 
respectively.
4. The Council shall meet at least once a year.
5. The Council shall report and be responsible to the Summit.
6. Decisions of the Council shall be by consensus.
ARTICLE 12 
COMMISSIONS
1. Commissions shall be constituted to guide and co-ordinate co-operation and
integration policies and programmes in designated Sectoral areas.
2. The composition, powers, functions, procedures and the matters related to each
Commission shall be prescribed by an appropriate Protocol approved by the Summit.
3. The Commission shall work closely with the Secretariat.
4. Commissions shall be responsible and report to the Council.
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ARTICLE 13
THE STANDING COMMITTEE OF OFFICIALS
1. The Standing Committee shall consist of one permanent secretary or an official 
of equivalent rank from each Member State, preferably from a ministry responsible 
for economic planning or finance.
2. The Standing Committee shall be technical advisory committee to the Council.
3. The Standing Committee shall be responsible and report to the Council.
4. The Chairman and Vice-chairman of the Standing committee shall be appointed
from the Member States holding the Chairmanship and the Vice-Chairmanship,
respectively, of the Council.
5. The Standing Committee shall meet at least once a year.
6. Decisions of the Standing Committee shall be by consensus.
ARTICLE 14 
THE SECRETARIAT
1. The Secretariat shall be the principal executive Institution of SADC, and shall 
be responsible for:
a) strategic planning and management of the programmes of SADC;
b) implementation of decisions of the Summit and of the Council;
c) organisation and management of SADC meetings;
d) financial and general administration;
e) representation and promotion of SADC; and
f) co-ordination and harmonisation of the policies and strategies of
Member States.
2. The Secretariat shall be headed by the Executive Secretary.
3. The Secretariat shall have such other staff as may be determined by the Council
from time to time.
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ARTICLE 15
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
1. The Executive Secretary shall be responsible to the Council for the following;
a) consultation and co-ordination with the Governments and other
institutions of Member States;
b) pursuant to the direction of Council or Summit, or on his/her own
initiative, undertaking measures aimed at promoting the objectives
of SADC and enhancing its performance;
c) promotion of corporation with other organisations for the furtherance of
the objectives of SADC;
d) organising and servicing meetings of the Summit, the Council, the
Standing Committee and any other meetings convened on the
direction of the Summit or the Council;
e) custodianship of the property of SADC;
f) appointment of the staff of the Secretariat, in accordance with
procedures, and under Terms and Conditions of Service determined by the
Council;
g) administration and finances of the Secretariat;
h) preparation of Annual Reports on the activities of SADC and its
institutions;
I) preparation of the Budget and Audited Accounts of SADC for
submission to the Council;
j) diplomatic and other representations of SADC;
k) public relations and promotion of SADC;
1) such other functions as may, from time to time, be determined by the
Summit and Council.
2. The Executive Secretary shall liaise closely with Commons, and other 
institutions, guide, support and monitor the performance of SADC in the various 
sectors to ensure conformity and harmony with agreed policies, strategies, 
programmes and projects.
3. The Executive Secretary shall be appointed for four years, and be eligible for 
appointment for another period not exceeding four years.
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ARTICLE 15
THE TRIBUNAL
1. The Tribunal shall be constituted to ensure adherence to and the proper 
interpretation of the provisions of this Treaty and subsidiary instruments and to 
adjudicate upon such disputes as may be referred to it.
2. The composition, powers, functions, procedures and other related matters 
governing the Tribunal shall be prescribed in a Protocol adopted by the Summit.
3. Members of the Tribunal shall be appointed for a specified period.
4. The Tribunal shall give advisory opinions on such matters as the Summit or the 
Council may refer to it.
5. The decisions of the Tribunal shall be final and binding.
ARTICLE 17 
SPECIFIC UNDERTAKINGS
1. Member States shall respect the international character and responsibilities of 
SADC the Executive Secretary and other staff of SADC, and shall not see to 
influence them in the discharge of their functions.
2. In the performance of their duties, the members of the Tribunal, the Executive 
Secretary and the other staff of SADC shall be committed to the international 
character of SADC, and shall not seek or receive instructions from any Member 
States, or from any authority external to SADC. They shall refrain from any 
action incompatible with their positions as international staff responsible only to 
SADC.
CHAPTER SIX 
MEETINGS
ARTICLE 18 
QUORUM
The quorum for all meetings of the Institutions of SADC shall be two-thirds of its 
Members.
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ARTICLE 19
DECISIONS
Except as otherwise provided in this Treaty, decisions of the Institutions of SADC shall
be taken by consensus.
ARTICLE 20 
PROCEDURE
Except as otherwise provided in this Treaty, decisions of the Institutions of SADC shall
determine their own rules of procedure.
CHAPTER SEVEN 
CO-OPERATION 
ARTICLE 21 
AREAS OF CO-OPERATION
1. Member States shall co-operate in all are necessary to foster regional 
development and integration on the basis of balance, equity and mutual benefit.
2. Member States shall, through appropriate institutions of SADC, co-ordinate, 
rationalise and harmonise their overall macro-economic and Sectoral policies 
and strategies, programmes and projects in the areas of co-operation
3. In accordance with the provisions of this Treaty, Member States agree to co­
operate in the areas of:
a) food security, land and agriculture;
b) infrastructure and service;
c) industry, trade, investment and finance;
d) human resources development, science and technology;
e) natural resources and environment;
f) social welfare, information and culture; and
g) politics, diplomacy, international relations, peace and security.
4. Additional areas of co-operation may be decided upon by the Council.
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ARTICLE 22
PROTOCOLS
1. Member States shall conclude such Protocols as may be necessary in each area 
of co-operation, which shall spell out the objectives and scope of, and 
institutional mechanisms for, co-operation and integration.
2. Each Protocol shall be approved by the Summit on the recommendation of the 
Council, and shall thereafter become an integral part of this Treaty.
3. Each Protocol shall be subject to signature and ratification by the parties thereto.
ARTICLE 23 
NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS
1. In pursuance of the objectives of this Treaty, SADC shall seek to involve fully, 
the peoples of the Region and non-governmental organisations in the process of 
regional integration.
2. SADC shall co-operate with, and support the initiatives of the peoples of the 
Region and non-governmental organisations, contributing to the objectives of 
this Treaty in the areas of co-operation in order to foster closer relations among 
the communities, associations and peoples of the Region.
CHAPTER EIGHT
RELATIONS WITH OTHER STATES.
REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS
ARTICLE 24
1. Subject to the provisions of Article 6(1), member States and SADC shall
maintain good working relations and other forms of co-operation, and may enter 
into agreements with other states, regional and international organisations, 
whose objectives are compatible with the objectives of SADC and the 
provisions of this Treaty.
Conferences and other meetings may be held between member States and other 
Governments and organisations associated with the development efforts of 
SADC to review polices and strategies, and evaluate the performance of SADC 
in the implementation of its programmes and projects, identify and agree on 
future plans of co-operation.
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CHAPTER NINE
RESOURCES. FUND AND ASSTS
ARTICLE 25
RESOURCES
1. SADC shall be responsible for the mobilisation of its own and other resources 
required for the implantation of its programmes and projects.
2. SADC shall create such institutions as may be necessary for the effective 
mobilisation and efficient application of resources for regional development.
3. Resources acquired by SADC by way of contributions, loans, grants or gifts, 
shall be the property of SADC.
4. The resources of SADC may be made available to Member States in pursuance 
of the objectives of this Treaty, on terms and conditions mutually agreed 
between SADC and the Member States involved.
5. Resources of SADC shall be utilised in the most efficient and equitable manner.
ARTICLE 26 
FUND
The Fund of SADC shall consist of contributions of Member States, income from SADC
enterprises and receipts from regional and non-regional sources.
ARTICLE 27 
ASSETS
1. Property, both movable and immovable, acquired by or on behalf of SADC shall 
constitute the assets of SADC, irrespective of their location.
2. Property acquired by Member States, under the auspices of SADC, shall belong 
to the Member States concerned, subject to provisions of paragraph 3 of this 
Article, and Articles 25 and 34 of this Treaty.
3. Assets acquired by Member States under the auspices of SADC shall be 
accessible to all Member States on an equitable basis.
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CHAPTER TEN
FINANCIAL PROVISIONS
ARTICLE 28 
THE BUDGET
1. The budget of SADC shall be funded by contributions made by Member States 
and such other sources as may be determined by the Council.
2. Member States shall contribute to the budget of SADC in proportions agreed by 
the Council.
3. The Executive Secretary shall cause to be prepared, estimates of revenue and 
expenditure for the Secretariat and Commissions, and submit them to the 
Council, not less than three months before the beginning of the financial year.
4. The Council shall approve the estimates of revenue and expenditure before the
beginning of the financial year.
5. The financial year of SADC shall be determined by the Council.
ARTICLE 29 
EXTERNAL AUDIT
1. The Council shall appoint external auditors and shall fix their fees and
remuneration at the beginning of each financial year.
2. The Executive Secretary shall cause to be prepared and audited annual
statements of accounts for the Secretariat and Commissions, and submit them to 
the Council for approval.
ARTICLE 30 
FINANCIAL REGULATIONS
The Executive Secretary shall prepare and submit to the Council for approval financial
regulations, standing orders and rules for the management of the affairs of SADC.
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CHAPTER ELEVEN
IMMUNITIES AND PRIVILEGES
ARTICLE 31
1. SADC, its Institutions and staff shall, in the territory of each Member State, 
have such immunities and privileges as are necessary for the proper performance 
of the functions under this Treaty, and which shall be similar to those accorded 
to comparable international organisations.
2. The immunities and privileges conferred by this Article shall be prescribed in a 
Protocol.
CHAPTER TWELVE 
SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES
ARTICLE 32
1. Sanctions may be imposed against any Member State that:
a) persistently fails, without good reason, to fulfil obligations assumed 
under this treaty;
b) implements policies which undermine the principles and objectives of 
SADC; or
c) is in arrears for more than one year in the payment of contributions to
SADC, for reasons other than those caused by natural calamity or
exceptional circumstances that gravely affect its economy, had has not secured
the dispensation of the Summit.
2. The sanctions shall be determined by the Summit on a case-by-case basis.
ARTICLE 34 
WITHDRAWAL
1. A Member State wishing to withdraw from SADC shall serve notice of its 
intention in writing, a year in advance, to the chairman of SADC, who shall 
inform other Member States accordingly.
2. At the expiration of the period of notice, the Member State shall, unless the 
notice is withdrawn cease to be a member of SADC.
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3. During the one year period of notice referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, 
the Member State wishing to withdraw from SADC shall comply with the 
provisions of this Treaty, and shall continue to be bound by its obligations.
4. A Member State which has withdrawn shall not be entitled to claim any property 
or rights until the dissolution of SADC.
5. Assets of SADC in the territory of a member State which has withdrawn, shall 
continue to be the property of SADC and be available for its use.
6. The obligations by Member States under this Treaty shall, to the extent 
necessary to fulfil such obligations, survive the termination of membership by 
any State.
ARTICLE 35 
DISSOLUTION
1. The Summit may decide by a relation supported by three-quarters of all 
members to dissolve SADC or any of its Institutions, and determine the terms 
and conditions of dealing with its liabilities and disposal of its assets.
2. A proposal for the dissolution of SADC may be made to the Council by any 
Member State, for preliminary consideration, provided, however, that such a 
proposal shall not be submitted for the decision of the Summit until all Member 
States have been duly notified of it as a period of twelve months has elapsed 
after the submission to the Council.
CHAPTER FOURTEEN 
AMENDMENT OF THE TREATY
ARTICLE 36
1. An amendment of this Treaty shall be adopted by a decision of three-quarters of 
all the Members of the Summit.
2. A proposal for the amendment of this Treaty may be made to the Executive 
Secretary by any Member State for preliminary consideration by the Council, 
provided, however, that the proposed amendment shall not be submitted to the 
Council for preliminary consideration until all Member States have been duly 
notified of it, and a period of three months has elapsed after such notification.
CHAPTER FIFTEEN
LANGUAGE
ARTICLE 37
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The working language or languages of SADC shall be determined, from time to time, by 
the Council.
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CHAPTER SIXTEEN
SAVING PROVISIONS
ARTICLE 38
A Sectoral Committee, Sector Co-ordinating Unit or any other institution, obligation or 
arrangement of the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference which 
exists immediately before the coming into force of this Treaty, shall to the extent that it 
is not inconsistent with the provisions of this Treaty, continue to subsist, operate or bind 
member States or SADC as if it were established or undertaken under this Treaty, until 
the Council or Summit determines otherwise.
CHAPTER SEVENTEEN
SIGNATURE. RATIFICATION. ENTRY INTO FORCE. ACCESSION
AND DEPOSITARY
ARTICLE 39
SIGNATURE
This Treaty shall be signed by the High Contracting Parties.
ARTICLE 40 
RATIFICATION
This Treaty shall be ratified by the signatory States in accordance with then- 
constitutional procedures.
ARTICLE 41
ENTRY INTO FORCE
This Treaty shall enter into force thirty (30) days after the deposit of the instruments of 
ratification by two thirds of the States listed in the Preamble.
ARTICLE 42 
ACCESSION
This treaty shall remain open for accession by any state subject to Article 8 of this 
Treaty.
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ARTICLE 43
DEPOSITARY
1. The original texts of this Treaty and Protocols and all instruments of ratification 
and accession shall be deposited with the Executive Secretary of SADC, who 
shall transmit certified copies to all Member States.
2. The Executive Secretary shall register this Treaty with the Secretariats of the 
United Nations Organisation and the organisation of African Unity.
CHAPTER EIGHTEEN 
TERMINATION OF THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING
ARTICLE 44
This Treaty replaces the Memorandum of understanding on the Institutions of the 
Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference dated 20th July, 1981.
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF, WE, the Heads of State or Government have signed this 
Treaty.
DONE at Windhoek, on th is day of August, 1982 in two (2) original texts in the
English and Portuguese languages, both texts being equally authentic.
PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA REPUBLIC OF BOTSWANA
KINGDOM OF LESOTHO REPUBLIC OF MALAWI
REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE REPUBLIC OF NAMIBIA
KINGDOM OF SWAZILAND UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA
REPUBLIC OF ZAMBIA REPUBLIC OF ZIMBABWE
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